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The birth of nuclear technology in 1942 opened the door to major 
technological developments and enhancements. After decades of research in the 
field, nuclear technologies currently offer a wide range of valuable applications, 
such as in food and agriculture (e.g., less environmentally-damaging fertilizers; 
genetic variability in plant breeding to develop vegetables and fruits that are more 
resistant to pests and more adaptable to rough weather conditions; food 
preservation techniques); in hydrology (e.g., precise tracing and measurement of 
underground water resources); in transportation (e.g., propulsion systems like 
nuclear-powered ships or space vehicles); in medicine (e.g., accurate medical 
diagnostic procedures; less invasive and more effective medical therapies and 
treatments; cheaper and more effective sterilization of medical products); industry 
and research (e.g., measurement of nature and levels of presence of gases, liquids 
and solids; gauging thickness and density of materials); and of course, in 
electricity generation by means of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs from this point 
on). 
The use of NPPs for electricity generation has led to increasing controversy 
since its beginnings. Nuclear energy is efficient, cleaner than fossil fuels, and 
reliable (i.e., its production does not depend on weather conditions). 447 
power reactors are in operation today (2017) to satisfy our energy demands. 
However, nuclear energy is also the most threatening form of energy production 
for human beings. Thus, to a greater or lesser extent, safety has been, is, and will 
be in the spotlight in the operation of NPPs. 
The XXI century has signified a new era in the field of energy, bringing 
major organizational, technological, and regulatory changes, among others, that 
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further challenge the inherent complexities in the safe operation of NPPs. One 
example is the progressive deregulation of markets, which has increased 
organizational mergers and acquisitions and competition between producers of 
nuclear power. This stiffer competition forces NPPs to employ cost-saving 
strategies, such as reducing qualified operative personnel and outsourcing certain 
functions that were previously operated and controlled inside NPPs (Itoigawa and 
Wilpert, 2005). These measures inevitably contribute to a loss of knowledge and 
competencies within nuclear operations (Itoigawa and Wilpert, 2005). 
In addition, the nuclear industry has typically been operated by engineers 
with a technical background (e.g., physics, chemistry, mechanics, electronics), 
and therefore from an engineering point of view. Thus, the nuclear industry has 
given greater weight to the development of safe nuclear technologies, without 
paying enough attention to the human factor in the safe operation of NPPs 
(Martínez-Córcoles, 2012). 
Despite the secondary role played by the human factor and organizational 
management  (as opposed to technical and engineering concerns) in the nuclear 
industry, human error has been shown to be a primary contributor to the risks and 
reliability of High Reliability Organizations
1
 (hereinafter, HROs): over 80% of 
                                                          
1
Although there is no accepted definition of High Reliability Organizations (HRO), they have been 
distinguished as organizations that achieve reliability and organizations that seek reliability, 
understanding reliability as the low probability of making errors. An example of the first 
conceptualization is presented by Roberts (1990), who considers HROs to be a subset of hazardous 
organizations that has ―enjoyed a record of high safety over long periods of time‖ (p. 160). An 
example of the second, and probably most accepted conceptualization, is found in Rochlin (1993), 
for whom HRO are not characterized by ―their absolute error or accident rate, but by their effective 
management of innately risky technologies through organizational control of both hazard and 
probability‖ (p. 17). Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) propose that HROs share five characteristics: 1) 
they are intrinsically preoccupied with potential errors and sensitive to early signs of failure; 2) 
reluctant to accept simplifications that may improve efficiency but expose to risks; 3) sensitive to 
operations, to the front line, where the real work gets done; 4) committed to resilience, to face 
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accidents in chemical and petro-chemical industries (Kariuki and Lowe, 2007); 
over 75% of marine accidents (Ren, Jenkinson, Wang, Xu and Yang, 2008); over 
70% of aviation accidents (Helmreich, 2000; Hollnagel, 1993); and over 90% of 
accidents in the nuclear industry (Reason, 1990). 
The study of the causes behind accidents in HROs has revealed that the 
existing culture of an organization and how it crystallizes in the behaviors 
displayed by employees and in the way the organization is managed, are 
determinant for the organizational safety outcomes (as seen in following reports: 
Baker, 2007; BEA, 2012; CAIB, 2003; Cullen, 1990; Committee on Lessons 
Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security 
of U.S. Nuclear Plants, 2014; Dawson and Brooks, 1999; Fennell, 1988; HAEA, 
2003; Hidden, 1989; IAEA, 1986; Sheen, 1987). In this context, the concept of 
safety culture has been used in all hazard industries during the past three decades 
as the guiding principle to understand the influence of organizational cultural 
elements on safety and as the cornerstone upon which to build safe HROs. 
However, despite the efforts of researchers and practitioners in all these years, 
safety culture continues to be difficult to understand as a theoretical concept and 
difficult to address in organizational practice.  
If the safety culture of an organization is at the core of its positive and 
negative safety outcomes, optimizing this safety culture becomes essential for 
HROs in general and for NPPs in particular. However, in order to know how to 
optimize a particular safety culture (which aspects need to be reinforced, 
                                                                                                                                                               
failures and to learn from them; 5) and prioritize expertise to face complexities and vulnerabilities. 
Main industries targeting HROs include: nuclear, aviation, space, marine, chemical, gas, 
petrochemical, firefighting, emergency healthcare, and military.  
GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND THESIS STRUCTURE
22 
 
improved, or eliminated), we first need to able to understand, capture, and assess 
that safety culture.   
The main goal of this thesis is to provide an overview of the current ways of 
understanding, dealing with, and assessing safety culture, putting a particular 
emphasis on use of questionnaires in the nuclear industry, and provide guidance to 
researchers and practitioners about how to capture the safety culture of NPPs. For 
this purpose, the current thesis includes the following chapters:   
CHAPTER I - A brief introduction to the nuclear industry is presented. We will 
present some of the most noteworthy pros and cons of nuclear energy and some of 
the most important challenges the nuclear industry has been facing in recent years. 
The last part of the chapter explains how safety has been particularly understood 
and preserved in hazardous industries at different times. 
CHAPTER II - The concept of organizational culture (its origins and definition) 
and the socio-anthropological and organizational psychology approaches to 
organizational culture are described. In this chapter, we also explain that culture is 
composed of different content levels (from deeper to more superficial levels), and 
we describe cultural level classifications proposed by different authors.  
CHAPTER III - We aim to clarify the concept of safety culture. On the one 
hand, we perform an analysis of the content of 40 of the most widely used 
definitions of safety culture and identify the main commonalities of the 
definitions. On the other hand, we address the relationship between safety culture 
and the organizational culture and safety climate constructs.  
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CHAPTER IV - This chapter deals with the assessment of safety culture. It is 
divided into three blocks: in the first place, pros and cons of qualitative and 
quantitative strategies for safety culture assessment are described; secondly, 20 of 
the most relevant safety culture questionnaires are presented, and analyses and 
conclusions from the contents of these dimensions are offered. And lastly, a 
further explanation is provided of questionnaires based on models of 
organizational culture or on models of safety culture, as well as a description of 
the corresponding models.  
CHAPTER V - We present the study goals, samples, and variables used in 
greater detail, and the statistical analyses performed in the three empirical studies 
presented in the next three chapters.  
CHAPTER VI - This chapter contains our first empirical study on safety culture 
assessment. We take the first steps to empirically validate the widely used model 
of safety culture of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 2006a). 
CHAPTER VII - Our second empirical study. Here, we develop a three-
dimensional safety culture model and a safety culture questionnaire (the Safety 
Culture Enactment Questionnaire [SCEQ]), designed to assess the degree to 
which safety is an enacted value in HROs and NPPs. The aim of this study is to 
empirically validate both the questionnaire and the dimensionality of the 
corresponding model. 
CHAPTER VIII - Our third empirical study. By studying the extent to which the 
Safety Culture Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ) and the Organizational Culture 
Inventory (OCI) can predict safety performance in a NPP, we shed light on the 
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usefulness of safety culture and organizational culture assessment tools for the 
nuclear industry. Moreover, we gather further evidence for the validation of both 
questionnaires.  
CHAPTER IX - This chapter offers a general discussion, which includes a 
summary of the results obtained, the main contributions of the thesis, the scope of 
the work presented and future research areas in safety culture.   
CHAPTER X - We finish this thesis with five general conclusions for those 
interested in our work. 
 
INTRODUCCIÓN GENERAL Y ESTRUCTURA DE LA TESIS 
El surgimiento de la energía nuclear en 1942 desencadenó importantes 
cambios y mejoras tecnológicos. Tras décadas de investigación en este ámbito, 
actualmente la tecnología nuclear ofrece una alta variedad de valiosas 
aplicaciones, tales como en alimentación y agricultura (p.e., fertilizantes menos 
dañinos para el medio ambiente; variabilidad genética en el cultivo para 
desarrollar frutas y vegetales más resistentes a las plagas y más adaptativas ante 
duras condiciones climáticas); en hidrología (p.e., trazabilidad y medición precisa 
de los recursos hídricos subterráneos); en el transporte (p.e., sistemas de 
propulsión nuclear en buques o vehículos espaciales); en medicina (p.e., 
procedimientos diagnósticos precisos, terapias y tratamientos médicos menos 
invasivos y más eficaces, esterilización más económica y más eficaz de productos 
médicos); en industria e investigación (p.e., medición de la naturaleza y niveles de 
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presencia de gases, líquidos y sólidos; calibración del espesor y densidad de los 
materiales); y por supuesto, en la generación de electricidad a través de centrales 
nucleares. 
El uso de centrales nucleares para la generación de electricidad ha generado 
una creciente controversia desde sus inicios. La energía nuclear es eficiente, más 
limpia que los combustibles fósiles y fiable (es decir, su producción no depende 
de las condiciones climáticas). 447 reactores operan hoy en día (2017) para 
satisfacer nuestras demandas de energía. Sin embargo, la energía nuclear es 
también la forma más amenazante de producción de energía para los seres 
humanos. Así, en mayor o menor medida, la seguridad ha sido, es, y será el centro 
de atención del funcionamiento de las centrales nucleares. 
El siglo XXI ha significado una nueva era en el campo de la energía, con 
importantes cambios organizacionales, tecnológicos y regulatorios, entre otros, 
que desafían aún más la complejidad inherente a la operación segura de las 
centrales nucleares. Un ejemplo es la desregulación progresiva de los mercados, 
lo que ha aumentado las fusiones y adquisiciones organizacionales y la 
competencia entre los productores de energía nuclear. Esta feroz competencia 
obliga a las centrales nucleares a emplear estrategias de ahorro de costos, tales 
como la reducción de personal operativo cualificado y la subcontratación de 
ciertas funciones que antes se operaban y controlaban dentro de las centrales 
nucleares (Itoigawa y Wilpert, 2005). Estas medidas contribuyen inevitablemente 
a la pérdida progresiva de conocimientos y competencias en operación dentro de 
las centrales (Itoigawa y Wilpert, 2005). 
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Además, la industria nuclear ha sido operada típicamente por ingenieros con 
un bagaje y experiencia técnicos (p.e., física, química, mecánica, electrónica) y, 
por lo tanto, desde el punto de vista de la ingeniería. Así, la industria nuclear ha 
dado más peso al desarrollo de tecnologías nucleares y barreras físicas para operar 
de manera segura, sin prestar la suficiente atención al factor humano en dicha 
operación (Martínez-Córcoles y cols., 2012). 
A pesar del papel secundario desempeñado por el factor humano y la gestión
organizativa (en oposición a la gestión técnica y de ingeniería) en la industria
nuclear, se ha demostrado que el error humano contribuye de manera fehaciente a
los riesgos y a la fiabilidad de las organizaciones2 (de ahora en adelante,
―HROs‖): más del 80% de los accidentes en las industrias química y petroquímica
(Kariuki y Lowe, 2007); más del 75% de los accidentes marítimos (Ren,
Jenkinson, Wang, Xu y Yang, 2008); más del 70% de los accidentes de aviación
(Helmreich, 2000; Hollnagel, 1993); y más del 90% de los accidentes en la
industria nuclear (Reason, 1990) se deben al factor humano.
2Aunque no hay una definición aceptada de las Organizaciones de Alta Fiabilidad (HRO), éstas se
han distinguido como organizaciones que (1) logran una operación fiable y (2) buscan la alta
fiabilidad en sus operaciones, entendiendo la fiabilidad como la baja probabilidad de cometer
errores en la operación pese a la complejidad de los sistemas involucrados. Un ejemplo de la
primera conceptualización es presentado por Roberts (1990), quien considera que los HRO son un
conjunto de organizaciones peligrosas que han "gozado de un registro de alta seguridad durante
largos períodos de tiempo" (p.160). Un ejemplo de la segunda conceptualización, y probablemente
la más aceptada, se encuentra en Rochlin (1993), para quien las HROs no se caracterizan por "su
error absoluto o tasa de accidentes, sino por el manejo efectivo de tecnologías inherentemente
peligrosas mediante el control tanto de los riesgos como de la probabilidad"(p.17). Weick y
Sutcliffe (2007) proponen que las HROs comparten cinco características: 1) están intrínsecamente
preocupadas por errores potenciales y son sensibles a los primeros signos de fallo/error; 2) son
reacias a aceptar simplificaciones que puedan mejorar la eficiencia, pero que al mismo tiempo
puedan exponer la operación a riesgos; 3) son sensibles a las operaciones, especialmente en la
primera línea, donde se realiza el trabajo de base (p.e., mantenimiento de equipos); 4) están
comprometidas con la resiliencia, enfrentando fallos/errores y aprendiendo de ellos; 5) y priorizan
la toma de decisiones por experiencia/especialización para hacer frente a complejidades y
vulnerabilidades surgidas. Las principales industrias consideradas HROs son: nuclear, aviación,
espacial, marina, química, gas, petroquímica, cuerpos de bomberos, asistencia médica de
emergencia, y la industria militar.
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El estudio de las causas de los accidentes en los HROs ha revelado que la 
cultura existente de una organización y cómo ésta cristaliza en los 
comportamientos mostrados por los empleados y en la forma en que se gestiona la 
organización, son determinantes para los resultados organizacionales de seguridad 
(como muestran diferentes estudios e informes tales como: Baker, 2007, CAIB, 
2003, Cullen, 1990. Comité de Lecciones Aprendidas del Accidente Nuclear de 
Fukushima para Mejorar la Seguridad de las Plantas Nucleares en Estados Unidos, 
2014, Dawson y Brooks, 1999, Fennell, 1988, HAEA, 2003, Oculto, 1989, IAEA, 
1986, Sheen, 1987). En este contexto, el concepto de cultura de seguridad se ha 
utilizado en todas las industrias de alta fiabilidad durante las últimas tres décadas 
como principio guía y piedra angular sobre la cual comprender la influencia de los 
elementos culturales organizativos en la seguridad y construir HROs seguras. Sin 
embargo, a pesar de los esfuerzos de investigadores y profesionales en todos estos 
años, la cultura de seguridad sigue siendo un concepto teórico difícil de entender y 
de abordar en la práctica organizativa. 
Si la cultura de seguridad de una organización es el factor más importante que 
explica sus resultados de seguridad positivos y negativos, la optimización de esta 
cultura de seguridad es esencial para las HROs en general y para las centrales 
nucleares en particular. Sin embargo, para saber cómo optimizar una cultura de 
seguridad en particular (cuáles son los aspectos que necesitan ser reforzados, 
mejorados o eliminados), necesitamos primero poder entender y evaluar esa 
cultura de seguridad. 
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El objetivo principal de esta tesis es proporcionar una visión general de las 
formas actuales de entender, tratar, y evaluar la cultura de la seguridad (poniendo 
un énfasis particular en la industria nuclear y en la utilización de cuestionarios), y 
proporcionar orientación a los investigadores y profesionales sobre cómo capturar 
la cultura de seguridad de las centrales nucleares. Para ello, la tesis actual incluye 
los siguientes capítulos: 
CAPÍTULO I - Se presenta una breve introducción a la industria nuclear. 
Asimismo se presentan algunos de los más destacables pros y contras de la 
energía nuclear y algunos de los desafíos más importantes que la industria nuclear 
ha estado enfrentando en los últimos años. La última parte del capítulo explica 
cómo la seguridad ha sido particularmente comprendida y preservada en 
industrias de alta fiabilidad en diferentes momentos de la historia. 
CAPÍTULO II - Se describe el concepto de cultura organizacional (sus orígenes
y definición), así como los enfoques socio-antropológico y de la psicología
organizacional de la cultura organizacional. En este capítulo, también se explica
que la cultura está compuesta por diferentes niveles de contenido (desde niveles
más profundos hasta niveles más superficiales), y se describen distintas
clasificaciones  de  niveles  culturales  propuestos  por  diferentes  autores.
CAPÍTULO III - El objetivo es clarificar el concepto de cultura de seguridad.
Por un lado, se realiza un análisis del contenido de 40 de las definiciones más
ampliamente utilizadas de cultura de seguridad y se identifican los principales
puntos en común de éstas. Por otro lado, se aborda la relación entre los
constructos  de  cultura  de  seguridad, cultura organizacional y clima de seguridad.
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CAPÍTULO IV - Este capítulo trata de la evaluación de la cultura de seguridad. 
Se divide en tres bloques: En primer lugar, se describen los pros y contras de 
estrategias tanto cualitativas como cuantitativas para la evaluación de la cultura de 
seguridad. En segundo lugar, se presentan 20 de los cuestionarios de cultura de 
seguridad más relevantes y se ofrecen análisis y conclusiones de sus contenidos. 
Por último, se ofrece una explicación adicional de cuestionarios basados en 
modelos de cultura organizacional o en modelos de cultura de seguridad, así como 
una descripción de los modelos correspondientes. 
CAPÍTULO V - Se presentan los objetivos del estudio, las muestras y las 
variables utilizadas con mayor detalle, así como los análisis estadísticos realizados 
en los tres estudios empíricos presentados en los próximos tres capítulos. 
CAPÍTULO VI - Este capítulo contiene el primer estudio empírico sobre la 
evaluación de la cultura de seguridad. Se presentan los primeros pasos para 
validar empíricamente el modelo ampliamente utilizado de cultura de seguridad 
de la Agencia Internacional de Energía Atómica (IAEA, 2006a). 
CAPÍTULO VII – Este capítulo contiene el segundo estudio empírico. Aquí 
desarrolla un modelo de cultura de seguridad tridimensional y un cuestionario de 
cultura de seguridad (el SCEQ), diseñado para evaluar el grado en que la 
seguridad es un valor en acción en las HROs y las centrales nucleares. El objetivo 
de este estudio es validar empíricamente tanto el cuestionario como la 
dimensionalidad del modelo correspondiente. 
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CAPÍTULO VIII – Este capítulo contiene el tercer estudio empírico. Se estudia 
hasta qué punto el Cuestionario de Cultura de Seguridad en Acción (SCEQ) y el 
Inventario de Cultura Organizacional (OCI) pueden predecir el desempeño de la 
seguridad en una central nuclear, arrojando luz sobre la utilidad de las 
herramientas de evaluación de la cultura de seguridad y la cultura organizacional 
para la industria nuclear. Además, se reúnen más pruebas para la validación de 
ambos cuestionarios. 
CAPÍTULO IX - Este capítulo ofrece una discusión general, que incluye un 
resumen de los resultados obtenidos, las principales contribuciones de la tesis, el 
alcance del trabajo presentado, y las futuras áreas de investigación en cultura de 
seguridad. 
CAPÍTULO X – Se finaliza esta tesis con cinco conclusiones generales para los 
interesados en nuestro trabajo. 
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To begin this thesis, we present a brief introduction to the current situation of 
the nuclear industry and the important role safety has played in it since its 
conception as a form of energy. In this chapter, we highlight some of the 
undeniable benefits and risks of using nuclear technologies for electricity 
generation. Next, three main challenges that threaten the operation of NPPs in 
recent years (rapid technological changes, changing regulatory policies, and 
increasing aggressive competition) are explained. Finally, five phases of safety 
concerns (technological, human performance, socio-technical, safety culture, and 
inter-organizational) in the nuclear industry are described.  
1.1. Presence, pros and cons of nuclear energy 
As of March 2017, 30 countries worldwide are operating 447 civil nuclear 
power reactors for electricity generation, supplying around 11.5% of the world's 
electricity production. Furthermore, 59 new reactors are under construction in 15 
countries, 164 new reactors are planned (mostly expected to be in operation 
within 8-10 years) and 350 other reactors are proposed (see Table 1, updated 
monthly by the World Nuclear Association, 2017). Moreover, there are currently 
hundreds of other (not civil) nuclear reactors in operation, such as research 
reactors used at universities and other research institutions, reactors used to power 
ships and submarines, and reactors used to make medical isotopes. 
Today, fossil fuels are consumed faster than they are produced. 
Consequently, these resources will soon be reduced, and their price will 
dramatically increase. Fossil fuels are also the largest source of ‗greenhouse gas‘ 
emissions from human activities in a number of countries (e.g., the United States, 
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as reported by the U.S. Government, 2017). On the other hand, renewable 
energies depend on natural aspects, where energy production varies depending on 
the hours of sun or wind, which do not always coincide with the hours with the 
most energy demand. This dependency questions the reliability of solar and wind 
energy to satisfy the World´s energy consumption.  
 
Table1 
           
Facts and figures of World nuclear power reactors in 2017 (World Nuclear Association, 2017) 
COUNTRY 
NUCLEAR 
ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION 
2015 
REACTORS 
OPERABLE 
REACTORS 
UNDER 
CONSTRUCTION 
REACTORS 
PLANNED 
REACTORS 
PROPOSED 
URANIUM 
REQUIRED 
  March 2017 March 2017 March 2017 March 2017 2016 
(Click name for 
Country Profile) 
Billion 
kWh 
% e No. 
MWe 
net 
No. 
MWe 
gross 
No. 
MWe 
gross 
No. 
MWe 
gross 
tonnes U 
Argentina  6.5 4.8 3 1627 1 27 2 1950 2 1300 215 
Armenia  2.6 34.5 1 376 0 0 1 1060     88 
Bangladesh  0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2400 0 0 0 
Belarus  0 0 0 0 2 2388 0 0 2 2400 0 
Belgium  24.8 37.5 7 5943 0 0 0 0 0 0 1015 
Brazil 13.9 2.8 2 1901 1 1405 0 0 4 4000 329 
Bulgaria  14.7 31.3 2 1926 0 0 1 950 0 0 327 
Canada  95.6 16.6 19 13553 0 0 2 1500 3 3800 1630 
Chile  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4400 0 
China  161.2 3.0 36 32637 21 23086 40 45700 139 160000 5338 
CzechRepublic  25.3 32.5 6 3904 0 0 2 2400 1 1200 565 
Egypt  0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2400 2 2400 0 
Finland  22.3 33.7 4 2764 1 1700 1 1200 1 1500 1126 
France  419.0 76.3 58 63130 1 1750 0 0 1 1750 9211 
Germany  86.8 14.1 8 10728 0 0 0 0 0 0 1689 
Hungary  15.0 52.7 4 1889 0 0 2 2400 0 0 356 
India 34.6 3.5 22 6219 5 3300 20 18600 44 51000 997 
Indonesia  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 30 4 4000 0 
Iran 3.2 1.3 1 915 0 0 2 2000 7 6300 178 
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Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1200 0 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan 4.3 0.5 42 39952 2 2756 9 12947 3 4145 680 
Jordan 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2000     0 
Kazakhstan  0 0 0 0 0 0 2 600 2 600 0 
Korea DPR (North) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 950 0 
Korea RO (South) 157.2 31.7 25 23081 3 4200 8 11600 0 0 5013 
Lithuania  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2700 0 
Malaysia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2000 0 
Mexico  11.2 6.8 2 1600 0 0 0 0 2 2000 282 
Netherlands  3.9 3,7 1 485 0 0 0 0 1 1000 102 
Pakistan  4.3 4.4 4 1040 3 2662 0 0 0 0 270 
Poland  0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6000 0 0 0 
Romania  10.7 17.3 2 1310 0 0 2 1440 1 655 179 
Russia  182.8 18.6 35 26865 7 5904 25 27755 23 22800 6264 
Saudi Arabia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 17000 0 
Slovakia  14.1 55.9 4 1816 2 942 0 0 1 1200 917 
Slovenia  5.4 38.0 1 696 0 0 0 0 1 1000 137 
South Africa  11.0 4.7 2 1830 0 0 0 0 8 9600 304 
Spain  54.8 20.3 7 7121 0 0 0 0 0 0 1271 
Sweden  54.5 34.3 9 8849  0 0 0 0 0 0 1471 
Switzerland  22.2 33.5 5 3333 0 0 0 0 3 4000 521 
Thailand  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5000 0 
Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4800 4 4500 0 
Ukraine  82.4 56.5 15 13107 0 0 2 1900 11 12000 2251 
UAE  0 0 0 0 4 5600 0 0 10 14400 0 
UnitedKingdom 63.9 18.9 15 8883 0 0 4 6100 9 11800 1734 
USA 798.0 19.5 99 99535 4 5000 18 8312 24 26000 18161 
Vietnam  0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4800 6 6700 0 
WORLD 2,441 c 11.5 447 391,94 59  63,420 164 170,84 350 395,3 63,404 
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Nuclear energy does not discharge any primary ‗greenhouse gasses‘, such as 
methane and carbon dioxide. The cost of uranium in relation to the energy it can 
produce is very low, and the World‘s present measured resources of uranium are 
expected to last for another 90 years (World Nuclear Association, 2016). 
Furthermore, NPPs can operate in rough weather conditions, producing power 
24/7 and being shut down only for maintenance purposes.  
The benefits of nuclear energy are therefore undeniable (e.g., efficiency, 
availability, easy transportation, lower greenhouse gas emissions, etc.). However, 
the production of nuclear energy also has the greatest potential to destroy people´s 
health and lives when compared to other sources of electricity generation. 
Although the ratio of accidents to active nuclear power reactors in the nuclear 
industry is extremely low, consequences of the release of radioactive 
substances into the environment can be devastating, as in the case of the 
Chernobyl (in 1986) and Fukushima Daiichi (in 2011) disasters, regarded as the 
most lethal accidents in the history of nuclear energy.  
Whether one is a supporter or detractor of the operation of NPPs, the reality is 
that nuclear energy exists and continues to progress as a solution to fulfill energy 
needs in modern societies. And while nuclear energy exists, practitioners and 
researchers from all disciplines (engineers and organizational psychologists, 
among others) must try their best to guarantee the safe operation of every single 
NPP in the world, avoiding future nuclear catastrophes.   
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1.2. Safety challenges in the nuclear industry 
Compared to the stable conditions of past decades, the nuclear industry 
currently faces higher levels of pressure and continuous changes in the conditions 
of industrial risk management. Already in 2001, Rasmussen described three main 
challenges (to guarantee safety of operations) that the increasingly dynamic 
nuclear industry is experiencing. 
1.2.1. Rapid Technological Changes 
Technology is changing and evolving at a frenetic pace in almost all the 
domains of society. Technological innovations, such as the introduction of 
advanced computer-based control and safety systems, challenge the rate of change 
of management structures and legislation (Rasmussen, 2001). The safety of NPPs 
(and their rather slow-changing technologies) can therefore be challenged when 
NPPs try to keep up with the pace of development of other industries (e.g., 
transport, manufacturing, computer, etc.) and implement their innovations. During 
a period of fast change, NPPs must take care of any and every factor that has the 
power to threaten the safety of the plant, such as the communication between 
system designers, constructors, and system operators (Rasmussen, 2001). 
1.2.2. Changing Regulatory Policies 
Organizations such as NPPs are often subject to changing government 
policies in terms of a move from prescriptive legislation toward performance-
based legislation and industrial deregulation (Rasmussen, 2001). NPPs are often 
required to carry out generic functions to maintain the safety of their operations, 
but the details about how these functions should be carried out are left to the 
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NPPs. According to Baram (1996), the new performance rules and reinforcement 
policies result in a number of potential difficulties, such as: uncertainty about how 
to put into practice broadly expressed requirements and rules; or managing rule 
compliance efforts. All these changes in the operation and management of NPPs 
represent a challenge for the safety of NPP operations. 
1.2.3. Aggressive Competition 
Companies today live in an aggressive and competitive environment that
―focuses the incentives of decision-makers on short-term financial criteria rather
than long term criteria concerning welfare, safety, and environmental impact‖
(Rasmussen, 2001, p. 24). HROs are increasingly being privatized, and strategies
to financially outperform competitors are sometimes put into place by decision-
makers and top managers who do not fully understand and consider the actual
hazardous processes found at the production level. In this context, among others,
NPPs must count on decision-makers with broad knowledge about the nuclear
industry (and not only a long-record of financial achievements), about the risks
and challenges inherent to nuclear technologies, and about managing people in
HROs. In addition, the management of incentives and economic rewards for all
NPP members has to be carefully  designed (see López de Castro, Gracia, Tomás
and Peiró [2017, p. 48] for a further discussion of this topic).
1.3. Phases of safety concerns 
Although safety has always been a challenge in the operation of NPPs, it has 
not always been understood and preserved in the same way. Reason (1993) 
distinguished among three overlapping phases of safety concerns, applicable to 
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HROs and to the nuclear industry in particular: the technical phase, the human 
error phase, and the socio-technical phase. Along the lines of Reason‘s proposal, 
Frischknecht (2005) also distinguished among three phases (also highlighted by 
Martínez-Córcoles [2012]): the technology phase, the phase of ergonomics and 
human performance, and the safety culture phase. The first two phases of Reason 
and Frischknecht‘s proposals are equivalent, but not the third one. Moreover, the 
safety culture phase explained by Frischknecht begins later than the socio-
technical phase described by Reason. Next, we integrate these two classifications 
into the following four phases of safety concerns: the technological phase, the 
human performance phase, the socio-technical phase, and the safety culture phase. 
Furthermore, the inter-organizational phase of safety concerns highlighted by 
Wilpert and Fahlbruch (1998) is also described at the end of this section.  
1.3.1. Technological phase 
The first human-made self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction was initiated in 
the Chicago Pile-1 reactor (CP-1) on 2nd December 1942, giving birth to nuclear 
technology. In the first decades of nuclear technology, safety in nuclear 
installations was guaranteed by a continuous optimization of the design and 
materials of technical components. Engineers were responsible for the 
development and implementation of safe and reliable nuclear technologies. Thus, 
technology and technical concepts were the key to maintaining the nuclear 
process at the necessary level of reliability and safety. Employees were trained to 
control this process and intervene in case of technological malfunctions. In the 
technical phase, humans were considered a means to correctly operate technology, 
but they were not seen as part of the system (Frischknecht, 2005). Technologies 
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were intrinsically dangerous, not the workers who operate them. Thus, safety was 
solely guaranteed by creating safe nuclear technologies. 
1.3.2. Human performance phase 
It took some years until it became evident that erroneous human actions and 
behaviors often produce accidents in spite of technically solid and reliable 
machines. The trigger for this shift in thinking was the Three Mile Island accident 
that occurred on the 28th of March 1979 in the Three Mile Island Nuclear 
Generating Station (TMI-2) in Pennsylvania, United States. The partial nuclear 
meltdown in TMI-2 was a shock to the industry, bringing a strong focus on human 
factors, human error, and the need for a better way to manage human reliability. 
As a response to the accident, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
3
 (NRC) 
established programs to minimize human errors in plant designs, procedures, 
operations, and maintenance. It also created a number of organizations responsible 
for addressing human factor issues in operator licensing, procedures, training, 
staffing, and management. The use of full-scope simulators for training reactor 
operators became important from this point on. In this phase, the preferred choice 
for combating human threats was to select capable operators and provide training 
in their competencies (Wilpert and Itoigawa, 2001). Humans were now considered 
part of the system, like components, which either acted correctly or failed 
(Frischknecht, 2005). 
                                                          
3
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was created as an independent agency by 
Congress in 1974 to ensure the safe use of radioactive materials for beneficial civilian purposes 
while protecting people and the environment. The NRC regulates commercial nuclear power 
plants and other uses of nuclear materials, such as in nuclear medicine, through licensing, 
inspection and enforcement of its requirements. 
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1.3.3. Socio-technical phase 
During the 1980s it was recognized that the complex and often poorly 
understood interaction between social (human) and technical features was the 
main cause of large-scale system failures. Reason (1993) acknowledged the 
leading role of this interaction in a number of disasters, e.g., Bhopal, Chernobyl, 
Zeebrugge, King‘s Cross, Piper Alpha, and Clapham Junction. As Reason (1993) 
highlighted, although general systems theory and the notion of socio-technical 
systems were well known for quite some time, decades had to pass until their 
implications for accident prevention and safety were recognized. Technology 
itself or human actions themselves could no longer be understood as being able to 
produce nuclear accidents separately. The socio-technical phase drew attention to 
the development of safety improvement strategies directed at the joint 
optimization of the social and technical subsystems. 
1.3.4. Safety culture phase 
The Chernobyl disaster, which took place on 26th April 1986 during a power-
failure stress test when safety systems were deliberately turned off, triggered a 
shift in safety thinking. Experts from the International Nuclear Safety Advisory 
Group (INSAG
4
) of the International Atomic Energy Agency analyzed the 
catastrophe and came to the conclusion that the occurrences could not be 
attributed only to human error, technology, or even the socio-technical system. 
The identified cause was a set of organizational and management factors, which 
they labeled as safety culture (IAEA, 1986). Safety culture gained strength and 
                                                          
4
The International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG) is a group of experts on nuclear safety 
convened under the auspices of the IAEA with the objective of providing authoritative advice and 
guidance on nuclear safety approaches, policies and principles. 
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popularity quickly and was soon identified as being behind other large-scale 
accidents in the 1980s, like those mentioned above (Section 1.3.3.). In particular, 
the concern for safety culture took off in the 1990s and gained momentum with 
the onset of the XXI century. This growing interest in safety culture is also 
depicted in the presence of the concept in scientific publications (See Figures 1 
and 2). In the safety culture phase, strategies to improve safety take into account 
all the aspects identified so far (technology, individuals, and the interaction 
between the two sub-systems), as well as organizational management and inter-
organizational factors (see the next section for an explanation of Inter-
organizational safety concerns) and their impacts on systems safety (Wilpert, 
2001). From this point on, the development and maintenance of pervasive and 
strong safety cultures became a priority for NPPs.  
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Fig. 1. Number of publications per year that included ‗safety culture‘ in the title, 
appearing in the Web of Science
5
 (WOS) database. 
 
Fig. 2. Number of publications per year that included ‗safety culture‘ in the 
abstract, appearing in the PsycINFO
6
 database.  
                                                          
5
Web of Science (previously known as Web of Knowledge) is a scientific citation indexing service 
that gives access to multiple databases that reference cross-disciplinary research, which allows for 
in-depth exploration of specialized sub-fields within an academic or scientific discipline. 
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1.3.5. Inter-organizational phase 
Wilpert and Fahlbruch added the Inter-organizational phase to the 
classifications of safety concerns. They highlight that the causes behind accidents 
are not always confined to the organization under study itself. Actually, safety 
analyses of major industrial catastrophes have shown that inter-organizational 
dysfunctions also play an active role in accident causation (Wilpert and 
Fahlbruch, 1998). In the inter-organizational concerns, attention is directed at 
nuclear safety-oriented relationships among governments, regulatory agents, 
utilities and plant management, research institutions, manufacturers, consultant 
bodies, and nuclear power plant staff. In order to ensure sustained system safety, 
dysfunctional relationships among these different actors must be looked after and 
corrected, when needed (Wilpert and Itoigawa, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
6
 Produced by the American Psychological Association (APA), PsycINFO is a database of 
abstracts and citations of behavioral and social science research, with special emphasis on the field 
of psychology. 
CHAPTER I
 CHAPTER II. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
  
 
 
 
 
  
This page intentionally left blank
47 
 
This chapter deals with the concept of organizational culture, without which 
safety culture could not be understood. The origins and the most widely used 
definition of organizational culture are briefly presented. Next, two broad 
categories are described, where existing theoretical and empirical approaches to 
organizational culture can be classified, the socio-anthropological and 
organizational psychology approaches to organizational culture. Thirdly, we 
explain that organizational culture has been understood by most researchers as 
being composed of distinct facets that are hierarchically ordered from deeper and 
more intangible levels to more superficial and visible ones. Some of the most 
relevant and influential cultural level classifications are given.  
2.1. Origins and definition 
The concept of culture can be applied to social units of any type that have 
been able to learn and establish a vision of themselves and the surrounding 
environment, that is, those that have their own basic assumptions (Schein, 1985), 
e.g., cultures belonging to Eastern and Western civilizations, specific countries, 
ethnic groups, occupations, families and whole organizations, such as NPPs, or 
groups within their limits. Schein (1992) proposes one of the most accepted and 
widely used definitions of culture:  
―Culture is a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a 
group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, 
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, 
think, and feel in relation to those problems‖ (p. 12). 
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When the group the definition refers to is the organization, then we are 
talking about organizational culture. 
In the 1980´s, the concept of culture started to gain strength in the corporate 
world. One reason may have been the increased alertness to the cultural 
differences in a global economy, such as between the United States and Japan, 
which have a noticeable effect on business practices and management. Since then, 
organizational culture has been a subject of study for a variety of disciplines, 
which have struggled to understand the complex nature and usefulness of this 
omnipresent construct. The different theoretical and empirical approaches used by 
researchers and practitioners from different industries and academic/professional 
backgrounds have contributed to the lack of consensus on the topic, complicating 
research efforts and attempts to build knowledge on previous literature and 
learnings. Nevertheless, the integration of multidisciplinary efforts has also helped 
to  develop a richer conception of the construct.  
Existing approaches to organizational culture can be classified into two broad 
categories: the socio-anthropological and organizational psychology approaches. 
2.2. Approaches to organizational culture 
2.2.1. Socio-anthropological approach 
One famous remark that illustrates the socio-anthropological approach was 
made by Geertz (1973, p. 5): ―Man is an animal suspended in webs of signiﬁcance 
he himself has spun; I take culture to be those webs‖. For him, culture becomes 
―the fabric of meaning in terms of which human beings interpret their experience 
and guide their action‖ (Geertz, 1973, p. 145). This ‗meaning‘ is comparable to 
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Schein´s (1992) ‗basic assumptions‘ or the deepest, underlying and usually 
unconscious level of culture that  determines perceptions,  thought  processes,  
feelings,  and  behavior (a description of the basic assumptions level and other 
cultural levels is given in Section 2.3.). From a socio-anthropological point of 
view, it is hardly possible to observe this level. Whereas an organization‘s culture 
is revealed in its general patterns of attitudes and actions, the deeper structure of 
its culture is not immediately interpretable by outsiders (Wiegmann, Zhang, 
Thaden, Sharma and Gibbons, 2004). 
The socio-anthropological approach considers organizational culture to be 
―more than the sum of its parts‖. It cannot be entirely understood by means of 
traditional analytical methods that breakdown a phenomenon to study its 
individual components, but rather by methods that account for the activity or the 
nature of what is being studied (Creswell, 1998; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
Suchman, 1987; Wiegmann et al., 2004). The anthropological answer to 
‗measurements‘ will usually be ‗thick descriptions‘ (Geertz, 1973, p. 3) and the 
preferential method is often ethnographic ﬁeldwork (Haukelid, 2008). Studying 
organizational culture requires the use of ethnographic approaches, including 
intensive and extensive observations and employee interviews (Schein, 1991).  
Organizational culture is often considered an ‗evolved construct‘, deeply 
rooted in history, collectively held, and sufficiently complex to resist any attempts 
at direct manipulation (Mearns and Flin, 1999). At least when talking about its 
deepest levels, as Haukelid (2008) observes, it may be possible to change the 
manifest levels of culture in a relatively short time, but the more basic levels of 
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culture are hard to change – and even harder to manage. From a socio-
anthropological point of view, culture can hardly be controlled. 
2.2.2. Organizational psychology approach 
One of the major contributions from organizational development is to support 
the evolution of organizations in the right direction, this is, enhance cultural 
elements that are critical to maintaining identity and promote the ‗unlearning‘ of 
cultural elements that are increasingly dysfunctional (Argyris, Putnam and Smith, 
1985; Argyris and Schon, 1978; Beckhard and Harris,1987; Hanna, 1988; Lippitt, 
1982; Schein, 1990; Walton, 1987). In the organizational psychology approach, 
the focus is not only on understanding, but also on benefiting from organizational 
culture. Management consultants and psychologists find this to be the most 
powerful resource for shaping organizations according to their interests and long-
term organizational goals. 
Psychologists, unlike anthropologists, believe in the possibility of measuring 
culture. They rely on observational and analytical methods to a larger extent. 
Cooper (2000) is a good illustration of the organizational psychology perspective. 
As Haukelid (2008) explained, Cooper (2000) wants to create a reciprocal model 
that can be used to measure and analyze safety culture. In this model, culture is 
broken down into sub-components and observable behavior (or what Cooper calls 
the ‗safety culture product‘), which are more easily measured: ―since each of 
these safety culture components can be directly measured in their own right, or in 
combination, it becomes possible to quantify culture in a meaningful way at many 
different organizational levels, which hitherto has been somewhat difficult‖ 
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(Cooper, 2000, p. 121). Therefore, from the organizational psychology approach, 
organizational cultures can be measured and often described with a limited 
number of dimensions. These dimensions are usually sought through 
organization-wide questionnaires with the ultimate goal of description or 
diagnosis and intervention, if required (Guldenmund, 2000). 
2.3. Levels of culture 
In organizational (and safety) culture research, there has been considerable 
interest in understanding the extent to which the components of culture are more 
or less easily observable and measurable. Most researchers agree that 
organizational culture is made up of distinct elements that are hierarchically 
ordered from deeper and more intangible levels to more superficial and visible 
ones. These different levels have been conceptualized in a variety of similar ways 
(Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Detert, Schroeder and Mauriel, 2000; Furnham and 
Gunter, 1993; Hatch, 1993; Hofstede, 1991; Kotter and Heskett, 1992; Lundberg, 
1990; Ott, 1989; Rousseau, 1990; Sanders and Neuijen, 1987, cited in 
Guldenmund, 2000; Schein, 1985; Van Hoewijk, 1988, cited in Guldenmund, 
2000; Van Wart, 1998). Deeper levels are usually comprised of assumptions, 
values, and/or beliefs that guide workers‘ attitudes and behavior because they 
have been taken-for-granted as the path to success within the organizational 
context. Surface levels habitually comprise observable artifacts, such as policies, 
symbols, and myths, considered to be manifestations of the deep-level facets. 
Among these authors, Schein´s (1985) model – comprising artifacts, espoused 
values, and basic assumptions (see Figure 3) – has become the compass in 
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organizational management and change. At the surface of the organization, the 
layer of artifacts can be found. Artifacts are the most tangible and overt 
manifestations of culture, including all the phenomena that can be seen, heard, 
and felt in an organization. According to Schein, artifacts include the physical 
environment of the organization, its language, its technology and products, myths, 
stories, observable rituals, emotional displays, observable behaviors, and, in 
general, any kind of visible product of organizational members. The second 
cultural layer of Schein´s model contains the espoused values, norms, 
philosophies, and organizational rules that reflect what the organization would 
ideally like to be. This level can be expressed in public declarations during 
meetings or ceremonies, written documents describing the organization‘s mission 
and strategy, leaders‘ messages, etc. At the third, least tangible, and deeper level, 
the basic beliefs and assumptions shared by the members of the organization can 
be found. These assumptions, often implicit, are deeply rooted in the history of the 
organization, as they have been shown to be useful for organizational survival and 
development. Therefore, to a greater extent than artifacts and espoused values, 
these underlying assumptions tell the members of an organization how to act, 
perceive, think, and feel about events and things if they are to be successful. Basic 
assumptions tend to be those that are never confronted or debated in the 
organization and, hence, extremely difficult to change. In fact, ―if a basic 
assumption is strongly held in a group, members will find behavior based on any 
other premise inconceivable‖ (Schein, 1985, p. 22).  
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Fig. 3. Schein´s (1985) model of organizational culture 
 
A number of authors have drawn on Schein‘s model to propose their cultural 
level classifications. Schein‘s model was expanded and reconceptualized by Hatch 
(1993), who affirmed that Schein‘s model leaves ―gaps regarding the appreciation 
of organizational culture as symbols and processes‖ (Hatch, 1993, p. 657). 
Hatch‘s model, called ‗cultural dynamics‘, combines Schein‘s theory with 
concepts from symbolic interpretive perspectives, proposing four cultural levels 
(assumptions, values, symbols, and artifacts). His model is aimed to articulate the 
processes of manifestation, realization, symbolization, and interpretation, 
providing a framework within which to discuss the dynamism of organizational 
cultures.  
Kotter and Heskett (1992) proposed a simplified organizational culture 
model, also shaped on the same basis as Schein‘s model, consisting of two levels 
that differ in terms of their visibility and resistance to change. On the one hand, 
―culture refers to values that are shared by the people in a group and that tend to 
Basic Underlying
Assumptions
Espoused
Values
Artifacts
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
54 
 
persist over time even when group membership changes‖. On the other hand, 
―culture represents the behavior patterns or style of an organization that new 
employees are automatically encouraged to follow by their fellow employees‖ 
(Kotter and Heskett, 1992, p. 4). Examples of the level of ‗shared values‘ given by 
the authors are: managers care about customers; executives like long-term debt. 
Examples of the level of ‗group behavior norms‘ given are: employees are quick 
to respond to requests from customers; managers often involve lower-level 
employees in decision-making. Kotter and Heskett note that each of the two levels 
of culture has a natural tendency to influence the other one. 
Ott (1989), in further refining Schein‘s proposal, kept his basic assumptions 
and value levels, but split Schein‘s artifacts level into two different sub-levels. 
Level 1A, also labeled ‗artifacts‘, refers to the technology and art in an 
organizational culture. Level 1B, labeled ‗patterns of behavior‘, contains 
management tasks, visible and audible behavior patterns, and norms.  
Building on the work of Schein and Ott, Van Wart (1998) also distinguished 
four levels of culture, namely ‗basic assumptions‘, the ‗beliefs‘ level, ‗patterns of 
action‘ and the ‗artifacts and actions‘ level.  
As can be observed, a certain degree of agreement exists among 
classifications of culture levels, which provides valuable frameworks to 
understand the composition of organizational culture and where to look for 
information when trying to understand and/or change the direction of an 
organization. However, since its conception, Schein‘s (1985) three-level 
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classification has been the most widespread and influential model in corporate 
culture research. 
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Having clarified the nature and components of organizational culture, this 
third section of the thesis addresses the construct of safety culture.  
First, we describe how the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986 gave rise to safety 
culture. Next, reviews of safety culture and safety climate are mentioned, and the 
contents of 40 of the most widely used definitions of safety culture are analyzed in 
order to identify their main commonalities, that is, what safety culture is for most 
researchers in the field. Additionally, this chapter intends to clarify the 
relationship of safety culture to the constructs of organizational culture and safety 
climate. 
3.1. Origins 
The active role of safety culture in accident causation has long been 
acknowledged in HROs. A long list of major incident and accident reports shows 
that they could have been avoided if higher and stronger safety cultures had been 
present in these organizations. Well-known examples are the reports on the 
nuclear disaster at Chernobyl (IAEA, 1986); the sinking of the Herald of Free 
Enterprise passenger ferry (Sheen, 1987); the fire at King‘s Cross underground 
station (Fennell, 1988); the passenger train crash at Clapham Junction (Hidden, 
1989); the explosion on the Piper-Alpha oil platform (Cullen, 1990); the accident 
at the Esso natural gas plant (Dawson and Brooks, 1999); the disintegration of the 
Columbia space shuttle (CAIB, 2003); the fuel damage at the Paks NPP in 
Hungary (HAEA, 2003); the accident at the BP Texas City reﬁnery (Baker, 2007); 
the crash of the Air France plane from Rio de Janeiro to Paris (BEA, 2012); and 
the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi (Committee on Lessons Learned from 
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the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. 
Nuclear Plants, 2014), to name a few. In light of this ongoing problem, all the 
hazard industries have adopted safety culture as their banner in the effort to 
promote safety in their installations and operations (Wilpert and Schöbel, 2007). 
The concept of safety culture arose in the aftermath of the Chernobyl 
catastrophe. Experts from the INSAG group of the IAEA analyzed the catastrophe 
and came to the conclusion that the occurrences could not be attributed just to 
human error, just to technology, or even just to the socio-technical system. The 
INSAG concluded that the disaster was produced by an interaction between the 
two sub-systems (i.e., socio-technical system), but also by organizational and 
management factors, as already mentioned in Section 1.3.4. This group of rather 
vague nonspecific organizational and management factors is what the IAEA 
baptized back in the 1980s as ‗safety culture‘. The report was published by the 
IAEA (1986) as Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-1. 
3.2. Safety culture and organizational culture 
Most of the existing conceptualizations, definitions, and measures of safety
culture have been derived from ‗organizational culture‘, used throughout the
social and management science (Cox and Flin, 1998), although scholars show
disagreement when linking safety culture to organizational culture. Antonsen
(2009) considers safety culture to be a conceptual label that denotes the
relationship between culture and safety, shifting the focus to the concept of
organizational culture. Díaz-Cabrera, Hernández-Fernaud and Isla-Díaz (2007)
highlight that some assume that safety culture is a type of organizational culture;
CHAPTER III
61 
 
both are related, but safety culture has distinctive peculiarities and its own 
identity. Others suggest that safety culture is an expression or manifestation of a 
speciﬁc organizational culture, which is then crystallized into a safety 
management system (Díaz-Cabrera et al., 2007; Glendon and Stanton, 2000; 
Guldenmund, 2000; Hale, 2000; Wilpert, 2001). However, Sorensen (2002) warns 
that some caution should be taken when ascribing what are commonly understood 
as characteristics of ‗culture‘ to safety culture because the term itself implies that 
it is a subset of a larger ‗organizational culture‘. 
Summarizing, in general terms most scholars refer to safety culture as a 
focused aspect (Richter and Koch, 2004), sub-element (Kennedy and Kirwan, 
1998), sub-facet (Cooper, 2000; Mohamed, 2003) or subset (Clarke, 1999; IAEA, 
1998a; Reiman and Rollenhagen, 2014; Sorensen, 2002) of organizational culture 
that alludes to organizational and/or worker features related to health and safety 
(López de Castro, Gracia, Peiró, Pietrantoni and Hernández, 2013).  
Next a further analysis of the nature and conceptualizations of safety culture 
is provided. 
3.3. Defining safety culture 
Since the conception of the term in 1986, there has been an extensive debate 
on the interpretation of the safety culture concept, which continues until today. A 
number of examples in this regard, addressed throughout this thesis, are: 1) An 
overly broad scope of safety culture that, among other issues, has led the concept 
to cover numerous elements of the organization and its employees, grouped in 
very distinct safety culture dimensions (see definitions of safety culture presented 
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later on in this Section); 2) A significant confusion between the nature of safety 
culture and safety climate (partially inherited from the confusion between 
organizational culture and organizational climate), which, among others, has 
resulted in many authors using both concepts indistinguishably and 
interchangeably (see Section 3.4.); 3) A variety of proposals about how safety 
culture is related to the more general organizational culture construct (see Section 
3.2.), which, among others, does not help us to understand when and for what 
purposes each of the concepts is to be used.   
In light of the lack of clarity surrounding safety culture and the great diversity 
of meanings and connotations attached to it, López de Castro, Gracia, Pietrantoni 
and Peiró (2011) aimed to clarify the concept by analyzing 35 definitions of safety 
culture
7
. Their work is extended in this section of the present thesis with the 
inclusion of 40 definitions of safety culture from the past 30 years; they are 
compiled in Table 2.  
Although many scholars strive for the clarification of safety culture, many 
others avoid the confusion behind the term. It is remarkable that the majority of 
the studies we reviewed avoided the confusion by not giving any definition of the 
construct. This finding agrees with other studies, as in Choudry, Fang and 
Mohamed (2007), where only eight of the 27 studies they selected defined safety 
culture.  
A more skeptical posture on safety culture definitions comes from ‗The 
LearnSafe project‘, which focuses on processes of management of change and 
                                                          
7
 The reader can also find an interesting analysis of 54 definitions of organizational culture, 
identified in the literature between 1960 and 1993, in Verbeke, Volkering and Hessels (1998). 
CHAPTER III
63 
 
organizational learning at NPPs across Europe. Reflections from this project show 
that attempts to define and measure safety culture may be counterproductive 
(Wahlström and Rollenhagen, 2004). A discussion of different interpretations of 
the term can sensitize plant personnel to shortcomings that may have a negative 
influence on safety (Wahlström and Rollenhagen, 2004). Observations have 
shown that most people have a rather clear interpretation of what the concept 
means to them (Hammar, Wahlström and Kettunen, 2000), and a ―more fruitful 
approach may be to use the concept to stimulate discussions on how safety is 
constructed‖ (Wahlström and Rollenhagen, 2004, p. 2).  
Other studies relating management and organization factors to safety of 
operations not only do not define the term safety culture; they do not even use it 
(Sorensen, 2002). 
Table 2 
Definitions of safety culture 
Reference   Definition of Safety culture 
   
Wert (1986)  A good nuclear safety culture  (NSC) is a work environment where a safety 
ethic permeates the organization and peoples‘ behavior focuses on accident 
prevention through critical self-assessment, pro-active identification of 
management and technical problems, and appropriate, timely, and effective 
resolution of the problems before they become crises. 
   
Turner, Pidgeon, 
Blockley, and Toft 
(1989) 
 The set  of  beliefs,  norms,  attitudes,  roles,  and  social  and  technical  
practices that are concerned with minimizing the exposure of employees, 
managers, customers, and members of the public to conditions considered 
dangerous or injurious 
   
Locke and Latham 
(1990) 
 That observable degree of effort with which  all  organizational  members  
direct  their  attention  and  actions  towards improving safety on a daily 
basis. 
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International 
Nuclear Safety 
Advisory Group 
(1991) 
 That assembly  of characteristics and attitudes  in  organizations  and  
individuals  which  establishes  that,  as  an  overriding   priority, nuclear   
plant  safety  issues  receive   the  attention   warranted   by  their 
significance. 
   
Cox and Cox 
(1991)  
 Reflects attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values that employees share in 
relation to safety. 
   
Confederation of 
British Industry 
(CBI, 1991) 
 The ideas and beliefs that all members of the organization share about risk, 
accidents and ill health. 
   
Pidgeon (1991), 
Turner (1991), 
Pidgeon and 
O‘Leary (1994). 
 The set of assumptions, and their associated practices, which permit beliefs 
about danger and safety to be constructed. 
   
Waring (1992)  Those aspects of culture that affect safety. 
   
Ostrom, 
Wilhelmsen, and 
Kaplan (1993) 
 The concept that the organization's beliefs and attitudes, manifested in 
actions, policies, and procedures, affect its safety performance. 
   
Health and Safety 
Commission 
(1993), Lee (1996) 
 The  product  of  individual  and group values,  attitudes,  perceptions, 
competencies,  and patterns  of  behavior  that  determine  the  commitment  
to,  and  the  style and proficiency of, an organization's health and safety 
management. Organizations with a positive safety culture are characterized 
by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the 
importance of safety, and by confidence in the efficacy of preventative 
measures. 
   
Ciavarelli and 
Figlock (1996)  
  
 The shared values, beliefs, assumptions, and norms which may govern 
organizational decision making, as well as individual and group attitudes 
about safety.  
   
Berends (1996)  The collective mental programming towards safety of a group of 
organization members. 
   
CHAPTER III
65 
 
Carroll (1998)     Refers to a high value (priority) placed on worker safety and public 
(nuclear) safety by everyone in every group and at every level of the plant. 
It also refers to expectations that people will act to preserve and enhance 
safety, take personal responsibility for safety, and be rewarded consistent 
with these values.  
   
Helmreich and 
Merritt (1998)  
 Safety culture is a group of individuals guided in their behavior by their 
joint belief in the importance of safety, and their shared understanding that 
every member willingly upholds the group's safety norms and will support 
other members to that common end.  
   
Kennedy and 
Kirwan (1998) 
 The amalgamation of individual and group perceptions, thought processes, 
feelings and behaviors, which in turn gives rise to the particular way of 
doing things in the organization. It is a sub-element of the overall 
organizational culture. 
   
Minerals Council 
of Australia (1999)  
 Refers to the formal safety issues in the company, dealing with perceptions 
of management, supervision, management systems and perceptions of the 
organization.  
   
Eiff (1999)   A safety culture exists within an organization where each individual 
employee, regardless of their position, assumes an active role in error 
prevention and that role is supported by the organization.  
   
Mearns and Flin 
(1999) 
 A more complex and enduring trait (in contrast to safety climate) reflecting 
fundamental values, norms, assumptions, and expectations, which to some 
extent reside in societal culture. 
   
Guldenmund 
(2000) 
 Those aspects of the organizational culture which will impact on attitudes 
and behavior related to increasing or decreasing risk. 
   
Reason (2000)  The ability of individuals or organizations to deal with risks and hazards so 
as to avoid damage or losses and yet still achieve their goals. 
   
Hale (2000)  The attitudes, beliefs and perceptions shared by natural groups as defining 
norms and values, which determine how they act and react in relation to 
risks and risk control systems. 
   
Glendon and 
Stanton (2000) 
 Comprises attitudes, behaviors, norms and values, personal responsibilities 
as well as such HR features as training and development. 
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Cooper (2000)   A sub-facet of organizational culture, which is thought to affect member's 
attitudes and behavior in relation to an organization‘s ongoing health and 
safety performance.  
   
Wiegmann, Zhang, 
Von Thaden, 
Sharma, and 
Mitchell (2002) 
 The  enduring  value  and  priority  placed  on  worker  and  public safety 
by everyone in every group at every level of an organization. It refers to 
the extent to which individuals and groups will commit to personal 
responsibility for  safety,  act  to  preserve,  enhance  and  communicate  
safety  concerns,  strive  to actively  learn,  adapt  and  modify  (both  
individual  and  organizational)  behavior based on lessons learned from 
mistakes, and be rewarded in a manner consistent with these values.  
   
Mohamed (2003)  A sub-facet of organizational culture, which affects workers‘ attitudes and 
behavior in relation to an organization‘s on-going safety performance. 
   
Collins (2003)  Leadership attitude that ensures a hazardous technology is managed 
ethically to ensure that individuals and the environment are not harmed. 
   
Clarke (2003)  Relates to the  core assumptions  and  beliefs  that  organizational  
members hold concerning safety issues; it is expressed through the beliefs, 
values and behavioral norms of its managers, supervisors and workforce, 
and is evident in company safety policy, rules and procedures. 
   
Ciavarelli and 
Crowson (2004) 
 Shared attitudes, values, norms, and beliefs about safety, including 
attitudes about danger, risk, and the proper conduct of hazardous 
operations.  
   
Institute  of  
Nuclear  Power  
Operations (2004) 
 An organization‘s values and behavior – modeled by its leaders and 
internalized by its members – that serve to make nuclear safety the 
overriding priority. 
   
Richter and Koch 
(2004) 
 The shared and learned meanings, experiences and interpretations of work 
and safety – expressed partially symbolically – which guide peoples´ 
actions towards risks, accidents and prevention. Safety culture is shaped by 
people in the structures and social relations within and outside the 
organization. 
   
Fang, Chen, and 
Louisa (2006) 
 A set of prevailing indicators, beliefs and values that the organization owns 
in safety. 
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Jeffcott, Pidgeon, 
Weymann and  
Walls (2006) 
 reflects the attitudes and behaviors that individuals share in considering 
and reacting to hazards and risks. 
   
Choudhry, Fang, 
and Mohamed 
(2007) 
 Construction safety culture could be defined as: the product of individual 
and group behaviors, attitudes, norms and values, perceptions and thoughts 
that determine the commitment to, and style and proficiency of, an 
organization‘s system and how its personnel act and react in terms of the 
company‘s on-going safety performance within construction  site  
environments 
   
Fernández-Muniz, 
Montes-Péon, and 
Vázquez-Ordás 
(2007) 
 A positive safety culture is a  set of  values,  perceptions,  attitudes  and  
patterns  of behavior with regard to safety shared by members of the 
organization; as well as a set of policies, practices and procedures relating 
to the reduction of employees' exposure to  occupational  risks,  
implemented  at  every  level  of  the organization,  and  reflecting  a  high  
level  of  concern  and commitment to the prevention of accidents and 
illnesses. 
   
Faridah, Hashim, 
Ismail and Abdul 
Majid (2009) 
 The product of shared values, beliefs, attitudes, and patterns of behavior 
based on a top-down approach practices that are concerned with 
minimizing the exposure to conditions considered dangerous or injurious to 
the entire group members on a self-regulatory basis. 
   
Ooshaksaraie, 
Majid, Yasir, and 
Yahaya (2009) 
 Refers  to  a  complex  structure  that  includes values  and  attitudes,  most  
of  which  are  potentially changeable and relate to actual accident 
behavior. 
   
Attree and 
Newbold (2009) 
 Refers to a commitment to safety that pervades the entire  organization,  
from  frontline  staff  to  executive management. 
   
EFCOG 
McDonald, 
Worthington, 
Barker and 
Podonsky (2010) 
 An organization‘s values and behaviors, modeled by its leaders and 
internalized by its members, which serve to make safe performance of 
work the overriding priority to protect the public, workers, and the 
environment. 
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Nævestad (2010)  Shared frames of reference that guide individuals‘ in workplace settings 
interpretations of hazards, and that motivate and legitimize preventive 
practices. Frames of reference are a prerequisite of seeing hazards, as they 
allocate attention, sensitize members to signals of danger and provide 
conceptualizations of hazards.  
   
Nuclear Regulatory 
Commision 
Workshop (2010) 
  The core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by 
leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure 
protection of people and the environment. 
 
We believe that the different definitions of safety culture serve as a reference 
point for guiding research efforts within the construct. They help to align 
researchers‘ discoveries in the same directions in order to understand the nature, 
usefulness, and relationships among the relevant terms included in those 
definitions. We agree with Guldenmund (2000) that ―the definition of a 
hypothetical construct sets the stage for ensuing research, i.e., it is the basis for 
hypotheses, research paradigms, and interpretations of the findings. It demarcates 
the boundaries of the concept and focuses the research‖ (p. 227). 
Definitions of safety culture differ considerably from each other. Several 
definitions draw on the more general concept of organizational culture, with the 
scope limited to safety (Cooper, 2000; Guldenmund, 2000; Kennedy and Kirwan, 
1998; Mohamed, 2003). Among other factors, the contents of safety culture, the 
organizational possibilities associated with safety culture, and the way safety 
culture is constructed bring the definitions closer to one of the two perspectives of 
culture mentioned in Section 2.2. Few definitions, such of those by Berends 
(1996) and Richter and Koch (2004), reflect a (more interpretive) socio-
anthropological approach to culture. Whereas the majority of the definitions found 
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(e.g., McDonald, Worthington, Barker and Podonsky, 2010; Ooshaksaraie, Majid, 
Yasir and Yahaya, 2009) follow the (more functionalistic) organizational 
psychology approach more. Some definitions of safety culture place special 
importance on the perceptions of organizational members (e.g., Minerals Council 
of Australia, 1999), and seem to be closer to safety climate than to safety culture 
(an explanation of the safety climate term is provided in Section 3.4.). Some 
definitions are exhaustive (e.g., Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007; Hale, 2000; HSC, 
1993; Lee, 1996) and consider that safety culture is composed of a wide variety of 
components, such as values,  perceptions,  attitudes, patterns  of behavior, 
policies, practices, and procedures; whereas others are rather restrictive in terms 
of safety culture elements (e.g., IAEA, 1991; Locke and Latham, 1990; Reason, 
2000).  
Although there is little consensus on the definition and the implications for 
the concept of safety culture, a number of commonalities can be identified among 
the definitions presented. Table 3 presents the most common elements found in 
the 40 definitions given. Taking these commonalities as a reference, it can be 
argued that experts in safety culture agree to a greater or lesser extent with the 
following 10 points: 
 Safety culture refers to a high value priority given to safety. 
 Safety culture is embedded in organizational members´ assumptions, 
values, beliefs, and norms. 
 Safety culture is manifested in organizational policies, practices, and 
procedures, as well as in members´ attitudes, perceptions and behaviors. 
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 Safety culture must be shared by all members of the organization. 
 Safety culture is stable and enduring. 
 Safety culture requires the responsibility and commitment to safety of all 
organizational members. 
 Leaders play an important role in channeling safety culture. 
 Safety culture determines the safety performance of the organization. 
 Training/learning and reward systems play a crucial role in safety culture. 
 The goal of safety culture is to promote and guarantee safety in the 
organization, thus protecting the workers, public, and environment from 
risks, accidents, and illnesses. 
 
Table 3 
 Most common contents found in definitions of safety culture.  
Behaviors / actions (21) Responsibility (4) 
Shared (17) Assumptions (4) 
Values (17) Practices (4) 
Attitudes (17) Supervising, leadership (4) 
Beliefs (12) Policies (3) 
Norms (9) Procedures (3) 
Safety Priority / importance (7)  Endurance (3) 
Perceptions (7) Safety management (2) 
Commitment (6) Rewarding (2) 
Safety performance (5) Training / learning (2) 
 
Thoughts (2) 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent the number of studies (out of 40) 
in which this theme appears once or more. 
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With all this in mind, we propose a definition of safety culture aimed to 
reflect the agreement reached by researchers during the past 30 years: 
―Safety culture is an enduring and high value priority for safety, embedded in 
the assumptions, values, beliefs, and norms shared by organizational members 
and manifested in the organizational policies, procedures and practices and in the 
members’ attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors at work, that determines 
organizational safety performance and serves to protect the workers, public, and 
environment from risks, accidents, and illnesses.‖ 
One of the most criticized aspects within the study of safety culture, 
highlighted by Cox and Flin (1998), has been the extensive debate about 
definitions and theoretical aspects at the expense of empirical research focused on 
the usefulness of the concept. The reason has been the heterogeneous application 
of the construct, which has led safety culture to be equated with concepts such as 
‗culture of reliability‘ (Sorensen, 2002), ‗safety conscious work environment‘, 
‗safety management‘ (Choudry et al., 2007), and ‗safety climate‘. In the study of 
safety in high-reliability organizations, it is especially important to distinguish and 
integrate safety culture with safety climate, with the latter having received, as Cox 
and Flin (1998) report, a great deal of empirical research without extended debate 
on its definition. 
3.4. Safety culture and safety climate 
Safety culture and safety climate are different, complementary, and 
indispensable concepts for the understanding and improvement of safety 
performance in HROs. Although many scholars acknowledge differences between 
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the two concepts, they have often been presented as indistinguishable and 
interchangeable (Rollenhagen, 2010). This debate about safety culture and safety 
climate is inherited from the classical debate about organizational culture and 
organizational climate (Denison, 1996; Pettigrew, 1990; Schneider, Ehrhart and 
Macey, 2013). The theoretical  and  empirical  development  of  safety  culture  
and  safety climate  have  followed distinct paths. However, safety culture, the 
newer term, has existed for some years as safety climate (Lee, 1998). The trend is 
for safety culture to gain ground at the expense of safety climate, as recognized by 
the IAEA and other authors (Antonsen, 2009; Guldenmund, 2000; Hale, 2000). 
Safety climate studies have been derived from the wider organizational 
climate, which in turn has been approached as global perceptions or as domain-
specific perceptions (Zohar and Hofmann, 2012). The first perspective 
conceptualizes organizational climate as organizational members‘ global shared 
perceptions of key characteristics of the organization, as in the proposal of the 
IAEA (2002a): ―Climate  is  the  characteristic  atmosphere  within  an  
organization  at  a  given  point  in time,  which  is  reflected  in  the  way  its  
members  perceive,  experience,  and  react  to  their surroundings‖ (p. 7). The 
distinction between organizational climate perceptions and other perceptions of 
key organizational characteristics and features is not clear, resulting in too much 
freedom in the inclusion of dimensions of organizational climate and, therefore, a 
noticeable lack of discriminant validity of the concept (Zohar and Hofmann, 
2012). The second perspective recognizes that perceptions for climate are limited 
to specific organizational facets or domains (e.g., climate for safety, innovation or 
service). We agree with Zohar that climate should be ‗for something‘. As 
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Schneider (1990) has acknowledged, organizational climate is made up of shared 
perceptions among employees about the procedures, practices, and kinds of 
behaviors that get rewarded and supported with regard to a specific strategic 
focus. When the strategic focus involves performance of high-reliability 
operations, the resulting shared perceptions define safety climate (Zohar, 2000).  
Safety climate and safety culture have been typically distinguished from a 
time-frame point of view. Safety climate is a manifestation or ‗snapshot‘ of safety 
culture (Flin, Mearns, O´Connor and Bryden, 2000; Mearns, Flin, Fleming and 
Gordon, 1998); it is more transient and less stable. This distinction is stated in a 
number of definitions of safety climate, such as the one previously mentioned 
from the IAEA: ―climate  is  the  characteristic  atmosphere  within  an  
organization  at  a  given  point  in time... ‖ (p. 7), and the one by Byrom and 
Corbridge (1997): ―...the tangible outputs of an organization's health and safety 
culture as perceived...at a particular point in time‖ (p. 3). Lee (1993) points out 
that safety culture, as opposed to the situationally-based safety climate, highlights 
a quintessential feature, which is that ―the social system is independent of the 
people who comprise it, it consists of all that has been acquired and then passed 
on, all that endures‖ (p. 2).  
Most authors also acknowledge differences in content when referring to 
safety climate and safety culture. Safety climate appears to be closer to operations, 
and its content generally includes day-to-day perceptions about the working 
environment, working practices, organizational policies, and management (Yule, 
2003), differing from the stable, shared basic assumptions, beliefs, values, and 
norms (regarding safety at work) typically assigned to the core of (safety) culture. 
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As explained in Section 2.3., most of the models of culture distinguish 
between deep and surface-level cultural layers. Although the essence of culture is 
hidden in the core and deep levels, it manifests itself through the outer layers. 
Schein (1992) states that "climate will be a reflection and manifestation of cultural 
assumptions'' (p. 230). Thus, (safety) climate is typically located in the outer 
layers (Guldenmund, 2000; Schein, 1992) of (safety) culture, facilitating ways 
through which (safety) culture can be partially reached. More precisely, climate 
perceptions focus on the surface-layer attributes of culture (Zohar, 2012).  
Taking all of the above into account, we could arguably state that safety 
climate is the shared perceptions among the employees of an organization (or its 
groups) of the role of safety in the policies, procedures, practices, and other 
artifacts of the organization at a given point in time.   
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Once the reader has been introduced to the concepts of organizational culture 
and safety culture, it is time to address the assessment of safety culture.  
To begin with, the main pros and cons of using qualitative and quantitative 
strategies for safety culture assessment are described, as well as the advantages of 
using a triangulation methodology to reduce the limitations of the single 
application of qualitative and quantitative safety culture assessment tools. Next, 
20 of the most relevant safety culture questionnaires are classified by theoretical 
background, industry, questionnaire factors, statistical analyses performed by its 
authors, and evidence of validity. Conclusions from the analysis of the contents of 
the 180 dimensions of the 20 questionnaires are provided. Finally, the last section 
of this chapter offers a further explanation of (safety culture) questionnaires based 
on models of organizational culture or models of safety culture, as well as a brief 
description of the corresponding models.  
4.1. Qualitative vs. quantitative strategies 
If safety culture has been shown to be a critical factor in the prevention / 
causation of nuclear accidents, the use of adequate methodologies and tools for 
safety culture assessment is fundamental in becoming aware of those 
organizational and management aspects that have to be improved, changed, or 
reinforced in order to guarantee the plant‘s safe operation. 
Unfortunately, there are no standardized or ‗off-the-shelf‘ tools that can be 
used across domains or even within a single domain (Cox and Flin, 1998). Safety 
culture has been assessed by a variety of methods that have traditionally been 
classified as qualitative or quantitative. 
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4.1.1. Qualitative methodologies 
The main and most frequently used qualitative methodologies for (safety) 
culture assessment are employee observations, focus groups, audits, examination 
of archival data, expert ratings, case studies, and, especially, in-depth interviews. 
Qualitative approaches provide vast amounts of unstructured information in the 
form of the participants‘ own words. They allow participants to raise their 
concerns and opinions about organizational and safety issues without restrictions, 
that is, without being limited or confined by researchers‘ prior ideas about what is 
to be found in the targeted organization. Thus, individuals serve as ῾informants᾽ 
(Rousseau, 1990). Qualitative methodologies provide rich and unique information 
from participants because the ῾meaning᾽ emerges without imposition (Reichers 
and Schneider, 1990). They have the greatest potential to provide information 
about the deepest levels of organizational culture, that is, the levels that ultimately 
determine the behavior of employees, which in turn influences the safety of the 
NPP. However, qualitative methodologies do not always guarantee that this 
information is obtained. Moreover, they may elicit relevant information about the 
existing (safety) culture in the organization, but the later integration and 
interpretation of this information can be very complex. As Schein (1992) 
highlights in his qualitative studies, to understand and interpret the culture of an 
organization, the researcher or consultant must have extensive previous 
experience and be able to set aside his/her prejudices and expectations, which is 
difficult in most cases. Or in the words of Tonn (2003), the process of expert fact-
finding is ―biased by the prejudices, interests, stereotypes, and moral codes of the 
investigators‖ (p. 361). Beyond the difficulties inherent in using qualitative 
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methodologies, they are often rejected because of their high costs in terms of time, 
money, and personnel. 
4.1.2. Quantitative methodologies 
The main and most frequently used quantitative methodologies for (safety) 
culture assessment are surveys, highly structured interviews, Q-sorts, and 
especially, questionnaires. With quantitative methods, researchers seek only the 
specific information they consider necessary to address the issue under study. This 
information is usually obtained by means of participants‘ answers to standardized 
sets of stimuli or questions. Thus, individuals serve as ῾respondents᾽ (Rousseau, 
1990). Therefore, quantitative methodologies provide restricted and targeted 
information from participants because meaning is imposed on a set of data rather 
than letting the meaning emerge (Reichers and Schneider, 1990), which makes it 
difficult to capture the idiosyncrasies and particularities of the deepest cultural 
levels of the NPP under study. However quantitative methodologies in the nuclear 
industry, particularly questionnaires, offer clear advantages over qualitative 
methodologies. Among others, they require significantly less time from 
participants, allowing access to many organizational members from all 
hierarchical levels of the NPP; they require a lower budget; and they provide data 
that can easily be coded, analyzed, and benchmarked among NPPs. As a result, 
questionnaires allow the safety culture of NPPs to be assessed more frequently 
and systematically than in-depth interviews and other qualitative methodologies. 
Frequent monitoring in NPPs is extremely important for the early detection of 
declining and weakening safety cultures (IAEA, 2006a, López de Castro et al., 
2017), allowing time to take remedial action before minimum acceptable safety 
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levels are challenged (IAEA, 2003).  Systematic monitoring through the 
comparison of quantified results at different times makes it possible to detect 
trends (Hale, 2009; Håvold, 2005; IAEA, 2003) and evaluate the evolution of 
safety culture. For these reasons, in spite of the merits of qualitative methods, a 
questionnaire on safety culture is a valuable resource for the nuclear industry 
(López de Castro et al., 2017). 
4.1.3. Triangulation 
To reduce the shortcomings from the single application of qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies and to obtain the best results when assessing safety 
culture, a triangulation methodology is most likely to be required (Glendon and 
Stanton, 2000; IAEA, 2002b; Schöbel, Klostermann, Lassalle, Beck and Manzey, 
2017). However, it is often not possible to use this approach in HROs. If the 
appropriate measurement instruments are employed, ―triangulation allows 
researchers to take a multifaceted view of safety culture, so that the reciprocal 
relationships between psychological, behavioral and situational factors can be 
examined with a view to establish antecedents, behavior(s) and consequence(s) 
within specific contexts‖ (Cooper, 2000, p. 120). A triangulation methodology, 
including interviews, surveys, audits, document analysis, etc., also allows for 
multilevel analyses of safety culture (Choudry et al., 2007).  
Two examples of triangulation in safety culture assessment in the nuclear 
industry can be found in the IAEA (2008) and in Schöbel et al. (2017). The IAEA 
developed a triangulation methodology called SCART (Safety Culture 
Assessment Review Team), including interviews, observations, and 
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documentation reviews, based on the IAEA five-dimensional safety culture 
model, which will be explained in Section 4.3.7. Most recently, Schöbel et al. 
(2017) developed a triangulation methodology that included observations, 
questionnaires, interviews, and group workshops, which will briefly be described 
in Section 4.3.8. 
4.2. Safety culture dimensions and questionnaires 
There are many questionnaires currently available that can be used to gather 
information about the safety culture of HROs. They claim to assess the construct 
of safety culture or other aspects related to safety culture, such as safety 
management systems, safety performance indicators, and particularly, safety 
climate.  
Because safety climate is viewed as a ‗snapshot‘ of workforce perceptions of 
safety (Mearns, Flin, Gordon and Fleming, 2001) that may reflect the current-state 
of the underlying safety culture (Mearns et al., 2001; Mearns, Whitaker and Flin, 
2003), many authors rely on climate studies to capture the state of HROs‘ safety 
cultures. However, caution must be used when ascribing the results of safety 
climate assessments to the stable cultural elements of an organization (González-
Romá and Peiró, 2014) because climate perceptions provide ‗here and now‘ 
information, which, as Mengolini and Debarberis (2007) indicate, is influenced by 
external and temporary circumstances. 
Some authors, such as Flin et al. (2000), Guldenmund (2000), and Yule 
(2003), have made an effort to compile questionnaires for safety culture 
assessment, the majority of which measure safety climate perceptions. These 
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reviews clearly support the multidimensionality of safety culture and safety 
climate; however, they find little consensus among studies about the number and 
labeling of their dimensions. Inconsistencies can be observed in the labeling of 
dimensions, even when authors refer to the same contents and sub-contents of 
these constructs. Despite this confusion, these reviews help to identify some of the 
most common themes assessed in safety (mainly climate) questionnaires. Flin et 
al. (2000) highlight five common contents in the following order: 
management/supervision, safety system, risk, work pressure, and competence. On 
the other hand, Flin et al. (2000) also identify the most frequently measured 
dimensions in Guldenmund´s (2000) work, namely: management, risk, safety 
arrangements, procedures, training, and work pressure (in that order). A number 
of questionnaires are included in both Guldenmund‘s and Flin et al.‘s reviews. 
The work by Clarke (2006) presents a comprehensive source of climate 
questionnaires; however, it does not present the dimensions in each survey. 
We have also included a review of questionnaires for HROs (summarized in 
Table 4). However, as the main focus of this thesis is safety culture, the present 
review only includes questionnaires that have been presented by their authors as 
‗safety culture questionnaires‘, or questionnaires whose dimensions are presented 
as dimensions, factors, or contents of safety culture. 
As part of our work, we calculated the frequency with which different safety 
culture contents have been identified in these studies. To do so, we took into 
account each of the 180 dimensions of the 20 questionnaires reviewed. We found 
eight double-barreled dimensions. In these cases, dimensions were assigned to 
two different contents (e.g., ‗safety training and competence‘ was classified under 
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‗training‘ and ‗competence‘, or ‗safety attitude and behavior‘ was classified under 
‗behaviors‘ and ‗attitudes‘).  
The five most common dimensions mentioned in the studies in our review are 
in this order: management, training, communication, risk, and support (see Table 
5). The ‗Management‘ dimension refers to perceptions about management and 
supervisors‘ attitudes and behaviors towards safety, as well as the extent to which 
leadership styles promote safety at work. ‗Training‘ addresses the efforts to 
maintain a qualified, skilled, and knowledgeable workforce through training in 
technical, management, and safety issues. ‗Communication‘ refers to formal 
communication among different hierarchical levels about issues related to safety 
(e.g., safety aims, safety rules, and procedures), as well as the extent to which 
safety pervades informal discussions. ‗Risk‘ dimensions capture the perception 
and awareness of risks, the management of risks at the worksite, and the extent to 
which employees take risks to get the work done. ‗Support‘ refers to the degree of 
social support among colleagues, regardless of the hierarchical level (including 
the support of safety personnel), and the existence of an environment that supports 
high-quality and safe work. 
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Table 4       
Safety culture questionnaires 
Reference 
Background (supported or not by 
theoretical frameworks) Items 
Industry and 
Sample 
Analysis to 
determine 
questionnaire 
factors 
Questionnairefactors = culture 
dimensions Evidence of validity 
 
Ostrom, 
Wilhelms
en and 
Kaplan 
(1993) 
 
Items developed from interviews and 
analyses of managers‘ safety statements. 
The authors sorted the items into 13 
categories identified from a review of 
literature. 
 
88 
 
US. 4000 
respondents 
from 5 
departments of 
a Nuclear 
energy  
laboratory 
 
Not applied. 
Dimensions 
identified from 
literature = 
questionnaire 
dimensions 
 
13: Safety awareness; teamwork; 
pride and commitment; excellence; 
honesty; communications; leadership 
and supervision; innovation; 
training; customer relations; 
compliance; safety effectiveness; 
facilities. 
 
Examples were given of few 
descriptive analyses: one 
department had a higher number of 
accidents and lower scores on a 
number of items than the other 
departments. 
Carroll 
(1998) 
Some items were taken from a prior 
research questionnaire, some from a 
safety culture questionnaire used by other 
consultants at the plant, and some were 
written by the team for this project. No 
dimensions specified a priori. 
47 US. 115 (88%) 
respondents 
from a NPP 
Not applied 5: Management support;  
openness; knowledge;  
work practices; attitudes. 
Apparent differences between 
groups (hierarchical level, 
department) on various items were 
found, but analyses were not 
conducted beyond descriptives. 
Lee 
(1998) 
Focus groups were held to elicit safety-
relevant beliefs, attitudes and values, and 
the material was incorporated into a 172-
item questionnaire. The authors grouped 
the items into 9 different domains: safety 
procedures; risks: job satisfaction; safety 
rules; participation; training; control; 
design of plant. 
172 UK. 5296 
(80%) 
respondents 
from a nuclear 
reprocessing 
plant 
Principal 
Component 
Analysis (PCA) 
were computed 
separately  for 
each of 9 the 
domains 
19: Confidence in safety procedures; 
personal caution over risks; 
perceived level of risk at work; trust 
in workforce; confidence in 
efficiency of PTW system; general 
support for PTW system; perceived 
need for PTW system; personal 
interest in job; contentment with job; 
satisfaction with work relationships; 
satisfaction with rewards for good 
work; personal understanding  of 
safety rules; perceived clarity of 
Factor scores were validated 
against reported number of lost-
time accidents and most  
discriminated at high levels of 
significance. 
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safety rules; satisfaction with 
training; satisfaction with staff 
suitability; perceived source of 
safety suggestions; perceived source 
of safety actions; perceived personal  
control  over safety; satisfaction with 
design of plant. 
Grote and 
Künzler 
(2000) 
A socio-technical model of safety culture 
was used as a framework for the 
development of the questionnaire. The 
items were constructed on the basis of 
broad definitions of three content areas: 
operational safety; safety and design 
strategies; personal job needs. 
57 UK and US. 
1201 
respondents 
from 6 globally 
operating 
petrochemical 
corporations 
PCA for each of 
the 3 content 
areas 
7: Operational safety (enacted 
safety; formal safety; technical 
safety); safety and design strategies; 
personal job needs (quality of job; 
general training; safety). 
Differences in scores in the three 
sections of the questionnaire 
between test sites as well as 
between different groups of 
employees within sites were found. 
Expert evaluations of safety 
management based on interviews 
and plant visits as a criterion for 
testing concurrent validity were 
used. 
Lee and 
Harrison 
(2000) 
Focus groups were held to elicit safety-
relevant beliefs, attitudes and values, and 
the material was incorporated into a 120-
item questionnaire. The authors relied on 
their judgment and the content of the 
focus group discussions to allocate the 
items to 8 domains relevant to safety 
performance: confidence in safety; 
contractors; job satisfaction; participation; 
risk; safety rules; stress; training. 
120 UK. 683 
(53.7%) 
respondents 
from 3 NPPs 
PCA for each of 
the 8 domains 
28: confidence in control measures; 
confidence anticipation/response; 
confidence in reorganization; 
confidence in safety standards; 
company support contractors; 
satisfaction with contractors' safety; 
respect for contractors' role; 
contentment with job; satisfaction 
with job relationships; interest in the 
job; trust in colleagues; perceived 
empowerment; management‘s 
concern for safety; general morale; 
organizational risk level; personal 
risk taking; risks of multi-skilling; 
risk vs. productivity; complexity of 
instructions; hazard 
24 factors were correlated with one 
or more of nine criteria for 
accident history. Differences in 
summary scores (single scores for 
each respondent which aggregated 
the score on each of the 28 factors) 
between and within stations 
(gender, age, shifts/days and work 
areas) were found. Correlations 
were found between several factors 
and three organizational variables. 
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identification/response; response to 
alarms; emergency procedures; 
personal stress; job insecurity; 
management's concern health; 
quality training induction; 
effectiveness of staff selection; 
general quality of training. 
 
Harvey, 
Erdos, 
Bolam, 
Cox, 
Kennedy 
and 
Gregory 
(2002) 
 
Items covering 8 contents of safety 
culture identified in the literature 
(perception of others‘ attitudes to safety; 
perceived trust in management in relation 
to safety; job interest and satisfaction; 
perceived judgement of and attitudes to 
risk; perceived responsibility for and 
involvement in safety issues; upward and 
downward communication with respect to 
safety; attitudes to conventional and 
radiological safety; perceived changes in 
work and safety attitudes over the past 
years) were constructed by the authors. 
 
60 
 
UK. 1003 
(64.7%) 
respondents 
from two 
nuclear 
reprocessing 
plants 
 
PCA of the entire 
data set. 
Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis 
(CFA) 
 
6: Management style and 
communication; responsibility and 
commitment; risk-taking; job 
satisfaction; complacency; risk 
awareness. 
 
Differences in item scores between 
and within plants (hierarchical 
groups) were found. Although not 
intended and not stated in the 
study, factor analysis partially 
supported the contents of safety 
culture chosen from the literature. 
Håvold 
(2005) 
Based on review of literature. 19 items 
selected from existing safety 
questionnaires and 21 new items. No 
dimensions specified a priori. 
From 
40 to 
22 
Norway. 349 
(60%) 
respondents 
from a large 
Norwegian 
shipping 
company 
PCA of the entire 
data set 
4: Employee and management‘s 
attitude to safety and quality; 
knowledge; attitudes to safety 
rules/instructions; quality and safety 
experience. 
Correlations were found between 
factor scores and three ‗level of 
safety‘ measures. Some differences 
in factor scores between groups 
(nations, occupation, and vessels) 
were found. 
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Gibbons, 
von 
Thaden 
and 
Wiegman
n (2006) 
The authors identified items from 
literature on organizational culture that 
could cover the five factors of safety 
culture (organizational commitment; 
management involvement; employee 
empowerment; reporting systems; 
accountability systems) identified by 
Wiegmann et al. (2004). 
From 
84 to 
55 
US. 503 (29%) 
pilots of a large 
airline 
CFA and 
Exploratory 
Factor Analysis 
(EFA) for the 
entire data set 
and for 
individual 
dimensions 
4 main factors and 12 sub-factors: 
formal safety program (reporting 
system; response and feedback; 
safety personnel); informal aspects 
of safety (accountability; pilots‘ 
authority; professionalism); 
operations personnel (chief pilots; 
dispatch; instructors/trainers); 
organizational commitment (safety 
values; safety fundamentals; going 
beyond compliance). 
A pilot study and the opinions of 
SMEs served to refine the 
questionnaire and establish face 
and content validity. The 5-factor 
structure proposed could not be 
replicated. A new structure for 
safety culture was proposed, 
although it did not yield a good fit 
to the data. 
Baker 
(2007) 
Questionnaire developed on the expertise 
of SME. 
65 US. 7451 
(72%) 
respondents 
from 5 oil 
refinery plants 
of the same 
company 
Not specified 6: process safety reporting; safety 
values/commitment to process 
safety; supervisory involvement and 
support; procedures and equipment; 
worker 
professionalism/empowerment; 
process safety training. 
Consistent and wide divergence in 
most of the items among plants. 
Díaz-
Cabrera, 
Hernánde
z-Fernaud 
and Isla-
Díaz 
(2007) 
7 components of safety culture (incident 
and accident reporting systems; 
orientation of safety rules and procedures; 
performance appraisal and safety 
promotion strategies; motivation patterns 
used; information and communication 
systems: and leadership styles) were 
identified from literature review. Items 
related to the four cultural orientations 
proposed by the competing values 
framework (Cameron and Quinn, 1999) 
were developed for each of the 
dimensions. 
44 299 
respondents 
from 5 
companies in 
different 
sectors: gas, 
petrol, aviation, 
transport and 
brewery 
PCA of the entire 
data set 
6: company values; leadership 
styles; motivation patterns; training 
programmes; downward 
communication; usage of accident 
and incident information. 
Cluster analyses and discriminant 
function analysis could not support 
the simultaneous presence of the 4 
cultural orientations proposed by 
the Competing Values Framework, 
but results suggested that different 
safety cultural orientations can 
coexist in a single organization. 
Different safety culture profiles in 
companies operating in different 
sectors (gas companies, petrol 
reﬁneries, aviation companies, 
transport companies and 
breweries) were found. 
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Ek, 
Akselsson, 
Arvidsson 
and 
Johansson 
(2007) 
9 aspects of safety culture were identified 
in the literature. Items were developed for 
each of the aspects. 
95 Sweden. 391 
(61.6%) 
respondents 
from one 
administrative 
and two 
operative units 
in an air traffic 
control setting 
Not applied. 
Dimensions 
identified from 
literature = 
questionnaire 
dimensions 
9: working situation; 
communication; learning; reporting; 
justness; flexibility; attitudes 
towards safety; safety-related 
behaviors; risk perception. 
Leaders evaluated the items for 
relevance and appropriateness. 
Pilot study was conducted. 
Differences in factor scores were 
found between managers and non-
managers. Correlations between all 
cultural aspects were found, as 
well as between each of the 
cultural aspects and 10 
organizational climate dimensions. 
Gordon, 
Kirwan 
and Perrin 
(2007) 
21 items from literature review were 
chosen and grouped into four safety 
culture dimensions. Items should provide 
info on the stage of maturity of an 
organizations´ safety culture. 
21 France. 36 
(90%) 
respondents 
from an air 
traffic 
management 
research center 
Not applied. 
Dimensions 
identified from 
literature = 
questionnaire 
dimensions 
4: Management demonstration; 
planning and organizing for safety; 
communication, trust and 
responsibility; measuring, auditing 
and reviewing. 
Compared in terms of various 
validity criteria against a safety 
management survey in order to 
investigate how both 
questionnaires can be used 
together to assess safety culture. 
Kao, 
Chung, 
Lai and 
Chuang 
(2007) 
Based on review of literature and related 
measures of safety culture, the authors 
proposed a number of dimensions of 
safety culture, which can be grouped 
under each of the 3 dimensions of the 
IAEA (1991) model of safety culture: 
policy level commitment, managers‘ 
commitment, and individuals‘ 
commitment. 
73 Taiwan. 466 
(77.2%) 
respondents 
from 5 sister 
plants within a 
petrochemical 
company 
CFA for 
individual 
dimensions. 
Structural 
equation 
modeling (SEM) 
8: organization‘s commitment 
(safety management system and 
organization; accident and 
emergency), managers‘ commitment 
(safety supervision and audit; safety 
commitment and support; rewards 
and punishment and benefits), and 
individuals‘ commitment (safety 
training and competence; safety 
attitude and behavior; safety 
communication and involvement). 
The 3-factor structure proposed 
provided an acceptable fit. Factor 
scores were validated against two 
safety performance variables: 
safety satisfaction and work risk. 
89 
 
Mohamed 
and  
Chinda 
(2008) 
Items from previous studies were 
identified to cover each of the five 
‗enablers‘ (leadership; people; policy and 
strategy; partnerships and resources; 
processes) of the EFQM model, as well as 
an overall dimension, labeled ‗goals‘, 
which combined the four ‗results‘ from 
the  EFQM. 
From 
34 to 
24 
Thailand. 115 
(53.6%) 
respondents 
from over 100 
construction 
organizations 
EFA for the 
entire data set. 
SEM 
5: leadership; people; policy and 
strategy; partnerships and resources; 
processes. 
The proposed factor structure was 
supported. Interactions and causal 
relationships were found between 
both the 5 enablers and the goals 
factor, and among the enablers 
themselves. 
Antonsen 
(2009) 
Not specified 20 Norway. 415 
(82.5%) 
respondents 
from an oil and 
gas platform 
Not specified 5: managers‘ prioritization  of 
safety; safety communication; 
individual risk assessment; 
supportive environment; safety rules 
and procedures. 
High divergence between the 
safety culture questionnaire results 
and two post-incident descriptions. 
Differences in four items between 
the platform under study and three 
other installations. 
Mearns, 
Kirwan 
and 
Kennedy 
(2009) 
Based on literature review and interviews 
with SMEs, items belonging to 13 
constituents of safety culture 
(commitment to safety; resources for 
safety; responsibility for safety; involving 
air traffic controllers in safety; 
management involvement in safety; 
teaming for safety; reporting 
incidents/communicating problems; 
learning from incidents; blame & error 
tolerance/discipline and punishment;  
communication about procedural/system 
changes; trust within the organization; 
real working practices; and regulatory 
effectiveness) were identified. 
From 
80 to 
59 
Europe. 4 
different 
samples from 4 
different air 
navigation 
service 
providers 
(ANSP). 
Response rate 
over 30% in 3 
of the 4 ANSPs 
EFA for the 
entire data set in 
two samples. 
CFA in one 
sample 
3 dimensions extracted from the 
CFA: prioritization; involvement; 
trust. 
Face and content validity by a 
group of European ANSP safety 
managers. EFA and CFA could not 
replicate the proposed factor 
structure. One EFA provided a 
unifactorial solution; another EFA 
resulted in an 8-factor model, but 
the items that grouped together did 
not reflect a single specific factor. 
CFA showed a good fit for a 3-
factor structure which represented 
3 main emerging themes from the 
safety culture literature. 
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Filho, 
Andrade 
and 
Marinho 
(2010) 
5 common dimensions of safety culture 
identified from literature review. Items for 
each of these dimensions were developed 
to identify Hudson‘s (2001) stages of 
maturity of an organization‘s safety 
culture. 
102 Brazil. 23 
(100%) safety 
managers from 
23 
petrochemical 
companies 
Not applied. 
Dimensions 
identified from 
literature = 
questionnaire 
dimensions 
5: Information; organization 
learning; involvement; 
communication; commitment. 
High correlations between 
questionnaire scores and interview 
scores were found for each of the 5 
dimensions. The 23 companies 
presented characteristics of 
different levels of safety culture 
maturity. 
Wang and 
Liu (2012) 
On the basis of literature review, items 
covering 18 dimensions of safety culture 
grouped in 4 categories (environment; 
organization; personal; psychology) were 
proposed. 
96 Taiwan. 229 
(88.1%) 
respondents 
from four 
railway 
companies 
PCA with 
summary scores 
of the 18 safety 
culture 
dimensions 
18 dimensions of culture were 
grouped in two categories: 
Organization and environment 
(management of change; risk 
management; performance 
measurement; procurement  
management; safety system; safety 
commitment; safety training; safety 
leadership; safety communication; 
safety encouragement and  
punishment; safety rule;  contractor 
management; safety environment); 
psychology and person (safety 
knowledge; worker participation; 
safe behavior; safety awareness and 
attitude; health activities) 
Face and content validity 
established by focus groups with 
the railway management and on-
site employees, and reviews by 5 
SMEs. Differences among 
positions were found in the 4 
dimensions of safety culture 
initially proposed. Factor analyses 
did not support the proposed factor 
structure. 
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Frazier 
(2013) 
SME on safety culture identified 4 safety 
culture dimensions (management concern 
for safety; peer support for  safety; 
personal responsibility for safety; safety 
management systems) from the literature, 
and 92 items to cover them. 
92 25574 
respondents 
from 5 
multinational 
organizations 
in five different 
industries ( 
mining, 
chemical, 
healthcare, 
steel, 
agricultural) 
EFA of the entire 
data set. CFA 
4 first order and 12 second order 
factors: management concern for 
safety (supervisor concern; senior 
management concern; management 
work pressure); personal 
responsibility for safety (risk taking; 
supervisor/management blame; 
incident reporting behavior); peer 
support safety (caution others; 
respectful feedback); safety 
management systems 
(communication; training and rules; 
discipline and investigation; 
reward/recognition). 
The data showed a good fit to the 4 
safety culture dimensions 
identified from the literature. 
López de 
Castro, 
Gracia, 
Peiró, 
Pietranton
i and 
Hernánde
z (2013) 
37 attributes clustered into 5 dimensions 
based on research findings, lessons 
learned about the root causes of 
organizational failures in safety 
management and safety culture, and the 
international collaboration of safety 
experts under the auspices of the IAEA. 
37 Spain. 3 
independent 
samples: 468 
workers of a 
Spanish NPP 
(65.13%), 48 
experts in 
organizational 
behavior (74%) 
and 290 
students 
(100%). 
Judgments. EFA 
and PCA of the 
entire data set. 
CFA 
5: safety is a clearly recognized 
value; leadership for safety is clear; 
accountability for safety is clear; 
safety is integrated into all activities; 
safety is learning driven 
The study suggests that several 
attributes may not be related to 
their corresponding dimensions. 
According to results, a one-
dimensional structure fits the data 
better than the five dimensions 
proposed by the IAEA. The IAEA 
proposal, as it stands, seems to 
have rather moderate content 
validity and low face validity. 
Note: In Antonsen (2009) and Frazier (2013), the authors of the study are not the same as the authors of the questionnaire. 
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Table 5 
 Most common assessed contents in safety culture questionnaires  
Management / Leadership / Supervision (14) Involvement (4) 
Training / Learning (12) Measures, Audit (4) 
Communication (10) Rules (4) 
Risk (7) Competence / Knowledge / Experience (4) 
Support (7)  Responsibility (4) 
Commitment (6) Values (4) 
Proactivity (6) Empowerment (3) 
Resources (5) Behaviors (3) 
Attitudes (5) Personnel suitability (3) 
Technology / Design (4) Compliance (3) 
Reporting (4) Relations (3) 
Trust (4) Professionalism (2) 
Job (4) Safety values (2) 
Rewards (4) Contractors (2) 
Procedures (4) Emergency (2) 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent the number of studies (out of 20) in which the 
corresponding theme appears once or more. 
 
 
Comparing our review with those by Guldemund and Flin et al., we notice 
that ‗management‘, ‗training‘ and ‗risk‘ are also among the five most common 
dimensions included in their reviews. However, ‗communication‘ and ‗support‘ 
were not highlighted as common themes in the Flin et al. and Guldenmund 
reviews. On the other hand, while their reviews highlight the safety management 
system (SMS) (‗safety system‘ in Flin [2000] and ‗safety arrangements‘ in 
Guldenmund [2000]) as a single and frequent dimension, our review does not. To 
us, SMS is too broad a concept to be considered as a single safety culture 
dimension. Moreover, there is still much debate about what the components of a 
good SMS are (e.g., safety policy, incentives for employee participation, training, 
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communication, planning and control [Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007]; safety 
officials, safety committees, permit to work systems, safety policies, and safety 
equipment [Flin, 2000]; policies, strategies, and procedures [Kirwan, 1998]). For 
these reasons, we have not grouped together the different contents that may 
belong to SMS. Furthermore, in our review we have separated ‗training‘ from 
‗competence‘ and ‗knowledge‘, as the latter two do not necessarily have to be a 
consequence of training. Flin et al. (2000), however, include these three 
dimensions under the theme of ‗competence‘. Finally, it is interesting that while 
‗work pressure‘ is a frequent dimension of their questionnaires, it only appears in 
one of the questionnaires in our review.  
This wide variety in the dimensions of culture and climate questionnaires is 
partly due to the methodology used in their designs. Typically, in both culture and 
climate questionnaires, the authors identify a number of objects that are believed 
to affect safety outcomes, and they create items to measure the current perceptions 
or current attitudes of respondents toward those objects. In order to reduce the 
complexity and help to interpret the information provided by the numerous items 
included in a questionnaire, the items are usually grouped by themes or higher-
level contents or dimensions of culture or climate. However, the typical use of 
reductionist approaches to identify these dimensions (e.g. factor analysis [FA]) 
without the guidance of solid theoretical models (Guldenmund, 2000) leads to 
limited consensus about the number and content of the dimensions of safety 
culture questionnaires. 
The majority of the studies in our review apply tentative exploratory analyses
without trying to elaborate on existing proposals. Only seven of them developed
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their questionnaires on the basis of theoretical models of safety culture or more 
general theoretical frameworks. Díaz-Cabrera et al. (2007) composed the 
questionnaire items based on the Competing Values Framework by Cameron and 
Quinn (1999); Grote and Kunzler (2000) presented a three-dimensional socio-
technical model of safety culture that was used to developed their own 
questionnaire; Filho et al. (2010) and Gordon et al. (2007) created questionnaires 
to identify the stages of maturity of organizations‘ safety culture proposed by 
Hudson (2001) and Fleming (1999), respectively; Chinda and Mohamed‘s (2008) 
questionnaire had its origins in the European Foundation for Quality Management 
Model (EFQM); Kao et al. (2007) created a safety culture model and 
questionnaire based on the first IAEA safety culture model (1991); López de 
Castro et al. (2013) created a questionnaire using the 37 attributes of the second 
IAEA safety culture model (IAEA, 2006a).  
Most of the studies in the present review reported differences in scores across 
different groups (e.g., hierarchical level, occupation, gender) as proof of the 
discriminative power of the items and dimensions of their scales. Some of the 
authors also made an effort to provide additional sources of evidence of validity. 
However, as Guldenmund (2000) claims in his review, only a few authors (Chinda 
and Mohamed, 2008; Håvold, 2005; Kao et al., 2007; Lee, 1998; Lee and 
Harrison, 2000]) validated their questionnaire scores against safety outcomes, 
which means that the usefulness of the majority of safety culture questionnaires 
remains untested.  
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4.3. Safety culture questionnaires based on models of organizational and 
safety culture 
This section provides a further description of those safety culture 
questionnaires (mentioned at the end of Section 4.2.) whose items and/or 
dimensions have been drawn from models of organizational culture or from 
models of safety culture (Chinda and Mohamed‘s, 2008; Díaz-Cabrera et al., 
2007; Filho et al., 2010; Gordon et al., 2007; Grote and Kunzler, 2000; Kao et al., 
2007). The corresponding ‗inspiring‘ safety culture or organizational culture 
models are also described.  
Additionally, two questionnaires (and their corresponding culture models) not 
included in the content analysis of safety culture questionnaires in Section 4.2. are 
also outlined in the present section: a triangulation study by Schöbel et al. (2017), 
not included in section 4.2. because the items on the questionnaires they used are 
to be customized for the particular organization under study; and a safety culture 
questionnaire (The Safety Culture Enactment Questionnaire [SCEQ]) and its 
corresponding model of safety culture, both developed by our team (López de 
Castro et. al., 2017). This model and questionnaire were not included in Section 
4.2. because ―the dimensions of the SCEQ are not intended to be dimensions of 
safety culture per se, but rather dimensions of fundamental sets of actions of an 
NPP where the value of safety can be crystallized‖ (López de Castro et. al., 2017, 
p. 50). 
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4.3.1. The Culture Values and Practices Questionnaire (QCS) and the Competing 
Values Framework 
The Competing Values Framework was created from research on key 
indicators of effective organizational performance. From these empirical studies, 
two major dimensions consistently emerged. One dimension distinguishes an 
emphasis on flexibility, discretion, and dynamism from an emphasis on stability, 
order, and control. A second dimension distinguishes an internal orientation with 
a focus on integration, collaboration, and unity from an external orientation with a 
focus on differentiation, competition, and rivalry (Cameron, 2009). Together, 
these dimensions form four quadrants representing organizational culture 
orientations that co-exist in an organization and represent opposite or competing 
assumptions of organizational life: human relations model or clan culture, open 
system model or adhocracy culture, internal process model or hierarchy culture, 
and rational goal model or market culture (Cameron and Quinn, 1999).  
Díaz-Cabrera et al (2007) developed a safety culture questionnaire focused on 
organizational values and practices related to the safety management system. 
Based on a theoretical review, they identified a number of key safety culture 
dimensions and indicators related to the four cultural models of Cameron and 
Quinn‘s (1999) framework. These safety culture dimensions reflect the 
organizational structure, policies, and practices of an organization that are directly 
involved in risk prevention. For Cabrera‘s team, these components come from 
underlying patterns of shared meanings and beliefs, and they can be used as valid 
indicators in safety culture assessment.  
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The initial questionnaire was reviewed by a human resources expert group, 
administered in a pilot study in an aviation maintenance company, and finally, 
submitted to Principal Component Analysis. The result was a 44-item 
questionnaire grouped ―in six factors for key organizational values and practice 
related to organizational safety culture‖ (p. 1205): company values, leadership 
styles, motivation patterns, training programs, downward communication, and use 
of accident and incident information. 
Furthermore, Díaz-Cabrera et al. (2007) used cluster analyses and 
discriminant function analysis to explore the simultaneous presence of the four 
cultural orientations proposed by the Competing Values Framework toward 
safety: support, innovation, rules, and goals. However, the four cultural 
orientations were not obtained. The authors proposed that some characteristics of 
their work made it difﬁcult to afﬁrm the suitability of Cameron and Quinn‘s 
model for the study of safety culture: an inherent theoretical difficulty of adapting 
and extrapolating Cameron and Quinn‘s (1999) framework to safety is that ―the 
organizational proﬁle oriented toward goal achievement is characterized by 
prioritizing productivity objectives that can occasionally conflict with safety 
goals‖ (p. 1210). Moreover, the Likert-Type scales used by Díaz-Cabrera‘s team 
may not accentuate the differences between the cultural orientations, such as the 
ipsative response scales employed by Cameron and Quinn, where participants 
must share 100 points among the four alternatives describing each cultural 
orientation. Díaz-Cabrera‘s team decided to use Likert-Type scales in order to run 
more complex statistical analyses and encourage greater sample participation. 
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The questionnaire could not reflect the competing values framework as 
planned, but the results suggested that different safety culture orientations can 
coexist in a single organization. Díaz-Cabrera‘s team suggested that ―a positive 
safety culture based on standard safety rules might co-exist with a cultural 
orientation towards developing human resources and innovation‖ (p. 1210). 
Finally, Díaz-Cabrera‘s team found different safety culture profiles in 
companies operating in different sectors (gas companies, petrol reﬁneries, aviation 
companies, transport companies, and breweries). The proﬁles obtained showed 
signiﬁcant differences in three of the six dimensions of their questionnaire 
(values, training programs, and motivation patterns) among the companies 
assessed. 
4.3.2. Socio-technical model and safety culture questionnaire 
Grote and Künzler (2000) presented a socio-technical model of safety culture 
and a questionnaire, based on that model, which, along with interviews and work 
place observations, could support audits to analyze a company‘s safety 
management and safety culture. Grote and Künzler argue that:   
―1. The proactive integration of safety into organizational structures and 
processes (proactiveness) and 2. the joint optimization of technology and work 
organization (socio-technical integration) need to be aimed at, taking into account 
3. both material and immaterial characteristics of an organization (value 
consciousness)‖ (p. 133). 
Grote and Künzler´s questionnaire included items related to material (visible) 
and immaterial (hidden) characteristics related to both safety process integration 
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and socio-technical design. The questionnaire, developed primarily to carry out 
audits at petrochemical production sites, contained three sets of items:  
 Operational safety: a total of 20 items for technical, organizational, and 
person-related safety measures; as well as for actual safety 
performance. This section tried to capture perceptions about formal 
safety management, as well as about safety enacted in daily operations. 
Five-point Likert-type scales were used for these items. 
 Safety and design strategies: a total of 16 pairs of statements were 
included in the questionnaire, addressing strategies related to safety 
management and socio-technical design. The authors defined a 
‗positive‘ and ‗negative‘ side based on assumptions contained in their 
safety culture model. Respondents needed to choose, on a five-point 
scale (2, 1, 0, 1, 2 with the two statements serving as anchors for the 
value 2 on either side), which value best described the way the 
respective issue was handled in their organization. 
 Personal job needs: a total of 21 items addressing personal needs for 
good job performance, dealing with safety measures as well as issues 
of quality of job design and general training. For each item, 
participants had to indicate whether they needed more or less of that 
aspect to do their job well. Five-point Likert-type scales were also used 
for these items. 
Grote and Künzler found differences in scores on the three sections of the 
questionnaire among the test sites, as well as between different groups of 
employees within sites (operations versus maintenance and management versus 
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employees). They used expert evaluations of safety management based on 
interviews and plant visits as a criterion for testing concurrent validity. However, 
the authors did not intend to correlate results from either the questionnaire or the 
formal safety management audits with accident and incident data because their 
occurrence was too rare in the petrochemical companies under study.  
4.3.3. Safety culture questionnaire drawing on the EFQM model 
The EFQM Excellence Model, promoted by the European Foundation for 
Quality Management, is based on nine criteria. Five of them are ‗enablers‘ and 
four are ‗results‘.  The ‗enabler‘ criteria cover what an organization does and how 
it does it, i.e. the operation of the company. The five enablers proposed by the 
EFQM are: leadership; people; strategy; partnerships and resources; and 
processes, products and services. The ‗results‘ criteria cover what an organization 
achieves, i.e. the organizational goals. The EFQM includes four results: customer 
results, people results, society results, and business results. 
Chinda und Mohamed (2007) used the EFQM model to understand and 
improve safety culture in construction companies. They created a safety culture 
questionnaire that covered the five enablers of the EFQM model and a sixth 
dimension called ‗goals‘, which amounted to the four ‗results‘ criteria from the 
EFQM model. The items were designed to elicit respondents‘ opinions about 
these six dimensions in the context of their current safety practices and 
performance. Five-point Likert-type scales were used. 
By performing exploratory factor analyses (EFA) with the ‗enablers‘ items, 
the authors identified a total of five underlying factors, which the authors labelled 
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(in line with the EFQM model‘s enablers): leadership; people; policy and strategy; 
partnerships and resources; processes. These five dimensions included a total of 
24 items. In addition, seven items were used to explain the ‗goals‘ dimension 
(e.g., level of job satisfaction, safe work behavior, number of accidents and 
safety-related incidents, exceeded customers‘ expectations). 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) supported the existence of a strong 
relationship between processes and goals, implying that ―positive safety outcomes 
can only be achieved through the rigorous implementation of safety related 
processes, which appear to be directly related to people, and to policy and 
strategy, and not to partnerships and resources‖ (p. 127).  
The six theoretical constructs mentioned (ﬁve enablers and a single set of 
goals) represented the basic elements of the proposed construction safety culture 
model by Chinda and Mohamed (2007). 
4.3.4. The Safety Culture Survey (SCS) and Fleming´s safety culture maturity 
model 
Fleming proposes that companies in the early stages of developing their 
safety culture need different improvement techniques from those companies with 
strong safety cultures. For this reason, a safety culture maturity model can be 
helpful to assist HROs in assessing their current level of safety culture maturity 
and in identifying the actions needed to improve their safety culture (Fleming, 
1999; Fleming, 2001). 
The safety culture maturity model is set out in a number of iterative stages. 
Organizations progress sequentially through the five levels by building on the 
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acquired strengths and removing the existent weaknesses of the previous level. A 
brief description of these levels (Fleming, 1999; Fleming, 2001) is presented next: 
 Level 1 - Emerging - safety guaranteed by technical and procedural 
solutions and compliance withregulations; safety is not a key business risk; 
accidents seen as unavoidable and part of the job; most frontline staff have 
no interest in safety. 
 Level 2 - Managing - safety seen as a business risk;  safety solely defined 
in terms of adherence to rules, procedures, and engineering controls; 
accidents seen as preventable; perception that most accidents are caused 
by unsafe behavior of front-line staff; senior managers are reactive in their 
involvement in health and safety. 
 Level 3 - Involving - majority of staff involved in health and safety and 
accept  personal responsibility for own health and safety; managers 
recognize a wide range of factors that cause accidents, and that root causes 
often originate from management decisions; safety performance actively 
monitored and data effectively used.  
 Level 4 - Cooperating - managers and frontline staff recognize a wide 
range of factors that cause accidents; employees accept personal 
responsibility for their own and others‘ health and safety; all employees 
are valued and treated fairly, and a healthy lifestyle is promoted; proactive 
measures to prevent accidents are in place; non-work accidents are also 
monitored.  
 Level 5 - Continuous improvement - prevention of all injuries or harm to 
employees (both at work and at home) as a core company value; no 
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feelings of complacency; organization always strives to find better ways to 
improve hazard control mechanisms; all employees share the belief that 
health and safety are crucial in their jobs and in the organization.  
Gordon et al. (2007) created the Safety Culture Survey (SCS) based on the 
findings from ﬁve research groups (Fleming, 1999; Hudson, 2001; NATS, 2002; 
Nickelby, 2002; Sharp et al., 2002), with an special emphasis on Fleming‘s (1999) 
safety culture maturity model. The SCS aims to gather information about the 
attitudes of the workforce related to detecting and helping to implement key steps 
to improve and develop the existing safety culture. The 21 items, believed to 
described the safety culture of organizations (Gordon et al., 2007), were chosen 
and grouped in four safety culture dimensions for this purpose: management 
demonstration; planning and organizing for safety; communication, trust, and 
responsibility; measuring, auditing, and reviewing. 
Gordon et al. (2007) also contrasted the application of the SCS and a SMS 
survey tool in an Air Traffic Management Research and Development Centre on 
the basis of five criteria: evaluation (overall assessment of maturity of safety), 
content validity, convergent validity, face validity, diagnosticity (usefulness of 
outcomes for improving safety), and usability.  
The authors of the study concluded that approaching safety with both tools 
simultaneously (the SCS and the SMS survey tool) would bring the best results. 
However, in the words of Gordon et al. (2007), the contrast of the two survey 
tools ―is not neatly scientiﬁc‖ (p. 693) because they were carried out with a 
difference of over a year, and the participants were different. 
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4.3.5. Safety culture questionnaire drawing on Hudson´s safety culture maturity 
model 
A number of authors, like Fleming (1999), have proposed (safety) culture 
maturity models (e.g., Hudson, 2001; IAEA, 2002; Parker et al., 2006; Schein, 
1992; Westrum, 1993). Hudson‘s (2001) model, based on the one originally 
developed by Westrum (1993), has been especially influential in HROs.  
The developmental stages of Hudson‘s model, in Hudson‘s own words (2003, 
p. 9), are: 
 Stage 1 - Pathological - safety is a problem caused by workers; the main 
drivers are the business and a desire not to get caught by the regulator. 
 Stage 2 - Reactive - organizations start to take safety seriously but there is 
only action after incidents. 
 Stage 3 - Calculative - safety is driven by management systems, with 
much collection of data; safety is still primarily driven by management 
and imposed rather than looked for by the workforce. 
 Stage 4 - Proactive - with improved performance, the unexpected is a 
challenge; workforce involvement starts to move the initiative away from 
a purely top down approach. 
 Stage 5 - Generative - there is active participation at all levels; safety is 
perceived to be an inherent part of the business; organizations are 
characterized by chronic unease as a counter to complacency. 
Fihlo et al. (2010) created a safety culture questionnaire designed to measure 
aspects of organizational safety indicative of Hudson´s ﬁve levels of cultural 
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maturity. Their safety culture framework, and resulting questionnaire, presented 
the following five dimensions chosen from a literature review of 19 safety culture 
studies: information, organizational learning, involvement, communication, and 
commitment. Fihlo‘ team described how each of their ﬁve dimensions is 
addressed in each of the ﬁve stages of the chosen safety culture maturity model.  
The questionnaire contained 22 questions: 14 questions with ﬁve items and 
eight questions with four items, totaling 102 items. For each question, participants 
were asked to choose the item that best represented their company. 
The questionnaire was completed by the safety managers of 23 different 
petrochemical companies who were interviewed by the researcher (asking the 
same questions as those on the questionnaire) one month later. The purpose was to 
compare the answers given to both (quantitative and qualitative) methods. The 
author found signiﬁcant correlations of between .70 and .90, which indicated good 
alternate form reliability. 
Results of the study indicated that the 23 companies had characteristics of 
different levels of safety culture maturity, with most scores at the proactive level. 
The results supported the idea that safety culture does not develop at the same 
pace in all companies and in all dimensions, even when companies come from the 
same sector and/or country (Fleming, 2001; Hudson and Willekes, 2000; IAEA, 
2002).  
4.3.6. Safety culture questionnaire and first IAEA safety culture model 
Back in 1991, the IAEA started to deal with the concept of safety culture and 
proposed that: 
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―Safety culture has two general components. The first is the 
necessary framework within an organization and is the 
responsibility of the management hierarchy. The second is the 
attitude of staff at all levels in responding to and benefiting from 
the framework. These components are dealt with under the 
headings of: requirements at policy level; requirements on 
managers; and response of individuals.‖ (p. 5). 
Figure 4 illustrates the major components of safety culture, as proposed by 
the IAEA in 1991: 
 
Fig. 4. First safety culture model of the IAEA (1991) 
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Kao et al. (2007) developed a safety culture questionnaire based on this 3-
dimensional safety culture structure developed by the IAEA. Using SEM 
techniques and CFA, the authors proposed a model containing 3 higher-order 
dimensions and 8 lower-order dimensions: 
 Organizations‘ commitment (equivalent to the policy level commitment of 
the IAEA‘s [1991] model): management system and organization; accident 
investigation and emergency. 
 Managers‘ commitment: supervision and audit; commitment and support; 
reward, punishment and benefits. 
 Individuals‘ commitment: attitude and behavior; communication and 
involvement; training and competence.  
These dimensions were covered by 73 survey items, which were responded 
by five petrochemical companies, in order to reveal safety-related areas in need of 
the company‘s attention for improvement.  
Differences in scores on the eight lower-order dimensions were investigated 
across different hierarchical levels and job occupations, as well as across 
companies. Moreover, support was found for the influence of companies‘ safety 
culture on safety performance, measured by the variables safety satisfaction and 
work risks. 
4.3.7. Safety culture questionnaire and second IAEA safety culture model 
In 2006, the IAEA presented a new model of safety culture that is still being 
used today for the common understanding and assessment of safety culture within 
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nuclear power facilities. The model is composed of 37 attributes clustered into 
five dimensions, referred to as characteristics by the IAEA: safety is a clearly 
recognized value, leadership for safety is clear, accountability for safety is clear, 
safety is integrated into all activities, and safety is learning driven. The IAEA 
(2008) explains that ―the attributes are short descriptions of a specific 
organizational performance or attitude in a nuclear facility, which, if fulfilled, 
would characterize this performance or attitude as belonging to a strong safety 
culture‖ (p. 8). More information about this model is provided in the first 
empirical study of the present thesis in Chapter VI.  
Despite the relevance of the 2006 IAEA safety culture model for the nuclear 
industry, and its use as a framework for the understanding and assessment of 
safety culture, its dimensionality was never empirically tested before. Because of 
this, our team (López de Castro et al., 2013) presented three independent 
empirical studies to take the first steps to empirically validate this model, in 
particular the correspondence between the attributes and dimensions proposed by 
the IAEA. In the first study, we tested the face validity of the model on the basis 
of the opinions of a sample of students. In the second study, a sample of experts in 
organizational behavior was used to test the content validity of the model. For the 
third study, we developed a questionnaire based on the IAEA safety culture 
model, composed of 37 items that corresponded to the 37 attributes of the model. 
The answers of a sample of workers of an NPP to the questionnaire were analyzed 
to discover the extent to which the data replicate the theoretical five-dimensional 
model. The questionnaire itself, as well as the three complete studies, can also be 
found in Chapter VI. 
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4.3.8. Artifacts and gap questionnaires based on Schein‘s organizational culture 
model 
Schöbel et al. (2017) presented two questionnaires based on Schein‘s (1985) 
organizational culture model, which is described in section 2.3. of this thesis. Like 
the assessment approach proposed by Grote and Künzler (2000), previously 
described, the Schöbel team‘s questionnaires are part of a wider triangulation 
assessment of safety culture. Schöbel et al.‘s (2017) multi-method approach aimed 
to reach deeper levels of culture, and, at the same time, be useful for practitioners 
and transparent in producing meaningful results. Their study is first carried out in 
an NPP and then cross-validated in a second NPP.   
The first questionnaire included 64 work practices (cultural artifacts) based 
on literature research, participant observations, and interviews with employees 
and supervisors from the NPP under analysis. Each of the work practices was 
assigned to one of four management domains (risk management, task 
management, management of technical resources, and management of human 
resources) further differentiated in ten facets. Afterwards, middle managers from 
the NPP rated each of the practices with regard to its implementation in daily 
work, which served to identify those work practices (plant-speciﬁc artifacts) that 
are most relevant to plant members in establishing safe and reliable plant 
performance. Seven-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (practice not applied) 
to 7 (practice fully applied) were used in this first questionnaire. 
The relevant plant-speciﬁc safety practices identiﬁed were included in a 
second questionnaire, labelled the ‗gap questionnaire‘, which was distributed to 
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all staff members of the NPP. Participants gave two ratings to each relevant 
practice: to what extent they perceive the practice is actually implemented in the 
plant; and to what extent they think the practice should ideally be implemented in 
the plant. The aim was to contrast the ‗actual‘ (level of artifacts) and ‗ideal‘ 
ratings (level of espoused values) for each practice. Seven-point Likert-type scales 
were also used for this questionnaire. From the application of this second 
questionnaire, gap-practices (presenting an important difference between their 
actual and ideal ratings) and best practices (presenting high ratings on both their 
actual and ideal implementation) were identified and used in a third assessment 
step. 
The authors assume that gap-practices and best practices provide hints about 
basic assumptions hold by the organizational members. For this reason, in a third 
and last assessment step, they were discussed in cultural dynamic interviews and 
group workshops. This goal of this last stage, called the ‗assumption analysis‘, 
was to uncover some of the basic assumptions shared by the organization or by 
groups within it, facilitating organizational intervention strategies to improve the 
existing safety culture (Schöbel et al., 2017). 
4.3.9. The Safety Culture Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ) and three-
dimensional model of safety culture 
We believe that a high intensity and strong safety culture can only be present 
in a HRO when safety pervades ‗everything‘ the HRO does, and the way all its 
employees constantly behave. Our team (López de Castro et al., 2017) developed 
a safety culture model, proposing that this ‗everything‘ can be covered by three 
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fundamental components of the functioning and operation of HROs: strategic 
decisions, human resources practices, and daily activities and behaviors. This 
way, the safety culture of an NPP or HRO will be mainly determined by the extent 
to which strategic and important decisions guarantee the priority of safety at all 
times (strategic level), human resources practices promote the safety of the plant 
(managerial level), and safety is the primary guide for all operating actions and 
behaviors (operational level). Next, we present a brief description extracted from 
López de Castro et al. (2017), of each of these components: 
 Strategic decisions ensuring safety: ―Safety culture manifests itself in the 
role safety plays in the strategic decisions made in NPPs. This dimension 
covers decisions that are carefully and thoughtfully made for the smooth 
running of the plant. It encompasses decisions about the operation of the 
plant and the conflicts between safety and other competing goals, and 
decisions about the allocation of resources and the establishment of 
procedures.‖ (p. 47).  
 Human resources practices driving safety: ―The safety culture of an NPP 
manifests itself in the extent to which the HR practices are coherently 
articulated to guarantee high levels of safety performance. For this 
purpose, the organization must be able to bring in new workers (e.g. by 
means of appropriate recruitment and selection practices) who share the 
priority of safety and have the ability and willingness to work safely; it 
must continuously prepare the employees, especially in safety matters 
(e.g., through training and performance appraisals), and it must encourage 
and motivate them (e.g., through formal reward systems, such as goal 
SAFETY CULTURE ASSESSMENT
112 
 
setting, promotions or salary, as well as informal rewards, such as 
recognition) to work safely under all conditions.‖ (p. 47). 
 Daily activities and behaviors supporting safety: ―The extent to which 
safety is important for an NPP is reflected in the daily behaviors of every 
employee in the organization, the relationship with external agents (e.g., 
contractors and regulatory bodies), and the day-to-day operations (such as 
meetings or internal publications, e.g., Gracia and Peiró, 2010).‖ (p. 48). 
A further detailed description of each of the three components is provided in 
Sections 7.1.4.1, 7.1.4.2. and 7.1.4.3. of the present thesis, respectively. 
Each of the main hierarchical levels of an organization (top management, 
supervisory level, and operating core) plays a role in preserving and enhancing the 
safety of an NPP through all three fundamental components of its functioning and 
operation. However, each hierarchical level has different opportunities to enact 
the value of safety through each of these components: 
Strategic decisions ensuring safety and hierarchical levels.  
The strategic decisions of any organization are made by the strategic apex. The 
strategic management defines the processes and procedures through which the 
mission and shared goals are to be met. Top management decides how to 
administer and assign available resources in order to satisfy the needs and 
demands of stakeholders (users, investors, government, employees, etc.), while 
guaranteeing the safety of the plant. If any of these demands come into conflict, 
they will convey the priorities to be followed to the rest of the organization. In 
accordance with the content of this dimension, the top management has the 
CHAPTER IV
113 
 
greatest opportunities in the organization to enact the value of safety through the 
strategic decisions made. However, although the strategic plan and strategic 
decisions (and how the importance of safety is embedded on them) are developed 
in the top management level, middle level managers (supervisors) and even the 
rest of employees play an important role in their realization. Supervisors must act 
as transmission belts of the strategic vision and as sounding boards echoing the 
strategic decisions and how the value of safety can and must be embedded in them 
in practice. Middle management must take these decisions upon themselves and 
encourage the rest of the employees to act in accordance. Thus, safety should not 
only be a priority of the strategic decisions, but also of their realization by all 
members of the organization.  
Human resources practices driving safety and hierarchical levels.  
Supervisors are in charge of identifying the needs that must be met in order to 
achieve safe and quality work within their departments. They report on the need 
for new employees and attend to the training needs of their supervisees. 
Supervisors make sure that their teams fulfill their functions without 
compromising the safety of the plant, playing a central role in goal setting, 
performance appraisals, and the way rewards systems are implemented. In 
accordance with the content of this dimension, middle management (supervisors) 
have the greatest opportunities in the organization to enact the value of safety 
through the organizational HR practices. However, although HR policies and 
practices are mainly implemented at the supervisory level, they are designed and 
spread by the HR department and by top management. On the other hand, the 
employees of the operating core have also opportunities to enact the value of 
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safety through specific HR practices, for example, employees who ask for 
additional training voluntarily in order to master their work and make less 
mistakes, or employees who raise the importance of not compromising the safety 
of their operations when establishing objectives with their supervisors.  
Daily activities and behaviors supporting safety and hierarchical levels.  
The performance of an NPP is shown in the daily work of employees from every 
functional area (operations, maintenance, technical support, etc.). In this regard, 
the ultimate safety of an NPP depends largely on what the operating core 
employees do and how they do it. On the other hand, the center stage that safety 
takes in meetings, bulletins, and other internal publications is intended to result in 
safer behaviors in the day-to-day running of the NPP. Based on the content of this 
dimension, the operating core of the organization has the greatest opportunities to 
enact the value of safety through the daily activities and behaviors displayed in 
the organization. However, top management and supervisors must set an example 
for the rest of the employees through their own daily behaviors and actions, and 
through their interactions with the other employees. It is clear that the operating 
core has greater access to the behaviors and actions displayed by their supervisors 
than to those of top management, who they interact with and see less frequently. 
But it is highly important for both top management and supervisors to consistently 
show their commitment to the value of safety through each of their behaviors, and 
actions because the extent to which safety is enacted, supported, prioritized, and 
rewarded in the day-to-day organizational functioning will inform organizational 
members about the actions expected from them (Schein, 1992).  
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  This model of safety culture also highlights that the three dimensions are 
different from each other, but closely related. The safety culture of an NPP can be 
understood as evolving and being configured through top-down and bottom-up 
flows among the three dimensions of the present model. The Top-down flow 
represents the way strategic decisions determine HR practices, and both in turn 
influence the daily activities and behaviors of all the employees in the 
organization. As an example, deciding to preserve safety in refueling outages is 
reflected in not awarding financial rewards for working faster and under time 
pressure during outages, which leads to safer employee and contractor behaviors 
during the outage. The bottom-up flow refers to how daily activities and behaviors 
from employees determine appropriate HR practices, and both in turn influence 
the strategic decisions made in the NPP. As an example, employees are identified 
as working systematically and routinely without having a questioning attitude. 
This leads to the training of supervisors in participative leadership techniques (if 
the reason for the problem is that leaders do not stimulate participation and open 
communication), which in turn affects the way top management allocates existing 
resources (e.g., higher investment in training).  
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Fig. 5. Dimensions and flows of the safety culture model behind the SCEQ. 
 
Based on this model, we developed the Safety Culture Enactment 
Questionnaire (SCEQ), a questionnaire designed to assess the degree to which 
safety is an enacted value in the day-to-day running of HROs and NPPs. The final 
goal of the SCEQ is to serve as a better predictor of safety performance than 
existing safety questionnaires that merely assess the endorsement of safety values. 
In Section 7.1.2. the concepts of enacted and espoused values are explained. In 
Section 7.1.3. three arguments are proposed to support the ability of the SCEQ in 
capturing the enactment of safety. 
The 21 items on the SCEQ were based on a literature review, examination of 
safety culture questionnaires, our consulting experience in the nuclear industry, 
the ―Analysis, Management and Intervention Guidelines in Organizations 
(AMIGO) model‖ (Peiró and Martínez-Tur, 2008), and focus group sessions. 
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Five-point Likert-type scales with responses ranging from 1 (not at all important) 
to 5 (very important) were used.  
In our study, the questionnaire was completed by the employees of two 
Spanish NPPs in 2008 and 2014. As can be seen in Chapter VII, empirical 
evidence was obtained showing the validity of the SCEQ and supporting the 
dimensionality derived from the theory. 
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En este capítulo se presentan los objetivos de la tesis y los motivos que nos 
llevaron a realizar cada uno de los tres estudios empíricos. Seguidamente, se 
describen las muestras utilizadas en los diferentes estudios y los procedimientos 
empleados a la hora de recoger los datos. Posteriormente, se detallan las variables 
consideradas y los instrumentos utilizados para su medición. Finalmente, se 
indican los análisis de datos realizados en los estudios. 
Para simplificar la redacción de este capítulo y los siguientes, hablaremos del 
Estudio 1, Estudio 2 y Estudio 3, para referirnos a los tres estudios empíricos que 
conforman la presente tesis doctoral: 
 Estudio 1: se investiga la validez empírica del modelo de cultura de 
seguridad de la Agencia Internacional de Energía Atómica (IAEA) y de un 
cuestionario de cultura de seguridad basado en el mismo. 
 Estudio 2: se investiga la validez empírica del modelo de cultura de 
seguridad y cuestionario de cultura de seguridad (SCEQ) creados por 
nuestro equipo.  
 Estudio 3: se investiga la adecuación de la utilización de herramientas de 
medición de cultura organizacional y de cultura de seguridad en la 
industria nuclear a través de la comparación del SCEQ y del Inventario de 
Cultura Organizacional (OCI). 
5.1. Objetivos y justificación de los estudios realizados 
La cultura de seguridad se ha identificado como causa directa de la gran 
mayoría de accidentes en Organizaciones de Alta Fiabilidad o High Reliability 
Organizations (HROs) (ver Apartado 3.1.). En consecuencia, la cultura de 
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seguridad se ha convertido en una bandera para las HROs y para la industria 
nuclear en particular. Todas las centrales nucleares son conscientes de que 
garantizar la seguridad en la operación de sus centrales, pasa por contar con una 
cultura de seguridad que contribuya a la consecución de un desempeño de 
seguridad y unos resultados de seguridad óptimos.  
Sin embargo, a pesar de haber nacido hace más de 30 años y del trabajo 
incesante de investigadores, profesionales y organismos reguladores, el concepto 
de cultura de seguridad y la forma de abordarlo, distan de ser claros. Prueba de 
ello es la disparidad mostrada entre las 40 definiciones de cultura de seguridad y 
entre los 20 cuestionarios para medirla, que se han descrito en las Apartados 3.3. y 
4.2. de esta tesis doctoral. 
El objetivo general de esta tesis es contribuir al desarrollo de una industria 
nuclear más segura a través de la clarificación del término de cultura de seguridad 
y, sobre todo, a través del avance en medidas de cultura de seguridad. Este 
objetivo general se desglosa en objetivos específicos teóricos y empíricos, los 
cuales se describen a continuación: 
 Objetivos teóricos - clarificación del constructo de cultura de seguridad. 
o Presentar y analizar las definiciones más influyentes de cultura de 
seguridad.   
o Identificar los elementos centrales de la naturaleza de cultura de 
seguridad. 
o Ofrecer una definición propia de cultura de seguridad que aúne el 
acuerdo entre expertos sobre el concepto. 
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o Presentar y analizar cuestionarios de cultura de seguridad de 
referencia en HROs.  
o Identificar las dimensiones en que la cultura de seguridad se ha 
operacionalizado con mayor frecuencia.  
o Clarificar la relación de cultura de seguridad con cultura 
organizacional y clima de seguridad.  
 Objetivos empíricos - avance en medidas de cultura de seguridad. 
o Validar por primera vez en la industria nuclear el modelo de 
cultura de seguridad de la IAEA. 
o Crear y validar el SCEQ, un cuestionario de cultura de seguridad 
diseñado para medir la importancia real de la seguridad en la 
industria nuclear. 
o Crear y validar un modelo de cultura de seguridad que sirve de 
respaldo del SCEQ y de marco teórico para la comprensión de la 
cultura de seguridad. 
o Ofrecer evidencias sobre la capacidad de cuestionarios de cultura 
organizacional y de cultura de seguridad de predecir el desempeño 
de seguridad. 
o Validar el OCI en la industria nuclear española. 
o Investigar qué perfiles culturales del OCI son más propicios para 
promover la cultura de seguridad y para optimizar el desempeño de 
seguridad. 
Los objetivos teóricos se han trabajado principalmente en la introducción de 
la tesis, mientras que los objetivos empíricos se pretenden conseguir a través de 
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los tres estudios mencionados anteriormente (Estudio 1, Estudio 2 y Estudio 3). A 
continuación, se explican los motivos que nos animaron a alcanzar los objetivos 
propuestos, y se especifica cuáles de ellos se cubren a través de la introducción y 
de cada uno de los tres estudios empíricos.  
5.1.1. Objetivos teóricos - clarificación del constructo de cultura de seguridad 
En vistas de la carencia de una definición comúnmente aceptada de cultura de 
seguridad, una definición que ofrezca un marco común para su comprensión y a 
partir de la cual se puedan aunar los esfuerzos para su medición, gestión y 
optimización, decidimos recopilar y analizar las principales definiciones dadas 
hasta día de hoy al constructo, y elaborar una definición que reúna los elementos 
más comúnmente aceptados hasta día de hoy. 
El análisis de estas definiciones nos permite obtener dos cosas, 
principalmente: 
1) Identificar los elementos centrales de la naturaleza de cultura de seguridad 
destacados por los expertos en la materia y posteriormente cuantificar el 
grado de acuerdo sobre la existencia de dichos elementos. 
2) Elaborar una definición de cultura de seguridad que reúna los elementos 
más comunes de las definiciones ofrecidas hasta ahora. Esta definición refleja 
en pocas palabras el acuerdo conseguido entre expertos en cultura de 
seguridad durante los últimos 30 años, y se ofrece como definición del 
concepto para las HROs. 
Debido a la confusión y múltiples acercamientos a la dimensionalidad del 
constructo de cultura de seguridad, recopilamos y analizamos algunos de los 
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cuestionarios de cultura de seguridad más conocidos en las HROs, e identificamos 
las dimensiones más comúnmente aceptadas en estos cuestionarios.  
La finalidad fue, por tanto, extraer conclusiones sobre los contenidos de 
cultura de seguridad que cubren dichos cuestionarios. Este análisis nos permitió, 
entre otras cosas, cuantificar el grado de acuerdo sobre las dimensiones de cultura 
de seguridad más comúnmente referidas en los cuestionarios bajo estudio.  
La confusión y distintos acercamientos existentes a la naturaleza y relación 
del constructo de cultura seguridad con otros términos pertenecientes a su red 
nomológica, nos animó a clarificar los conceptos de cultura organizacional y 
clima de seguridad, y la relación de estos dos con cultura de seguridad. Esto se 
aborda principalmente en la introducción teórica de la tesis (Apartados 3.2. y 3.4.) 
y a lo largo de los tres estudios empíricos presentados en esta tesis.  
5.1.2. Objetivos empíricos - avance en medidas de cultura de seguridad 
Las HROs necesitan, no sólo poder entender qué es exactamente una cultura 
de seguridad, sino también saber cómo capturar el estado de sus culturas de 
seguridad o el grado en que sus culturas organizacionales garantizan un 
desempeño y resultados de seguridad óptimos. 
La cultura de seguridad se puede medir a través de herramientas cualitativas y 
cuantitativas (ver Apartado 4.1. para una explicación mayor sobre ambos 
acercamientos). Se reconoce que las herramientas cualitativas tienen el mayor 
potencial para capturar los elementos culturales más profundos e influyentes en la 
organización o en sus sub-grupos. Sin embargo, las herramientas cualitativas 
requieren altos costes económico-temporales que las organizaciones 
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frecuentemente no están dispuestas a asumir. Además, una herramienta cualitativa 
no permite por sí misma acercarse a la cultura real de la organización, sino que 
requiere un trabajo de integración e interpretación de resultados muy complejo y 
no exento de ser contaminado por prejuicios y expectativas de los evaluadores.  
Por otro lado, las herramientas cuantitativas proveen información sobre la 
cultura de la organización que se limita a los ítems escogidos sin permitir 
profundizar en los resultados obtenidos, a no ser que se empleen de forma 
conjunta con otras herramientas cualitativas. Sin embargo, las herramientas 
cuantitativas, como los cuestionarios de cultura de seguridad, ofrecen un gran 
número de ventajas, que es lo que los ha convertido en una estrategia muy 
frecuente de medición de cultura HROs y en la industria nuclear. La aplicación de 
cuestionarios es menos costosa en términos económicos y de implicación de los 
trabajadores, y permite obtener información de un gran número de trabajadores de 
todos los niveles jerárquicos y departamentos de la organización. Además, los 
resultados obtenidos se pueden comparar entre organizaciones del mismo sector 
(p.e., entre centrales nucleares) y ofrecen indicios a los investigadores de forma 
rápida sobre disfunciones en elementos organizacionales y de gestión (entre otros) 
que puedan suponer un peligro potencial para la seguridad de la organización.  
Por lo argumentado anteriormente, parece claro que contar con cuestionarios 
que capten información relevante sobre la cultura de seguridad de la organización, 
es una obligación en la industria nuclear. Sin embargo, los cuestionarios de 
cultura de seguridad existentes no han permitido traspasar los niveles más 
superficiales de cultura y, a menudo, no han sido sustentados en modelos con 
respaldo empírico.     
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La detección de esta necesidad nos motivó a querer contribuir al avance en 
medidas de cultura de seguridad, que a su vez sirvan de base para gestionar y 
optimizar la cultura de seguridad en las HROs, y en las centrales nucleares en 
particular. Este objetivo se materializa de distinta forma a lo largo de los tres 
estudios empíricos que conforman esta tesis doctoral. 
5.1.2.1. Estudio 1 
Fundada en 1957, la Agencia Internacional de Energía Atómica (IAEA) 
pertenece a las organizaciones internacionales conexas al sistema de las 
Organización de las Naciones Unidas, siendo el organismo de referencia mundial 
en materia nuclear. En concreto, la IAEA establece normas de seguridad nuclear y 
protección ambiental, sirve de ayuda a los países miembros (167 a día de hoy) 
mediante actividades de cooperación técnica, y alienta el intercambio de 
información científica y técnica sobre la energía nuclear y sobre cómo garantizar 
la seguridad en la operación de las centrales nucleares. 
Como se ha explicado anteriormente, fue la IAEA el organismo que acuñó el 
concepto de cultura de seguridad después de la catástrofe de Chernobyl en 1986. 
Desde ese momento, la IAEA ha trabajado sin cesar en el desarrollo teórico del 
concepto y en la creación de metodologías que permitan comprender, medir y 
desarrollar una cultura de seguridad que evite futuras catástrofes. Dentro de este 
marco, una de las contribuciones mayores de la IAEA ha sido la creación de un 
modelo de cultura de seguridad, el cual la misma IAEA etiqueta como ‗esencial‘ 
para alcanzar una cultura de seguridad óptima (IAEA, 2006b). Este modelo está 
compuesto por 37 atributos, agrupados en 5 dimensiones, que todos los 
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trabajadores de la industria nuclear deben comprender y tener en cuenta a la hora 
de preservar la seguridad nuclear (IAEA, 2009a). Este modelo ha satisfecho la 
urgente necesidad de la industria nuclear de comprender qué es cultura de 
seguridad, y qué aspectos se deben medir, monitorizar y optimizar para contar con 
una cultura de seguridad que asegure un desempeño y resultados de seguridad 
óptimos (en el Apartado 6.1.3. se pueden encontrar ejemplos del alcance y 
utilización de este modelo por organismos reguladores, y por la propia IAEA). Sin 
embargo, a pesar de la común aceptación y utilización del modelo de cultura de 
seguridad de la IAEA en la industria nuclear, este modelo no había sido 
previamente testado de forma empírica.  
Ante esta situación, nuestro equipo tomo la responsabilidad de dar los 
primeros pasos en la validación empírica del modelo de cultura de seguridad de la 
IAEA. En concreto, nuestro Estudio 1 investiga la correspondencia empírica entre 
los 37 atributos y las 5 dimensiones de cultura de seguridad propuestas por la 
IAEA. Comprobar esta correspondencia es necesario para evitar que herramientas 
de medición basadas en este modelo puedan llevar a conclusiones erróneas sobre 
aquellos aspectos en la organización sobre los que se necesita actuar para asegurar 
la seguridad de la central nuclear.  
El Estudio 1 completo se presenta en el Capítulo VI y a su vez puede 
encontrarse en la revista Accident Analysis & Prevention, Volumen 60, 
Noviembre 2013, páginas 231–244, bajo el título: ―Testing the validity of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety culture model‖. 
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5.1.2.2. Estudio 2 
Como se ha explicado en el Apartado 2.3., la mayor parte de los 
investigadores y expertos en cultura organizacional, entienden que ésta está 
compuesta por distintos elementos que se pueden ordenar por el grado en que son 
accesibles, tangibles y modificables. La propuesta más aceptada y utilizada a la 
hora de estudiar la cultura de las organizaciones ha sido de largo la ofrecida por 
Schein (1985), quien clasifica estos elementos culturales en tres niveles: 
asunciones básicas profundas que conforman el corazón de la cultura 
organizacional y de las que los trabajadores generalmente no son conscientes; 
valores expuestos, ideales o racionalizaciones, sobre cómo los trabajadores 
entienden que su organización debería de ser y debería comportarse; y artefactos o 
productos tangibles de la organización, que son resultado de los niveles culturales 
más profundos. 
Es aceptado que cada uno de estos tres niveles puede captarse a través de 
distintas metodologías. En un extremo, los artefactos pueden captarse a través de 
observaciones, incluso sin ser necesario la ayuda de los integrantes de la 
organización bajo estudio. En el otro extremo, capturar las asunciones básicas de 
los trabajadores de una organización demanda la utilización de combinaciones de 
herramientas cualitativas y procesos de interpretación complejos. Y en el medio se 
encuentran los cuestionarios, la herramienta de medición de cultura más utilizada 
en las HROs, que normalmente se han centrado en recabar información sobre los 
artefactos de la organización y, en ocasiones, sobre la cultura reflejada en los 
valores expuestos. 
OBJETIVOS DE LA TESIS Y METODOLOGÍA
130 
 
A pesar de la popularidad de los cuestionarios de cultura de seguridad en la 
industria nuclear, Wilpert y Schobel (2007) indican que no es claro el grado en 
que los valores expuestos determinan el comportamiento último de los 
trabajadores. La medición de los valores expuestos a través de cuestionarios 
podría ser útil siempre y cuando los valores expuestos estuviesen alineados con 
los valores en acción. Sin embargo, hay suficiente evidencia, proveniente de 
investigaciones de incidentes y desastres organizacionales, de que la puesta en 
acción de los valores expuestos raramente ocurre (Waring, 2015, p. 261). Como 
Schein (1992) indica, son los valores en acción, los que en el día a día se 
respaldan, se priorizan y por los que se recompensa y se da reconocimiento a los 
trabajadores, los que informan a los miembros de la organización de las acciones 
que se espera de ellos. En resumen, para poder entender la cultura de una 
organización y tener más probabilidades de predecir su futuro desempeño, no 
basta con capturar los valores expuestos en la organización. 
Debido a lo planteado anteriormente, la necesidad de tener en cuenta los 
valores en acción a la hora de estudiar la cultura de una organización, ha sido 
enfatizada por muchos autores (Branch y Olson, 2011; Schein, 1992; Siehl y 
Martin, 1990; Waring, 2015; Zohar y Hofmann, 2012). Sin embargo, de acuerdo 
con nuestro conocimiento del sector nuclear, no existen cuestionarios de cultura 
de seguridad en la industria nuclear (y tampoco en otras HROs) que permitan 
captar los valores en acción. La detección de la necesidad de cubrir esta carencia, 
fue lo que motivo la realización del Estudio 2 de la presente tesis doctoral. 
Nuestro objetivo central fue por tanto crear y validar un cuestionario que 
pudiese captar el nivel de los valores en acción en HROs. En concreto, nos 
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propusimos crear y validar un cuestionario diseñado para medir el grado en que la 
seguridad es un valor en acción o puesto en práctica (y no un valor expuesto o 
teórico) en HROs. Este cuestionario se bautizó como el Safety Culture Enactment 
Questionnaire (SCEQ), que podría traducirse como el Cuestionario de Cultura de 
Seguridad en Acción. El SCEQ está enmarcado en un modelo teórico de cultura 
de seguridad, creado por nuestro equipo de investigación, que cubre tres 
componentes fundamentales del funcionamiento y operación de cualquier 
organización: decisiones estratégicas, prácticas de gestión de recursos humanos, y 
comportamientos y actividades del día a día. El Estudio 2 tuvo también como 
objetivo la validación del modelo de forma paralela a la validación del SCEQ. 
El Estudio 2 completo se presenta en el Capítulo VII y a su vez puede 
encontrarse en la revista Accident Analysis & Prevention, Volumen 103, Junio 
2017, páginas 44–55, bajo el título: ―The Safety Culture Enactment Questionnaire 
(SCEQ): Theoretical model and empirical validation‖. 
5.1.2.3. Estudio 3 
A la hora de abordar el estudio de cultura de seguridad caben dos enfoques. 
El primero aborda el estudio directo e inmediato de la cultura de seguridad. Como 
se viene explicando a lo largo de esta tesis, éste es el enfoque que se ha utilizado 
normalmente en HROs y en particular en la industria nuclear. El segundo enfoque 
plantea que se puede obtener información sobre la cultura de seguridad a través 
del estudio general de la cultura organizacional. Dentro del primer enfoque 
(directo) encontramos un gran número de cuestionarios, etiquetados por sus 
autores como cuestionarios de cultura de seguridad, que han sido utilizados en la 
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industria nuclear. Por su parte, el segundo enfoque (distal) ha tenido poca 
relevancia dentro de la industria nuclear, encontrándose prácticamente ningún 
cuestionario de cultura organizacional aplicado en centrales nucleares.  
A pesar de la existencia de ambos enfoques, prácticamente no hay estudios 
que ofrezcan evidencias empíricas para decantarse por la utilización de 
cuestionarios de cultura organizacional o de cultura de seguridad en la industria 
nuclear. Aún menos se encuentran estudios metodológicamente sólidos que 
comparen ambos enfoques en términos de su poder para predecir el desempeño de 
seguridad y/o los resultados de seguridad de una organización.  
Ante esta situación, nuestro equipo se propuso arrojar luz sobre esta cuestión 
a través del estudio comparativo de nuestro cuestionario de cultura de seguridad 
SCEQ y del OCI. En particular, nos propusimos estudiar el poder de ambas 
herramientas para predecir el desempeño de seguridad en una central nuclear. 
Por otro lado, este tercer estudio de la tesis tuvo los objetivos de validar el 
OCI en la industria nuclear española, y de obtener nuevas evidencias para la 
validación del SCEQ en la industria nuclear española y del modelo en que éste se 
sustenta.  
Finalmente, comprendiendo la aplicación del OCI en la industria nuclear 
desde un enfoque distal, se entiende que las dimensiones de cultura organizacional 
que abarca el OCI, a pesar de no hacer referencia directa a la seguridad, sí que 
están relacionadas con ella. En este contexto, nos propusimos también investigar 
qué perfiles culturales son más propicios para fomentar la cultura de seguridad y 
optimizar el desempeño de seguridad en las HROs. 
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El Estudio 3 completo se presenta en el Capítulo VIII, y está en la fase final 
de preparación para ser sometido a una revista científica bajo el título: 
―Organizational culture or safety culture assessment?‖. 
5.2. Muestras, participantes y procedimientos de recogida de datos 
En la realización de los tres estudios empíricos de la presente tesis, se 
utilizaron cinco muestras diferentes. A continuación se describe cada muestra, así 
como el procedimiento de recogida de datos empleado. Al final del apartado se 
resume de forma esquemática qué muestras se utilizaron en cada uno de los tres 
estudios (Tabla 6). 
5.2.1. Muestra de estudiantes (2010) 
En el Estudio 1 se utilizó una muestra de estudiantes (recogida en 2010) para
estudiar la validez aparente del modelo. La muestra contó con 290 estudiantes de
la Universidad de Valencia (110 estudiantes de psicología, 96 de relaciones
laborales y 84 de turismo). Todos los estudiantes a los que se les entregó el
ejercicio, lo completaron, por lo que se obtuvo una tasa de respuesta del 100%. La
literatura recomienda evaluar la validez aparente de modelos, cuestionarios o
herramientas de medición en general, mediante personas no entrenadas para el
propósito y sin conocimientos previos de la herramienta a evaluar (Anastasi,
1976; Cronbach, 1984; Sartori, 2010). En palabras de Litwin, ―jueces no
entrenados, como tu hermana, novio o compañero de squash‖ (1995, p. 35). Por
este motivo, se decidió contar con una muestra de estudiantes (personas sin
conocimientos de cultura de seguridad de la industria nuclear) para este propósito.
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Los participantes recibieron dos documentos: uno con los 37 atributos del 
modelo de cultura de seguridad de la IAEA; y otro con las cinco dimensiones a las 
que, según la IAEA, pertenecen los atributos. El primer documento incluía además 
las instrucciones sobre la tarea, que consistía en determinar a cuál de las cinco 
categorías (A, B, C, D y E, donde cada letra correspondía a una dimensión) 
pertenecía cada uno de los 37 enunciados. Los atributos y dimensiones fueron 
presentados en español, para lo que previamente fueron traducidos desde el inglés al 
español por dos traductores certificados a través técnicas de traducción inversa o 
back-translation.  
Durante la administración del cuestionario, los investigadores estuvieron 
presentes para clarificar posibles dudas que pudiesen surgir. Se enfatizó la 
importancia del proyecto para contribuir al desarrollo de la seguridad en la 
industria nuclear. La participación fue voluntaria y anónima. 
Para ver más detalles sobre la muestra, motivo de su elección, así como sobre 
el desarrollo y administración de la herramienta, se recomienda visitar el Apartado 
6.2.1. de esta tesis.  
5.2.2. Muestra de expertos en comportamiento organizacional (2010) 
En el Estudio 1 se empleo también una muestra de expertos en 
comportamiento organizacional de la Universidad de Valencia (España). La 
muestra fue recogida en 2010. En total participaron 48 expertos de los 65 que 
fueron invitados a formar parte del estudio, lo que supuso una tasa de respuesta 
del 74%. En esta ocasión el objetivo fue estudiar la validez de contenido del 
modelo de cultura de seguridad de la IAEA. En concreto la muestra estuvo 
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compuesta por 24 doctores del departamento de Psicología Social, siete 
doctorandos del programa Europeo de Psicología del Trabajo, de 
las Organizaciones y de los Recursos Humanos (WOP-P), y 17 estudiantes del 
Master Erasmus Mundus WOP-P. Para evaluar la validez de contenido de 
modelos, cuestionarios o herramientas de medición en general, la literatura 
recomienda que personas expertas en el tema bajo estudio juzguen la relevancia y 
representatividad del dominio de contenido estudiado (Sireci, 1998). Los 
participantes de la muestra elegida eran expertos en los contenidos incluidos en el 
modelo de la IAEA (p.e., liderazgo, aprendizaje organizacional, gestión 
organizacional), pero no eran expertos en la industria nuclear ni en HROs, lo cual 
evitaba que sus respuestas pudiesen estar sesgadas por conocimientos previos del 
modelo de la IAEA o de otros modelos de cultura de seguridad utilizados en el 
sector nuclear.  
Los 48 expertos recibieron las mismas instrucciones y documentos que los 
290 estudiantes de la muestra explicada en el apartado anterior. Sin embargo, los 
expertos fueron contactados por email debido a las dificultades de contactar con 
muchos de ellos en persona. Se hizo énfasis en que los expertos debían contactar 
con los investigadores en caso de dudas o dificultades a la hora de realizar el 
ejercicio. Algunos expertos destacaron la complejidad de la tarea, percibiendo 
solapamiento y ambigüedad en algunas dimensiones.  
De la misma forma que en la muestra de estudiantes, se enfatizó la 
importancia del proyecto para contribuir al desarrollo de la seguridad en la 
industria nuclear, y la participación fue voluntaria y anónima. 
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Para ver más detalles sobre esta muestra, motivo de su elección, así como 
sobre el desarrollo y administración de la herramienta, se recomienda visitar el 
Apartado 6.2.2. de la presente tesis.  
5.2.3. Muestras de trabajadores del sector nuclear (2008, 2011, 2014) 
En los tres estudios empíricos de la presente tesis, se emplearon muestras con 
empleados de dos centrales nucleares españolas pertenecientes a la misma 
organización, así como de sus servicios centrales. Todos los niveles de 
responsabilidad y áreas funcionales posibles fueron registrados. El procedimiento 
mediante el cual se llevó a cabo la recogida de datos en 2008, 2011 y 2014, fue 
idéntico. La organización bajo estudio instó (por correo interno) a la participación 
voluntaria de todos los trabajadores en sesiones grupales dispuestas cada hora 
durante tres días. En dichas sesiones, se presentó el objetivo de la evaluación, se 
señaló la importancia de la participación en el estudio y se enfatizó que el 
tratamiento de los datos sería totalmente confidencial, por lo que el anonimato 
estaba garantizado. En todas y cada una de estas sesiones se siguió dicho 
procedimiento. Una vez los participantes presentes fueron informados a este 
respecto, cumplimentaron de forma individual una batería de cuestionarios 
diseñada para evaluar diferentes aspectos organizacionales relacionados con la 
seguridad. Cada uno de los cuestionarios de la batería contó con sus 
correspondientes instrucciones de cumplimentación. Debido al sistema de trabajo 
por turnos utilizado en la organización bajo estudio, se dejaron en sobre cerrado el 
número de cuestionarios correspondientes a los trabajadores de los turnos que no 
pudieron presentarse. En estos casos, una persona de contacto de la propia 
organización entregó el cuestionario, igualmente explicando a los participantes la 
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importancia de su colaboración y la confidencialidad de las respuestas. De ésta 
forma, los participantes respondieron al cuestionario durante el horario laboral, en 
la mayoría de los casos en presencia del investigador responsable. Con ello, las 
dudas que pudieran surgir durante el proceso fueron resueltas inmediatamente.  
A continuación se resume la inclusión de cada una de estas tres muestras en 
los estudios empíricos de la presente tesis. En concreto se detalla el número de 
participantes, tasa de respuesta obtenida y número de cuestionarios utilizados en 
los análisis estadísticos correspondientes a cada estudio. 
Muestra sector nuclear 2008 
566 trabajadores de las dos centrales nucleares pertenecientes a la misma 
organización completaron la batería de cuestionarios. El tamaño total de la 
organización en 2008 era de 760 trabajadores, por lo que se obtuvo una tasa de 
respuesta del 74.47%. Esta muestra fue utilizada en el Estudio 2 y en el Estudio 3 
de la tesis, como se indica en la Tabla 6.  
En el caso del Estudio 2, no se incluyeron en los análisis los cuestionarios de 
aquellos participantes que no habían respondido a más de tres de los 24 ítems 
iniciales del SCEQ, lo que resultó en la utilización de 533 cuestionarios. En el 
caso del Estudio 3, los 566 participantes que completaron la batería de 
cuestionarios fueron incluidos en los análisis estadísticos correspondientes. 
Muestra sector nuclear 2011 
En esta ocasión 495 trabajadores de las dos centrales nucleares completaron 
la batería de cuestionarios correspondiente. El tamaño total de la organización en 
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2011 era también de 760 trabajadores, por lo que se obtuvo una tasa de respuesta 
del 65.13%. Esta muestra fue utilizada en el Estudio 1 y en el Estudio 3, como se 
indica en la Tabla 6.  
En el caso del Estudio 1, no se incluyeron en los análisis los cuestionarios de 
aquellos participantes que no habían respondido a más de tres de los 37 ítems del 
cuestionario correspondiente al modelo de IAEA, lo que dio lugar a la utilización 
de 468 cuestionarios. En el caso del Estudio 3, los 495 participantes que 
completaron la batería de cuestionarios fueron incluidos en los análisis 
estadísticos correspondientes. 
Muestra sector nuclear 2014 
Tres años más tarde, 617 trabajadores de las dos centrales nucleares 
completaron de nuevo un batería de cuestionarios. El tamaño total de la 
organización en 2014 fue de 806 empleados, por lo que la tasa de respuesta, un 
76.55%, mejoró con respecto a las dos ocasiones anteriores. Esta muestra fue 
utilizada únicamente en el Estudio 2 de la tesis, como se indica en la Tabla 6.  
Tampoco en esta ocasión se incluyeron en los análisis los cuestionarios de 
aquellos participantes que no habían respondido a más de tres de los 21 ítems 
finales del SCEQ, lo que dio lugar a la utilización de 598 cuestionarios. 
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Tabla 6  
Resumen de las muestras utilizadas en los estudios empíricos de la presente tesis 
doctoral  
Participantes y 
recogida de datos 
Manuscrito 
Estudiantes 
universitarios 
(2010) 
Estudio 1 
Testando la validez del modelo de cultura de seguridad de la 
Agencia Internacional de energía Atómica 
Testing the validity of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) safety culture model 
Expertos en 
comportamiento 
organizacional 
(2010)  
Estudio 1 
Testando la validez del modelo de cultura de seguridad de la 
Agencia Internacional de energía Atómica 
Testing the validity of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) safety culture model 
Empleados de 
central nuclear 
(2008) 
Estudio 2 
El cuestionario de cultura de seguridad en acción (SCEQ): modelo 
teórico y validación empírica 
The Safety Culture Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ): 
Theoretical model and empirical validation 
Estudio 3 
¿Medición de cultura organizacional o de cultura de seguridad? 
Organizational culture or safety culture assessment? 
Empleados de 
central nuclear 
(2011) 
Estudio 1 
Testando la validez del modelo de cultura de seguridad de la 
Agencia Internacional de energía Atómica 
Testing the validity of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) safety culture model 
Estudio 3 
¿Medición de cultura organizacional o de cultura de seguridad? 
Organizational culture or safety culture assessment? 
Empleados de 
central nuclear 
(2014) 
Estudio 2 
El cuestionario de cultura de seguridad en acción (SCEQ): modelo 
teórico y validación empírica 
The Safety Culture Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ): 
Theoretical model and empirical validation 
Nota: el nombre original de los estudios se destaca en negrita 
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5.3. Variables e instrumentos de medida 
A continuación se describen las variables utilizadas en esta tesis, así como los 
instrumentos de medida empleados para su operacionalización. Al final del 
apartado se incluye la Tabla 7, donde se resume la utilización de las variables en 
los estudios empíricos de la presente tesis. Complementariamente, en el anexo se 
presentan las escalas utilizadas para medir cada una de las variables. 
5.3.1. Cultura de seguridad (safety culture) 
Para medir cultura de seguridad en el Estudio 1 se utilizó el modelo de cultura 
de seguridad de la IAEA (IAEA, 2006a). Por un lado, se presentó un ejercicio que 
incluyó las cinco dimensiones y 37 atributos de cultura de seguridad propuestos 
por la IAEA, en el que los participantes tuvieron que asignar cada uno de los 
atributos a una de las dimensiones. Por otro lado, se creó un cuestionario que 
incluía 37 ítems, correspondientes a los 37 atributos del modelo, y en el que los 
participantes tuvieron que reportar la medida en que cada uno de estos atributos 
estaba presente en su organización. Para este cuestionario se utilizo una escala de 
respuesta tipo Likert (1-Muy en desacuerdo/ 5- Muy de acuerdo). Algunos 
ejemplos de los ítems (atributos del modelo de la IAEA) son ―la dirección 
fomenta la participación activa del personal en la mejora de la seguridad‖, ―la 
confianza impregna la organización‖ y ―una actitud cuestionadora predomina en 
todos los niveles de la organización‖. 
5.3.2. Cultura de seguridad en acción (enacted safety culture) 
La cultura de seguridad fue evaluada en los Estudios 2 y 3 mediante el Safety 
Culture Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ), creado por nuestro equipo (López de 
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Castro y cols., 2017). El SCEQ estuvo inicialmente formado por 24 ítems, a través 
de los cuales los participantes tuvieron que reportar el peso fundamental y la 
importancia práctica en el día a día de la seguridad en su empresa. El cuestionario 
incluyó una escala de respuesta tipo Likert (1-Nada/ 5- Mucho). Algunos 
ejemplos de los ítems en que se refleja la importancia y peso fundamental de la 
seguridad son ―en el comportamiento diario de la alta dirección‖, ―en la 
contratación del personal‖ y ―a la hora de adjudicar recursos (tiempo, equipos, 
personal, dinero)‖.  
5.3.3. Cultura organizacional (organizational culture) 
La cultura organizacional fue evaluada en el Estudio 3 mediante la versión 
original del Inventario de Cultura Organizacional (Organizational Culture 
Inventory [OCI]) de Human Synergistics International (Cooke y Lafferty, 1987). 
Este cuestionario está formado por 120 ítems que recaban información sobre los 
comportamientos que los trabajadores consideran que se espera de ellos y de otros 
trabajadores para encajar y satisfacer las expectativas (―fit in and meet 
expectations‖) de su organización. De esta forma, los participantes tuvieron que 
reportar en qué medida se espera que la gente lleve a cabo ciertos 
comportamientos. El cuestionario incluyó una escala de respuesta tipo Likert (1-
En ninguna medida/ 5-En muy gran medida). Algunos ejemplos de ítems son 
―motive a los demás con la amabilidad‖, ―asuma tareas que constituyan un reto‖ y 
―esté de acuerdo con todo el mundo‖. 
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5.3.4. Clima de seguridad organizacional (organizational-level safety climate) 
El clima de seguridad a nivel organizacional se evaluó en los Estudios 2 y 3 
mediante el cuestionario original de Zohar y Luria (2005) de ―Clima de seguridad 
organizacional‖ ("Organizational-level Safety Climate"). Este cuestionario está 
formado por 16 ítems con una escala de respuesta tipo Likert (1- Muy en 
desacuerdo/ 5- Muy de acuerdo). Los participantes fueron instados a contestar en 
qué medida estaban de acuerdo con afirmaciones tales como ―continuamente se 
pone empeño en mejorar los niveles de seguridad en cada departamento‖, ―se 
corrige rápidamente cualquier riesgo para la seguridad (incluso si es costoso)‖ o 
―se considera la seguridad cuando se establece la programación y los plazos de los 
trabajos‖.  
5.3.5. Clima de seguridad grupal (group-level safety climate) 
El clima de seguridad a nivel de unidad de trabajo se evaluó en el Estudio 3 
mediante una adaptación española del cuestionario original de Clima de Seguridad 
Grupal ("Group-level Safety Climate") de Zohar y Luria (2005). La escala 
original de Zohar y Luria incluía una serie de interacciones entre supervisores y 
miembros del equipo que servían para medir percepciones sobre cómo las 
prácticas de los supervisores reflejaban la prioridad de la seguridad frente a la 
productividad en la organización. La adaptación de Latorre, Gracia, Tomás y 
Peiró (2013) utilizó 15 de los 16 ítems originales añadiendo algunas 
modificaciones. En concreto, en ocho ítems el referente de las percepciones de los 
participantes pasó de ser el supervisor o jefe a ser el grupo de trabajo. De esta 
forma los participantes respondieron en qué medida estaban de acuerdo con una 
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serie de afirmaciones (ítems) referidas a su unidad de trabajo. Se empleó una 
escala de respuesta tipo Likert (1- Muy en desacuerdo/ 5- Muy de acuerdo). 
Algunos ejemplos de los ítems son ―frecuentemente se recuerdan los riesgos que 
existen en nuestro trabajo‖, ―nuestro jefe se asegura de que seguimos todas las 
normas de seguridad (no sólo las más importantes)‖ y ―se siguen las reglas de 
seguridad incluso cuando el trabajo se retrasa respecto a la planificación‖.  
5.3.6. Satisfacción con la seguridad (safety satisfaction) 
Para medir la satisfacción con la seguridad en los Estudios 2 y 3 se utilizó el 
Cuestionario de Satisfacción con la Seguridad (―Safety Satisfaction Questionnaire 
[SSQ]‖), el cual fue desarrollado por nuestro equipo. El cuestionario constó de 
seis ítems, a través de los cuales los participantes tuvieron que reportar cuán 
satisfechos estaban con la seguridad de su organización. El SSQ incluyó una 
escala de respuesta tipo Likert (1-Muy insatisfecho/ 5- Muy satisfecho). Algunos 
ejemplos de los ítems son ―la seguridad en el funcionamiento u operación de la 
planta‖ ó ―la eficacia de las acciones correctivas‖.  
5.3.7. Satisfacción con el trabajo (job satisfaction) 
La satisfacción con el trabajo se midió en los Estudios 2 y 3 mediante los 
siguientes tres ítems: ―¿cuán satisfecho está con su trabajo?‖, ―¿cuán satisfecho 
está con el equipo en el que trabaja?‖ y ―¿cuán satisfecho está con su empresa?‖. 
Se empleó una escala de respuesta tipo Likert (1- Muy insatisfecho/ 5- Muy 
satisfecho).  
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5.3.8. Ambigüedad de rol (role ambiguity) 
Para medir ambigüedad de rol en el Estudio 1 se utilizaron cuatro ítems de la 
escala original de ambigüedad de rol de Rizzo, House y Lirtzman (1970). El 
cuestionario incluyó una escala de respuesta tipo Likert (1-Muy en desacuerdo/ 5- 
Muy de acuerdo) en la que los participantes indicaron su grado de acuerdo con los 
cuatro enunciados. Algunos ejemplos de estos enunciados son ―sé exactamente lo 
que se espera de mi en mi trabajo‖ y ―sé cuáles son mis responsabilidades en mi 
trabajo‖.  
5.3.9. Confianza (trust) 
Para medir confianza en el Estudio 1, se utilizaron cuatro ítems desarrollados 
por nuestro equipo. Los participantes tuvieron que evaluar el grado de confianza 
que tenían en su jefe de equipo, en los miembros de su equipo, en otras unidades 
de trabajo de la organización, y en el equipo de dirección. Un ejemplo de un ítem 
es ―confío en los compañeros de mi unidad‖. Se empleo una escala de respuesta 
tipo Likert (1- Muy en desacuerdo/ 5- Muy de acuerdo). 
5.3.10. Cumplimiento de la seguridad (safety compliance) 
El cumplimiento de la seguridad se midió en el Estudio 3 con la escala 
original de Cumplimiento de la Seguridad (―Safety compliance‖) de Neal y 
Griffin (2006), formada por 3 ítems. Los participantes tuvieron que indicar en una 
escala de respuesta tipo Likert (1-Muy en desacuerdo/ 5- Muy de acuerdo) su 
grado de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones: ―uso todo el equipo de 
seguridad necesario para hacer mi trabajo‖, ―uso los procedimientos correctos de 
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seguridad para llevar a cabo mi trabajo‖, y ―aseguro los niveles más altos de 
seguridad cuando realizo mi trabajo‖.  
5.3.11. Participación en seguridad (safety participation) 
La participación en seguridad se midió en el Estudio 3 mediante la escala 
original Participación en Seguridad (―Safety participation‖) de Neal y Griffin 
(2006), compuesta por 3 ítems. Los participantes señalaron en una escala de 
respuesta tipo Likert (1-Muy en desacuerdo/ 5- Muy de acuerdo) su grado de 
acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones: ―promuevo el programa de seguridad 
dentro de la organización‖, ―hago un esfuerzo extra para mejorar la seguridad del 
lugar de trabajo‖, y ―voluntariamente realizo tareas o actividades que ayudan a 
mejorar la seguridad en el trabajo‖. 
5.3.12. Conductas arriesgadas (risky behaviours) 
Las conductas arriesgadas de los trabajadores se midieron en los Estudios 2 y 
3 mediante el cuestionario original de Conductas Arriesgadas (―Risky behaviors‖) 
de Mearns, Flin, Gordon y Fleming (2001). El cuestionario original está formado 
por doce ítems, pero nuestros estudios no tuvieron en cuenta dos ítems de la 
escala original porque no se consideraron apropiados para el sector nuclear. Por lo 
tanto, la escala utilizada se compuso de diez ítems con un rango de respuesta (1-
Nunca/ 5- Muy a menudo). Los participantes tuvieron que marcar la frecuencia 
con la que se llevaban a cabo diversas conductas. Algunos ejemplos de dichas 
conductas son ―para poder ser más eficaz en mi trabajo, tengo que saltarme 
algunos procedimientos que no son esenciales‖, ―para lograr los objetivos, tengo 
que saltarme ciertas reglas que no son críticas para la seguridad‖ y ―algunas 
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situaciones en mi trabajo me impiden trabajar siguiendo los procedimientos y 
normativas en seguridad‖.  
Tabla 7 
   
Utilización de variables en los tres estudios empíricos de la presente tesis 
 Estudio 1 Estudio 2 Estudio 3 
Cultura de seguridad X     
Cultura de seguridad en acción   X X 
Cultura organizacional     X 
Clima de seguridad organizacional   X X 
Clima de seguridad grupal      X 
Satisfacción con la seguridad    X X 
Satisfacción con el trabajo    X X 
Ambigüedad de rol  X     
Confianza X     
Cumplimiento de la seguridad      X 
Participación en seguridad      X 
Conductas arriesgadas    X X 
Nota: La variable "Cultura de seguridad 1 (IAEA)" tomó como referencia 
el modelo de cultura de seguridad de la IAEA. La variable "Cultura de 
seguridad 2 (SCEQ)" tomó como referencia el cuestionario SCEQ. 
 
 
5.4. Análisis de datos 
Los tres estudios incluidos en la presente tesis tienen como objetivo central la 
validación de tres cuestionarios, que a su vez contribuya a la validación de los 
modelos teóricos en que estos cuestionarios se sustentan.  
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Es ampliamente aceptado que los dos requisitos más importantes de una 
herramienta de medida (p.e., un cuestionario) son la fiabilidad y la validez. La 
fiabilidad se refiere al grado en que las puntuaciones del cuestionario no son 
afectadas por errores de medición, es decir, la fiabilidad se preocupa de la 
precisión de la herramienta. Se dice que un cuestionario es ‗fiable‘ en la medida 
en que las diferencias obtenidas entre las puntuaciones individuales son debidas a 
diferencias reales en el constructo bajo estudio. Por otro lado, la validez se refiere 
al grado en que las puntuaciones del cuestionario ofrecen información sobre el 
constructo bajo estudio, es decir, la validez se preocupa del significado. Se dice 
que un cuestionario es ‗válido‘ en tanto en cuanto mida el constructo o 
constructos que pretende medir.  
La validación empírica de un cuestionario reside por tanto en la fuerza de las 
evidencias encontradas para apoyar la fiabilidad y validez de sus resultados. De 
acuerdo con esto, los análisis estadísticos realizados en los tres estudios se han 
centrado en recoger evidencias que permitan validar o no validar empíricamente 
los cuestionarios y modelos presentados.  
5.4.1. Análisis descriptivos 
En los tres estudios que componen la presente tesis doctoral se han realizado 
una serie de análisis descriptivos preliminares. De esta forma se calculó la media, 
desviación típica, asimetría y curtosis, de las respuestas dadas por los trabajadores 
de las centrales nucleares a cada uno de los ítems pertenecientes a los 
cuestionarios estudiados (cuestionario basado en el modelo de la IAEA, 
cuestionario SCEQ y cuestionario OCI).  
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Por otro lado, se realizaron análisis descriptivos con los ítems de las variables 
externas utilizadas en los Estudios 2 y 3 (clima de seguridad organizacional, clima 
de seguridad grupal, satisfacción con la seguridad, satisfacción con el trabajo, 
cumplimiento de la seguridad, participación en seguridad y conductas 
arriesgadas). Los análisis de desviaciones típicas permitieron estudiar el poder 
discriminante de los ítems, mientras que los análisis de asimetría y curtosis 
permitieron analizar la existencia de normalidad en la distribución de los datos 
muestrales correspondientes a cada uno de los estudios. Los criterios utilizados 
para asumir un ajuste razonable a la distribución normal fueron que los valores 
absolutos medios en la asimetría presentada por los ítems fuesen inferiores a 1 
(Boomsma, 1983) y que casi todos los ítems presentasen una asimetría y curtosis 
univariantes entre -1 y +1 (Muthén y Kaplan, 1985). 
Adicionalmente, se llevaron a cabo análisis descriptivos para investigar cómo 
las muestras de estudiantes y de expertos en comportamiento organizacional en el 
Estudio 1 determinaron la correspondencia entre cada uno de los 37 atributos del 
modelo de la IAEA y sus 5 dimensiones. Para ello se calcularon los porcentajes de 
respuestas correctas por persona, de respuestas correctas por dimensión, y de 
participantes que asignaron cada uno de los atributos de forma correcta. Una 
respuesta fue calificada como ‗correcta‘ cuando el participante asignó un atributo 
a la dimensión a la que, de acuerdo a la IAEA, pertenece. 
5.4.2. Evidencias de fiabilidad 
A lo largo de los tres estudios se hicieron distintos análisis de fiabilidad. Por 
un lado, mediante el coeficiente alfa de Cronbach, se comprobó la consistencia 
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interna de cada una de las dimensiones y sub-dimensiones propuestas por los 
cuestionarios bajo estudio, así como la consistencia interna de otras escalas 
utilizadas en los Estudios 2 y 3 (clima de seguridad organizacional, clima de 
seguridad grupal, satisfacción con la seguridad, satisfacción con el trabajo, 
cumplimiento de la seguridad, participación en seguridad y conductas 
arriesgadas). Adicionalmente, se empleo el índice de fiabilidad compuesta para 
estudiar la consistencia interna de las dimensiones del SCEQ en el Estudio 2. En 
la presente tesis se aceptan los valores superiores a .70 como indicadores de una 
consistencia interna aceptable medidos por el coeficiente alfa de Cronbach 
(Nunnally, 1978) y por el índice de fiabilidad compuesta (Hair, Anderson, Tatham 
and Black, 1998; Raykov, 2001).  
Por otro lado, en los Estudios 2 y 3 se calcularon los coeficientes de 
homogeneidad corregidos de cada uno de los ítems de los tres cuestionarios bajo 
estudio (cuestionario basado en el modelo de la IAEA, cuestionario SCEQ y 
cuestionario OCI) a través de análisis de correlaciones ítem-escala corregidas. El 
criterio de aceptación utilizado en este caso es que las correlaciones ítem-escala 
corregidas sean mayores de .30 (Fitzpatrick y cols., 1998; Nunnally y Bernstein, 
1994) y menores que .90 (Fitzpatrick y cols., 1998). Un valor de correlación alto 
es indicador de que el ítem mide el mismo constructo que el resto de ítems de su 
escala. Sin embargo, una correlación demasiado alta (˃.90) es una señal de 
redundancia con otros ítems de la escala. Estos análisis de fiabilidad permiten 
evaluar cuánto mejoraría (o empeoraría) la fiabilidad de una escala si se excluyera 
un determinado ítem.  
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5.4.3. Evidencias de validez 
Para recoger evidencias de validez de las puntuaciones de los tres 
cuestionarios bajo estudio (cuestionario basado en el modelo de la IAEA, 
cuestionario SCEQ y cuestionario OCI) se hicieron distintos análisis, que a 
continuación se detallan.   
5.4.3.1. Evidencias de validez basadas en la estructura interna 
En los tres estudios de la tesis se examinó el grado en que los ítems de los 
cuestionarios bajo estudio mostraron cargas factoriales altas y significativas en sus 
factores (dimensiones) correspondientes. A lo largo de la tesis se aceptaron como 
satisfactorias las saturaciones iguales o superiores a .40, y se consideró que un 
ítem satura fuertemente en su factor correspondiente si la saturación es igual o 
mayor que .60 (Hair y cols., 1998). 
En lo que se refiere a los análisis factoriales empleados, en los tres estudios se 
ha investigado la estructura interna de los cuestionarios evaluados a través de 
análisis factorial confirmatorio (AFC). En el Estudio 1 se ha empleado también 
análisis de componentes principales (ACP), y análisis factorial exploratorio 
(AFE). Y en el Estudio 2 se ha utilizado AFE. A continuación se detallan los 
análisis factoriales realizados en cada estudio.  
Estructura interna del cuestionario basado en el modelo de la IAEA (Estudio 1) 
En el Estudio 1 se realizó en primer lugar un AFC mediante el programa 
LISREL 8.80 (Jöreskog y Sörbom, 2006). Para estimar los parámetros del modelo 
de cultura de seguridad de cinco factores propuesto por la IAEA, se analizaron las 
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correlaciones policóricas a través del método de estimación de máxima 
verosimilitud robusto o ‗robust maximum likelihood‘ (RML).  
Con el objetivo de evaluar el ajuste del modelo de cinco factores propuesto 
por la IAEA, se consideraron los siguientes índices de bondad de ajuste: NNFI 
(non-normed ﬁt index), CFI (comparative ﬁt index), RMSEA (root mean square 
error of approximation) y SRMR (standarized root mean square residual). El 
criterio utilizado en esta tesis para considerar que un modelo presenta un ajuste 
satisfactorio atendiendo a los índices NNFI y el CFI es el de obtener valores 
superiores o iguales a .90 (Batista-Foquet y Coenders, 2000; Jöreskog y Sörbom, 
2006; Marsh, Hau y Grayson, 2005). Para considerar un buen ajuste, los valores 
deberían ser mayores de .95 (Hu y Bentler, 1999). Por su parte, para interpretar 
los índices RMSEA y SRMR, los valores menores que .08 se han considerado 
indicativos de un ajuste aceptable al modelo (Byon y Zhang, 2010; Hu y Bentler, 
1999), siendo mejor el ajuste cuanto menores sean los valores. 
Sin embargo, a pesar del ajuste satisfactorio del modelo de cinco dimensiones 
propuesto por la IAEA, las altas correlaciones encontradas entre las cinco 
dimensiones del modelo (rxy ˃ .85) sugerían que un modelo unidimensional podría 
ser más adecuado para representar los 37 atributos (ítems) del modelo de la IAEA.   
Por este motivo se decidió investigar el ajuste de un modelo unidimensional y 
compararlo con el ajuste del modelo de cinco dimensiones. Para comparar el 
ajuste entre ambos modelos, se tuvieron en cuenta varios criterios basados en la 
comparación de los índices de bondad de ajuste (índices de ajuste incrementales). 
De este modo, siguiendo las recomendaciones de Cheung y Rensvold (2002) y 
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Widaman (1985), las diferencias inferiores a .01 entre los valores de los índices
NNFI y CFI fueron consideradas como indicación de diferencias triviales entre
modelos. Asimismo, seguimos la recomendación de Chen (2007), quien sugiere
que cuando el incremento de los valores del índice RMSEA es menor que .015,
las diferencias entre los modelos son triviales, pudiendo optar por el modelo más
parsimonioso.
Finalmente, a pesar de que el AFC apoyó la estructura unidimensional del
modelo de la IAEA, se decidió explorar la estructura interna del modelo sin las
restricciones impuestas por AFCs por dos motivos: 1) las respuestas de las otras
dos muestras utilizadas en este Estudio (estudiantes y expertos en comportamiento
organizacional) sugerían que algunos de los atributos del modelo (ítems) sí
podrían estar relacionados con las dimensiones a las que teóricamente pertenecen;
2) los resultados de los AFCs sugerían que algunas de las correlaciones entre
dimensiones del modelo parecían empíricamente discriminables.
Para ello se exploró la estructura interna del modelo de la IAEA a través de 
ACPs con rotación oblimin, sin establecer el número de factores a priori. De 
acuerdo con el criterio comúnmente aceptado de Kaiser o ‗Kaiser Criterion‘, se 
retuvieron aquellos factores que presentaron un Eigenvalue igual o mayor que 1. 
Se ofrecieron resultados teniendo en cuenta tanto las saturaciones factoriales por 
encima de .30 (recomendado por Spector, 1992) como las saturaciones por encima 
de .40 (recomendado por Hair y cols., 1995). Se aceptó un número mínimo de tres 
ítems por factor (Brown, 2006; Tabachnick y Fidell, 2001). Adicionalmente, 
debido a que el criterio de Kaiser puede sobreestimar el número de factores a 
retener (Costello y Osborne, 2005; Kline, 1994; Lance, Butts y Michels, 2006; 
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Zwick y Velicer 1986), se repitieron los ACPs forzando el número de factores a 
dos, tres o cuatro.   
La razón de escoger ACP en vez de AFE, fue para controlar la posibilidad de 
que cultura de seguridad fuese un constructo formativo multidimensional en vez 
de un constructo reflectivo multidimensional (una diferenciación entre ambos 
tipos de constructos se ofrece en el Apartado 6.2.3.4.). En todo caso, finalmente se 
investigó también si una solución factorial más acorde con la propuesta por la 
IAEA podía emerger a través de AFEs.  
Adicionalmente, en el Estudio 1 se decidió controlar la posibilidad de que las 
altas correlaciones entre las cinco dimensiones del cuestionario (basado en el 
modelo de cultura de seguridad de la IAEA) no se debieran, al menos 
parcialmente, a que todos los ítems habían sido asignados a las dimensiones a 
través de los mismos participantes. Para ello se empleo el método Harman de un 
solo factor o ‗Harman‘s single factor test‘, realizando un AFE con constructos 
claramente distintos para determinar si la presencia de varianza del método común 
resulta en un único factor o en un factor que cuente con la mayoría de las 
varianzas (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee y Podsakoff, 2003). Para descartar esta 
posibilidad, se empleo el método de Harman de un solo factor mediante un AFE 
que incluyó los 37 ítems del cuestionario de cultura seguridad, cuatro ítems del 
cuestionario de confianza y cuatro ítems del cuestionario de ambigüedad de rol.    
Estructura interna del cuestionario SCEQ (Estudio 2) 
En el Estudio 2, en primer lugar se llevo a cabo un AFE con las respuestas 
dadas al SCEQ por los trabajadores de dos centrales nucleares (pertenecientes a la 
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misma organización), en 2008. El AFE se realizó mediante el método de 
estimación de mínimos cuadrados no ponderados o ‗unweighted least square‘ 
(ULS) aplicando el criterio de rotación oblicua o ‗oblique rotation criterion‘ 
(Lloret-Segura y cols., 2014; Sass y Schmitt, 2010). Como paso previo a los 
análisis factoriales, se evaluó si los datos eran adecuados para realizarlos. Para 
ello se utilizaron dos indicadores del grado de asociación entre variables: la 
prueba de esfericidad de Bartlett o ‗Bartlett test of sphericity‘, y la medida de 
adecuación de la muestra KMO o ‗Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin‘ (KMO). En la prueba de 
Bartlett se consideró que el resultado del test debería de ser estadísticamente 
significativo (p < .05). Por su parte, se consideró que los resultados del modelo 
factorial serían excelentes si el índice KMO estuviese comprendido entre .90 y 1; 
mientras que los resultados serían buenos, si estuviese comprendido entre .80 y 
.90 (Kaiser, 1974).   
Al igual que en el Estudio 1, en el AFE llevado a cabo en el Estudio 2, se 
retuvieron también aquellos factores que presentaron un Eigenvalue igual o mayor 
que 1, se tuvieron en cuenta saturaciones factoriales por encima de .40 y se aceptó 
un número mínimo de tres ítems por factor. En base a los resultados del AFE y su 
interpretación teórica, se eliminaron tres ítems de los 24 ítems que inicialmente 
componían el SCEQ.  
Para confirmar la estructura interna del SCEQ, se llevaron a cabo AFCs con 
las respuestas dadas al SCEQ por los trabajadores de las centrales nucleares seis 
años más tarde (muestra de 2014) mediante el programa Mplus (Muthén y 
Muthén, 1998-2010). Se utilizó el método de estimación de Mínimos Cuadrados 
Ponderados Robustos o ‗robust weighted least squares‘ (WLSMV). Se estudiaron 
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y compararon los ajustes del modelo tridimensional del SCEQ hipotetizado 
(decisiones estratégicas, prácticas de gestión de recursos humanos, y 
comportamientos y actividades del día a día ó más en concreto ‗strategic decisions 
ensuring safety‘, ‗human resources practices driving safety‘ y ‗daily activities and 
behaviors supporting safety‘), y de un modelo unidimensional donde los 21 ítems 
del SCEQ medían una misma dimensión. 
Para evaluar el ajuste de ambos modelos, se consideraron los índices de 
bondad de ajuste NNFI (también llamado TLI, Tucker-Lewis Index), CFI y 
RMSEA. Los criterios seguidos para considerar que un modelo presenta un ajuste 
satisfactorio atendiendo a estos índices fueron los mismos que los seguidos en los 
AFCs del Estudio 1. Del mismo modo, la comparación del modelo tridimensional 
y unidimensional del SCEQ siguió los mismos criterios y recomendaciones que 
los utilizados en la comparación del ajuste de modelos en el Estudio 1.  
Estructura interna de los cuestionarios SCEQ y OCI (Estudio 3) 
Para analizar la estructura interna del OCI propuesta por sus autores, se 
llevaron a cabo AFCs con las respuestas dadas al OCI por los trabajadores de dos 
centrales nucleares (pertenecientes a la misma organización) en 2008 mediante el 
programa Lisrel 8.80 (Jöreskog y Sörbom, 2006). Se utilizó el método de 
estimación de máxima verosimilitud (ML) y la matriz de correlaciones de Pearson 
como input para los análisis.  
En concreto se estudiaron y compararon los ajustes de los siguientes tres 
modelos: 1) un modelo unifactorial donde los 120 ítems del OCI representaban 
una misma dimensión; 2) un modelo de tres factores (con 40 ítems cada uno) que 
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representaban las tres dimensiones o estilos culturales del OCI (estilo 
‗constructivo, estilo ‗Pasivo/defensivo, y estilo ‗Agresivo/defensivo); 3) un 
modelo de doce factores (con 10 ítems cada uno) que representaban los doce sub-
dimensiones o normas culturales del OCI.  
Por otro lado, para profundizar aún más en la estructura interna del OCI, 
mediante AFCs se compararon también modelos alternativos que tuvieron en 
cuenta los ítems de cada uno de los estilos culturales por separado. De esta forma 
se comparó un modelo unifactorial donde los ítems del estilo ‗constructivo‘ 
representaban una misma dimensión con un modelo de cuatro factores que 
representaban las cuatro sub-dimensiones o normas culturales del estilo 
‗constructivo‘; un modelo unifactorial donde los ítems del estilo 
‗pasivo/defensivo‘ representaban una misma dimensión con un modelo de cuatro 
factores que representaban las cuatro sub-dimensiones o normas culturales del 
estilo ‗pasivo/defensivo‘; y un modelo unifactorial donde los ítems del estilo 
‗agresivo/defensivo‘ representaban una misma dimensión con un modelo de 
cuatro factores que representaban las cuatro sub-dimensiones o normas culturales 
del estilo ‗agresivo/defensivo‘. 
Para evaluar el ajuste de cada uno de los modelos probados, se consideraron 
los índices de bondad de ajuste NNFI, CFI y RMSEA. Los criterios seguidos para 
considerar que un modelo presenta un ajuste satisfactorio atendiendo a estos 
índices fueron los mismos que los seguidos en los AFCs de los Estudios 1 y 2. Del 
mismo modo, las comparaciones entre modelos siguieron los mismos criterios y 
recomendaciones que los utilizados en las comparaciones del ajuste de modelos 
en los Estudios 1 y 2.  
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5.4.3.2. Evidencias de validez basadas en las relaciones con otras variables 
El estudio de las relaciones entre la medida obtenida por el cuestionario (en 
este caso el SCEQ y el OCI) y variables externas (las siete variables utilizadas), 
conocida como el aspecto externo de la validez por Loevinger (1957), o como 
amplitud nomotética por Embretson (1983), es probablemente el tipo de evidencia 
más utilizado en el proceso de validación de cuestionarios (Elosua Oliden, 2003). 
Esta fuente de información se nutre de evidencias que relacionan la puntuación 
con algún criterio que se espera pronostique el cuestionario, con otros 
cuestionarios que hipotéticamente midan el mismo constructo, constructos 
relacionados o constructos diferentes (AERA, APA y NCME, 1999). Los 
resultados de estos análisis servirían para evaluar el grado en que las relaciones 
hipotetizadas son consistentes con la interpretación propuesta, y obtener así 
evidencias de validez del cuestionario estudiado.  
Relaciones con variables externas 
Como parte del trabajo de validación del cuestionario de cultura de seguridad 
SCEQ y del cuestionario de cultura organizacional OCI, en los Estudios 2 y 3 se 
analizaron las relaciones de estos dos cuestionarios con diferentes variables 
externas que miden constructos teórica y empíricamente asociados con cultura de 
seguridad y cultura organizacional, y conceptualizados en la literatura como 
consecuentes de cultura de seguridad. Por otro lado, se analizó la relación entre 
cultura de seguridad y cultura organizacional.  
En concreto, en el Estudio 2 se calcularon coeficientes de correlación de 
Pearson entre cada una de las dimensiones del SCEQ (muestra de 2014) y las 
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variables externas clima de seguridad organizacional, satisfacción con la 
seguridad, satisfacción con el trabajo y conductas arriesgadas (muestra de 2014). 
Adicionalmente, en el Estudio 2 recogimos evidencias de validez 
discriminante entre el cuestionario de cultura de seguridad SCEQ y la adaptación 
española del cuestionario de clima de seguridad de Zohar y Luria (2005). Esto se 
realizó de dos formas: 1) se estudió si existían diferencias significativas entre las 
correlaciones de cada par de dimensiones del SCEQ y la correlación de cada una 
de estas dimensiones con el SCEQ. Si las correlaciones entre dos dimensiones del 
SCEQ fuesen significativamente mayores que las correlaciones entre cada una de 
esas dimensiones y el clima de seguridad, se obtendrían evidencias adicionales de 
validez del SCEQ; 2) se realizaron AFCs testando distintos modelos que incluían 
los ítems del SCEQ y los ítems del cuestionario de clima de seguridad. A través 
del ajuste y comparación entre los modelos estudiados, se quiso también respaldar 
que el SCEQ y el cuestionario de clima de seguridad medían constructos distintos.   
En el Estudio 3 se presentó un estudio transversal y un estudio longitudinal. 
En el estudio transversal se calcularon coeficientes de correlación de Pearson 
entre cada una de las tres dimensiones del SCEQ (muestra de 2008) y las variables 
externas clima de seguridad organizacional, clima de seguridad grupal, 
satisfacción con la seguridad y satisfacción con el trabajo (muestra 2011). En el 
estudio longitudinal, se calcularon coeficientes de correlación de Pearson entre 
cada una de las tres dimensiones del SCEQ (muestra 2008) y las variables 
externas cumplimiento de la seguridad, participación en seguridad y conductas 
arriesgadas (muestra 2011). Del mismo modo se calcularon las correlaciones entre 
cada una de las tres dimensiones y doce sub-dimensiones del OCI (2008) y las 
CAPÍTULO V
159 
 
variables anteriormente mencionadas (muestras 2008 y 2011). Finalmente se 
estudió empíricamente la relación entre cultura de seguridad y cultura 
organizacional mediante coeficientes de correlación de Pearson entre las 
dimensiones del SCEQ, y las dimensiones y sub-dimensiones del OCI.   
Predicción de variables externas 
En el Estudio 3 se llevaron a cabo análisis de regresión múltiple con el 
programa SPSS 22 para investigar el grado en que la cultura de seguridad (medido 
por las dimensiones del SCEQ en 2008) y la cultura organizacional (medido por 
las dimensiones y sub-dimensiones el OCI en 2008) podrían predecir el 
desempeño de seguridad (medido en 2011 por los cuestionarios de cumplimiento 
de la seguridad, participación en seguridad y conductas arriesgadas) de las 
centrales nucleares estudiadas. Para evitar problemas de colinealidad, se 
estandarizaron las variables independientes.  
Los coeficientes de determinación (R
2
) obtenidos en los análisis de regresión 
múltiple expresaron la proporción de varianza de cada uno de los tres criterios de 
desempeño de seguridad que explicaban las dimensiones del SCEQ y las 
dimensiones del OCI. 
Posteriormente se incluyeron las dimensiones del SCEQ y las dimensiones 
del OCI en un modelo de regresión jerárquica para investigar el grado en que el 
desempeño de seguridad se podría predecir empleando herramientas de medición 
de cultura de seguridad y de cultura organizacional por separado o conjuntamente. 
En este caso, los cambios en R
2 
de modelos consecutivos permitieron estudiar la 
proporción de varianza de cada uno de los tres criterios de desempeño de 
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seguridad que se podía explicar teniendo en cuenta las respuestas de los 
participantes al SCEQ y al OCI de forma separada y conjunta. 
Relaciones entre las dimensiones del cuestionario 
La evidencia de validez convergente y discriminante se enmarca dentro de las
evidencias  de  validez  basadas en las relaciones con otras variables (AERA, APA
y NCME, 1999).  Siguiendo  este  criterio,  incluimos  en este apartado los análisis
realizados para recoger evidencias de validez  discriminante de las dimensiones de
los  cuestionarios   estudiados  (cuestionario   basado  en  el  modelo  de  la  IAEA,
cuestionario SCEQ y cuestionario OCI).  Debido a que estos análisis se ciñen a las
relaciones entre las dimensiones  de  los  propios  cuestionarios,  esta  información
podría haberse  incluido  también  en  el  apartado  anterior (5.4.3.1), referido a las
evidencias basadas en la estructura interna.
En concreto, se calcularon coeficientes de correlación de Pearson para 
estudiar la correlación presentada por cada dimensión de cada uno de los tres 
cuestionarios bajo estudio con el resto de las dimensiones del cuestionario al que 
pertenecen. La presente tesis toma el criterio comúnmente aceptado de Kline 
(2005), que establece que dos dimensiones son discriminantes cuando las 
correlaciones entre éstas son menores de .85. El cumplimiento de este criterio 
(rxy< .85) apoyaría que las dimensiones de los cuestionarios estudiados en esta 
tesis miden aspectos relacionados pero distintos del mismo constructo (cultura de 
seguridad en el caso del SCEQ y del cuestionario de la IAEA, y cultura 
organizacional en el caso del OCI).  
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5.4.3.3. Evidencias de validez basadas en diferencias inter-grupos 
En el Estudio 2 se compararon las respuestas dadas a cada una de las tres 
dimensiones del SCEQ por el equipo de alta dirección y por el resto de empleados 
de las centrales nucleares. A través de pruebas t o ‗T-Tests‘ se estudió si el SCEQ 
tenía la capacidad de discriminar entre las valoraciones que distintos grupos 
jerárquicos daban al grado en que la seguridad era un valor en acción en su 
organización. Este gap en la percepción y valoración de la seguridad en la 
organización se ha observado frecuentemente en la literatura (Huang, Robertson, 
Lee, Rineer, Murphy, Garabet y Dainoff, 2014).  
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Abstract 
This paper takes the first steps to empirically validate the widely used model 
of safety culture of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), composed 
of five dimensions, further specified by 37 attributes. To do so, three independent 
and complementary studies are presented. First, 290 students serve to collect 
evidence about the face validity of the model. Second, 48 experts in 
organizational behavior judge its content validity. And third, 468 workers in a 
Spanish nuclear power plant help to reveal how closely the theoretical five-
dimensional model can be replicated. Our findings suggest that several attributes 
of the model may not be related to their corresponding dimensions. According to 
our results, a one-dimensional structure fits the data better than the five 
dimensions proposed by the IAEA. Moreover, the IAEA model, as it stands, 
seems to have rather moderate content validity and low face validity. Practical 
implications for researchers and practitioners are included.  
Keywords: Empirical validation;HRO; nuclear industry;nuclear power plant; 
safety culture; safety performance 
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6.1. Introduction 
In 1986 the Chernobyl catastrophe led to the emergence of ῾safety culture᾽ as 
a new concept in high reliability organizations (HRO) in general and in the 
nuclear industry in particular. Experts at the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) analyzed the disaster and came to the conclusion that the occurrences 
could not just be attributed to human error, the technology, or even the socio-
technical system. The identified cause was a group of organizational and 
management factors which they labeled as safety culture. The report was 
published by the IAEA (1986) as Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-1. Since the 
appearance of this term, all of the hazard industries have adopted it as their banner 
in the efforts to promote safety in their installations and operations (Wilpert and 
Schöbel, 2007).  
During the last 25 years, the IAEA has continuously worked toward the 
conceptualization and theoretical development of safety culture and the creation 
of specific methodologies and tools for the assessment and development of strong 
safety cultures. One of the most remarkable contributions of the IAEA has been 
its five-dimensional model of safety culture. This model has clearly influenced a 
sector – largely composed of technical professionals, such as engineers, physicists 
and chemists – eager to know exactly what that important concept called safety 
culture was, what they should do to assess it, and how they could build strong 
safety cultures capable of avoiding future catastrophes. As a result, the IAEA 
model has become widely used in the nuclear industry as the main guide to safety 
culture.  
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Despite the relevance of the IAEA model to nuclear safety outcomes, its 
validity has never been empirically tested. This will be the aim of the present 
study and our main contribution to the advancement of safety in the nuclear 
industry. In order to achieve this goal, three studies are presented. The first study 
tests the face validity of the model on the basis of the opinions of a sample of non-
experts in organizational behavior with no previous experience in the nuclear 
industry. In the second study, a sample of experts in organizational behavior is 
used to test the content validity of the model. Finally, the third study examines the 
factorial structure of a questionnaire based on the model in a sample of workers in 
a Spanish nuclear power plant (NPP).  
6.1.1. Conceptualization of safety culture 
Safety culture presents a great diversity of meanings and connotations due to 
the broad dimensionality of the concept. It has sometimes been explained in the 
form of intuitive slogans (e.g. ―do the right thing even when nobody is watching‖ 
or ―the way we do things around here‖). Nevertheless, the understanding, 
assessment and improvement of the safety culture have typically been based on 
the way it has been formally defined.  
Safety culture has been defined by the IAEA (1991) as ―that assembly of 
characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes 
that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention 
warranted by their significance‖ (p. 1). This was the first definition of safety 
culture and one of the most influential in the field. The IAEA definition ―was 
carefully composed to emphasize that safety culture is attitudinal as well as 
CHAPTER VI
169 
 
structural, relates both to organizations and individuals‖ (IAEA, 1991, p. 1). 
Therefore, the IAEA (1991) highlights two general components of safety culture: 
―the first is the necessary framework within an organization and is the 
responsibility of the management hierarchy. The second is the attitude of staff at 
all levels in responding to and benefiting from the framework‖ (p. 5).  
The definition of safety culture of the IAEA has stimulated researchers‘ 
interest in the topic, but it is not exempt from criticism. Wilpert (1991; cited in 
Wilpert, 2001) referred to the ῾characteristics᾽ term in the definition as being 
rather vague. On the other hand, he warned that this definition leaves out safety-
related behavior, which is important because, as he reminds us, attitudes and 
actions do not always correlate strongly. In our view, another critical issue is that 
cultures are ‗shared‘ by individuals and groups pertaining to the same country, 
society, organization, etc.  
Later, the IAEA (1998a) adds that the ῾characteristics᾽ and ῾attitudes᾽ referred 
to in its definition should be commonly held (addressing the shared issue) and 
relatively stable. Furthermore, in an effort to extend its own definition to other 
contents, the IAEA (1998a) clarifies that ―safety culture is also an amalgamation 
of values, standards, morals and norms of acceptable behavior. Therefore, safety 
culture has to be inherent in the thoughts and actions of all the individuals at every 
level in an organization‖ (p. 4).  
The theoretical and practical development of safety culture has been closely 
related to the development of the term ―safety climate‖. In this context, it is 
important to mention the theoretical distinction between these two constructs. 
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While safety culture is believed to encompass stable shared basic assumptions, 
beliefs, values and norms regarding safety at work, safety climate is presented as 
shared perceptions of safety at a given point in time. Specifically, safety climate 
generally includes day-to-day perceptions towards the working environment, 
working practices, organizational policies, and management (Yule, 2003). Safety 
climate is viewed as a manifestation or ―snapshot‖ of safety culture (Flin et al, 
2000); it is more transient and less stable, and reflects somewhat the current-state 
of the underlying safety culture (Mearns et al., 2001; Mearns et al., 2003). 
Because of this, many authors rely on climate studies to capture the state of 
HRO´s safety cultures, and these terms have been often used interchangeably 
(Cox and Flin, 1998; Rollenhagen, 2010) although it is important to define each 
construct precisely and use them accordingly. 
6.1.2. Dimensions of safety culture  
Safety culture comprises a variety of contents that are indistinctively called 
indicators, principles, traits, characteristics, components, dimensions, attributes or 
a combination of these (e.g., the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations [INPO] 
and the World Association of Nuclear Operators [WANO] refer to principles; the 
Health and Safety Executive [HSE], to indicators; the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission [NRC], to components; and the IAEA, to characteristics). Following 
the psychometric terminology and reflecting the assumed multidimensional nature 
of safety culture, we will use the term dimension when referring to each of these 
contents. When a dimension is composed of smaller sub-contents, these will be 
referred as attributes of that specific dimension.  
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The existing conceptualizations, models and assessment tools for safety 
culture reflect a lack of consensus on the dimensions that comprise the safety 
culture construct. There is an overlap between the identified dimensions as well as 
a lack of conceptual clarity. The dimensionality of safety culture, as reported by 
Guldenmund (2000), ranges from 2 to 19 dimensions, with little coincidence in 
their labels. The labels given to these dimensions vary considerably from author 
to author, even when they try to refer to the same safety culture contents. Several 
reasons lie behind the existing multitude of safety culture dimensions and the lack 
agreement between them, for instance:  
 The numerous definitions of safety culture, which show little consensus 
about the operationalization of the construct.  
 The variety in authors‘ professional and academic backgrounds (e.g., 
psychology, sociology, engineering, economics, etc.), their idiosyncratic 
writing styles, and the paradigms their work is influenced by (e.g., 
constructivism, positivism, relativism, etc.). 
 The use of empirical atheoretical approaches to identify the dimensions of 
safety culture (e.g. factor analysis [FA], principal components analysis 
[PCA], etc.) without the guidance of solid theoretical models, leaves 
researchers considerable freedom to label their dimensions. For a detailed 
explanation of this point, the reader is directed to Guldenmund (2000). 
 Different industries (e.g., nuclear, petrochemical, aviation, mining, 
construction, etc.) often address distinct organizational and management 
aspects having an impact on safety outcomes. 
TESTING THE DIMENSIONALITY OF THE IAEA SAFETY CULTURE MODEL
172 
 
The labeling of dimensions requires special caution, as quite often labels have 
a life of their own beyond what the items making up these dimensions 
operationally measure. This is especially true when assessment tools are used by 
practitioners. If a label does not adequately capture and summarize the content of 
its corresponding attributes, it can be confusing and misleading in practice. 
A number of safety culture reviews have attempted to identify the commonly 
accepted dimensions of safety culture (see Table 8). According to Sorensen 
(2002), most investigators agree that the dimensions of safety culture are: good 
organizational communication; good organizational learning; senior management 
commitment to safety; and a working environment that rewards indentifying 
safety issues. He also noted that some investigations have included a dimension 
related to management and organizational factors, such as a participative 
management leadership style. Wiegmann et al. (2004) concluded in their review 
that safety culture includes five dimensions: organizational commitment; 
management involvement; employee empowerment; reward systems; and 
reporting systems. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2005), after reviewing 
the literature surrounding safety culture, identified the following five dimensions: 
safety leadership; two-way communication; employee involvement; learning 
culture; and attitudes towards blame (a just culture). Meanwhile, Choudhry et al. 
(2007) take the view that safety culture comprises five dimensions: management 
commitment to safety; management concerns for the workforce; mutual trust and 
credibility between management and employees; workforce empowerment; and 
continuous monitoring, corrective action, review of system and continual 
improvements to reflect the safety at the work site. 
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In addition to the common themes identified in existing reviews of safety 
culture, nuclear organizations and regulators have contributed to the development 
of the safety culture dimensionality (see Table 8). The INPO (2004) and the 
WANO (2006) consider that strong safety cultures are composed of eight different 
dimensions: everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety; leaders 
demonstrate commitment to safety; trust permeates the organization; decision-
making reflects safety first; nuclear technology is recognized as special and 
unique; a questioning attitude is cultivated; organizational learning is embraced; 
and nuclear safety undergoes constant examination. The NRC (2011) recently 
finalized its new safety culture policy statement as the result of a three-year 
project with extensive public participation and numerous workshops and 
meetings. The policy statement concluded that a positive safety culture has the 
following nine dimensions: leadership safety values and actions; problem 
identification and resolution; personal accountability; work processes; continuous 
learning; environment for raising concerns; effective safety communication; 
respectful work environment; and a questioning attitude. The IAEA (2006c) has 
identified five main safety culture dimensions based on ―research findings, 
lessons learned regarding the root causes of organizational failures in safety 
management and safety culture, and the international collaboration of safety 
experts under the auspices of the IAEA‖ (p. 35). The dimensions proposed by the 
IAEA are: safety is a clearly recognized value; leadership for safety is clear; 
accountability for safety is clear; safety is integrated into all activities; and safety 
is learning driven. 
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Table 8 
  Common themes or dimensions of safety culture identified by safety culture reviews, 
regulators and nuclear organizations 
Sorensen (2002) 
 
Good organizational communication 
  
Good organizational learning 
  
Senior management commitment to safety 
  
Working environment that rewards identifying safety issues 
  
Participative management leadership style  
   Wiegmann et al. (2004) 
 
Organizational commitment 
  
Management involvement 
  
Employee empowerment 
  
Reward systems 
  
Reporting systems 
   INPO (2004) /  
 
Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety 
WANO (2006) 
 
Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety 
  
Trust permeates the organization 
  
Decision-making reflects safety first 
  
Nuclear technology is recognized as special and unique 
  
A questioning attitude is cultivated 
  
Organizational learning is embraced 
  
Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination 
   HSE (2005) 
 
Leadership 
  
Two-way communication 
  
Employee involvement 
  
Learning culture 
  
Just culture 
   IAEA (2006a,b) 
 
Safety is a clearly recognized value 
  
Leadership for safety is clear 
  
Accountability for safety is clear 
  
Safety is integrated into all activities 
  
Safety is learning driven 
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Choudhry et al. (2007) 
 
Management  commitment  to safety 
  
Management concerns for the workforce 
  
Mutual trust and credibility between management and 
employees 
  
Workforce empowerment 
  
Continuous monitoring, corrective action, review of system and 
continual improvements to reflect the safety at the work site 
   NRC (2011) 
 
Leadership safety values and actions 
  
Problem identification and resolution  
  
Personal accountability 
  
Work processes 
  
Continuous learning 
  
Environment for raising concerns 
  
Effective safety communication 
  
Respectful work environment 
  Questioning attitude 
 
The authors of the present paper are especially interested in the dimensions 
proposed by the IAEA because they are widely accepted and used in the nuclear 
industry. For this reason, the IAEA model was compared to the dimensions 
suggested in the other six studies mentioned above. Two of the dimensions of the 
IAEA model – ―safety is a clearly recognized value‖, and ―safety is integrated into 
all activities‖ – could not be clearly related to any of the dimensions proposed by 
these studies. At first glance, the labels of these two dimensions seemed very 
general and wide in scope. Therefore, covering the content of these dimensions 
would probably require a large number of attributes. The IAEA‘s dimension 
―leadership for safety is clear‖ is consistent with the HSE‘s ―safety leadership‖, as 
both generally highlight that leadership is a key element for safety. The 
dimensions ―participative management leadership style‖ (reported by Sorensen), 
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―leadership safety values and actions‖ (NRC) and ―leaders demonstrate 
commitment to safety‖ (INPO/WANO) cover distinct aspects of the IAEA‘s 
―leadership for safety is clear‖, and as such they could be understood as attributes 
of it. The IAEA‘s dimension ―accountability for safety is clear‖ corresponds fairly 
well to the NRC‘s dimension ―personal accountability‖ and to the INPO/WANO‘s 
―everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety‖. Finally, the IAEA‘s 
dimension ―safety is learning driven‖ shows the closest match to the studies to 
which it was compared. In this regard, the reviews by Sorensen (―good 
organizational learning‖), the HSE (―learning culture‖), the INPO/WANO 
(―organizational learning is embraced‖) and the NRC (continuous learning‖) agree 
with the IAEA that learning is fundamental to preserving the safety of HROs. 
Moreover, the NRC and the INPO/WANO include a ―questioning attitude‖ as a 
dimension of safety culture, which could also be understood as an attribute of the 
IAEA‘s ―safety is learning driven‖.   
The dimensions of the IAEA model are covered by 37 attributes, which are 
presented in the next section. Some of these attributes have similar labels to the 
dimensions proposed by other authors. An analysis of these correspondences is 
not included in this paper; nevertheless, two examples are given to show the 
existing confusion between dimensions and attributes of safety culture. Sorensen, 
Choudhry, and the INPO/WANO include a dimension of safety culture referring 
to management commitment to safety. The IAEA captures this element in the 
attribute ―commitment to safety is evident at all levels of management‖, which 
belongs to the IAEA‘s dimension ―leadership for safety is clear‖. As a second 
example, Sorensen, Weigmann, the HSE and the NRC believe that one dimension 
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of safety culture should highlight the existence of report systems for safety issues 
and an environment for raising concerns without fear of retaliation. This idea is 
reflected in the IAEA‘s attribute ―open reporting of deviations and errors is 
encouraged‖, which is part of the IAEA‘s dimension ―safety is learning driven‖. 
6.1.3. The IAEA five-dimensional safety culture model 
The IAEA has created a model for the common understanding and 
assessment of safety culture within nuclear power facilities. The model, described 
in detail in Table 9, is identified in Safety Guide No. GS-G-3.1 (IAEA, 2006a) as 
essential for achieving a strong safety culture. It is composed of 37 attributes 
clustered into five dimensions, referred to as characteristics by the IAEA, and 
mentioned in section 1.2.: safety is a clearly recognized value; leadership for 
safety is clear; accountability for safety is clear; safety is integrated into all 
activities; and safety is learning driven. The IAEA (2008a) explains that ―the 
attributes are short descriptions of a specific organizational performance or 
attitude in a nuclear facility, which, if fulfilled, would characterize this 
performance or attitude as belonging to a strong safety culture‖ (p. 8). The 
characteristics and attributes are general enough to reflect the reality of distinct 
types of nuclear facilities (NPPs, research reactors, fuel cycle facilities, etc.). 
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Table 9 
  
The IAEA five-dimensional safety culture model 
Dimension Attribute 
   
A - Safety is a 
clearly recognized 
value 
A1 The high priority given to safety is shown in documentation, 
communications and decision making 
A2 Safety is a primary consideration in the allocation of resources 
 A3 The strategic business importance of safety is reflected in the business plan 
 A4 Individuals are convinced that safety and production go hand in hand 
 A5 A proactive and long term approach to safety issues is shown in decision 
making 
 
 A6 Safety conscious behavior is socially accepted and supported (both formally 
and informally). 
   
B - Leadership for 
safety is clear 
B1 Senior management is clearly committed to safety 
B2 Commitment to safety is evident at all levels of management 
 B3 There is visible leadership showing the involvement of management in 
safety related activities 
 
 B4 Leadership skills are systematically developed 
 B5 Management ensures that there are sufficient competent individuals 
 B6 Management seeks the active involvement of individuals in improving 
safety 
 B7 Safety implications are considered in change management processes 
 B8 Management shows a continual effort to strive for openness and good 
communication throughout the organization 
 B9 Management has the ability to resolve conflicts as necessary 
 B10 Relationships between managers and individuals are built on trust 
   
C - Accountability 
for safety is clear 
C1 An appropriate relationship with the regulatory body exists that ensures that 
the accountability for safety remains with the licensee 
C2 Roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and understood 
 C3 There is a high level of compliance with regulations and procedures 
 C4 Management delegates responsibility with appropriate authority to enable 
clear accountabilities to be established 
 C5 ‗Ownership‘ for safety is evident at all organizational levels and for all 
individuals 
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D - Safety is 
integrated into all 
activities 
D1 Trust permeates the organization 
D2 Consideration of all types of safety, including industrial safety and 
environmental safety, and of security is evident 
 D3 The quality of documentation and procedures is good 
 D4 The quality of processes, from planning to implementation and review, is 
good 
 
 D5 Individuals have the necessary knowledge and understanding of the work 
processes 
 
 D6 Factors affecting work motivation and job satisfaction are considered 
 D7 Good working conditions exist with regard to time pressures, workload and 
stress 
 
 D8 There is cross-functional and  interdisciplinary  cooperation and teamwork 
 D9 Housekeeping and material conditions reflect commitment to excellence 
   
E - Safety is 
learning driven 
E1 A questioning attitude prevails at all organizational levels 
E2 Open reporting of deviations and errors is encouraged 
 E3 Internal and external assessments, including self-assessments, are used 
 E4 Organizational experience and operating experience (both internal and 
external to the facility) are used 
 E5 Learning is facilitated through the ability to recognize and diagnose 
deviations, to formulate and implement solutions and to monitor the effects 
of corrective actions 
 
 E6 Safety performance indicators are tracked, trended, evaluated and acted 
upon 
  E7 There is systematic development of individual competences 
 
The IAEA highlights that all individuals must have a common understanding 
of the characteristics and attributes of this model; consequently, training should be 
regularly provided to make sure that the model is understood and acted upon 
(IAEA, 2009a). At the management level, importance is given to the monitoring 
and reinforcement of attributes, and to the detection of early signs of decline in 
these attributes (IAEA, 2006a). The IAEA recommends that safety culture 
assessments take the characteristics and attributes of its model into account. This 
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recommendation is applicable to independent assessments, such as internal audits, 
external audits, surveillance and reviews, checks and inspections, as well as to 
self-assessments (IAEA, 2006a). The IAEA (2009a) specifies that ―these 
characteristics and attributes should all be covered when developing interview 
questions, items for inclusion in a questionnaire or issues for discussion in focus 
groups‖ (p. 89). As an example, the IAEA has developed a triangulated 
methodology to assess safety culture based on this model. This methodology, 
called SCART (Safety Culture Assessment Review Team), includes interviews, 
observations and documentation reviews. SCART is aimed to identify strengths 
and areas for improvement in nuclear facilities in relation to the dimensions and 
attributes of the IAEA model.  
Although the IAEA‘s role is purely advisory, its model of safety culture is 
becoming a reference for regulatory bodies. As an example, the Norwegian 
Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA) and the Department of Nuclear Safety 
and Security of the IAEA are working together with the Bulgarian Nuclear Safety 
Agency (BNRA) and the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control 
(CNCAN) towards the development and implementation of several projects to 
promote nuclear safety in Bulgaria and Romania (IAEA website). These projects 
aim to enhance the ability of the BNRA and CNCAN to assess the safety culture 
of their licensees on the basis of the IAEA safety culture model and the SCART 
methodology (Rolina, 2011). Another example comes from the Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology (MEST) in South Korea, which encourages 
NPPs to improve their methodologies for safety culture self-assessment by taking 
the IAEA safety culture model into consideration (MEST, 2010). An increasing 
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number of well-known organizations are recognizing the importance of the model 
(e.g. the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre [BNRC] [Xu et al., 2011], and the 
Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia [FNCA] [FNCA website]). On the other 
hand, SCART missions are being carried out in different nuclear organizations, 
such as the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (Pty) Limited in South Africa (IAEA, 
2006d), Santa María de Garoña in Spain (IAEA, 2007), and Laguna Verde in 
Mexico (IAEA, 2009b). 
6.1.4. Need for empirical testing of the IAEA five-dimensional safety culture 
model 
The five dimensions and 37 attributes of the IAEA safety culture model serve 
to understand what safety culture is and what organizational aspects should be 
assessed, monitored and acted upon in order to ensure safer nuclear facilities. In 
this sense, the work of the IAEA has been commendable and highly useful for the 
nuclear industry. However, and to our knowledge, the validity of the IAEA model 
and of the measurement instruments based on the model have not been 
empirically tested yet.  
The course of action in science is that a model must be empirically validated 
before it can be applied to practical settings. Empirical validation ideally takes 
place before the application of a model but, if not, during or after its application. 
In any case, this validation is not only desirable but also necessary in order to 
ensure a rigorous professional performance in solving organizational problems. 
The scientist-practitioner model (Briner and Rousseau, 2011; Jones and Mehr, 
2007; Trierweiler and Stricker, 1998) is a good example of the way professionals 
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who are scientifically rigorous in developing and implementing solutions must act 
to maximize success when facing practical problems. However, on some 
occasions the need for urgent and efficient solutions to practical problems justifies 
professionals putting supposedly ‗good‘ models into practice, even though these 
models do not have sufficient empirical support. This is the case of the nuclear 
industry, where the pressing need for cultures that can guarantee the safety of 
nuclear facilities has led to the extended use of the IAEA safety culture model. In 
our opinion, this model has contributed to fulfilling the need stated by the nuclear 
industry; however, a model that has the potential to change nuclear safety 
outcomes should have sufficient empirical support.  
The empirical validation of the IAEA model is necessary in order to 
maximize its practical usefulness for the nuclear industry. The validation of an 
assessment instrument, such as the one directly derived from the IAEA model and 
the 37 attributes included in this model to capture the five dimensions proposed, 
requires accumulating evidence that supports the adequacy, meaning and 
usefulness of inferences that can be drawn from this instrument. In this context, if 
there was a lack of empirical correspondence between the IAEA‘s attributes and 
the dimensions proposed by the model, the scores on the dimensions obtained 
from safety culture assessments could lead to misleading inferences. Therefore, 
we believe that testing the correspondence between the attributes and dimensions 
is of paramount importance and contributes to obtaining evidence about the 
validity of the IAEA model. As a result, we agreed to accept this challenge by 
working on three independent empirical studies designed to study the face, 
content and factorial validity of the IAEA model.  
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6.2. Method 
6.2.1. First study – testing face validity 
6.2.1.1. Purpose of the study 
Research using new, changed or previously unexamined scale items should, 
at a minimum, be judged on its face validity (Hardesty and Bearden, 2004). Face 
validity refers to the extent to which a measure reflects what it is intended to 
measure (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). It is not about what the model actually 
measures but about what it superficially appears to measure. Improving the face 
validity of a model, a test or a measurement instrument in general will not ensure 
the improvement of its construct validity; however, face validity is a requirement 
for a measurement instrument to function effectively in practical situations 
(Anastasi, 1976).  
The purpose of this first study is to test the face validity of the IAEA safety 
culture model, by investigating to what extent the attributes of the model appear to 
reflect what they are supposed to measure, that is, whether or not the 37 attributes 
of the model appear to be valid in our sample. 
Hypothesis 1. The attributes of the model will appear to measure what they 
are intended to measure, showing evidence of face validity. 
6.2.1.2. Development of the survey 
The IAEA safety culture model was converted into a survey form. Attributes 
and dimensions were separated into two different documents that make up the 
survey. The first document included the instructions for completing the exercise 
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and the model‘s 37 attributes mixed randomly and numbered from 1 to 37. The 
second document included the five dimensions of the model labeled from A to E. 
The labeling of attributes with numbers and dimensions with letters was done to 
avoid biased answers based on potential cognitive associations between numbers 
or letters. It is worth noting that this second document included the labels (e.g. 
accountability for safety is clear) and not the descriptions of the dimensions. The 
reasons behind this choice were twofold. First, the descriptions given by the IAEA 
(2009a) overlapped with the attributes of the model. Using the descriptions 
instead of the labels could have biased the answers of our participants who, as will 
be explained in section 2.1.4., were asked to match the attributes to the 
dimensions of the model. Second, the descriptions of the dimensions provide 
additional and rich information about the IAEA model. However, when putting a 
model into practice, researchers and practitioners quite often only consider the 
labels of dimensions, and for this reason the adequacy and accuracy of these 
labels must be ensured. 
The next step was to translate the survey into Spanish, since it was the native 
language of the target sample. The back-translation technique was chosen, as it is 
the best approach to preserve the functional and conceptual equivalence of words 
and sentences. Back-translation is the translation of a survey instrument that has 
already been translated into a foreign language back to the original language. Two 
certified translators performed this task. The forward-translation, English into 
Spanish, was done by one of them, whereas the other one carried out the back-
translation, Spanish into English. Afterwards, the two translators met to analyze 
any divergence on the forward-translated, the original and the back-
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translated surveys. As a result, they agreed by consensus on a translation that 
accurately reflected the intent of the wording in the original language.  
6.2.1.3. Sampling procedure 
Face validity has typically been tested by participants who do not have prior 
knowledge about the construct under study. A model, a test or a measurement 
instrument has face validity when it appears valid to non-experts (Sartori, 2010), 
lay persons (Cronbach, 1984), untrained observers (Anastasi, 1976), or in the 
words of Litwin (1995), ―untrained judges such as your sister, boyfriend or squash 
partner‖ (p. 35). In this sense, a number of studies in organizational management 
have favored the use of students to assess the face validity of their models or 
measurement instruments (Chaudhry et al., 2011; Cockrell and Stone, 2010; 
Holden and Jackson, 1979; Key, 1997; Porter, Angle and Allen, 2003; Torres-
Harding, Siers and Olson, 2011; VandeWalle, 1997; Verbeke, 2000). The 
opinions provided by these students have helped researchers to decide what items 
on their proposed instruments they should retain or eliminate.  
For all these reasons, we decided to test the face validity of the IAEA model 
with a sample of graduate students. Participants were untrained judges for this 
study, as they were not knowledgeable about safety culture. Furthermore, they 
were not familiar with the IAEA safety culture model and had never worked 
within the nuclear industry. All surveys were completed and returned to the 
researchers; therefore, a response rate of 100% was obtained. Any survey showing 
systematic response patterns or having more than 3 unanswered items was 
dropped from the data set. As a result, 290 out of the 297 surveys returned were 
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accepted for data analyses (N=290). The final sample was composed of 110 
students of psychology, 96 of labor relations and 84 of tourism. The students 
averaged 24 years of age ranging from 18 to 55. 72% of students were female, and 
80% had previous work experience. 
6.2.1.4. Survey administration  
The survey was administered by the authors of the current study. This 
condition assured that any doubts when filling out the survey could be resolved by 
the researchers, who were always present during the administration. No help was 
provided in terms of clarifying the meaning of attributes and dimensions, but only 
about the manner in which the survey should be completed.  
Each of the participants was provided with written instructions that explained 
the purpose of the study and the way the survey should be completed. Participants 
received the 37 attributes and the five dimensions on two different documents, 
and their task was to place each of the attributes in the dimension to which they 
believed it belonged. For this purpose, they were asked to write A, B, C, D or E – 
letters representing the five dimensions – next to each of the attributes. 
Participants were encouraged not to leave any attribute without a response. 
Participation and making an effort to do their best were reinforced by telling 
the participants that they were contributing to the development of nuclear safety, 
an indispensable goal for all of us. Voluntary participation and anonymity were 
emphasized. No names or identifying information were required on the survey, 
only some socio-demographic data, which included gender, age and whether or 
not the participant had previous work experience. 
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Reactions of a few students included questions about hard-to-understand 
statements.  
6.2.1.5. Analyses and results 
For simplicity, a correct answer is scored when a participant successfully 
classifies an attribute in the dimension it belongs to according to the IAEA. 
Incorrect answers reflect an inappropriate classification of attributes into 
dimensions. 
To get a global view of the face validity of the model, the average of correct 
answers per participant was calculated. Descriptive analyses indicated that the 
students were able to correctly allocate an average of 13 attributes – ranging from 
3 to 22 – out of 37 to their corresponding dimensions. In the participants‘ 
opinions, 35.51% of the attributes appeared to measure the dimensions that, 
according to the IAEA, they were supposed to measure.  
The next step was to explore the face validity of each of the dimensions of the 
model. To do so, we analyzed participants‘ correct answers for each of the 
dimensions of the model. The percentage of correct answers given by the students 
was 36.4% in dimension A, 44.7% in B, 28.6% in C, 25.8% in D, and 38.6% in E.  
Finally, face validity was checked for each of the 37 attributes of the model. 
To do this, the percentage of participants assigning each of the attributes to each 
of the five dimensions of the model was calculated. A great variance was found in 
the results, ranging from 8% of participants placing attribute B7 in its 
corresponding dimension (―leadership for safety is clear‖) to 78.9% of 
participants placing attribute B3 in its corresponding dimension (―leadership for 
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safety is clear‖). Further details on the allocation of the attributes can be seen in 
Table 10.  
We followed two different criteria to assess the face validity of the attributes 
of the model. The first and less restrictive criterion considered an attribute to have 
enough face validity when the percentage of students allocating it to its 
corresponding dimension was higher than the percentages of students allocating it 
to each of the four remaining dimensions. The second and more restrictive 
criterion accepted every attribute that was allocated to its corresponding 
dimension by at least half of the students. Under less restrictive conditions, 21 
attributes were accepted: 4 attributes supposed to belong to dimension A (A1, A2, 
A3 and A4); 7 to dimension B (B1, B3, B4, B5, B8, B9 and B10); 2 to dimension 
C (C1 and C2); 3 to dimension D (D4, D7 and D8); and 5 to dimension E (E2, E3, 
E4, E5 and E7). The less restrictive criterion indicated that 43% of the attributes 
of the model did not show enough face validity. When the answers of the students 
were analyzed according to the more restrictive criterion, only 6 attributes could 
be accepted as being face valid: A2, B3, B4, B8, B9 and E5. In other words, 
according to more than half of the students, 84% of the attributes of the model do 
not appear to reflect what they are intended to measure.  
6.2.1.6. Conclusions 
Taking the validity of the model at face value, it seems that most of the 
model‘s attributes and dimensions may be problematic. Moreover, most of its 
components (attributes and dimensions) do not appear to be valid to the untrained 
eye. 
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6.2.2. Second study – testing content validity 
6.2.2.1. Purpose of the study 
The demonstration of content validity is a fundamental requirement of all 
assessment instruments because, among other reasons, by maximizing content 
validity the predictive validity of the instrument will be enhanced (Sireci, 1998). 
As Haynes, Richard and Kubany (1995) point out, most definitions of content 
validity refer to the degree to which elements of an assessment instrument are 
relevant to and representative of the targeted construct for a particular assessment 
purpose. While the relevance aspect refers to the appropriateness of its items, that 
is, the degree to which the instrument contains items reflecting the facets or 
dimensions of the targeted construct, the representativeness refers to the coverage 
of the intended construct, that is, the extent to which the content of the items is 
sampled representatively from the universe of content being measured. These two 
characteristics of content validity have been highlighted by Fitzpatrick (1983) as 
domain relevance and domain sampling, and by Anastasi (1986) as content 
relevance and content coverage.  
The purpose of this second study is to shed light on the content validity of the 
IAEA safety culture model. We tested the relevance of the 37 attributes of the 
model to the five dimensions of safety culture identified by the IAEA. 
Hypothesis 2. The attributes of the model will be relevant to the dimensions 
to which they are supposed to belong, showing evidence of content validity. 
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6.2.2.2. Development of the survey  
For this second study, researchers used the same survey as in the first study in 
this paper. The development of the survey was explained in detail in section 2.1.2. 
6.2.2.3. Sampling procedure 
The evaluation of content validity is dependent on knowledge about the 
underlying constructs being measured (Holden and Jackson, 1979). A model, test 
or measurement instrument has content validity when a group of subject matter 
experts (SMEs) rate its items high with regard to their relevance to and 
representativeness of the content domain tested (Sireci, 1998). Therefore, content 
validity has to be assessed by experts in the constructs under study.  
Following this requirement, the second study of this paper counted with 48 
experts in organizational behavior, who were highly knowledgeable about 
organizational culture, leadership, organizational learning, management, values, 
roles, etc., and all the main constructs that the IAEA model and its attributes 
revolve around. The participants were industrial and organizational psychologists 
not specialized in safety culture or the nuclear industry. Of them, 24 were PhD 
holders working in the department of social psychology, 7 were undertaking 
doctoral research within the European Work, Organizational and Personnel 
Psychology Program – WOP-P – and 17 were completing the Erasmus Mundus 
Master in WOP-P. Furthermore, most of the participants teach these topics in 
degree, master and doctoral courses, and have published articles on these topics in 
scientific journals. Participants were between 23 and 58 years old, with an average 
of 35 years. 63% percent of the experts were female and 98% had worked before. 
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6.2.2.4. Survey administration 
In this study participants were contacted via e-mail. They were provided with 
the same instructions and survey received by the students in the first study. The 
experts were strongly encouraged to ask for any necessary clarification before or 
while completing the survey. As in the first study, voluntary participation and 
anonymity were emphasized.  
The response rate obtained was 74%. In this second study, all 48 returned 
surveys were found to be usable after determining the percentage of missing data 
and the absence of systematic response patterns. 
Feedback received from some experts highlighted the complexity of the 
survey due to the ambiguous and apparently overlapping dimensions.  
6.2.2.5. Analyses and results 
To offer a general approach to the content validity of the model, the experts‘ 
answers were analyzed at a global level. The average of correct answers per 
participant was 17,ranging from 9 to 27; that is, according to the experts, more 
than half of the attributes of the model (53.49%) were not relevant to the 
dimensions to which they should belong.  
When analyzing the experts‘ answers at a dimensional level, noticeable 
differences in the content validity of the dimensions were found. The percentage 
of correct answers given by the experts was 47.6% in dimension A, 60.8% in B, 
35.8% in C, 37.7% in D, and 44% in E. This means that according to the 
judgment of experts, more than half of the attributes of dimensions A, C, D and E 
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were not appropriate or relevant to the dimensions they were supposed to 
measure. Dimensions C and D seemed to be especially problematic, while, 
according to participants‘ answers, dimension B offered the highest content 
validity. 
This last analysis further examined the content validity of the IAEA model by 
testing the relevance of each attribute to each of the five dimensions of the model. 
The degree to which an attribute was relevant to the dimension to which it belongs 
according to the IAEA was determined by the percentage of participants who 
assigned this attribute to that dimension. Table 11 shows that results ranged from 
2.1% of participants allocating attribute E1 to its corresponding dimension 
(―safety is learning driven‖) to 95.8% of participants allocating attribute B3 to its 
corresponding dimension (―leadership for safety is clear‖).  
Researchers proposed two criteria to determine whether an attribute was 
relevant enough to the dimension to which it was supposed to belong. The first 
and less restrictive criterion considered an attribute to be relevant when the 
percentage of experts allocating it to its corresponding dimension was higher than 
the percentages of experts allocating it to each of the four remaining dimensions. 
The second and more restrictive criterion accepted every attribute that was 
allocated to its corresponding dimension by at least half of the experts. Results 
under less restrictive conditions indicated that 28 attributes were relevant enough 
to their corresponding dimensions: 5 attributes that were supposed to measure 
dimension A (A1, A2, A3, A4 and A6); 9, dimension B (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, 
B8, B9 and B10); 3, dimension C (C1, C2 and C3); 7, dimension D (D2, D3, D4, 
D6, D7, D8 and D9); and 4, dimension E (E2, E4, E5 and E7). This means that 
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under the less restrictive criterion, one-fourth of the attributes of the model were 
not relevant indicators of the dimensions they were supposed to measure. When 
the participants‘ answers were analyzed using the more restrictive criterion, 17 
attributes were considered relevant enough to their corresponding dimensions: A2, 
A3, A4, B1, B3, B4, B5, B6, B8, B9, B10, C1, C2, D4, D7, E5 and E7. In other 
words, according to the judgment of more than half of the experts, 46% of the 
attributes of the model are not good indicators of the dimensions they are 
supposed to measure.  
 
Table 10 
    
Table 11 
   
Testing the face validity of the model of safety 
culture of the IAEA - Percentage of students 
allocating each of the attributes in each of the 
dimensions of the model.  
 
Testing the content validity of the model of safety 
culture of the IAEA - Percentage of experts in 
organizational behavior allocating each of the 
attributes in each of the dimensions of the model.  
  
Dimension 
      
Dimension 
   
  
A B C D E 
 
NRC RC 
   
A B C D E 
 
NRC RC 
Att. 
          
Att. 
         A1 
 
42,6 12,1 18,3 17 10 
 
X 
  
A1 
 
45,8 6,3 16,7 25 6,3 
 
X 
 A2 
 
50,9 7,3 14,9 23,5 3,5 
 
X X 
 
A2 
 
64,6 6,3 8,3 18,8 2,1 
 
X X 
A3 
 
34,5 13,4 19,3 23,1 9,7 
 
X 
  
A3 
 
62,5 6,3 6,3 22,9 2,1 
 
X X 
A4 
 
37,6 3,8 13,8 30,3 14,5 
 
X 
  
A4 
 
54,2 2,1 10,4 27,1 6,3 
 
X X 
A5 
 
22,2 22,9 29,5 12,5 12,8 
    
A5 
 
25 27,1 25 16,7 6,3 
   A6 
 
31,1 6,2 19,7 11,4 31,5 
    
A6 
 
33,3 4,2 18,8 25 18,8 
 
X 
 B1 
 
27,2 41,4 19 8,3 4,1 
 
X 
  
B1 
 
18,8 70,8 10,4 0 0 
 
X X 
B2 
 
21,4 24,8 24,8 24,1 4,8 
    
B2 
 
18,8 37,5 27,1 16,7 0 
 
X 
 B3 
 
5,2 78,9 8 4,8 3,1 
 
X X 
 
B3 
 
0 95,8 0 0 4,2 
 
X X 
B4 
 
7,6 63,7 5,5 8,3 14,9 
 
X X 
 
B4 
 
0 60,4 0 2,1 37,5 
 
X X 
B5 
 
10,3 44,8 26,6 7,2 11 
 
X 
  
B5 
 
12,5 54,2 16,7 4,2 12,5 
 
X X 
B6 
 
12,8 27,6 13,4 11,4 34,8 
    
B6 
 
10,4 62,5 8,3 6,3 12,5 
 
X X 
B7 
 
26,6 8 21,1 26,3 18 
    
B7 
 
18,8 10,4 12,5 43,8 14,6 
   B8 
 
9,3 53,6 14,2 10 12,8 
 
X X 
 
B8 
 
12,5 72,9 6,3 4,2 4,2 
 
X X 
B9 
 
5,2 71,7 15,2 4,5 3,4 
 
X X 
 
B9 
 
2,1 93,8 2,1 2,1 0 
 
X X 
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B10 
 
16,6 33,1 18,3 14,8 17,2 
 
X 
  
B10 
 
22,9 50 12,5 10,4 4,2 
 
X X 
C1 
 
23,5 28,7 37,4 7,3 3,1 
 
X 
  
C1 
 
20,8 6,3 56,3 12,5 4,2 
 
X X 
C2 
 
18,7 11,4 34,6 21,1 14,2 
 
X 
  
C2 
 
10,4 14,6 50 16,7 8,3 
 
X X 
C3 
 
34,5 6,2 33,8 19 6,6 
    
C3 
 
20,8 0 45,8 31,3 2,1 
 
X 
 C4 
 
4,2 60,9 23,2 6,6 5,2 
    
C4 
 
2,1 77,1 12,5 8,3 0 
   C5 
 
29,7 5,2 14,1 42,1 9 
    
C5 
 
35,4 0 18,8 43,8 2,1 
   D1 
 
33 9,7 24 18,4 14,9 
    
D1 
 
37,8 6,7 13,3 35,6 6,7 
   D2 
 
40,7 6,6 15,9 31 5,9 
    
D2 
 
37,5 2,1 10,4 45,8 4,2 
 
X 
 D3 
 
25,4 7,7 28,6 23 15,3 
    
D3 
 
17 2,1 27,7 38,3 14,9 
 
X 
 D4 
 
23,4 9 20 36,9 10,7 
 
X 
  
D4 
 
14,6 8,3 18,8 54,2 4,2 
 
X X 
D5 
 
11 4,5 13,8 9,7 61 
    
D5 
 
4,2 0 8,3 10,4 77,1 
   D6 
 
21,4 13,1 24,5 23,1 17,9 
    
D6 
 
20,8 16,7 22,9 33,3 6,3 
 
X 
 D7 
 
21,7 5,9 26,9 32,4 13,1 
 
X 
  
D7 
 
14,6 8,3 16,7 56,3 4,2 
 
X X 
D8 
 
10 21 21,7 32,4 14,8 
 
X 
  
D8 
 
20,8 14,6 18,8 31,3 14,6 
 
X 
 D9 
 
27,9 4,8 31,4 25,5 10,3 
    
D9 
 
29,2 0 31,3 37,5 2,1 
 
X 
 E1 
 
12,9 34,8 21,3 15,7 15,3 
    
E1 
 
22,9 12,5 29,2 33,3 2,1 
   E2 
 
15,2 10 20,8 16,6 37,4 
 
X 
  
E2 
 
20,8 12,5 25 12,5 29,2 
 
X 
 E3 
 
17,3 6,6 26,6 13,8 35,6 
 
X 
  
E3 
 
10,4 0 33,3 27,1 29,2 
   E4 
 
20,8 8,7 18,8 20,8 30,9 
 
X 
  
E4 
 
14,6 0 14,6 25 45,8 
 
X 
 E5 
 
4,5 4,8 7,6 6,9 76,1 
 
X X 
 
E5 
 
4,2 0 0 4,2 91,7 
 
X X 
E6 
 
24,7 5,6 28,5 14,9 26,4 
    
E6 
 
12,5 2,1 41,7 22,9 20,8 
   E7   5,5 8,7 23,9 12,5 49,5   X   
 
E7   2,1 4,2 0 4,2 89,6   X X 
Note: marks in columns RC and NRC indicate 
attributes showing face validity under the restrictive 
and non-restrictive conditions respectively.  
Percentages of respondents allocating attributes to 
its corresponding dimension are shown in bold.  
Att. denotes attributes. 
 
Note: marks in columns RC and NRC indicate 
attributes showing content validity under restrictive 
and non-restrictive conditions respectively.  
Percentages of respondents allocating attributes to 
its corresponding dimension are shown in bold. 
Att. denotes attributes. 
 
Because both face and content validity are essential requirements of 
assessment instruments, it was agreed that those attributes satisfying face and 
content validity analyses could be more adequate for the current IAEA proposal. 
Under the less restrictive criterion, 20 attributes out of 37 should be kept: A1, A2, 
A3, A4, B1, B3, B4, B5, B8, B9, B10, C1, C2, D4, D7, D8, E2, E4, E5 and E7; 
while under more restrictive conditions, only 6 should be maintained: A2, B3, B4, 
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B8, B9 and E5. It is worth noting that these attributes are the same ones accepted 
in the face validity study (with the exception of attribute E3, which under more 
restrictive conditions showed face validity but did not show content validity). Our 
studies suggest, therefore, that attributes with face validity have content validity 
as well, which is logical, since an attribute that appears to measure a dimension 
(face validity) would be expected to be relevant to that dimension (content 
validity). 
6.2.2.6. Conclusions 
Regardless of the way the answers have been analyzed – at a global, 
dimensional, or attribute level – experts‘ judgments dubiously support the IAEA 
proposal. At the most specific levels, many of the attributes and dimensions do 
not seem content valid to the experts. However, it is important to remember that 
the focus of this study is on the relevance aspect of content validity and not on the 
representativeness one. On the whole, the judgment of a sample of experts in 
organizational behavior suggests that the content validity of the IAEA model is 
rather moderate.  
As a conclusion of the first two studies, taking into account the opinion of 
both students and experts, it seems that the IAEA safety culture model could be 
substantially improved. 
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6.2.3. Third study – testing the factorial structure 
6.2.3.1. Purpose of the study  
Investigating the internal structure of theoretical constructs is essential to 
social science research because the misspecification of dimensions can lead to 
incorrect and, consequently, misleading empirical results. The extent to which the 
relationships between the components of an assessment instrument are consistent 
with the definition of the construct constitutes relevant evidence of the validity of 
the instrument, which in turn contributes to the validation of the underlying 
construct (AERA, APA and NCME, 1999).  
The purpose of this study is to test whether the five-dimensional safety 
culture model specified by the IAEA adequately represents the attributes that 
reflect, according to the IAEA, the attitudes and behaviors that are indicators of 
strong safety cultures. In order to attain this goal, the IAEA safety culture model 
was converted into a questionnaire containing 37 items corresponding to the 37 
attributes of the model.  
Specifically, apart from evaluating the fit of the five-factor model to the data, 
convergent and discriminant validity were assessed. Convergent validity was 
evaluated by examining the extent to which items correlate strongly with the 
dimensions they represent and show high and statistically significant factor 
loadings in the corresponding factors (Byon and Zhang, 2010). Discriminant 
validity was assessed by testing the hypothesis that the correlations among the 
IAEA factors differ significantly from unity (i.e., are not correlated perfectly) and 
are empirically discriminable (Floyd and Widaman, 1995). 
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Hypothesis 3. The five-factor structure of the model, operationalized through 
the proposed attributes, will be confirmed by the data, showing evidence of 
factorial validity. 
6.2.3.2. Sampling procedure 
We received a completed questionnaire from 495 workers from one Spanish 
nuclear power plant (NPP). The total size of the company was 760 employees. 
Thus, we obtained a response rate of 65.13%. The data were collected in 2011. In 
order to guarantee the quality of the data, those questionnaires with more than 
three unanswered items were dropped from the data set, resulting in a final sample 
of 468 participants. The sample included all responsibility levels and functional 
areas in the nuclear facility. 47% of participants had completed university studies. 
3% of participants were under 30 years old; 18% were between 30 and 45; and 
79% were older than 45.  
6.2.3.3. Survey administration 
The questionnaire was administered by the researchers, who stayed at the 
NPP for three days to collect data. This condition assured that any doubts when 
filling out the questionnaire could be immediately resolved. This questionnaire 
was part of a battery of questionnaires, aimed to address different topics related to 
safety culture and safety climate, that each participant was asked to complete. The 
administration of the battery took place during work time, and participants needed 
around 30 minutes to complete the entire battery. They were provided with 
instructions explaining the purpose of the study and the way the questionnaire 
should be completed. Participants‘ task was to rate on a five-point Likert-type 
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scale to what extent they agreed with 37 statements related to their organization. 
These statements were the 37 attributes of the IAEA model. Since the target 
sample was native Spanish speakers, researchers created the questionnaire using 
the back-translated version of the model mentioned in the first two studies of this 
paper. 
Participants were encouraged to answer sincerely and take as much time as 
they needed to accurately complete the questionnaire. Voluntary participation, 
confidentiality and anonymity were emphasized.  
Cronbach‘s alpha values for the five dimensions of the model were as 
follows: .87 for the dimension ―safety is a clearly recognized value‖, .92 for 
―leadership for safety is clear‖, .83 for ―accountability for safety is clear‖, .89 for 
―safety is integrated into all activities‖, and .84 for ―safety is learning driven‖. 
Cronbach‘s alpha for all the items included in the five dimensions was .97. 
6.2.3.4. Analyses 
Confirmatory analyses 
Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were performed using the Linear 
Structural Relationship (LISREL) program, version 8.8. (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 
2006).To estimate the parameters of the five-factor model, polychoric correlations 
were analyzed by means of the robust maximum likelihood (RML) estimation 
method. The reasons for choosing this method were twofold: First, considering 
the size of our sample (N=468), this method is preferable to other specific 
methods for ordinal variables, such as weighted least squares (WLS), because it 
does not require inverting the asymptotic covariance matrix; Second, RML is a 
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commonly accepted estimation technique for the ordinal nature of the variables 
under study (Hoyle and Panter, 1995), and it is more suitable than maximum 
likelihood when the assumption of multivariate normality does not hold (Brown, 
2006; Mels, 2003), as is the case in our sample. When RML is used, standard 
errors and goodness-of-fit indices are corrected for non-normality. 
Exploratory analyses 
The structure of the IAEA was also explored by means of principal 
component analysis (PCA), with oblimin rotation, without establishing the 
number of factors a priori. The reason for carrying out a PCA instead of an 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was that PCA provides a mathematical 
representation of the construct in terms of the measured variables without 
imposing the directionality of the effects from the construct to the items (Jarvis, 
MacKenzie and Podsakoff, 2003). This allows us to control for the possibility that 
safety culture is a formative multidimensional construct instead of a reflective 
multidimensional construct. Typically, constructs are viewed as reflective, since 
responses to the indicators are thought to be caused by the latent variable that is 
measured (i.e., because there is a strong safety culture, open reporting of 
deviations and errors is encouraged). In this case, EFA or principal axis is the best 
option (Jarvis et al., 2003). The indicators are expected to be highly correlated, 
but dropping one indicator from the measurement model is not expected to alter 
the empirical meaning of the construct (Podsakoff et al., 2003). However, in some 
occasions indicators are viewed as causing rather than being caused by the latent 
variable. In these cases, the constructs are formative instead of reflective, in such 
a way that changes in the indicators determine changes in the value of the latent 
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variable (i.e. because open reporting of deviations and errors is encouraged in the 
organization, a strong safety culture emerges) (see Jarvis et al., 2003; Podsakoff et 
al., 2003). In this case, the principal component model is more adequate. 
6.2.3.5. Results 
Confirmatory analyses 
Fit indices provide information about how well the proposed model 
empirically fits the driving theory. The chi-square (χ2) value is the traditional 
measure for evaluating overall model fit (Hooper, Coughlan and Mullen, 2008). 
However, because chi-square value is sensitive to sample size, the use of other 
indices is recommended. Values of NNFI and CFI greater than .95 are presently 
recognized as indicative of good fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999). Values of RMSEA 
and SMR under .08 indicate an acceptable ﬁt (Byon and Zhang, 2010; Hu and 
Bentler, 1999), with lower values indicating better fit.  
The five-factor CFA revealed that the goodness-of-fit of the model proposed 
by the IAEA (5 dimensions with 37 corresponding attributes) did show 
satisfactory fit (Satorra-Bentler scaled χ2 = 1901.23, df = 619, p< .01; NNFI = 
.985; CFI = .986; RMSEA = .071; and SRMR = .055).  
Regarding convergent validity of the attributes reflected in the items, results 
indicated that the items converged well enough, since the standardized factor 
loadings for the five-factor structure proposed by the IAEA were statistically 
significant (p<.01) and high enough according to the standards. As a rule of 
thumb, an item loads high if the corresponding factor loading is above .60, and it 
does not load high enough if the corresponding factor loading is below .40 (Hair 
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et al., 1998). Our results showed that for the five-factor model all the factor 
loadings, with the exception of items E1 and E7, were larger than .60 (see Table 
12), ranging from.45 and .55 (for items E1 and E7, respectively) to .92 (for item 
A1), thus supporting convergent validity. 
 
Table 12 
    Factor loadings and squared multiple correlations for CFA for the IAEA 
safety culture model (5 dimensions with 37 corresponding attributes)  
Item  
variable 
Standardized  
factor loading 
SMC 
(R2) 
               
Item  
variable 
Standardized  
factor loading 
SMC 
(R2) 
A1 .92 (.01) .85 
 
C4 .76 (.03) .58 
A2 .87 (.02) .76 
 
C5 .82 (.03) .67 
A3 .74 (.04) .55 
 
D1 .77 (.03) .59 
A4 .73 (.04) .53 
 
D2 .84 (.02) .70 
A5 .75 (.04) .56 
 
D3 .67 (.03) .45 
A6 .85 (.03) .73 
 
D4 .81 (.03) .66 
B1 .87 (.02) .76 
 
D5 .70 (.04) .49 
B2 .85 (.02) .73 
 
D6 .76 (.03) .58 
B3 .85 (.02) .72 
 
D7 .66 (.04) .44 
B4 .72 (.03) .52 
 
D8 .70 (.03) .49 
B5 .70 (.03) .49 
 
D9 .72 (.03) .52 
B6 .84 (.02) .71 
 
E1 .55 (.05) .30 
B7 .78 (.03) .61 
 
E2 .83 (.03) .69 
B8 .81 (.02) .66 
 
E3 .64 (.03) .41 
B9 .80 (.03) .65 
 
E4 .85 (.02) .72 
B10 .74 (.03) .55 
 
E5 .83 (.02) .69 
C1 .76 (.03) .58 
 
E6 .81 (.02) .66 
C2 .73 (.03) .53 
 
E7 .45 (.05) .20 
C3 .78 (.03) .60        
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However, results on the discriminant validity of the five dimensions proposed 
by the IAEA were not satisfactory. The correlation coefficients among the five 
dimensions of the IAEA model were extremely high, ranging between .90 and 1 
(see Table 13). Half of them (correlations between dimensions C and A, 
dimensions C and B, dimensions D and C, dimensions E and C and dimensions E 
and D) were not empirically discriminable as the correlations did not significantly 
differ from 1 (p>.05). The remaining correlations, although significantly lower 
than one, were too large from a practical point of view, following the criterion of 
Kline (2005), who stated that discriminant validity can be established when inter-
factor correlations are below .85.  
The large correlations among the 5 dimensions of the IAEA model suggested 
that a one-factor model could be more suitable to represent the IAEA‘s attributes. 
To evaluate this possibility, we fit a one-factor model and compared the results to 
the five-factor model. In fact, this is an advantage of applying CFA as it allows 
testing different conceptualizations of the data, or competing models, and helps 
researchers to retain the best fitting model (Noar, 2003). The results showed that 
the one-factor model provided a satisfactory fit to data (Satorra-Bentler scaled χ2 
= 2052.76, df = 629, p< .01; NNFI = .984; CFI = .985; RMSEA = .074; and 
SRMR = .055).  
The one-factor model was compared to the five-factor model proposed by the 
IAEA, both in terms of statistical and practical significance. Focusing on 
statistical significance, and considering that Satorra (2000) showed that the 
difference between two nested models in Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square for 
overall model fit (which is applicable when using RML methods of estimation) 
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does not yield the correct Satorra-Bentler scaled difference, we applied the 
correction proposed by Satorra and Bentler (2001). Focusing on practical 
significance (i.e., substantive differences between models), it is widely accepted 
that differences in NNFI and CFI lower than .01 indicate irrelevant differences 
between models (Cheung and Rensvold, 2002; Widaman, 1985). In addition, 
Chen (2007) also suggests that significant differences not larger than .015 in 
RMSEA would suggest negligible practical differences. 
 
Table 13 
       
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among the five dimensions of the IAEA model 
 
M SD Dim.1 Dim.2 Dim.3 Dim.4  Dim.5 
Dim.1 - safety is a clearly recognized value 4.06 .83 - 
    
Dim.2 - leadership for safety is clear 3.80 .92 .90 - 
   
Dim.3 - accountability for safety is clear 4.04 .84 .98 .99 - 
  
Dim.4 - safety is integrated into all activities 3.84 .86 .94 .96 1 - 
 
Dim.5 - safety is learning driven 3.78 .88 .95 .95 1 .98 -  
Note. all correlations are significant at p< .05 
 
The results of the comparison showed significant differences between the two 
models (corrected Satorra-Bentler scaled χ2 difference=147.19; df=10; p<.01).  
However, the differences in NNFI, CFI and RMSEA between the five and one-
factor models (.001, .001 and -.004) suggest that, although statistically significant, 
the differences are irrelevant from a practical point of view (see Table 14). These 
results indicate that, pursuing the parsimony principle, the one-factor model will 
represent the empirical data better than the five-factor model, bringing into 
TESTING THE DIMENSIONALITY OF THE IAEA SAFETY CULTURE MODEL
204 
 
question the adequacy of the attributes to assess the safety culture model as 
proposed by the IAEA. 
 
Table 14 
Goodness of fit indices for the IAEA safety culture model 
Model χ² χ²/gl NNFI CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Original 1901.23 3.07 .985 .986 .070 .055 
 
Unidimensional 2052.76 3.26 .984 .985 .074 .055 
Note. NNFI = non-normed fit index; CFI = comparative fit index; 
RMSEA = root mean square error of  approximation; SRMR = 
standarized root mean square residual. ‗Original‘ refers to the factor 
structure proposed by the IAEA ( 37 attributes and 5 dimensions); 
‗Unidimensional‘ refers to a one-factor structure based on the model of 
the IAEA (37 attributes and 1 dimension). 
 
 
Despite these results, we decided to explore the internal structure of the IAEA 
model without the restrictions imposed by a confirmatory analysis approach for 
two reasons.  On the one hand, the first two studies in this paper suggested that a 
number of attributes of the model were related to the dimensions which, according 
to the IAEA, they belong to. This indicated that, although far from the IAEA 
proposal, some of the attributes of the model may be grouped under the same 
dimensions. On the other hand, as reported in the previous CFA, some of the 
inter-factor correlations seem to be empirically discriminable. 
Exploratory analyses 
The PCA of the 37-item safety culture model produced five factors with 
Eigenvalues greater than 1 (Kaiser Criterion), which accounted for 64% of the 
total variance. The way the attributes were grouped by the PCA was very different 
from the IAEA proposal (see Table 15). Several points that did not support the 
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adequacy of this structure to represent the safety culture construct. First, 50% of 
the total variance explained was accounted for by the first factor, and the scree 
plot clearly suggested retaining only one factor (see Figure 6). Second, when 
trying to label the five factors that met the Kaiser rule, researchers found 
difficulties in conceptually interpreting each of these factors. For example, 
attributes A1, A6, C1, C2, D3, D5, E2 and E4, which seem to be grouped under 
the same factor, refer to quite distinct aspects of safety culture that cannot easily 
be included under the same label (items C1 and C2 refer to accountabilities and 
responsibilities; A6 and E2 refer to safety behaviors; D3 and D5 refer to 
conditions to act safely; and A1 could be understood as a mixture of conditions 
for safety and safety behaviors). Third, some of the items showed low loadings on 
all of the factors (i.e. <.40) (e.g. B3, B6, D1, D2, D4, D8, D9, E4 and E5), and 
several items cross-loaded on more than one factor (i.e. cross-loadings ≥.30) (e.g. 
A1, A2, A3, A6, B6, B7, B9, C1, C2, C3, C4, D1, D2, D4, D7, D8, E4, E5 and 
E6). All factor loadings can also be checked in Table 15. Fourth, some factors did 
not contain the recommended minimum of three items per factor (Brown, 2006; 
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). When the minimum value to consider that an item 
loads on any given factor was .30 to .35 (as recommended by Spector, 1992), the 
third factor contained just three items (D8, E1 and E7), and the fourth factor only 
two (E3 and E4). But when the cut-off point was .40 (as recommended by Hair et 
al., 1998), the third factor contained two items (E1 and E7), and the fourth factor 
only one (E3).   
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Table 15 
     PCA results for the 37 attributes of the IAEA model  
 
Factor 
Attribute          I           II III IV          V 
B1 .79 .06 .09 -.01 .01 
C5 .71 .08 .07 .09 .14 
C3 .66 -.11 .09 .10 .31 
B2 .62 .16 .06 .00 .13 
A5 .56 .18 .20 -.05 -.05 
A3 .52 -.02 .13 -.37 -.03 
E6 .51 .14 -.02 -.32 .08 
B7 .49 .35 -.04 -.21 -.05 
A4 .45 .11 .09 -.15 .10 
A2 .45 .06 .11 -.01 .34 
D2 .38 -.04 .06 -.38 .32 
D1 .38 .30 .16 .24 .26 
D4 .37 .34 -.14 -.15 .24 
D9 .32 .23 .02 .01 .28 
B8 .13 .75 .03 -.01 .03 
B5 .12 .73 -.16 -.06 .04 
B4 .04 .65 .25 -.23 -.19 
B9 .35 .64 .05 .04 -.09 
D6 -.18 .62 .22 -.16 .24 
B10 .16 .48 .21 .26 .25 
D7 .03 .44 .04 .11 .36 
C4 -.14 .43 .25 -.18 .36 
B6 .38 .39 .09 -.22 -.01 
B3 .16 .35 .17 -.27 .20 
E5 .07 .32 .18 -.30 .27 
E7 -.09 -.02 .87 -.09 -.09 
E1 .13 -.12 .87 .05 .01 
D8 .31 .31 .36 .19 .07 
E3 -.05 .10 .19 -.62 .17 
E4 .28 .14 .01 -.35 .34 
D3 .07 -.03 -.05 -.09 .70 
D5 .08 -.03 .05 -.07 .66 
C2 -.12 .39 .13 .06 .57 
A1 .40 -.04 .05 -.14 .50 
C1 .21 .03 -.01 -.32 .45 
A6 .30 -.02 .21 -.12 .45 
E2 .25 .22 .04 -.04 .45 
% Variance explained 50.44 4.56 3.38 3.13 2.74 
Note. factor loadings ≥ .30 are indicated in bold, and variables have been sorted by 
loadings on each factor. 
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Figure 6. Scree plot of Eigenvalues from the IAEA safety culture model 
 
Although the reasons for choosing PCA have been explained (see section 
2.3.4.2.), the authors decided to perform an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to 
see if a ―better‖ factorial solution could emerge. The EFA also resulted in the 
retention of five factors, which showed the same problems as the PCA in terms of 
explained variance, interpretability and factor loadings.  
Finally, because the use of the Kaiser criterion alone may overestimate the 
number of factors to retain (Costello and Osborne 2005; Kline, 1994; Lance et al., 
2006; Zwick and Velicer, 1986), PCAs were carried out forcing the number of 
factors to two, three, and four. Of these options, only the two-factor solution 
seemed to be interpretable, but the authors could not support this solution because 
one of the factors accounted for 50% out of the 55% total variance explained.  
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6.2.3.6. Conclusions 
Factor analyses (CFA, PCA and EFA) of the answers given by a sample of 
workers from a NPP to a questionnaire based on the IAEA model failed to support 
the dimensionality of this model. Results from these analyses could not support 
any alternative multidimensional structure either. Moreover, it seems that the 
IAEA‘s attributes may be better understood as being part of one unique 
dimension, namely safety culture.  
6.3. Discussion 
This is the first time that the validity of the IAEA model and the 
psychometric properties of the attributes that underpin the model have been 
investigated. Results from three independent but complementary studies could not 
support the correspondence between the IAEA‘s attributes and the dimensions 
proposed by the model; consequently, substantial evidence to support the validity 
of this model was not found. Our findings suggest that most of the attributes of the 
IAEA model may not be related to the dimensions to which they are supposed to 
belong; that is, most of the attributes included in the IAEA model may not be 
measuring the dimensions they are intended to measure. Furthermore, according 
to our results, the IAEA safety culture model, as it stands, could have a one-
dimensional structure instead of the five dimensions the IAEA proposes. We 
believe that the conclusions from the three empirical studies included in this paper 
provide a useful addition to the discourse on safety culture, as they open the door 
for the improvement of a widely-used model that has the potential to change 
nuclear safety outcomes.  
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We consider two possible explanations for our results. First, the five 
dimensions of the IAEA model may not appropriately reflect the essence of safety 
culture. In this scenario, the attributes of the model could be good indicators of the 
construct of safety culture, even though they were not related to the dimensions 
the IAEA proposes. This could either mean that, as our results suggest, the 
attributes of the model are part of a one-dimensional construct (supposedly safety 
culture), or that other dimensions, distinct from those proposed by the IAEA, may 
need to be included in the model. Nevertheless, this last option seems less likely, 
as our results could not support any factorial solution apart from a one-
dimensional structure. Second, the five dimensions of the IAEA model may 
appropriately reflect the essence of safety culture, but some of the attributes may 
not be adequate to assess these dimensions. In this case, the dimensions of the 
model should be kept, and the inclusion of better indicators (attributes) of these 
dimensions should be considered. All in all, it seems reasonable to think that our 
studies were not able to empirically reproduce the IAEA model due to a 
combination of these two explanations (non-adequacy of some dimensions and 
non-adequacy of some attributes). For example, it seems at first glance that some 
attributes of the model may overlap (e.g. ―relationships between managers and 
individuals are built on trust‖ and ―trust permeates the organization‖). We also 
noted in section 1.2. that two dimensions of the model (―safety is a clearly 
recognized value‖, and ―safety is integrated into all activities‖) may be too general 
and wide in scope. As these two broad dimensions could cover many of the 
attributes of the model, they may have contributed to the overlap among the five 
dimensions (i.e., inter-factor correlations between .90 and 1) and the one-
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dimensional structure supported by our results. Discovering the reasons behind 
the weak correspondence between attributes and IAEA‘s dimensions is essential 
to understanding how the proposed model could be evaluated and improved. To 
help with this purpose, the IAEA is encouraged to share additional information 
regarding the origin and development of the model. Were the attributes developed 
first? If so, how were they grouped and under which criteria were the dimensions 
labeled? Or on the contrary, were the dimensions developed first? If so, how were 
they identified and further operationalized through the attributes?  
This paper is especially relevant to the IAEA, organizations using the IAEA 
model for self-assessment purposes, regulators currently using this model to 
determine policies and guidelines affecting the functioning of nuclear facilities 
(NPP, research reactors, fuel cycle facilities, etc), and those scholars and 
practitioners interested in this model of safety culture. Two practical implications 
of our results are discussed next. First, the IAEA provides detailed instructions 
about how to use the attributes when assessing safety culture (IAEA, 2008a), but 
it does not clarify the role of the dimensions in safety culture assessments. The 
IAEA also proposes that each attribute corresponds to one specific dimension of 
its model, but it does not specify either how the relation between attributes and 
their corresponding dimensions should be addressed in practice. This lack of 
specificity and guidance may lead to different interpretations about how to use the 
model in theory and in practice, how it should be empirically tested, etc. Authors 
such as Taylor (2010) note that the strength of a particular dimension of the IAEA 
model should be judged by assessing the degree of presence of the dimension‘s 
attributes. However, our findings suggest that the current attributes of the model 
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should not be grouped into higher-level dimensions.  For example, if attributes 
C1, C2, C3, C4 and C5 receive high scores on a safety culture assessment, one 
cannot conclude that ―accountability for safety is clear‖ (label of dimension C) in 
the organization. But beyond the lack of guidance, another point must be noted. In 
practice, practitioners often only consider the interpretations suggested by higher-
level dimensions, instead of the information derived from the scores of individual 
items, for several reasons (saving time, more intuitive approach, etc). 
Consequently, not only clear guidance on the use of the models must be provided, 
but the attributes must also be true indicators of the dimensions to which they 
supposedly belong and be grouped together in practice as well as in theory. 
Second, our studies suggest that the face validity of the IAEA safety culture 
model, as it stands, is low. The extent to which a safety culture model is face valid 
has practical implications for the nuclear industry. A model with low face validity 
will not make clear what it is intended to cover and what its purpose is. If the 
workers of a NPP find the IAEA model hard to understand and not very intuitive, 
they will have difficulty internalizing it. And if workers do not assimilate the 
model, they cannot be expected to contribute to the type of culture described by 
the model. The contribution and involvement of all workers in safety-related 
issues is in itself a characteristic of a strong safety culture (Filho et al., 2010; 
IAEA, 1999; Reason, 1997).  
A number of possible limitations of our study are highlighted. First, although 
sections 2.1.3. and 2.2.3. explained why we chose a sample of students to test the 
face validity of the IAEA model and a sample of experts in organizational 
behavior to test its content validity, we acknowledge that using samples of a 
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different nature could have provided relevant and perhaps distinct results from 
those we have obtained. On the one hand, although face validity is often assessed 
by participants who are not knowledgeable about the constructs under study (e.g., 
students), it is worth noting that the purpose of testing face validity is to ensure 
that the measure is self evident to the people who use the assessment instrument, 
in the case of the IAEA model, employees in the nuclear industry. Nevertheless, 
we decided not to include a sample of this type because nuclear power workers 
are typically exposed to the model, which they see in courses, 
seminars/congresses, posters around the nuclear plant, etc. On the other hand, it 
would have been interesting to test the content validity of the IAEA model with a 
sample of experts in safety culture in the nuclear industry. However, we did not 
include such a sample because their answers could have been biased by their 
previous knowledge about the IAEA model or other models and instruments used 
in the nuclear industry that have been influenced by the IAEA model. Second, the 
fact that a few students reported confusion about the meaning of attributes and 
dimensions could have contributed to the variability in their allocation of 
attributes into dimensions. If the students had problems understanding the content 
of the model, it could be expected that some of their answers would be arbitrary, 
which in turn could have contributed to the observed low face validity of the 
model. However, the sample of experts in the content validity study also showed a 
low performance in the allocation of attributes into dimensions. In this case, the 
difficulties in the sorting task could not be due to a lack of understanding of the 
contents of the model. Therefore, it seems reasonable to reject the lack of 
knowledge of some students as an alternative explanation for the results of the 
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face validity study. Third, NPPs are highly-regulated work environments in which 
audits, control processes and safety measurements are part of workers‘ routines. 
The questionnaire we used for the third study of this paper not only served to test 
the factorial validity of the IAEA model, but it was also used, together with other 
questionnaires, to inform the members of the NPP about the state of their safety 
culture. This could have been a reason for participants to complete the 
questionnaire in a socially desirable manner. Such a tendency toward high ratings 
could have contributed to the one-dimensional structure of the model supported 
by our results. This could have been especially applicable in a ῾blame culture᾽, 
where members do not feel free to report mistakes and try to give the best picture 
of their work and the functioning of organizational policies, processes and 
practices. However, we tried to avoid social desirability bias by guaranteeing the 
anonymity and confidentiality of participants‘ answers. On the other hand, a 
strong awareness in the nuclear industry that their plants must be managed under 
῾no blame᾽ principles should be enough to encourage workers to express their 
opinions openly and honestly. Fourth, the attributes of the model were not 
designed to be used as items on a questionnaire. A number of these attributes are 
double and triple barreled, and as such, respondents can agree with one part of the 
item but perhaps not with the other. We acknowledge that including these 
attributes in the questionnaire of the third study is a limitation of this paper; 
however, if we had rephrased them, the conclusions of this study would have been 
seriously biased. We kept all the attributes unaltered because the purpose of our 
study was not to create a safety culture questionnaire, but rather to test whether 
our participants‘ answers to the attributes could replicate the five-dimensional 
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structure proposed by the IAEA. Despite this, three reasons support that the 
results of the third study have not been compromised by the ―barreled‖ items: we 
could not find significant differences between the number of missing values of 
―barreled‖ and ―non-barreled‖ items; none of the attributes increased the Alpha 
value of its corresponding dimension when it was removed; and none of the 
participants verbally expressed difficulties in understanding or responding to any 
of the ―barreled‖ items. Nevertheless, we advise the nuclear industry to carefully 
review and adapt the attributes (e.g., some attributes could be divided and 
rephrased as separate items) if they are to be included as part of a questionnaire. 
Fifth, the fact that all the items across the five dimensions were rated by the same 
raters could explain, at least partially, the high correlations and lack of empirical 
discriminability among the five dimensions of the IAEA model as assessed by the 
corresponding attributes. To control for this possibility, we performed Harman‘s 
single factor test, which requires taking measures of clearly different traits and 
loading all the measures into an exploratory factor analysis under the assumption 
that the presence of common method variance will result in either a single factor 
or a general factor accounting for the majority of the covariance among measures 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). In our case, even if the EFA of the IAEA‘s attributes 
resulted in five factors, we factor analyzed the responses of two additional scales 
(role ambiguity and trust). The analyses of the three scales, which had all been 
collected at the same time, resulted in a six-factor model that explained 58% of 
the variance. Interestingly, all the role ambiguity items (specifically four items 
with an alpha coefficient of .81) loaded on the same factor, and all the trust items 
(specifically four items with an alpha coefficient of .77) loaded on the same 
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factor. None of the safety culture items had factor loadings larger than .40 on the 
factors that comprised the items on the role ambiguity and trust scales. These 
results reduce the likelihood that the high correlations observed among the five 
dimensions of the IAEA model could be mainly attributed to a response bias or 
common method effects. Finally, the sixth issue to be considered is related to the 
use of questionnaires for safety culture assessments. The third study explored the 
dimensional structure of the IAEA model through the answers given by a sample 
of nuclear workers to a questionnaire based on this model. With this quantitative 
technique, we measured to what extent participants perceived that 37 specific 
organizational performance aspects or attitudes were being fulfilled in their NPP. 
Perceptions, as well as thought processes, feelings and behaviors, are usually 
determined by the deepest and usually unconscious levels of culture (Schein, 
2004), but it is believed that these underlying levels of culture can only be reached 
by ethnographic approaches, including intensive and extensive observations and 
employee interviews (Schein, 1991). Therefore, with this questionnaire we may 
have measured safety climate perceptions. However, if these perceptions are 
determined by the underlying safety culture of the organization, participants‘ 
answers should, to a certain degree, reflect the existing safety culture in their 
organization. Safety climate perceptions are a window to the underlying safety 
culture assumptions. Furthermore, the use of questionnaires for the assessment of 
safety culture is widely spread (Antonsen, 2009).  
We encourage the nuclear community to contribute to the improvement and 
empirical validation of the IAEA model. The empirical studies presented in this 
paper could be replicated to determine whether our results are consistent across 
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different samples and NPPs. We would also like to suggest the IAEA to perform 
factorial analyses of the scores they obtained on each of the attributes in their 
SCART missions, as this information may be crucial for understanding the 
dimensionality of their model. We are not aware that the validity of the SCART 
methodology has been investigated, and doing so could help to find evidence 
supporting the validity of the IAEA model. Organizations that have used the 
SCART methodology on their own (or any other assessment instrument based on 
the IAEA model) are also encouraged to test the validity of these instruments. As 
has been shown, the validity of the IAEA model can also be tested by means of 
assessment procedures simpler than SCART, such as the one we have presented in 
the third study of this paper. It is worth noting that the IAEA has created specific 
indicators of safety culture for each of the attributes of the model (IAEA, 2009a). 
In the present paper we decided to test the IAEA model through its 37 attributes; 
however, using these indicators could have provided additional information about 
the internal structure of the IAEA model. Further studies should also try to 
replicate the model with the indicators of safety culture, keeping in mind that 
some of them, as in the case of the attributes, are double or triple barreled. Finally, 
to gain more evidence about the validity of the model, an additional study is 
suggested. We have been concerned with the extent to which each of the attributes 
of the model is relevant to the dimension to which it is supposed to belong. This 
has been referred to as the relevance aspect of content validity. However, 
exploring the other side of the coin, the representativeness aspect of content 
validity, could also help to improve the model. Researchers are encouraged to test 
whether the attributes of the model are representative of the safety culture 
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construct, in other words, whether the entire domain of the safety culture construct 
can be reproduced by the 37 attributes included in the IAEA model and, if higher-
level dimensions exist within the construct, whether the attributes are proportional 
to them.  
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Abstract 
This paper presents the Safety Culture Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ), 
designed to assess the degree to which safety is an enacted value in the day-to-day 
running of nuclear power plants (NPPs). The SCEQ is based on a theoretical 
safety culture model that is manifested in three fundamental components of the 
functioning and operation of any organization: strategic decisions, human 
resources practices, and daily activities and behaviors. The extent to which the 
importance of safety is enacted in each of these three components provides 
information about the pervasiveness of the safety culture in the NPP. To validate 
the SCEQ and the model on which it is based, two separate studies were carried 
out with data collection in 2008 and 2014, respectively. In Study 1, the SCEQ was 
administered to the employees of two Spanish NPPs (N=533) belonging to the 
same company. Participants in Study 2 included 598 employees from the same 
NPPs, who completed the SCEQ and other questionnaires measuring different 
safety culture outcomes (safety climate, safety satisfaction, job satisfaction and 
risky behaviors). Study 1 comprised item formulation and examination of the 
factorial structure and reliability of the SCEQ. Study 2 tested internal consistency 
and provided evidence of factorial validity, validity based on relationships with 
other variables, and discriminant validity between the SCEQ and safety climate. 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) carried out in Study 1 revealed a three-factor 
solution corresponding to the three components of the theoretical model. 
Reliability analyses showed strong internal consistency for the three scales of the 
SCEQ, and each of the 21 items on the questionnaire contributed to the 
homogeneity of its theoretically developed scale. Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
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(CFA) carried out in Study 2 supported the internal structure of the SCEQ; 
internal consistency of the scales was also supported. Furthermore, the three 
scales of the SCEQ showed the expected correlation patterns with the measured 
safety culture outcomes. Finally, results provided evidence of discriminant 
validity between the SCEQ and safety climate. We conclude that the SCEQ is a 
valid, reliable instrument supported by a theoretical framework, and it is useful to 
measure the enactment of safety culture in NPPs.  
Keywords: Empirical validation; enacted values; nuclear industry; nuclear power 
plant; safety culture model; safety culture questionnaire 
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7.1. INTRODUCTION  
For the past 30 years, scientists and practitioners have continuously worked 
toward the creation of specific models, methodologies, and tools for the 
assessment of safety cultures. However, most culture studies have relied too 
heavily on the organization‘s espoused values (i.e., what should be done), instead 
of capturing what is actually enacted. Thus, many tools may be skewed toward the 
―declared‖ culture, rather than identifying ―culture in action‖ (Siehl and Martin, 
1990). In particular, questionnaires to assess safety culture have not yet been 
successful in grasping information about safety values (Guldenmund, 2000) and 
capturing the enactment of safety. In addition, most safety culture questionnaires 
created for High Reliability Organizations (HROs) are not supported by solid 
theoretical frameworks. Due to these shortcomings, even though questionnaires 
have been the main strategy for safety culture assessment (Antonsen, 2009; Gadd 
und Collins, 2002; Guldenmund, 2000), none of them has been widely used and 
accepted to capture and assess the enactment safety culture in the nuclear 
industry. Thus, there is rather limited guidance about how to assess safety culture 
(benefiting from the inherent advantages of questionnaires) in order to ensure 
safety in nuclear power plants. 
This paper presents the SCEQ, a safety culture questionnaire developed to 
overcome these weaknesses. On the one hand, the SCEQ was designed to assess 
the degree to which the safety value is enacted in the operations of nuclear 
facilities and other HRO. On the other hand, the SCEQ is based on a safety 
culture model that measures its manifestation in three fundamental components of 
the functioning and operation of any NPP or HRO. 
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The paper aims to empirically validate the SCEQ and the dimensionality of 
the model on which it is based. The authors expect that the SCEQ will serve the 
nuclear industry and other High Reliability industries in the difficult but 
unavoidable quest to assess safety culture enactment. 
7.1.1. What is safety culture? 
The culture of an organization is composed of a specific set of elements that 
guide the ultimate behavior of its members toward the attainment of specific 
organizational goals. These cultural elements are hierarchically ordered from 
deeper and more intangible layers to more superficial and visible ones (Deal and 
Kennedy, 1982; Detert et al., 2000; Furnham and Gunter, 1993; Hofstede, 1991; 
Lundberg, 1990; Rousseau, 1990; Schein, 1985). Schein‘s (1985) three-layer 
model provides a widely-accepted framework to understand these cultural 
elements. At the organizational surface, the layer of artifacts is found. Artifacts 
are the most tangible and overt manifestations of culture, and they include 
everything that can be seen, heard and felt in an organization. Typical artifacts 
include physical environment, language, myths, stories, observable rituals, 
emotional displays, observable behaviors, and, in general, any kind of visible 
product of organizational members. At the second layer, one can find the 
espoused values, norms, philosophies and organizational rules that reflect what 
this organization would ideally like to be. This level can be expressed in public 
declarations during meetings or ceremonies, written documents describing the 
organization‘s mission and strategy, leaders‘ messages, etc. The third and deepest 
layer is composed of basic beliefs and assumptions shared by the members of the 
organization. These assumptions, often implicit, are deeply rooted in the history of 
CHAPTER VII
225 
 
the organization, as they have demonstrated to be useful for organizational 
survival and development. Therefore, to a greater extent than artifacts and 
espoused values, these underlying assumptions tell the members of an 
organization how to act, perceive, think, and feel about events and things if they 
are to be successful.  
In general terms, most scholars refer to safety culture as a focused aspect 
(Richter and Koch, 2004), sub-element (Kennedy and Kirwan, 1998), sub-facet 
(Cooper, 2000; Mohamed, 2003) or subset (Clarke, 1999; IAEA, 1998a; Reiman 
and Rollenhagen, 2014; Sorensen, 2002) of organizational culture that alludes to 
organizational and/or worker features related to health and safety. In this line, and 
using Schein‘s model as a reference framework, an NPP has a high and strong 
safety culture (see González-Romá and Peiró, 2014) when its cultural elements 
(i.e., basic assumptions and values held by its workers and visible artifacts) result 
in safety management and performance behaviors designed to guarantee the safety 
of workers, the public, and the environment.  Therefore, safety culture is present 
to the extent to which safety is the most important value in an NPP and, this is 
demonstrated through the enactment of this value in the behaviors its members do. 
As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Institute of Nuclear 
Power Operations (INPO) conclude, in a safety culture, safety is the enduring 
overriding priority, always emphasized over any competing organizational goal 
(e.g. production, innovation, etc.) (IAEA, 1991; INPO, 2004), and a clearly 
recognized value (IAEA, 2006a). 
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7.1.2. Espoused vs. enacted values 
Values refer to what is desirable (Kohn and Schooler, 1983; Rokeach, 1973; 
Schwartz, 1994; Williams, 1979). They are enduring convictions (Rokeach, 1973) 
and tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs to others (Hofstede, 1980) in 
trying to achieve our goals (e.g. cooperation vs. competition or flexibility vs. 
rigidity). In the nuclear industry, safety (vs. risk) can be considered an 
instrumental value (see Rokeach [1973] for an explanation of terminal and 
instrumental values) to achieve organizational goals (i.e., the necessary level of 
production without putting workers and the society at risk). 
However, in some circumstances (e.g. financial rewards for producing more 
energy in an NPP), the enduring convictions or preferred tendencies of a specific 
group (e.g. safety) may be questioned. Members do not always behave according 
to the values that ―in theory‖ are preferred and shared by their organizations. This 
distinction has been addressed in the literature as espoused theories vs. theories in 
use (Argyris and Schon, 1974); espoused rules vs. real rules (Shapiro, 1995); or 
espoused values vs. enacted values (Simons, 2002). Espoused values reflect what 
the organization articulates as essential, the managerial philosophy, and its 
aspirations, whereas the real, in use, or enacted values are the decision rules that 
guide employees‘ ultimate behavior in real situations and settings.  
In the organizational context, the study of espoused vs. enacted values has 
mainly been addressed from two perspectives: 1) From an employee-leader 
approach, the concept of ―behavioral integrity‖ is used (Simons, 2002). 
Behavioral integrity is defined as ―the perceived pattern of alignment between an 
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actor‘s words and deeds‖ (Simons, 2002, p. 19). It refers therefore to the 
congruence between the leader‘s espoused and enacted values, the famous ―walk 
the talk‖. 2) From an organizational approach, the concept of ―organizational 
authenticity‖ is adopted (Cording, Harrison, Hoskisson and Jonsen, 2014; 
Freeman and Auster, 2011; Liedtka, 2008). Organizational authenticity is defined 
as the consistency between an organization´s espoused values and the practices it 
carries out (Cording et al., 2014). It refers therefore to the alignment between the 
actions taken by an organization and the values it openly espouses. 
From both the employee-leader and organizational approaches, the main 
interest in studying espoused and enacted values lies on how they determine 
individual and collective behaviors and organizational outcomes (e.g., 
organizational productivity [Cording et al., 2014], corporate growth [Neumann, 
2005], confusion and dissatisfaction [Patankar et al., 2012], employee 
performance [Schuh and Miller, 2006], commitment [Branch and Olson, 2011], 
and the underreporting of near misses and first aid injuries [Lauver, Trank and Le, 
2011]. Thus, if values determine and guide behaviors, measuring the varying 
degrees to which organizational values are enacted can provide information about 
the likelihood of future safety performance and employee behaviors in NPPs (e.g., 
if safety is a central value of an NPP, it can be expected that their workers will do 
everything possible to avoid risky behaviors). 
However, is not clear to what extent espoused values determine employees‘ 
behaviors (Wilpert and Schobel, 2007). It could be argued that measuring 
espoused values would be useful when espoused and enacted values are aligned. 
Unfortunately, the values espoused by managers and leaders are not always 
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coherent with the values that guide their priorities and behaviors (Argyris and 
Schon, 1978; Simons, 2002; Zohar and Hofmann, 2012). Specifically, there is 
―sufficient evidence from inquiry reports into major hazard incidents and disasters 
that idealized enactment rarely occurs‖ (Waring, 2015, p. 261). As Schein (1992) 
points out, the enacted values, the ones that are supported, prioritized and 
rewarded in the day-to-day organizational functioning, inform members about the 
actions expected from them. In summary, it seems that to understand an 
organization and predict its future performance, it is not enough to merely capture 
the culture reflected in its espoused values. 
7.1.3. Capturing the enactment of safety culture 
The need to take the level of enacted values into account when studying 
organizations has been widely highlighted (Branch and Olson, 2011; Schein, 
1992; Siehl and Martin, 1990; Waring, 2015; Zohar and Hofmann, 2012), as they 
―offer more valid information regarding deep-layer assumptions and values than 
their espoused counterparts‖ (Zohar and Hofmann, 2012, p. 661). However, how 
can we reach beyond the level of espoused values? 
The different layers of culture call for distinct research methods. Artifacts are 
easy to observe and, consequently, can be directly registered without the help of 
organizational members‘ reports. However, it is very difficult to understand the 
real meaning of artifacts and the cultural aspects that lie behind them without 
conducting a deeper cultural analysis. Next, one can try to capture and analyze the 
values of an organization. The espoused values are relatively easy for 
organizational members to articulate and, thus, can be captured by written surveys 
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and questionnaires (Guldenmund 2007; Schein, 1992; Wilpert and Schobel, 2007) 
that have been adequately designed for this purpose. Access to the basic 
assumptions is the most difficult aspect of analyzing a particular culture. Because 
basic assumptions are taken for granted and ingrained, organizational members 
who hold them are often not aware of them (Schein, 1985).Therefore, basic 
assumptions cannot be reached by directly asking employees about them. The 
deepest cultural level can only be revealed through a combination of novel 
qualitative methodological approaches (Schein, 1985; Wilpert and Schobel, 2007) 
and time-consuming objective processes of data integration, deciphering, and 
interpretation (Schein, 1985).  
Each of these levels provides valuable and complementary information with 
which to understand the particular culture of an organization. However, most 
attempts to assess safety culture have used questionnaires (Antonsen, 2009; Gadd 
und Collins, 2002; Guldenmund, 2000), typically oriented toward the espoused 
values layer (Guldenmund, 2007), and avoiding the difficulties and costs involved 
in the study of basic assumptions and the limited information provided by cultural 
artifacts.  
Questionnaires offer advantages over qualitative approaches. They do not 
require excessive time and economic resources, they allow access to many 
organizational members from all hierarchical levels of the NPP, and they provide 
data that can be easily coded, analyzed and benchmarked. As a result, 
questionnaires allow the safety culture of NPPs to be assessed more frequently 
(e.g., annually) and systematically than other methods. Frequent monitoring in 
NPPs is extremely important for the early detection of declining and weakening 
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safety cultures (IAEA, 2006a), allowing time to take remedial action before 
minimum acceptable safety levels are challenged (IAEA, 2003).  Systematic 
monitoring through the comparison of quantified results at different times makes 
it possible to detect trends (Hale, 2009; Håvold, 2005; IAEA, 2003) and evaluate 
the evolution of safety culture. For these reasons, in spite of the merits of 
qualitative methods, a questionnaire on safety culture is a valuable resource for 
the nuclear industry. ―The challenge is, of course, to develop a questionnaire that 
yields just enough relevant and valid information – the trusted ‗wet ﬁnger‘ to ﬁnd 
out from which way the wind blows – to decide whether and possibly where any 
corrective measures or actions are opportune‖ (Guldenmund 2007, p. 724). 
We took on this challenge by creating a questionnaire that could capture the 
level of enacted values in HRO. However, the SCEQ does not intend to assess all 
the possible values enacted in an organization. As it is a safety culture 
questionnaire, the focus is on the real importance of safety in practice. More 
specifically, the SCEQ is designed to assess the degree to which safety is an 
enacted value within NPPs and HROs. 
How can a questionnaire encourage respondents to report the degree to which 
safety is an enacted value, and not just an espoused value? Howell, Kirk-Brown 
and Cooper (2012) propose that ―assessing the degree to which employees believe 
that a particular value is enacted within their organization requires employees to 
be directly asked about their perceptions of the degree of enactment‖ (p. 734). 
Along the same lines, we argue that this can be done by asking employees about 
the practical importance of safety in the decisions and behaviors taking place in 
the organization, a requirement for enacted values to be present in the Argyris 
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(1990), Shapiro (1995) and Simons (2002) studies. To obtain this information, we 
relied on the introduction to the questionnaire (see section 7.2.1.). First, the text 
that presents the SCEQ encourages the surveyed person to think about the 
practical importance of safety, leaving aside its theoretical value (what is said and 
how things should be) and focusing, in the words of Simons (2002, p. 29), on ―the 
way things really get done‖, and not just the ―official policies and managerial 
philosophy‖. Second, the introduction to the SCEQ forces the surveyed person to 
think about the importance of safety in the day-to-day running of the plant (i.e. the 
extent to which safety is a long-standing cultural element in their organization). 
Asking for the importance in practice we ask to report about the use of the safety 
values in real practice. An organizational member can easily observe and be 
aware of an espoused value, as these values may take the form of rationalizations, 
aspirations, or norms that are openly spread. However, to recognize an enacted 
value, this person needs to consistently experience over time that the value in 
question is considered in practice and implemented consistently as a non-
negotiable priority. The SCEQ tries to capture the way participants perceive that 
the value of safety is aligned with and embedded in strategic and daily operations 
and practices, and the extent to which safety is a long-standing cultural element in 
their organization. Thus, the SCEQ differs from most existing safety culture 
questionnaires, which typically focus on espoused values and provide a 
―snapshot‖ of culture. 
Moreover, Forty years ago, Guttman and Levy (1976) established the criteria 
for an item to be considered to belong to the universe of value items. For these 
authors, an item belongs to the universe of value items if and only if its domain 
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asks for an estimation of the degree of importance of a goal or behavior in a life 
area, with a range from very important to obtain the goal to very important to 
avoid the goal. Elizur (1984), following Guttman and Levy‘s criteria, states that 
―an item belongs to the universe of work value items if its domain asks for an 
assessment of the importance of a goal in the work context, with a range from 
very important to very unimportant‖ (p. 379). These criteria are widely accepted 
in the scientific community. Accordingly, the response scale of the SCEQ fulfills 
these requirements for the assessment of work values by asking for an estimation 
of the importance of (the goal) safety in practice.  
To our knowledge, so far there is no safety culture questionnaire in the 
nuclear industry that meets these criteria and that approaches the level of work 
values and, in particular, the enactment of the value of safety. 
But what aspects can provide significant information about the enactment of 
safety values in an NPP or HRO? This question is addressed in the next section. 
7.1.4. An organizational model for the enactment of safety culture 
The IAEA emphasizes the importance of safety as a clearly recognized value 
(IAEA, 2006a) that must be present throughout the entire nuclear installation 
(IAEA, 2008a). That is, safety culture implies that safety is the most important 
value and consequently, one that has to be enacted. Therefore, when an NPP or 
HRO has a high and strong safety culture, safety should be reflected in 
―everything‖ the NPP or HRO does, and in the way its members behave. When 
this happens, it inspires and drives the behaviors and attitudes of the people who 
contribute to the organization‘s functioning and the outputs they produce 
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(González-Romá and Peiró, 2014). Thus, IAEA (1991) and Kao et al. (2007), 
among others, conceptualize safety culture as the degree to which different 
hierarchical levels contribute to the safety of an organization. The IAEA safety 
culture model (1991) highlights three levels: policies, managerial, and individual. 
Kao et al. (2007) adapted the IAEA proposal by relating the policy level to top 
management functions, the managerial level to supervisory, support and personnel 
management functions, and the individual level to attitudes, involvement and 
behaviors of the basic operating core. As Mintzberg (1979) reported, and in line 
with the IAEA (1991) and Kao et al. (2007), the main levels of an organization 
are: the strategic apex (i.e., top management), the middle line (i.e., supervisory 
level), and the operating core (i.e., employee level), each of which has a different 
mission and distinct functions in the organization. Top management‘s main role is 
to make decisions and guarantee the conditions for the plant‘s smooth running; 
supervisors must manage the work of employees, mainly by enacting formal and 
informal human resources practices; and employees operate in the organization by 
implementing the work system. The safety culture of an NPP or any other HRO 
must be enacted by showing the alignment between the espoused importance of 
the value of safety and the behaviors and attitudes of its members at any of these 
levels.  
Following this line of reasoning, we developed a safety culture model that 
comprises these three fundamental components of the functioning and operation 
of HROs, where the value of safety must be put into practice: strategic decisions, 
personnel management, and operating behaviors. Therefore, an NPP has a high 
intensity and strong safety culture when the strategic and important decisions 
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guarantee the priority of safety at all times (strategic level), a set of human 
resources practices promotes the safety of the plant (managerial level), and safety 
is the primary determinant of all operating actions and behaviors (operational 
level). 
7.1.4.1. Strategic decisions ensuring safety  
Safety culture manifests itself in the role safety plays in the strategic 
decisions made in NPPs. This dimension covers decisions that are carefully and 
thoughtfully made for the smooth running of the plant. It encompasses decisions 
about the operation of the plant and the conflicts between safety and other 
competing goals, and decisions about the allocation of resources and the 
establishment of procedures.  
Due to competitiveness and stakeholder pressure, NPPs often face the 
dilemma of how to achieve production goals without compromising the safety of 
the plant through their strategic decisions. Having a ‗safety first‘ policy as a 
strategy does not guarantee that it will become an operational reality in NPPs, 
where profitability tends to compete with non-productive investments in nuclear 
safety (Perin, 2005). The IAEA (1999) warns that there are times when the 
emphasis on safety might come into conflict with the requirement to meet all the 
demands for electricity generation. What happens in these situations? Is safety 
still the number one priority when money comes into play? Or are NPPs taking 
risky cost-cutting measures (e.g. deferring maintenance, downsizing staff, 
reducing training, etc.) to cope with competitive pressures (Meshkati, Butler and 
Pelling, 2001)? The practical importance of safety will be reflected in the 
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decisions NPPs‘ leaders make when facing these competing demands. The extent 
to which safety is favored over productivity when they come into direct conflict 
will allow organizational members to align their behaviors accordingly (Zohar and 
Hofmann, 2012). 
Satisfying these safety and productivity demands often becomes a difficult 
task in NPPs, as they have limited resources. Deciding how to allocate and 
manage these resources is critical to the survival and success of the plant. The use 
of adequate qualitative and quantitative risk assessments helps NPPs to make 
decisions about the allocation of resources for safety improvements, by directing 
attention to the features that dominate plant risk (Colombo and Saiz de 
Bustamante, 1990), accident-related events, the level of technical knowledge, etc. 
Important resources for safety (IAEA, 2006a) can include: information to make 
fact-based decisions, material and financial resources to meet safety standards, 
enough personnel and training for the safe operation of the plant (see section 
7.1.4.2.), or adequate infrastructures (e.g., workspace, equipment, support 
services, communication technology, etc.) and resources. But unfortunately, 
essential resources are not always available (e.g., regulators have taken corrective 
actions because decisions about the allocation of resources have sometimes been 
made without an understanding of what is required to maintain the defense of 
safety in depth [IAEA, 2003]). 
To satisfy their financial and safety goals, NPPs must also specify, develop, 
implement, maintain, and improve the necessary processes. For this reason, 
possible hazards and risks must be identified and taken into account in all 
processes, along with any necessary mitigating actions (IAEA, 2009a). 
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Specifically, NPPs must count on decision-making processes that help the 
personnel to be systematic and rigorous in making decisions that support safe, 
reliable plant operations (INPO, 2004). In any case, these processes should not 
diminish organizational flexibility and the ability to adapt, which are essential for 
being prepared in crises (Reason, 1997). In this context, NPPs must allow for the 
possibility of changes in the decision-making processes, depending on the 
urgency of the decision and the expertise of the people involved (CANSO, 2008). 
However, when the consequences a decision can have for safety are not fully 
understood, a conservative approach must be taken (INPO, 2004). 
A culture for safety will also be reflected in the quality of the procedures and 
the extent to which they are developed with the safety of the plant in mind. The 
management system documentation will include procedures and instructions that 
explain how the work is to be prepared, reviewed, carried out, recorded, assessed 
and improved (IAEA, 2009a), to ensure high levels of safety performance. In 
order to guarantee the safety of the plant, these procedures must be designed not 
only from a technical viewpoint, but also by integrating the socio-technical 
conditions required for their application (types of skills, type of environment, type 
of aids required, etc.) (Dien, 1998). Procedures must be easily understood and 
easy to use, and they must be regularly reviewed and updated to guarantee their 
adequacy and effectiveness (IAEA, 2009a). However, to guarantee the safety of 
the plant, procedures must be applied ―intelligently‖ (Dien, 1998), which requires 
―strict adherence to procedures as long as they are adapted to the situation, and 
use of initiative at times when there is a divergence between the actual situation 
and what is expected by the procedure‖ (p. 184). Dien‘s (1998) work provides a 
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thorough analysis of the nature of the problem of applying procedures in the 
nuclear industry. 
On the whole, the practical importance of safety is reflected in the way the 
plant is operated and the extent to which safety is embedded in any decision 
related to its operation. Some examples of the way safety culture can be 
manifested in the plant operations are: the establishment of an operational quality 
assurance program to assist in ensuring satisfactory performance in the plant‘s 
operation and all plant activities relevant to safety (IAEA, 1999), and the 
existence of operational limits and conditions defined for all the stages of 
commissioning, power operation, shutting down, starting up, maintenance, testing 
and refueling (IAEA, 2000).The IAEA also inquires whether there is a plant life 
management program for long term operation, including ageing monitoring 
(IAEA, 2006b), and whether feedback on operating experience is obtained and 
evaluated, promptly taking the necessary corrective measures and disseminating 
information about them (IAEA, 1999). 
7.1.4.2. Human resources practices driving safety 
The safety culture of an NPP manifests itself in the extent to which the HR 
practices are coherently articulated to guarantee high levels of safety performance. 
For this purpose, the organization must be able to bring in new workers (e.g., by 
means of appropriate recruitment and selection practices) who share the priority 
of safety and have the ability and willingness to work safely; it must continuously 
prepare the employees, especially in safety matters (e.g., through training and 
performance appraisals), and it must encourage and motivate them (e.g., through 
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formal reward systems, such as goal setting, promotions or salary, as well as 
informal rewards, such as recognition) to work safely under all conditions. 
A number of regulatory bodies regulate their licensees‘ recruitment practices, 
determining, for example, the minimum length of experience or qualifications for 
specific positions (IAEA, 2002; IAEA, 2008b). In a strong safety culture, the 
management and supervisors go beyond these requirements, hiring only people 
who show attitudes, values and past experiences that support safe work. They look 
for ―pre-socialized‖ members who already have a firm conviction that safety is the 
number one priority in NPPs. The IAEA (2002) makes several recommendations 
about recruitment in the nuclear sector, such as using aptitude and psychological 
tests for some key and critical positions, and performing medical examinations on 
all the operating staff whose duties have a bearing on safety, at the time of 
recruitment and periodically thereafter.  
Attracting the ―right‖ people cannot be an excuse for reducing the importance 
of training personnel in the safe running of the plant. A strong safety culture 
includes training practices to maintain a knowledgeable, safety aware, and 
competent workforce (including operations, maintenance, management and 
technical support personnel). The extent to which safety is important for the plant 
will be expressed in the training provided in plant specifics, quality assurance 
(QA), radiological protection, and safety aspects related to each specific job 
(IAEA, 2006c), as well as in personnel management and leadership, and 
theoretical and practical aspects of strong safety cultures, among others. All 
training programs and processes should be systematically evaluated (e.g. by plant 
supervisors, instructors, trainees, independent experts, and regulatory inspectors) 
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and confirmed, improved or modified according to safety needs and safety values 
(IAEA, 1996). Management must make sure that there are general and specific 
training programs for each position, allowing job holders to develop the necessary 
competencies to carry out safe and quality work. In this context, employees‘ needs 
and suggestions must be listened to and considered (both in the day-to-day and in 
the formal performance appraisals) in relation to their contributions to the plant‘s 
safety. At the same time, managers and supervisors should be trained in how to 
conduct performance appraisal and use feedback techniques, in order to identify 
training needs that guarantee the safety of the plant. In a safety culture, 
performance appraisals must include specific sections on hazard awareness, 
safety-related competencies, and safety conscious attitudes and behaviors (Tronea, 
2011). Formal performance appraisals should be systematically carried out (e.g. at 
the end of probation periods). However, they should not diminish the importance 
of continuous safety performance monitoring and feedback from employees in 
supervisory positions (e.g. project managers, department heads, etc.) (IAEA, 
1998b). 
The goals of each employee (e.g., production or maintenance goals) are set in 
a way that guarantees that their attainment will contribute to and not threaten the 
safety of the plant. Employees‘ active role in setting their own goals is important 
because nobody knows more about the level of performance they can achieve 
without compromising the safety of the plant. Participative goal setting is a 
recognized motivational strategy because it generates ownership of the goals and 
encourages workers to attain them (Karakowsky and Mann, 2008; Latham and 
Yukl, 1976). Participative goal setting can result in employees being more 
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committed to their own personal safety goals, and in a reduction in organizational 
accidents and incidents (Leung, Chan and Yu, 2012). Individual employees and 
teams should have specific safety goals. These safety goals can often be translated 
into quantitative safety performance indicators (Reiman and Pietikäinen, 2010), 
making it possible to detect safety or risk trends and establish benchmarks with 
other plants. Examples of these indicators (Reiman and Pietikäinen, 2010) could 
be the percentage of critical safety equipment that fails inspection, the recurrence 
of incidents with similar root causes, the frequency and length of sick leave 
periods, or the number of proposals for safety improvement.  
A critical aspect of a safety culture is the inclusion of a reward and 
recognition system to reinforce safe work performance (Monta, 2001) and the 
attainment of these safety-oriented goals. In fact, the (safety) culture of an 
organization is created and expressed through the actions that supervisors support 
and reward (Schein, 2010). Managers and experienced employees in an NPP must 
give informal recognition to employees who perform actions that are beneficial to 
safety (IAEA, 2008a). In a culture for safety, recognition is also given to safety 
suggestions (Clarke, 2006; Gibbons et al., 2006), including public recognition 
(e.g. safety celebrations) for employees who suggest potential safety 
improvements (IAEA, 2008a). Recognition must be timely, focus on specific 
behaviors, and consider safety as the primary reference. Moreover, the recognition 
of safety milestones is only productive if it does not inhibit incident reporting 
(Frazier et al., 2013). 
Likewise, financial rewards must guarantee and improve the safety of the 
plant. However, care should be taken to avoid misleading effects. On the one 
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hand, financial incentives to increase productivity (e.g., a bonus for an outage 
ending ahead of schedule or for extra energy produced) or to compensate for 
working in hazardous conditions can lead to safety being compromised (Gadd and 
Collins, 2002). As an example, Sawacha et al. (1999) found that employees 
eligible for hazard pay were at greater risk because they might perceive this 
increase as an inducement to take risks. On the other hand, risks can go hand in 
hand with the attainment of safety-related goals. Whereas financially rewarding 
zero accidents or no lost-time injuries (i.e., blame culture) may make employees 
reluctant to report incidents, accidents, injuries or near-misses (Gadd and Collins, 
2002), linking employees‘ salaries to the identification of safety-related issues can 
lead to an over-reporting culture (Reason, 1997; Yule, 2003). For example, the 
IAEA (IAEA website) points out that if a low number of unplanned automatic 
scrams is highly valued, pressure could rise to adjust the set points for triggering 
the scram appropriately. Taking this double-edged sword into account, a safety 
culture should have salary systems that are cautiously designed and graded 
considering demonstrated performance, knowledge, attitudes and competences 
that contribute to organizational safety. 
Along the same lines, the importance of safety in promoting personnel should 
be cautiously communicated within the NPP. Managerial and supervisory 
positions should be filled on the basis of safety-related criteria, such as personnel 
who have shown consistent attitudes and behaviors toward safety and 
conservative, safety-enhancing decision-making (IAEA, 2002c). Employees learn 
from cases where safety-related factors are decisive in approving or rejecting a 
promotion.  
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All these safety-oriented HR practices must be applied to all the members of 
the NPP and to the people who, without being members of the organization, have 
an effect on the safety of the plant (e.g. contractors). As the IAEA (2001b) states, 
NPPs in all Member States require contractor personnel for outage work, which 
often includes refueling. NPPs must ensure that contractors have the necessary 
qualifications and motivation to carry out an effective and safe refueling outage. 
Long-term relationships with contractors may be a good way to motivate them 
and support a strong safety culture, which may include defining common 
objectives for contractors and plant staff (IAEA, 2006c).  
Finally, formal HR systems (attraction, development and motivation 
practices) must be aligned with the day-to-day work of management and with the 
supervisor-supervisee relationship. For example, if plant management  does  not  
actively  support  and  reinforce  the  standards for safety and quality established 
in training programs, these standards may not be applied at the NPP. There is little 
point in having a formal rewards system if it is not coherent with the actions that 
supervisors reinforce in the day-to-day running of the plant. 
7.1.4.3. Daily activities and behaviors supporting safety 
The extent to which safety is important for an NPP is reflected in the daily 
behaviors of every employee in the organization, the relationship with external 
agents (e.g., contractors and regulatory bodies), and the day-to-day operations 
(such as meetings or internal publications, e.g., Gracia and Peiró, 2010). 
Safety culture is enacted in employees' behaviors and attitudes. According to 
Schein (2010), observed behaviors are cultural artifacts and, as such, a product of 
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deeper cultural layers. As culture is a reality that permeates the whole 
organization, safety culture must be reflected in the daily behaviors of the entire 
staff, from employees to supervisors and top management (e.g., core operating 
workers always use the necessary protective equipment to perform their duties 
safely; supervisors consistently show their support and willingness to help with 
any task that may have a direct or indirect impact on the safety of the plant; and 
top management frequently walk the plant and interact with workers in search of 
safety maintenance and improvement).  
Moreover, the day-to-day operation of an NPP cannot be fully understood
without considering its external relationships. Two external agents that are
essential for the safety of NPPs are regulatory bodies and contractors. Safety is
the primary purpose of regulatory bodies, and, therefore, one of their main
functions is to ensure the development and maintenance of high and strong safety
cultures in nuclear facilities. The extent to which the licensee collaborates with
the regulator in the day-to-day operations not only helps to achieve that goal, but
it is also an indicator of safety culture strength. Delays or failure to meet
regulatory commitments, policies of minimal compliance with regulations on
safety matters, attempts to dispute and defy the safety regulator, or efforts to
maintain operations within the current licensing (NEA, 1999), among others, will
inform workers about the practical importance of safety for the organization.
Leveson‘s (2004) system-theoretical  model of accidents (STAMP) helps to
understand the role of relationships among different actors (including designers,
operators, managers, and regulators) in the safety of increasingly demanding and
complex high-tech systems, such as NPPs.
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On the other hand, the management and interactions with contractors must be 
taken into special consideration, as contractors may make different assumptions 
and have different working values related to safety than those of the NPP. 
Carroll‘s (1998) study reported that employees at an NPP plant complained that 
contractors do not perform the same quality of work as permanent employees, 
either due to a lack of site-specific experience/training or because of a ―don‘t care, 
I‘m only here for 3 months‖ attitude. On the other hand, Alexander (1994 cited in 
Cox and Cheyne, 2000) found contractors to have a higher appreciation of risk 
and a higher personal need for safety than company employees. Either way, 
continuous efforts should be made to acculturate
8
 contractors and benefit from 
their positive enactment of safety culture, in such a way that the priority of safety 
is guaranteed in the organization and operations are carried out accordingly. The 
IAEA (1998a) made a number of recommendations about contractors in the 
nuclear industry. It recommends that contractors involved in design, engineering, 
manufacturing, construction, operation, maintenance, or other areas participate in 
the enhancement of plant quality and safety, and that contractors be made aware 
of the quality and safety standards required. In addition, the HSE (2003; cited in 
HSE 2005) adds other recommendations, such as the idea that major accident 
risks must be communicated and explained, not only to employees, but also to 
contractors. 
To maintain and enhance safety awareness, the central role of safety should 
always be considered in meetings, internal publications, bulletins, and other 
                                                          
8
Acculturation is the process of converting a non-member of the culture to a member  
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formal and informal communications. These are cultural elements included in the 
Schein (1985) and Guldenmund (2000) culture models. In a strong safety culture, 
near misses and safety improvements are addressed and communicated in daily 
practice through all possible methods, including meetings with staff, bulletins, 
newspapers and posters (IAEA, 2010). The HSC (2001) also recommends using 
company bulletins and communications to encourage safety commitment by all 
employees. Moreover, Shafai-Sahrai (1971, cited in Mearns et al., 2003) found 
that the priority of safety in meetings was a characteristic of organizations with 
lower accident rates. Regular attendance and active participation in safety 
meetings show the importance of safety at all the hierarchical levels in an NPP. 
Moreover, meetings and publications that are not explicitly focused on safety 
matters should carefully address the impact of the topics discussed on the safety 
of the plant and take the opportunity to share constructive safety-related messages 
(Gracia and Peiró, 2010). For safety messages to be effective, they must be 
embedded and enacted in the day-to-day operations of the NPP. 
Changes are a frequent reality in NPPs; therefore, safety has to be guaranteed 
and prioritized in the way changes are managed by all employees. Changes 
affecting the nuclear industry may consist of government policy changes, open 
market demands, or regulatory and social pressures (IAEA, 2001b), to name a 
few. Other changes occurring in NPPs may just take the form of internal 
improvements, such as the implementation of a new performance appraisal system 
or a new information system. Changes can modify cultural values and, 
consequently, safety behaviors. Properly managed in the day-to-day of the NPP, 
changes have the power to enhance not only nuclear safety and plant reliability, 
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but also cost competitiveness, from the design stage to decommissioning (IAEA, 
2001b). In a strong safety culture, safety must be the priority when implementing 
changes and safety-focused change management processes will be constantly 
applied (e.g. proposed changes are frequently studied by multi-disciplinary teams 
to ensure that as many viewpoints as possible are used to minimize the chances of 
overlooking a hazard [Hackman, 2011]).   
Every hierarchical level in an organization (top management, supervisory 
level and operating core) plays a role in preserving and enhancing the safety of an 
NPP through all three fundamental components of the functioning and operation 
of an NPP (strategic decisions ensuring safety, human resources practices driving 
safety, and daily activities and behaviors supporting safety). However, each 
hierarchical level has different opportunities to enact safety values through each 
of these organizational components. Nevertheless, our focus here is on the 
appraisal of the enactment by every member of the organization, because this 
shared appraisal constitutes the ‗real‘ safety culture of organizations and may 
influence the safety climate, behaviors and performance in NPPs. 
Thus, the appraisal of these three dimensions, measured with the Safety 
Culture Enactment Questionnaire, by the members of organizations offers an 
encompassing assessment of safety culture ‗in action‘ in NPPs. 
7.2. METHOD 
The purpose of this study is to fill a gap in the measurement of safety culture 
in the nuclear industry through the development and validation of the Safety 
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Culture Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ). This measurement tool goes beyond 
the surface levels of culture and is supported by a theoretical framework. 
7.2.1. Development of the questionnaire 
The development of the SCEQ was based on: (a) a literature review of 
different conceptualizations and theoretical frameworks of organizational culture 
and safety culture, and the integration of this knowledge into our organization‘s 
core functions; (b) a critical examination of safety culture questionnaires currently 
available in the literature; (c) observations and reflections stemming from our 
consulting experience in organizational behavior, particularly within the nuclear 
industry; and (d) the critical analysis of the multiple facets considered in the 
―Analysis, Management and Intervention Guidelines in Organizations (AMIGO) 
model‖ (Peiró and Martínez-Tur, 2008). Through an experts‘ focus group session 
(including both experts from the nuclear industry and organizational behavior 
researchers and academics), the most significant facets to preserve and promote 
safety in NPPs were selected. This procedure resulted in an initial pool containing 
24 items that covered the three fundamental components of the functioning and 
operation of NPPs presented in our safety culture model; that is: strategic 
decisions ensuring safety, HR practices driving safety, and daily activities and 
behaviors supporting safety. Therefore, the dimensions of the SCEQ are not 
intended to be dimensions of safety culture per se, but rather dimensions of 
fundamental sets of actions of an NPP where the value of safety can be 
crystallized. Each item was designed to obtain information about the degree to 
which nuclear safety is important to the organization and enacted in decisions and 
actions carried out in one of the dimensions considered. Five-point Likert-type 
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scales with responses ranging from 1 (not important at all) to 5 (very important) 
were used to record this information. Three of the items were dropped, in 
response to theoretical or methodological concerns, as explained in Study 1. The 
full list of the remaining 21 items grouped in the three dimensions of the SCEQ is 
presented in Table 16. The text introducing the questionnaire to the survey-
respondents reads as follows: ―We would like to know your opinion about how 
important safety is to your company. We are not as interested in discovering its 
theoretical importance as in finding out its practical importance on a daily basis. 
For this purpose, we request that you answer the following questionnaire 
carefully‖. This introduction is important to emphasize and focus on the enacted 
value of safety culture. 
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Table 16     
Items and dimensions of the Safety Culture Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ) and its descriptive statistics  
      
To what degree is nuclear safety important…     
  Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Dimension 1 - Strategic decisions ensuring safety     
SC1 … in decision-making processes about the work?  4.29 .74 -1.14 2.02 
SC2 … when allocating resources (time, personnel, money)?  4.12 .81 -.95 1.27 
SC3 … when establishing procedures?  4.20 .77 -.96 1.42 
SC4 … in the operation of the plant?  4.46 .72 -1.57 3.35 
SC5 … when resolving conflicts between safety and production?  4.04 .83 -.81 .90 
      
Dimension 2 - HR practices driving safety     
SC6 ...  in hiring personnel?  3.44 1 -.39 -.30 
SC7 … in training personnel?  3.99 .93 -.93 .73 
SC8 … in promoting personnel?  2.90 1.15 -.04 -.86 
SC9 … in paying the personnel?  2.95 1.12 -.10 -.70 
SC10 … in establishing objectives?  3.60 1.04 -.62 -.08 
SC11 … in evaluating the performance of the workers?  3.32 1.04 -.41 -.38 
SC12 … in planning and hiring personnel for refueling?  3.17 1.11 -.11 -.75 
SC13 … in the recognition the bosses give to their collaborators? 3.33 1.01 -.36 -.39 
      
Dimension 3 - Daily activities and behaviors supporting safety      
SC14 … in bulletins and other publications?  3.98 .86 -.58 -.10 
SC15 … in the meetings?  3.85 .82 -.52 .21 
SC16 … in the relationship with the regulator?  4.12 .85 -.72 .14 
SC17 … in the relationship with the contractors?  3.79 .89 -.59 .17 
SC18 … in the daily behavior of the employees?  3.88 .83 -.68 .74 
SC19 … in the daily behavior of the bosses?  3.82 .87 -.56 .19 
SC20 … in the daily behavior of top management?  3.90 .94 -.86 .63 
SC21 … in the change management processes 3.73 .86 -.32 -.16 
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7.2.2. Sample 
Study 1. 566 workers from two Spanish NPPs belonging to the same 
company completed the questionnaire. The total size of the company was 760 
employees. Thus, we obtained a response rate of 74.47%. To guarantee the quality 
of the data, those questionnaires with more than three unanswered items were not 
considered in the analyses. Through this screening process, approximately 6% of 
the returned questionnaires were dropped from the data set. Therefore, 533 
questionnaires were accepted for data analysis. The sample included all the 
responsibility levels and functional areas in the nuclear facility. Among the 
participants, 45% had completed university studies,  4% were under 30 years old, 
23% were between 30 and 45 years old, and 73% were older than 45. 
Study 2. 617 workers from the same Spanish NPPs completed the SCEQ and 
other questionnaires measuring different safety culture outcomes. The total size of 
the company was 806 employees. Thus, we obtained a response rate of 76.55%. 
Following the same screening process described in Study 1, approximately 3% of 
the returned questionnaires were dropped from the data set, as they had more than 
three unanswered items. Therefore, 598 questionnaires were accepted for data 
analysis. As in Study 1, the sample included all the responsibility levels and 
functional areas in the nuclear facility. Among the participants, 55% had 
completed university studies, 6% were under 30 years old, 21% were between 30 
and 45 years old, and 73% were older than 45. 
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7.2.3. Survey administration  
The present research was conducted in accordance with international ethical 
guidelines, which are consistent with the American Psychological Association 
(APA) guidelines. In both studies, the questionnaire was administered by the 
researchers, who stayed at the NPPs to ensure that any doubts when filling out the 
questionnaire could be immediately resolved. The SCEQ was part of a battery of 
questionnaires designed to assess different constructs and variables related to 
safety culture and safety climate. The administration of the battery took place 
during work time in small groups in a quiet and convenient room, and participants 
needed around 30 minutes to complete the entire battery. They were provided 
with instructions explaining the purpose of the study and the way the 
questionnaire should be completed. Participants were encouraged to answer 
honestly and take as much time as they needed to accurately complete the 
questionnaire. Voluntary participation, confidentiality and anonymity were 
guaranteed.  
Data collection for Study 1 and Study 2 took place during 2008 and 2014 
respectively.  
7.2.4. Variables 
Safety culture was measured by the Safety Culture Enactment Questionnaire 
(SCEQ). Additionally, in Study 2, four safety culture outcomes (safety climate, 
safety satisfaction, job satisfaction and risky behaviors) were also assessed to 
provide evidence of the validity of the SCEQ, based on its relationship with other 
related constructs. Variables of different natures were chosen to show the 
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pervasiveness and influence of safety culture in respondents‘ cognitive processes 
and behaviors. The variable ―psychological safety climate‖ refers to individual 
perceptions of safety in the organization; ―safety satisfaction‖ and ―job 
satisfaction‖ are closer to respondents‘ attitudes and affective responses; and 
―risky behaviors‖ asks for information about individuals‘ actions. On the other 
hand, and in line with the literature about attitudes, specific and general attitudinal 
referents have been considered (e.g., ―safety satisfaction‖ and ―job satisfaction‖, 
respectively).  
Safety climate was measured by a Spanish version of Zohar and Luria‘s 
(2005) questionnaire developed by Latorre et al., 2013. This adaptation kept the 
16 items from Zohar and Luria‘s questionnaire, although the referent for workers‘ 
perceptions was modified. The original scale was designed to capture workers‘ 
perceptions about top management‘s commitment to safety (e.g. ―Top 
management in this plant/company... ―...provides all the equipment needed to do 
the job safely‖, ―...reacts quickly to solve the problem when told about safety 
hazards‖), while the referent in our version was the whole organization (e.g. ―My 
company… ―...provides all the equipment needed to do the job safely‖, ―...reacts 
quickly to solve the problem when told about safety hazards‖). Following Zohar 
and Luria‘s scale, respondents were asked to answer these questions on a five-
point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely 
agree).Cronbach‘s alpha for the scale in Study 2 sample was .94. 
Safety satisfaction was assessed by the ―Safety Satisfaction Questionnaire 
(SSQ)‖, a scale developed by our team. The questionnaire was composed of 6 
items designed to explore participants‘ satisfaction with organizational safety (e.g. 
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―To what extent are you satisfied with radiological issues?‖). Respondents 
answered on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (very unsatisfied) to 5 
(very satisfied). Cronbach‘s alpha for this scale in Study 2 sample was .91.  
Job satisfaction was measured with 3 items. It was conceptualized as overall 
satisfaction with the company, with the unit of work, and with the work itself. 
Consequently, participants were asked about their job satisfaction in relation to 
each of these domains: ―How satisfied are you with your work?‖, ―How satisfied 
are you with your team?‖ and ―How satisfied are you with your company?‖ A 
five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (very unsatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied) 
was employed for this purpose. Cronbach‘s alpha for this scale in Study 2 sample 
was .84. 
Individuals’ risky behaviors were assessed by a scale based on Mearns et al. 
(2001). This questionnaire was designed to address the level of fulfillment of 
safety norms, procedures, and rules. The original scale was composed of 12 items; 
however, two of them were not included because they were not considered 
appropriate for the nuclear industry, as they could induce resistance in 
respondents to other items or scales in the battery. These items were: ‗‗I carry out 
activities that are forbidden‘‘ and ‗‗I get financial rewards for breaking the rules‘‘. 
The resulting scale was composed of 10 items answered on a five-point Likert-
type scale ranging from 1 (never or almost never) to 5 (always or almost always). 
Higher scores on this scale would indicate risky behaviors. A sample item from 
this scale is: ―I take shortcuts that involve little or no risk‖. Cronbach‘s alpha for 
this scale in the Study 2 sample was .92. 
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Hierarchical status was also requested in a dichotomous variable that 
differentiates respondents with managerial responsibilities from those who do not 
hold this type of position. 
7.2.5. Analyses 
Study 1. Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis) of individual items on the SCEQ were obtained. Factorial structure was 
tested through exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using unweighted least squares 
as the extraction method and applying an oblique rotation criterion (Lloret-Segura 
et al., 2014; Sass and Schmitt, 2010). Internal consistency (homogeneity) analyses 
were performed for individual items (corrected item-scale correlations) and for 
entire scales (Cronbach‘s alpha). Corrected item-scale correlations should be 
higher than .30 (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). Additionally, values of .70 or 
more indicate acceptable reliability for Cronbach‘s alpha coefficient (Nunnally, 
1978). The analyses were carried out using SPSS 21. 
Study 2. To test the internal structure of the SCEQ, confirmatory factor 
analyses (CFAs) were performed using Mplus (Muthén and Muthén, 1998-2010) 
and robust weighted least squares (WLSMV) as the estimation method. Two 
alternative models were tested: a one-factor model (all 21 items measuring a 
single dimension) and the hypothesized three-factor model. Model fit was 
assessed using the chi-square statistic and a number of goodness-of-fit indices 
(RMSEA, NNFI and CFI). Values of RMSEA lower than .05, lower than .08, and 
greater than .10, indicate a close fit, a fair fit, and a poor fit of the model, 
respectively (Browne and Cudeck, 1993; Browne and Du Toit, 1992). NNFI and 
CHAPTER VII
255 
 
CFI values greater than .90 and .95 are typically taken to reflect acceptable and 
excellent fit to the data, respectively (Marsh, Hau and Grayson, 2005). To 
compare the alternative models‘ goodness of fit, the incremental fit indices were 
estimated. It has been suggested that differences not larger than .01 between NNFI 
and CFI are considered to indicate irrelevant differences between models (Cheung 
and Rensvold, 2002; Widaman, 1985). Differences lower than .015 in RMSEA 
are also proposed as an indicator of negligible practical differences (Chen, 2007). 
When differences between models cannot be proven, it is preferable to keep the 
most parsimonious solution.  
Internal consistency was tested by means of different reliability indices: 
Cronbach‘s alpha coefficient (, and composite reliability index (rho). Rho 
values of .70 or greater indicate an acceptable reliability (Hair et al., 1998; 
Raykov, 2001).  
Correlations between questionnaire dimensions were also estimated. It is 
widely accepted that factor discrimination can be established when inter-factor 
correlations are below .85 (Kline, 2005). 
Evidence of validity based on relationships with external variables was 
obtained by correlating the scores on the SCEQ with four scales that measure 
constructs conceptualized in the literature as consequences of safety culture or 
safety culture outcomes: safety climate, safety satisfaction, job satisfaction, and 
risky behaviors.  
In order to validate the new measure of safety culture, we also collected 
evidence of discriminant validity between the SCEQ and safety climate. First, we 
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compared the pair correlations among the three factors of safety culture to the pair 
correlations between each of these factors and safety climate. If the SCEQ and 
Zohar‘s safety climate questionnaire measure different constructs, the correlations 
among the different factors of safety culture should be higher than the correlations 
of these factors with safety climate. Second, CFAs were carried out with the items 
on the SCEQ and the items on the Safety Climate scale. Different models were 
tested to provide further evidence of discriminant validity between the SCEQ and 
safety climate. 
7.3. RESULTS 
7.3.1. Study 1 
7.3.1.1. Descriptive analyses 
Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis) for 
individual items on the SCEQ are presented in Table 1.The items on the 
questionnaire showed standard deviations between .72 and 1.15, which indicates 
some discriminant power of the questionnaire items. The average skewness and 
kurtosis values are .63 and .74, respectively, with 4 items presenting values out of 
range (SC1, SC2, SC3 and SC4).  
7.3.1.2. Factorial structure: Exploratory factor analysis 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was .95, and 
the Bartlett test of sphericity was statistically significant (p < .01), indicating the 
suitability of these data for factor analytic procedures. The results obtained 
showed a three-factor solution that accounted for 58% of common variance. Three 
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of the items were removed, as two of them did not load uniquely into any one 
factor. In addition, both of these items had low communality scores, indicating 
that the extracted factors explained little of these items‘ variance. Regarding the 
third item, it was difficult to theoretically justify its location in the factor where it 
showed a high factor loading. Thus, we also decided to remove this item. The 
results presented here are related to the factor analysis conducted with the 21 
remaining items. The three factors identified, comprising 21 of the original 24 
items, accounted for 59% of the common variance. All the items‘ factor loadings 
were equal to or higher than .40 (see Table 17). 
Table 17 
Factor loadings of the SCEQ items in Study 1 
 Strategic decisions HR practices 
Daily activities  
and behaviors 
SC1 .77 (.64)   
SC2 .76 (.63)   
SC3 .85 (.69)   
SC4 .73 (.59)   
SC5 .46 (.47)   
SC6  .53 (.56)  
SC7  .40 (.51)  
SC8  .88 (.75)  
SC9  .84 (.65)  
SC10  .50 (.52)  
SC11  .71 (.61)  
SC12  .65 (.48)  
SC13  .42 (.58)  
SC14   .50 (.39) 
SC15   .81 (.59) 
SC16   .66 (.59) 
SC17   .57 (.59) 
SC18   .62 (.64) 
SC19   .65 (.70) 
SC20   .59 (.59) 
SC21   .66 (.62) 
Eigenvalue 1.00 2.15 10.38 
Note. Factor loadings lower than .40 were not reported. Item communalities are in 
brackets. 
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7.3.1.3. Reliability 
The Cronbach alpha values were satisfactory for the three subscales: .87 for 
the dimension strategic decisions ensuring safety; .90 for the dimension HR 
practices driving safety; and .91 for the dimension daily activities and behaviors 
supporting safety. Finally, all corrected item-scale correlations were high and fell 
into the proposed optimal range. Results are as follows: corrected item-scale 
correlations ranging from .60 to .73 in the dimension strategic decisions ensuring 
safety; from .64 to .77 in the dimension HR practices driving safety; and from.55 
to .78 in the dimension daily activities and behaviors supporting safety. 
Therefore, reliability analyses showed strong internal consistency 
(homogeneity) for the three scales of the SCEQ. In addition, each of the 21 items 
on the questionnaire was shown to contribute to the homogeneity of its 
corresponding scale. These results support the stability of the scores on the SCEQ.  
7.3.2. Study 2 
7.3.2.1. Reliability 
Reliability values in Study 2 were satisfactory for the three subscales: 
strategic decisions ensuring safety ( = .87; rho = .92), HR practices driving 
safety ( = .92; rho = .94), and daily activities and behaviors supporting safety ( 
= 93; rho = .96).  
7.3.2.2. Validity 
Evidence based on internal structure.  
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Confirmatory factor analysis revealed that the goodness-of-fit of the proposed 
three-factor model fit the data adequately (χ2 = 1115.05, df = 186, p < .01; 
RMSEA = .091; NNFI = .964; CFI = .968). By contrast, the one-factor solution 
provided a poorer fit to the data (χ2 = 2001.72, df = 189, p < .01; RMSEA = .127; 
NNFI = .931; CFI = .938). Moreover, differences between the fit of the three- and 
one-factor models were relevant from a practical point of view (NNFI= 0.033, 
CFI = 0.030 and RMSEA= 0.036). Thus, the three-factor model proposed by 
the authors was empirically supported. 
All factor loadings were statistically significant (p<.01) and high enough 
according to the standards (> .60). Average factor loadings were .83, ranging from 
.66 to .94, thus supporting convergent validity. The correlation coefficients among 
the three dimensions of the questionnaire are shown in Table 18. All correlations 
are high (ranging from .65 to .79), but did not exceed the accepted criterion, thus 
supporting factor discrimination. These correlations show that the three 
dimensions represent highly interrelated components of the functioning and 
operation of any NPP. In line with the safety culture model presented, coherence 
in the practical importance of safety among the three dimensions was expected, 
due to the influence they have on each other. 
Evidence based on relationships with external variables.  
Pearson correlations between each of the three dimensions of the SCEQ and 
each of the four external criteria are also presented in Table 18. All correlation 
coefficients are statistically significant (p< .01) and exhibit the correct sign, as 
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safety culture is expected to be positively correlated with safety climate, safety 
satisfaction, and job satisfaction, and negatively with risky behaviors. 
 
Table 18 
Inter-factor correlations of the SCEQ and correlations with external criteria 
  M SD Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Factor 1 - Strategic decisions  4.36 .59    
Factor 2 - HR practices 3.58 .81 .65   
Factor 3 - Daily activities and behaviors  4.08 .70 .79 .75  
Safety climate 4.05 .64 .65 .68 .65 
Safety satisfaction 4.27 .66 .61 .57 .60 
Job satisfaction 4.15 .92 .43 .46 .42 
Risky behaviors 1.47 .55 -.37 -.77 -.36 
Note. All correlations are significant at p< .01 (2-tailed) 
 
Discriminant validity between the SCEQ and safety climate.  
The correlation between Factor 3 (Daily activities and behaviors) and Factor 
2 (HR Practices) was higher than the correlation between either of these two 
factors and safety climate, and the difference was statistically significant (t = 4.38, 
p<.01; t = 3.08, p<.01, respectively). Additionally, the correlation between Factor 
3 (Daily activities and behaviors) and Factor 1 (Strategic decisions) was higher 
than the correlation between either of these two factors and safety climate, 
showing a statistically significant difference (t = 6.65, p<.01; t = 6.86, p<.01, 
respectively). However, the correlation between Factor 2 (HR practices) and 
Factor 1 (Strategic decisions) was not statistically different than the correlation 
between either of these two factors and safety climate (t = -1.32, p>.05; t = -0.04, 
p>.05, respectively). 
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Regarding the CFAs, as previously stated, four different models were tested 
to provide further evidence of discriminant validity between the SCEQ and safety 
climate. In the one-factor model (model 1) all the items on both questionnaires 
loaded in the same latent factor. In the two-factor model (model 2), items on the 
SCEQ loaded in one latent factor, and items on the safety climate questionnaire 
loaded in a different latent factor. In the four-factor model (model 3), four latent 
factors where defined (safety climate, strategic decisions, HR practices, and daily 
activities and behaviors). A final model (model 4) was tested with the same four 
first-order latent factors and a second-order latent factor comprising the three 
dimensions of safety culture. 
The one-factor model (model 1) did not show adequate fit to data. The two-
factor model (model 2) showed adequate fit to data. Additionally, the four-factor 
model (model 3) showed a better fit than the two-factor model, and differences in 
fit between the two models were not trivial (RMSEA = .016, NNFI = .019). 
Finally, the fit of the four-factor model with second-order factors (model 4) 
showed a satisfactory fit to data, and differences between this model and the four-
factor model were not relevant (RMSEA = .002, NNFI = .002, CFI = .002) 
(see Table 19). 
Together, those results provide evidence of discriminant validity between the 
SCEQ and safety climate. 
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Table 19 
Fit indices of different tested models with SCEQ and Safety climate items 
  χ² gl χ²/gl RMSEA NNFI CFI 
One-factor model 7128.52 629 11.33 .131 .875 .882 
Two-factormodel 3617.59 628 5.76 .089 .942 .946 
Four-factor model 2603.94 623 4.18 .073 .961 .964 
Four-factor with second 
order model 
2724.29 625 4.36 .075 .959 .962 
Note. χ2 = Chi-square; gl = degrees of freedom; χ2/df = relative/normed chi-
square; RMSEA = root mean square error of  approximation, NNFI = non-
normed fit index, CFI = comparative fit index. 
 
Scores of top managers vs. the rest of the employees.  
We computed the differences in the SCEQ dimensions across hierarchical 
levels (managers and supervisors: N=27, rest of employees, N=539). T-tests 
revealed significant differences between top managers and the rest of the 
employees, with higher mean values for top managers in all three dimensions of 
the SCEQ: strategic decisions ensuring safety (meantop_managers = 4.87, meanothers = 
4.34; t = 13.52, p<.01), HR practices driving safety (meantop_managers = 4.25, 
meanothers = 3.53; t = 6.96, p<.01), and daily activities and behaviors supporting 
safety (meantop_managers = 4.54, meanothers = 4.06; t = 6.97, p<.01). 
7.4. DISCUSSION 
This paper presents a new questionnaire (the SCEQ) to assess safety culture 
in NPPs. The SCEQ is based on a safety culture model that assesses how the value 
of safety is embedded in the behaviors displayed in the functioning and operation 
of NPPs in fulfilling their core functions: strategic decisions, human resources 
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management, and behaviors and activities. It specifically focuses on how the 
enactment of safety in these areas is appraised by the members of the 
organizations. Empirical evidence was obtained showing the validity of the 
SCEQ. Results also support the dimensionality derived from the theory. The 21 
items on the questionnaire were found to be good indicators of the three 
dimensions of the fundamental sets of actions to be considered for this purpose in 
NPPs. The three dimensions of the SCEQ are highly related to a variety of 
constructs that are theoretically and empirically associated with enacted safety 
culture, such as safety climate, safety satisfaction, and job satisfaction, and 
negatively associated with risky behaviors. Moreover, our study obtained 
significant differences in the three dimensions of SCEQ between managers and 
the rest of the employees, with managers scoring significantly higher in the three 
dimensions of our model. Thus, the perceptual gap in organizational safety, often 
found in the literature across the organizational hierarchy (Huang et al., 2014), is 
confirmed for the appraisal of safety values enactment. This gap may be 
interpreted from different perspectives. First, the results of the hierarchical 
analysis could have been influenced by hierarchical sub-cultures. The different 
basic assumptions and beliefs specific to each hierarchical level could have 
influenced participants‘ answers. Moreover, managers could have more precise 
knowledge about items related to strategic decisions and HR practices; therefore, 
they might better perceive the extent to which safety is important in relation to 
those items. However, managers also perceive higher enactment in daily 
activities, even though we can assume that managers and employees have similar 
access to the information and knowledge. Thus, a third potential interpretation 
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would be that the positive gap in the management perceptions could be influenced 
by an attribution bias. Respondents who were more responsible for a number of 
safety measures might perceive them more positively in order to support a more 
positive self-image (Grote and Künzler, 2000). Interestingly, Huang et al. (2014) 
point out that employees‘ interpretations of safety climate are more reliable than 
those of supervisors when trying to gauge and improve safety climate. Future 
research should clarify these issues related to the enactment of safety culture. 
This paper opens the door to a new approach to understanding and assessing 
safety culture in NPPs. Two main contributions can be highlighted. On the one 
hand, we believe that the SCEQ makes it possible to capture the extent to which 
safety is an enacted value in an NPP. Therefore, the SCEQ may serve as a better 
predictor of safety performance than existing safety questionnaires that merely 
assess the endorsement of safety values. On the other hand, the safety culture 
model formulated helps to understand the main organizational components where 
the value of safety is expressed, and where the safety culture is constructed and 
carried out. Thus, it has an excellent diagnostic value, indicating the behavioral 
dimensions where culture can be improved. Through decisions, organizational 
practices, and behaviors, the deep layers of the culture are manifested and 
influence the outputs of the organizational culture. As Schein‘s model states, 
culture is composed of three layers that have the power to influence employees‘ 
behavior. The deepest layer (i.e., the basic assumptions) has the most powerful 
influence on these behaviors (Schein, 1992). However, its proper assessment is 
hardly achieved by questionnaires; instead, it is better obtained through other 
methods. As these alternative methods are costly, in terms of time and money, and 
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too intrusive (e.g., they may interrupt the daily operation of organizations), 
methods are needed that, although not reaching the deepest cultural layer, can 
capture part of its essence. The SCEQ has the advantages of questionnaire 
methods, while providing more accurate and relevant information than existing 
conventional questionnaires because it focuses on the degree to which safety is an 
enacted value, and not just a theoretical aspiration, and it is appraised by the 
members of the organization.  
The SCEQ may be extremely useful for the assessment of safety culture in 
NPPs, fulfilling diagnostic functions and providing guidance for interventions to 
improve safety culture. First, each item has been included in the SCEQ because of 
its influence on the safety performance of NPPs. Thus, the analysis of the scores 
on each of the items may provide further information about strengths and 
opportunities for improvement. The scores on the questionnaire provide powerful 
diagnostic information to identify the operational areas that strengthen safety 
culture and those that need improvement. It is advisable to pay attention to the 
dimensions and specific behaviors (items) that receive lower scores, as they can 
help to identify latent weaknesses that could compromise the safety of the plant. 
Second, due to the relationships among the dimensions of the model, low scores 
in one dimension may lead to a decrease in other dimensions. Third, aggregate 
dimension scores for different units of the NPP may also provide relevant 
information to identify sub-cultures of safety values and, thus, plan ways to 
improve the situation. The analysis of the SCEQ scores on the basis of subsamples 
(e.g., departments and work units, hierarchical levels, employees vs. contractors, 
etc.) can help to make a more powerful and precise diagnosis of the real 
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importance of safety in the NPP. Whenever possible, it is advisable to investigate 
items and dimensions where perceptions of different groups differ. A proper 
design of the study and data collection makes it possible to perform a culture 
assessment with a multilevel analysis, where safety culture can be assessed at the 
work unit or organizational level, which in turn could provide collective indicators 
such as culture strength (see González-Romá and Peiró, 2014) that enrich the 
assessment and diagnosis of safety culture in NPPs. This multilevel approach to 
the assessment of safety culture makes it possible to answer a number of questions 
related to cross-level influences, such as how a work-unit indicator of safety 
culture can predict individual outcomes beyond the individual endorsement of the 
safety values (Peiró, Gracia and Martinez-Córcoles, 2015). Finally, the use of the 
SCEQ in a longitudinal design makes it possible to analyze changes in the safety 
culture across time, and the antecedents and consequences of these changes. The 
dynamic of change can also be explored at both the individual and collective 
levels of analysis.  
The model depicted and the developed assessment tool also provide a guiding 
framework for practitioners to develop interventions to improve safety culture in 
NPPs. The three dimensions of the model may serve as the basis for 
understanding in which sets of actions an organizational safety culture is formed, 
and the critical importance of the enactment of safety in each of them. This model 
can be presented in training sessions, meetings, etc., and it may inspire learning 
strategies to promote and build culture values in the members of the organization. 
It also helps to promote enacted safety values in the decisions, policies, and 
operations of organizational members at every hierarchical level. Moreover, it 
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indicates to what extent different organizational and behavioral aspects are related 
and can influence each other. Thus, the model helps the members of the 
organization to reflect and act on the areas considered.   
Two possible limitations of our study are highlighted next. One is the fact that 
only two NPPs have been included in our sample, and both are from the same 
country. In future studies, other organizations, including other types of HROs, 
should be studied to prove the generalizability of the SCEQ and the model 
supporting it. Moreover, the validity of the questionnaire has been established 
basically through its concurrent criterion validity with a significant, although 
limited, number of variables. Future studies will have to extend and consolidate 
the validity of the questionnaire by paying attention to its predictive validity and 
extending the criteria for concurrent validity, focusing on significant variables.  
In spite of these limitations, in this study significant evidence has been 
presented to support the psychometric properties of the SCEQ and the theoretical 
model on which it is based. The results provide empirical evidence of its 
usefulness for the diagnosis and intervention in the safety culture of NPPs. 
Moreover, its focus on the enactment of the safety value in several strategic 
decisions, human resources practices, and daily behaviors in organizations is an 
innovation that contributes to a more reliable assessment and diagnosis of the 
―real‖ safety culture of the organization, avoiding the situation where scores 
obtained on questionnaires just reflect the espoused values, but not the values in 
action.  
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Different arguments have been used to theoretically support the SCEQ‘s 
ability to reach the level of enacted values; however, we would like to encourage 
future studies to provide further empirical evidence about this matter. In future 
studies on safety culture, half of the sample could receive a questionnaire that 
includes the differential elements of the SCEQ, and the other half could receive a 
questionnaire without these elements, thus making it possible to investigate 
whether there are significant differences between the scores of the two sub-
samples. 
We hope that future studies will further contribute to the validation of this 
tool and to a more comprehensive understanding of the process of assessing the 
safety culture and the way it impacts the processes that ensure safety in HROs. It 
is also important to identify the most appropriate tools and strategies to introduce 
changes in these organizations that can strengthen the safety culture in a way that 
effectively influences the decisions, practices, and behaviors that can ensure safer 
HROs. 
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Abstract 
The main goal of the present paper is to shed light on the usefulness of 
organizational culture and safety culture assessment tools in High Reliability 
Organizations and, consequently, of general-purpose and domain-specific 
assessments tools. For this purpose, the Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI) 
and the Safety Culture Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ) were studied and 
compared based on the answers given by the workers of a Spanish NPP. The first 
(transversal) study in 2008 used the answers of participants (N=566) to the OCI, 
the SCEQ, and four other questionnaires measuring safety culture outcomes 
(group safety climate, organizational safety climate, safety satisfaction, and job 
satisfaction). In the second (longitudinal) study, in 2011, respondents who 
participated in the first study (N=163) completed three questionnaires measuring 
safety performance (safety compliance, safety participation, and risky behaviors). 
Results obtained supported the factor structures of the OCI and the SCEQ 
proposed by their corresponding theoretical models. Internal consistency of the 
SCEQ was supported, whereas reliability analyses for the Spanish version of the 
original 120-item OCI scale showed room for improvement. A 113-item version 
of the OCI resulted in strong internal consistency for the three dimensions and for 
11 (out of 12) sub-dimensions of the OCI. Regression analyses and hierarchical 
regression modeling were used to investigate the power of the OCI and the SCEQ 
to predict (separately or together) the safety performance in the NPP under study. 
Practical implications for researchers and practitioners are included. The empirical 
studies are complemented by a theoretical clarification of the nature of the 
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relationship between organizational culture and domain-specific cultures 
(especially safety culture).  
Keywords: culture assessment, nuclear industry; nuclear power plant, 
organizational culture, safety culture, safety performance, safety outcomes. 
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8.1. INTRODUCTION 
Safety must be a top priority in high reliability organizations (HROs) in order 
to avoid devastating consequences that can even go beyond organizational limits, 
as in the case of nuclear power, where failures can ―have adverse effects upon 
whole continents over several generations‖ (Reason, 1990, p. 1). The scientific 
community, practitioners, and regulatory bodies have worked to identify, 
understand, measure, and optimize the determinant factors in the final safety 
outcomes of HROs. Analyses of major accidents in these organizations have 
concluded that their cultures had a direct impact on the accidents (Baker, 2007; 
BEA, 2012; CAIB, 2003; Cullen, 1990; Committee on Lessons Learned from the 
Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear 
Plants, 2014; Dawson and Brooks, 1999; Fennell, 1988; HAEA, 2003; Hidden, 
1989; IAEA, 1986; Sheen, 1987). Consequently, the HROs‘ culture and its impact 
on the safety of operations have been  a key study topic for the past 30 years. 
The cultures of HROs, and in particular of nuclear power plants (NPPs), have 
typically been assessed with specific safety culture assessment methodologies, 
and less often with general-purpose organizational culture assessment tools. In the 
case of the nuclear industry, the direct assessment of safety culture has been 
favored. Despite the use of these two approaches, there are practically no studies 
revealing whether assessing safety culture is more effective in HROs and in the 
nuclear industry than employing assessment tools that capture the general 
organizational culture.   
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The main goal of this paper is to shed light on the usefulness of safety culture 
and organizational culture assessment tools in HROs and in the nuclear industry 
by comparing the Safety Culture Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ) and the 
Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI), especially the extent to which they can 
predict safety performance in an NPP. Furthermore, this paper aims to validate the 
Spanish version of the OCI in the Spanish nuclear industry and gather further 
evidence for the validation of the SCEQ in the Spanish nuclear industry.  These 
contributions are complemented by a clarification of theoretical aspects 
surrounding the concepts of organizational culture and safety culture, and the 
relationship between the two constructs.  
8.2. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND DOMAIN-SPECIFIC 
CULTURES 
The concept of culture can be applied to social units of any type that have 
been able to learn and establish a vision of themselves and the surrounding 
environment. These units have their own basic assumptions (Schein, 1985), e.g., 
cultures belonging to Eastern and Western civilizations, specific countries, ethnic 
groups, occupations, families, and whole organizations, such as NPPs, or groups 
within them. Schein (1992) offers one of the most widely accepted definitions of 
culture:  
―Culture is a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a 
group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, 
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therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, 
think, and feel in relation to those problems‖ (p. 12). 
When this group is the organization, we can talk about organizational culture. 
Most scholars agree that organizational culture is made up of distinct 
elements that are hierarchically ordered from deeper to more surface levels (Deal 
and Kennedy, 1982; Detert et al., 2000; Furnham and Gunter, 1993; Hofstede, 
1991; Lundberg, 1990; Rousseau, 1990; Sanders and Neuijen, 1987, cited in 
Guldenmund, 2000; Schein, 1985; Van Hoewijk, 1988, cited in Guldenmund, 
2000). Deeper-level elements are habitually comprised of assumptions, values, 
and/or beliefs that guide workers‘ attitudes and behavior because they have been 
accepted as the path to success within the organizational context. Surface-levels 
comprise observable artifacts, such as policies, symbols, myths, and observable 
behaviors, which are believed to be manifestations of the deep-level elements. 
Among these authors, Schein‘s (1985) three-level classification – comprising 
artifacts, espoused values, and basic assumptions – has been shown to be of 
paramount influence in organizational contexts, as in the case of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, henceforth IAEA (2006c), which has accepted his model 
and acknowledged its application to safety culture.  
Enhancing the cultural elements that are critical to maintaining identity and 
promoting the ‗unlearning‘ of increasingly dysfunctional cultural elements is one 
of the key roles of organizational development (Schein, 1985). Because 
organizational culture stems from the social environment‘s effect on the 
individual, and not from the person‘s genes, it can be evaluated, acted upon, and 
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improved (García-Herrero, Mariscal, Gutiérrez and Toca-Otero, 2013). From an 
organizational psychology perspective (as opposed to a socio-anthropological 
perspective [see Section 8.2.2. of this Thesis for a distinction between the two]), 
the main interest in the organizational culture construct lies, therefore, in its power 
to shape organizations according to organizational interests and needs.  
In the past two decades, significant progress has been made in understanding 
the impact of organizational culture on specific organizational outcomes. 
Researchers and practitioners have recast cultural frameworks in diverse ways to 
better address specific organizational outcomes, such as safety, innovation, 
quality, customer service, etc. When cultural elements of the organization guide 
the ultimate behavior of its members toward the attainment of these specific 
strategic organizational outcomes, these organizations are said to have domain-
specific cultures, as in the case of safety culture, innovation culture, quality 
culture, customer service culture, etc. 
There is increasing support for the use of domain-specific cultures in research 
and practice. The use of a general organizational culture may lose power if it does 
not capture the specific functional imperatives of the organization. Thus, Klein et 
al. (1995) highlight that the constructs of a general organizational culture may be 
distant from the functional imperatives of HROs and, in turn, may not capture 
specific values and norms that operate to enhance reliability and safety. In other 
words, the constructs used in research from a general organizational culture 
perspective may be too general (Frost et al., 1991; Klein et al., 1995). However, 
other authors state that the underlying elements of domain-specific cultures have a 
lot in common (Denison, 1996; Moorcroft, 2014; Xenikou and Furnham, 1996). 
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Moreover, there is evidence of the importance of a general organizational culture 
in a wide range of organizational outcomes, including safety and financial 
outcomes (Moorcroft, 2014; Sackmann, 2011). 
In spite of the increasing use and popularity of domain-specific cultures, there 
is no consensus about their relationship with the construct of organizational 
culture. Instead, the focus has been placed on how to achieve domain-specific 
cultures that maximize organizational outcomes. In HROs, this means achieving a 
safety culture that guarantees the attainment of their desired safety outcomes. 
8.3. SAFETY CULTURE 
Safety culture is seen by a number of researchers as a focused aspect (Richter 
and Koch, 2004), sub-element (Kennedy and Kirwan, 1998), sub-facet (Cooper, 
2000; Mohamed, 2003), or subset (Clarke, 1999; IAEA, 1998a; Reiman and 
Rollenhagen, 2014; Sorensen, 2002) of organizational culture that refers to 
organizational and/or worker features related to health and safety (López de 
Castro et al., 2013). This conceptualization can be extrapolated to other domain-
specific cultures, that could be understood as focused aspects, sub-elements, sub-
facets or subsets of a general organizational culture that allude to organizational 
and/or worker features related to innovation, quality, customer service, etc.  
The first definition of safety culture was proposed by the IAEA (1991) as 
―that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals 
which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues 
receive the attention warranted by their significance‖ (p. 1). A few years later, the 
IAEA (1998) enriched their definition by stating that these ‗characteristics‘ and 
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‗attitudes‘ should be stable and commonly held. This addition by the IAEA 
attributed two of the classic properties of organizational culture to safety culture: 
cultural traits are enduring and shared by the organization or by group of members 
within their limits (Schein, 1992). 
Another well-known definition is that of the British Advisory Committee on 
the Safety of Nuclear Installations: safety culture is ―the product of individual and 
group values, attitudes, perceptions, competences, and patterns of behavior that 
determine the commitment to, and the style and proﬁciency of, an organization‘s 
health and safety management‖ (ACSNI, 1993, p. 23). 
One of the most criticized aspects within the study of safety culture was 
highlighted by Cox and Flin (1998). It involves the extensive debate about 
definitions and theoretical aspects at the expense of empirical research focused on 
the usability of the concept. Whereas consensus about the definition and 
implications of the concept seem today out of reach, a number of commonalities 
across definitions of safety culture were identified by López de Castro et al. 
(2011) and reformulated in the present Thesis with the inclusion of new 
definitions (see Section 3.3.). Moreover, in light of the absence of a solid and 
commonly accepted definition of safety culture, out team proposed a definition 
that encompasses the agreement reached by researchers since the conception of 
the term (see Section 3.3. of this Thesis). This definition is also presented in this 
paper: 
"Safety culture is an enduring and high value priority for safety, embedded in 
the assumptions, values, beliefs, and norms shared by organizational members 
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and manifested in the organizational policies, procedures and practices and in the 
members’ attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors at work, that determines 
organizational safety performance and serves to protect the workers, public, and 
environment from risks, accidents, and illnesses" 
8.4. SAFETY PERFORMANCE 
To protect the public, workers, and environment from risks, accidents, and 
illnesses, HROs‘ organizational members must perform safely. Thus, safety 
performance refers to organizational members‘ behaviors that contribute to 
achieving positive safety outcomes (Martínez-Córcoles et al., 2012; Zohar, 2000, 
2002). 
Safety performance models have replicated general work or job performance 
models in the literature, which typically distinguish between task and contextual 
performance (Borman and Motowidlo, 1993; Motowidlo and Van Scotter, 1994). 
Whereas task performance refers to accomplishing tasks directly related to the 
job, contextual performance refers to performing tasks that, although not directly 
related to the job, have an effect on organizational performance (Borman and 
Motowidlo, 1997). A later review on job performance carried out by Rotundo and 
Sackett (2002) completed the domain of job performance with a third set of 
behaviors, counterproductive performance. Robinson and Bennett (1995) define 
counterproductive behaviors as voluntary behaviors that harm the wellbeing of the 
organization, such as theft, harassment, absenteeism, or inattention to quality.  
Research on safety performance typically distinguishes between safety 
compliance (inherited from the concept of task performance) and safety 
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participation (inherited from contextual performance) (Griffin and Neal, 2000; 
Neal and Griffin, 2004, 2006). Safety compliance refers to the work activities that 
organizational members must carry out to establish safety at the workplace (e.g., 
adhering to established safety procedures or wearing required personal protective 
equipment). Safety participation refers to behaviors that, although not contributing 
directly to an individual‘s personal safety, are beneficial for a work environment 
by supporting process safety (e.g., taking part in voluntary safety activities or 
helping co-workers with safety-related issues). Based on Rotundo and Sacket‘s 
model (2002), Martínez-Córcoles Gracia, Tomás, Peiró and Schöbel (2013) 
proposed the construct of risky behaviors as a third component in the domain of 
safety performance. Risky behaviors have the potential to cause adverse 
consequences for safety. However, Martínez-Córcoles et al. specified that risky 
behaviors, unlike counterproductive behaviors, do not necessarily produce 
detrimental effects on productivity. In particular, Martínez-Córcoles et al., 
following Ramanujam and Goodman‘s concept of latent errors (2003), consider 
risky behaviors to be deviations from standard organizational practices, 
procedures, and expectations that do not always result in adverse consequences 
and can lead to efficient (but not necessarily safe) outcomes.  
Martínez-Córcoles et al. (2013) performed a CFA comparing their three-
factor model of safety performance to two alternative models (a two-factor model 
and a one-factor model), and they found that the three-factor model was 
significantly better with regard to goodness of fit statistics, thus obtaining 
empirical support for their proposal.  
CHAPTER VIII
281 
 
8.5. CULTURE ASSESSMENT IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 
There is a long-running debate in both academic discussions and practical 
implications about what methods should be used to capture and assess both 
organizational culture and safety culture. NPPs need reliable and valid 
information about the state of their cultures in order to identify which 
organizational and management aspects must be improved, changed, or reinforced 
to guarantee the plant‘s safe operation. This information is obtained by means of 
qualitative and quantitative assessment methodologies.  
8.5.1. Qualitative vs. quantitative strategies 
Qualitative approaches include in-depth interviews, employee observations, 
focus groups, audits, examinations of archival data, expert ratings, and case 
studies. With qualitative methods, researchers usually obtain non-restricted 
information from organizational members‘ own words and points of view. 
Individuals serve as ‗informants‘ (Rousseau, 1990). Qualitative procedures 
provide rich and unique information based on participants‘ assumptions, values, 
perceptions, attitudes, etc. because the ‗meaning‘ emerges without imposition 
(Reichers and Schneider, 1990). However, using qualitative methods for 
organizational culture and safety culture assessment is costly and more time 
consuming than paper-and-pen employee surveys. Organizations might be more 
reticent about participating in the large-scale and in-depth investigations that 
ethnographic approaches to culture usually require (Reichers and Schneider, 
1990). In addition, these approaches tend to produce ‗discovery data‘, rather than 
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hard data that can be incorporated into a management action plan (Choudry et al., 
2007; Glendon and Stanton, 2000).  
Quantitative approaches include surveys, highly structured interviews and Q-
sorts, and, especially, questionnaires. Using quantitative methods, researchers 
usually obtain restricted information from organizational members‘ responses to 
standardized sets of stimuli or questions. With this measurement strategy, 
researchers impose meaning on a set of data rather than letting the meaning 
emerge (Reichers and Schneider, 1990). In these cases, individuals serve as 
‗respondents‘ (Rousseau, 1990). Quantitative methods for organizational culture 
and for safety culture assessment ideally count on extensive empirical support that 
corroborates the reliability and validity of the chosen stimuli for the purpose for 
which they were created. That is, an organizational culture or a safety culture 
questionnaire will be useful in the nuclear industry to the extent that its items 
target specific organizational and management issues that have been shown to be 
relevant to nuclear safety. From this point of view, quantitative methods, such as 
safety culture questionnaires, are target-oriented by nature and often more 
efficient than qualitative approaches. Questionnaires provide instant quantiﬁed 
results that can be used to produce medians or means, compare subgroups, and 
benchmark the results obtained (Guldenmund, 2007). They are usually more 
practical and less time consuming. Most importantly, questionnaires allow the 
culture of HROs to be assessed more frequently and systematically than 
qualitative approaches, which in turn helps to monitor the extent to which the 
cultural aspects of the HROs are backing or compromising nuclear safety.  
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8.5.2. General vs. domain-specific approaches 
In studying the culture of NPPs, two different approaches can be 
distinguished. In the first, the safety culture of an organization is captured through 
the study of its general organizational culture. Because safety culture is a focused 
aspect, sub-element, sub-facet, or subset of a broader organizational culture, 
organizational culture questionnaires can provide information about cultural 
elements that have an impact on plant safety performance. However, the authors 
of the present paper have found few studies that use general-purpose 
organizational culture questionnaires in the nuclear industry (e.g., Haber, O'Brien, 
Metlay and Crouch [1991] with the Organizational Culture Inventory; Reiman and 
Oedewald [2004] with the CULTURE-questionnaire). 
The second and most widely used approach is the direct assessment of safety
culture (Harvey et al., 2002;  Lee  and  Harrison,  2000;  López  de  Castro  et  al.,
2013; López de Castro et al., 2017;  and  Ostrom  et  al., 1993;  to  name  a  few).
In the present study, the Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI) and the 
Safety Culture Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ) are considered. The OCI is used 
because of its pervasiveness, as it is believed to be the most widely used 
organizational culture assessment instrument in the world (Balthazard, Cooke and 
Potter, 2006). The SCEQ is employed because of its functionality, as it claims to 
capture information about the enactment of safety in HROs and NPPs (López de 
Castro et al., 2017). 
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8.5.2.1. The Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI)  
The Organizational Culture Inventory was developed by Human Synergistics 
International (Cooke and Lafferty, 1987). Since its introduction in prototype form 
in 1983, the inventory has been used by thousands of organizations, completed by 
over two million respondents, and translated into numerous languages. The OCI 
has been used in a wide array of organizations, such as nuclear power plants, 
research laboratories, universities, consulting firms, sales organizations, 
governments, hospitals, etc., for a variety of purposes, including to enhance 
system reliability and safety (Haber et al., 1991; Keenan, Cooke and Hillis, 1998; 
Shurberg and Haber, 1992), facilitate strategic alliances and mergers (Slowinski, 
1992), predict the type of leadership that characterizes an organization‘s culture 
(Eppard, 2004), provide data for the development of person-organization fit 
selection criteria (Belova, 2003), find cultural elements critical to reducing 
turnover (Vukotich, 1996), or decrease stress levels (van der Velde and Class, 
1995). 
The OCI provides an assessment of the operating organizational culture in 
terms of the behaviors that members believe are required to ―fit in" and "meet 
expectations‖ within their organization. The OCI comprises 12 cultural scales or 
behavioral norms that describe thinking and behavioral styles that organizational 
members may be expected to adopt in carrying out their work and in interacting 
with others. These 12 behavioral norms are deﬁned by two underlying 
dimensions: first, a concern for people versus a concern for completing tasks; 
second, expectations for behaviors that fulﬁll higher-order satisfaction needs 
versus expectations for behaviors aimed to protect and maintain lower-order 
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security needs (i.e. to protect one‘s own sense of security) (Maslow, 1954). At the 
same time, the 12 behavioral norms are categorized into three different general 
cultural styles: Constructive, Passive/defensive, and Aggressive/defensive.  
In Constructive cultures, organizational members are encouraged to interact 
with others and approach tasks in ways that will help them meet their higher-order 
satisfaction needs. This cultural style is directed toward the attainment of 
organizational goals through the development of people. Constructive cultures 
account for synergy and explain why certain individuals, groups, and 
organizations are particularly effective in terms of performance, growth, and work 
quality (Human Synergistics International website). In Passive-Defensive 
cultures, organizational members believe they must interact with people in ways 
that will not threaten their own security. This cultural style characterizes 
organizations where people subordinate themselves to the organization, but in the 
process end up creating stress for themselves and allowing the organization to 
stagnate. Passive-Defensive cultures may ensure a predictable and secure 
situation, but sacrificing learning, adaptability, and even organizational survival 
(Human Synergistics International website). In Aggressive-Defensive cultures, 
organizational members are expected to approach tasks in forceful ways in order 
to protect their status and security (Cooke, 1989); tasks are emphasized over 
people. In the extreme, in Aggressive-Defensive cultures, organizational members 
focus on their own needs at the expense of those of the group. Though sometimes 
temporarily effective, Aggressive-Defensive cultures may lead to stress, decisions 
based on status rather than expertise, and conflict rather than collaboration 
(Human Synergistics International website). 
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Each of the three cultural styles of the OCI is further divided into four 
cultural norms. The four constructive cultural norms, as described by Cooke and 
Rousseau (1988, pp. 258-259), are: 
A Humanistic-encouraging culture characterizes organizations that are 
managed in a participative and person-centered way. Members are expected to be 
supportive, constructive, and open to inﬂuence in their dealings with one another 
(helping others to grow and develop; taking time with people). 
An Afﬁliative culture characterizes organizations that place a high priority 
on constructive interpersonal relationships. Members are expected to be friendly, 
open, and sensitive to the satisfaction of their work group (dealing with others in a 
friendly way; sharing feelings and thoughts). 
An Achievement culture characterizes organizations that do things well and 
value members who set and accomplish their own goals. Members of these 
organizations set challenging but realistic goals, establish plans to reach these 
goals, and pursue them with enthusiasm (pursuing a standard of excellence; 
openly showing enthusiasm). 
A Self-actualizing culture characterizes organizations that value creativity, 
quality over quantity, and both task accomplishment and individual growth. 
Members of these organizations are encouraged to obtain enjoyment from their 
work, develop themselves, and take on new and interesting activities (thinking in 
unique and independent ways; doing even simple tasks well). 
The four passive/defensive cultural norms, as described by Cooke and 
Rousseau (1988, pp. 258-259), are: 
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An Approval culture describes organizations in which conﬂicts are avoided 
and interpersonal relationships are pleasant, at least superﬁcially. Members feel 
that they should agree with, gain the approval of, and be liked by others (making 
sure people accept you; ‗going along‘ with others). 
A Conventional culture is descriptive of organizations that are conservative, 
traditional, and bureaucratically controlled. Members are expected to conform, 
follow the rules, and make a good impression (always following policies and 
practices; ﬁtting into ‗the mold‘). 
A Dependent culture is descriptive of organizations that are hierarchically 
controlled and non-participative. Centralized decision-making in such 
organizations leads members to do only what they are told and clear all decisions 
with superiors (pleasing those in positions of authority; doing what is expected). 
An Avoidance culture characterizes organizations that fail to reward success 
but punish mistakes. This negative reward system leads members to shift 
responsibilities to others and avoid any possibility of being blamed for a mistake 
(waiting for others to act ﬁrst; not taking many chances). 
The four aggressive/defensive cultural norms, as described by Cooke and 
Rousseau (1988, pp. 258-259), are: 
An Oppositional culture describes organizations in which confrontation 
prevails and negativism is rewarded. Members gain status and inﬂuence by being 
critical and, thus, receive reinforcement if they oppose the ideas of others and 
make safe (but ineffectual) decisions (pointing out ﬂaws; being hard to impress). 
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A Power culture is descriptive of non-participative organizations structured 
on the basis of the authority inherent in members‘ positions. Members believe 
they will be rewarded for taking charge, controlling subordinates, and, at the same 
time, being responsive to the demands of superiors (building up one‘s power base; 
motivating others any way necessary). 
A Competitive culture is one in which winning is valued and members are 
rewarded for outperforming each other. People in such organizations operate in a 
‗win-lose‘ framework and believe they must work against (rather than with) their 
peers in order to be noticed (turning the job into a contest; never appearing to 
lose). 
A Competence/perfectionistic culture characterizes organizations in which 
perfectionism, persistence, and hard work are valued. Members feel they must 
avoid all mistakes, keep track of everything, and work long hours to attain 
narrowly deﬁned objectives (doing things perfectly; keeping on top of 
everything). 
The theoretical framework underlying the OCI posits that constructive styles 
are indicative of positive and supportive environments that facilitate problem 
solving, decision making, teamwork, productivity, long-term effectiveness, etc., 
whereas passive/defensive and aggressive/defensive are posited to be negatively 
related to desirable outcomes and positively related to undesirable outcomes, 
detracting from effective organizational performance. Defensive styles are 
therefore useful in identifying potentially dysfunctional environments. 
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The nuclear industry has explored the influence of the OCI cultural styles and 
norms on safety, and tried to gather evidence of the validity of the OCI based on 
relationships between its cultural styles and norms and a number of outcomes. 
Haber and Shurberg (1993a) found that an aggressive/defensive culture could 
work in situations with an established anticipatory strategy in the nuclear industry. 
However, when situations were not anticipated or foreseen (requiring ad hoc 
strategies), a constructive culture was needed. Haber and Shurberg (1993b) also 
observed, when examining two NPPs, that the plant with the highest scores on 
constructive styles also scored higher on overall commitment to the organization‘s 
perceived hazardous nature of work and attention to safety. In the aircraft 
industry, Human Synergistics found that organizations with constructive cultural 
styles paid more attention to safety, and organizations with defensive cultural 
styles did not comply with safety operative values (Gourley, 2005). Stewart 
(2014), from Human Synergistics, positions himself in favor of constructive 
cultures and summarizes some of the outcomes that HROs can expect with each 
of the three cultural styles: passive cultures produce ‗keep your head down‘ and 
‗do not rock the boat‘ attitudes, which in turn lead to incompetence and 
ineffective safety procedures, among others. Aggressive cultures result in high 
stress levels and discourage ownership of safe practices. Moreover, they result in 
high employee turnover and absenteeism, which in turn increases the number of 
new and less-experienced employees in the HRO. Constructive cultures have a 
positive impact on training, written procedures, incident reporting, maintenance 
and testing, and management policies, among others. Furthermore, a constructive 
culture is more effective at following rules than a conventional one, more 
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effective at catching and pointing out mistakes than an oppositional one, and more 
effective at reducing mistakes and operating safely than a perfectionistic one. 
Another study (Utility Service Alliance and Human Synergistics, 2004) tried to 
identify the optimal culture for nuclear organizations. For this purpose, 123 
employees from NPPs in the US completed the OCI to identify the behaviors that 
should be expected and encouraged in a nuclear plant to maximize organizational 
effectiveness. Afterwards, a group of NPP leaders and three representatives of the 
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) fine-tuned the ‗ideal‘ model, taking 
into account INPO‘s attributes of high-performing organizations and principles of 
excellence in human performance. The conclusion was that in an optimal culture 
for NPPs, constructive norms (in this order of importance: humanistic-
encouraging, self-actualizing, achievement, and affiliative) should prevail over 
defensive norms. They also noted that some degree of defensive norms is needed, 
especially an oppositional norm that will encourage the type of questioning 
attitude and rigor required to perform at the highest levels of excellence in a NPP.  
The 12 cultural norms of the OCI are represented by 120 statements (10 per 
cultural norm), where respondents have to indicate their level of agreement using 
a 1–5 scale, (1) not at all, (2) somewhat, (3) moderately, (4) mostly, and (5) 
strongly. A number of studies show empirical support for the structure and 
internal consistency of the 12 cultural norms (lower-order dimensions) and the 
three cultural styles (higher-order dimensions) provided by principal component 
analyses (e.g., Cooke and Rousseau, 1988; Cooke and Szumal, 1993; Xenikou and 
Furnham, 1996). However, Cook and Szumal (1993) also noted that some cultural 
scales showed dual loadings, which could be an indication of weaknesses in 
CHAPTER VIII
291 
 
discriminant validity or a suggestion that norms for the Aggressive-Defensive and 
Passive-Defensive styles may be loosely linked in certain settings. Moreover, 
Oberholtzer (2005) could not find evidence to support the discriminant validity of 
the OCI because correlations over .90. were found among the three cultural styles 
it proposes.  
8.5.2.2. The Safety Culture Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ) 
The Safety Culture Enactment Questionnaire was developed by the IDOCAL
9
 
(López de Castro et al., 2017) for the assessment of safety culture in High 
Reliability Organizations (HROs) in general, and in particular, in NPPs. Since its 
development in 2008, the SCEQ has been used in the Spanish nuclear industry to 
provide guidance for interventions to improve safety culture and, as a result, to 
enhance plant safety performance.  
The SCEQ is designed to assess the degree to which safety is an enacted 
value within HROs and NPPs, going one step beyond existing safety culture 
questionnaires, which typically address the level of espoused values. Espoused 
values reflect what the organization articulates as essential, the managerial 
philosophy, and its aspirations. However, enacted values are those that are 
supported, prioritized, and rewarded in the day-to-day organizational functioning 
and, consequently, the ones that inform members about the actions expected from 
them (Schein, 1992). Therefore, enacted values guide employees‘ ultimate 
behavior in real situations and settings. Because of this, predicting future 
employee behaviors and future safety performance in a NPP calls for tools that 
                                                          
9
Research Institute on Personnel Psychology, Organizational Development, and Quality of 
Working Life (IDOCAL), University of Valencia, Spain 
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capture the enactment of safety, and not only the culture reflected in its espoused 
values (López de Castro et al., 2017).  
The SCEQ is based on a theoretical safety culture model that comprises three 
fundamental components of the functioning and operation of HROs, where the 
value of safety must be put into practice: strategic decisions, personnel 
management, and operating behaviors. These three components, as described by 
López de Castro et al. (2017), are:  
Strategic decisions ensuring safety: ―safety culture manifests itself in the 
role safety plays in the strategic decisions made in NPPs. This dimension covers 
decisions that are carefully and thoughtfully made for the smooth running of the 
plant. It encompasses decisions about the operation of the plant and the conflicts 
between safety and other competing goals, and decisions about the allocation of 
resources and the establishment of procedures‖ (p. 47). 
Human resources practices driving safety: ―the safety culture of an NPP 
manifests itself in the extent to which the HR practices are coherently articulated 
to guarantee high levels of safety performance. For this purpose, the organization 
must be able to bring in new workers (e.g., by means of appropriate recruitment 
and selection practices) who share the priority of safety and have the ability and 
willingness to work safely; it must continuously prepare the employees, especially 
in safety matters (e.g., through training and performance appraisals), and it must 
encourage and motivate them (e.g., through formal reward systems, such as goal 
setting, promotions or salary, as well as informal rewards, such as recognition) to 
work safely under all conditions‖ (p. 47). 
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Daily activities and behaviors supporting safety: ―The extent to which 
safety is important for an NPP is reflected in the daily behaviors of every 
employee in the organization, the relationship with external agents (e.g., 
contractors and regulatory bodies), and the day-to-day operations (such as 
meetings or internal publications)‖ (p. 49). 
The three fundamental components of the functioning and operation of HROs 
are represented by 21 items, on which respondents provide information about the 
degree to which nuclear safety is important to the organization and enacted in 
decisions and actions carried out in one of the components. Five-point Likert-type 
scales with responses ranging from 1 (not important at all) to 5 (very important) 
are used to record this information. 
López de Castro et al. (2017) provided empirical evidence to support the 
validity of the SCEQ. Their empirical study in the nuclear industry supported the 
internal structure of the SCEQ and showed how the dimensions of the SCEQ were 
highly related to constructs that are theoretically and empirically associated with 
enacted safety culture and regarded in the literature as consequences of safety 
culture, such as safety climate, safety satisfaction, and job satisfaction, and 
negatively associated with risky behaviors. Furthermore, the study obtained 
significant differences in the three dimensions of the SCEQ between managers 
and the rest of the employees, with managers scoring significantly higher on the 
three dimensions of our model, providing support for the perceptual gap in 
organizational safety often found across the organizational hierarchy (Huang et 
al., 2014). 
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8.5.2.3. Ensuring safety: organizational culture or safety culture assessment?   
Although a significant number of studies defend the usefulness of particular 
organizational culture and safety culture assessment tools in HROs and NPPs, 
there is almost no literature that empirically shows whether the assessment of a 
general organizational culture or a domain-specific safety culture is preferable in 
the nuclear industry.  
We found a few studies that compared the answers to the OCI to the answers 
given to different versions of a safety culture scale developed by researchers at the 
University of California at Berkeley (Brown, 2000a; Haber et al., 1991). This 
safety culture scale was based in part on work with personnel serving on aircraft 
carriers, and it was developed for use in organizations where the consequence of 
making a mistake is very high (e.g., naval aircraft carriers, air traffic control 
centers). The scale was designed to assess an individual‘s perception of the 
importance of safety and acting safely to success in an organization (Haber et al., 
1991).  
As part of a research project conducted by Brookhaven National Laboratory 
for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Haber et al. (1991) 
administered a battery of questionnaires in a Fossil Fuel Plant (FFP) and, at a later 
stage, in an NPP. The battery for the Fossil Fuel Plant included the OCI and 19 
items from the aforementioned safety culture questionnaire by the Berkeley 
group, which at the time was being developed (Roberts, 1990, cited in Haber et 
al., 1991). The battery for the NPP included the OCI and 40 items from the safety 
culture questionnaire by the Berkeley group, which by then had already been 
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applied at several HROs (Roberts, 1990, cited in Haber et al., 1991). In both 
studies (FFP and NPP), several scales from the OCI yielded significant 
differences among departments and functional groups (e.g., between engineers 
and employees in the operations and maintenance departments), as well as 
differences between organizational levels (managers and non-managers). When 
the safety culture scale was applied in the FFP, managers scored significantly 
higher than non-managers, but no differences were obtained across any of the 
departments (e.g., operations vs. support departments), despite significant 
differences among these groups in the perceived hazard of their jobs. When the 
safety culture scale was applied in the NPP, no statistically significant differences 
were obtained across any of the departments or organizational levels. The authors 
of the study interpreted that either the safety scale could not distinguish among 
groups that would be expected to differ in safety culture or that there was a 
homogeneously high regard for attention to safety within this organization. 
However, the main utility of culture assessment tools for organizations lies in 
their ability to predict specific organizational outcomes. In the case of HROs and 
NPPs, the key outcomes to be predicted are safety outcomes, most importantly, 
accidents. But the ratio of nuclear accidents occurring in the nuclear industry to 
active nuclear power reactors is extremely low, which limits the possibilities of 
studying the power of culture assessment tools to predict future accidents. Instead, 
attempts have been made to study the ability of these tools to predict more likely 
safety outcomes (e.g., work-related injuries or near-miss incidents, at best), and 
particularly to predict safety performance behaviors because they are understood 
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as antecedents of safety outcomes, as shown in the literature (see the Meta-
Analysis of Christian et al., 2009). 
In the literature, two empirical studies were found that compare the OCI to 
safety questionnaires in terms of their power to predict safety outcomes and safety 
performance.  
In the first study, Brown (2000a) elaborated on the work of Sonja Haber and 
Deborah Shurberg for the NRC. In particular, he analyzed the results of their 
application of the OCI and the 40-item safety scale of the Berkeley group in two 
research facilities. Archival data showed that the two facilities consistently -
differed on work-related illness and injuries. Brown‘s goal was to determine 
whether existing differences in these safety outcomes were related to general 
organizational factors or to safety culture. Brown (2000a) did not find significant 
differences between the two facilities on the 12 cultural norms of the OCI. He also 
did not find differences among occupational groups within each of the facilities. 
However, significant differences were found for all but one of the 12 cultural 
norms of the OCI in the responses given by the same occupational groups in 
different facilities. Meanwhile, the safety scale did not yield significant 
differences between the two facilities or among the groups within each facility 
and between facilities. Some differences on selected subsets of 40 items that 
comprise the safety scale were found, but they were not as large or reliable as 
those for the OCI. Brown (2000a) explained that his results were consistent with 
the findings of Haber et al. (1991) and with Cooke and Szumal‘s (1993) 
suggestion that specialized scales are not necessarily more sensitive to safety-
relevant organizational differences than general-purpose inventories like the OCI. 
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However, Brown (2000b) also argued that conclusions drawn from the 
comparison of the OCI with the Berkeley group‘s safety scale may not be reliable 
for two reasons. First, the wording of some of the items preserved the vocabulary 
of the aircraft carrier personnel and may not have ‗translated‘ well from the 
original context. Second, the ‗root‘ statement of the safety scale (―To what extent 
do each of the following help you meet what is expected of you to do your job 
well in this organization?‖) may have produced different responses depending on 
which part of the statement the participant pays more attention to  (i.e., ‗fulfilling 
what is expected‘ or ‗doing your job well‘). Consequently, Brown (2000b) 
concluded that it cannot be stated that specialized surveys ‗per se‘ are not 
sensitive to cultural differences, but rather that the Berkeley group‘s scale may not 
perform as intended.  
In the second study, Smith, Garrett and Calvert (2006) presented a safety 
culture model that included a re-analysis of survey data from nuclear facilities 
gathered by the IAEA (1991) and input from discussions with Safety Managers 
who developed meaningful questions for mining employees. The resulting model 
covered five safety factors (safety leadership, safety communication, safety 
management, safety change readiness, and safety performance), further 
operationalized by 60 items, whose structure was supported by confirmatory 
factor analysis. Safety leadership, safety communication, safety management, and 
safety change readiness were found to be predictors of safety performance 
(measured as a safety system rating), accounting for 59% of the variance in safety 
performance. Of this percentage, 47% of the variance was predicted by the safety 
leadership factor. As part of their study, Smith and Garrett also explored the 
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predictive power of the OCI, in particular of the Constructive style, which 
accounted for 22% of the variance in the safety performance factor of the 
aforementioned safety culture model. Along with constructive styles, 
passive/defensive styles predicted 23% of the variance in safety performance. 
However, the fact that safety performance is portrayed both as one of the 
dimensions of the safety culture model and as a consequent of the other four 
safety culture dimensions questions the results obtained in this study. 
Furthermore, the authors of the study do not state whether safety performance was 
measured at a later point than the OCI and the other four safety culture measures, 
which would be a requirement for talking about predictive validity. 
The nuclear industry calls for tools that provide information about the future 
safety performance of employees and future safety outcomes. For this purpose, a 
variety of organizational culture and safety culture questionnaires have been used. 
However, empirical support for one approach or the other in HROs seems 
insufficient. The present paper aims to shed light on this matter by collecting 
evidence about the suitability of organizational culture assessment tools and safety 
culture assessment tools for the nuclear industry. To do so, the Safety Culture 
Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ) and the Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI) 
will be analyzed and compared in two different studies. In particular, the main 
goals pursued in each of these two studies are described:   
Study 1 (N=566) is cross-sectional because all the variables were measured in 
2008. The goals of this study are: 
1) To validate the OCI in the Spanish nuclear industry. 
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2) To further validate the SCEQ in the Spanish nuclear industry. 
Study 2 (N=163) is longitudinal because organizational culture and safety 
culture were measured in 2008, and three safety performance indicators were 
measured in 2011. The goals of this study are: 
3) To provide insights into the power of organizational culture questionnaires 
(measured by the OCI) and safety culture questionnaires (measured by the SCEQ) 
to predict safety performance. 
Furthermore, both Study 1 and Study 2 have two goals: 
4) To empirically examine the relationships between organizational culture 
(measured by the OCI) and safety culture (measured by the SCEQ). 
5) To provide insights into which OCI cultural styles and cultural norms 
should be favored in the nuclear industry. 
8.6. METHOD 
8.6.1. Study 1 
8.6.1.1. Participants and procedure 
566 workers from two NPPs belonging to the same company completed the 
questionnaire. The total size of the company was 760 employees. Thus, we 
obtained a satisfactory response rate of 74.47%. The sample included all the 
responsibility levels and functional areas in the nuclear facility. Regarding 
demographic variables, 59.5% of the sample did not have university studies, 4% 
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were under 30 years old, 23% were between 30 and 45 years old, and 73% were 
older than 45. 
The scale was administered in their workplace as part of a broader battery of 
questionnaires designed to evaluate different constructs and variables related to 
safety culture and safety climate. The administration of the battery took place 
during work time in small groups in a quiet and convenient room, and participants 
needed around 30 minutes to complete the entire battery. The questionnaire was 
administered by the researchers, who stayed at the NPPs to ensure that any doubts 
about filling out the questionnaire could be immediately resolved. Participants 
were provided with instructions explaining the purpose of the study and the way 
the questionnaire should be completed. They were encouraged to answer honestly 
and take as much time as they needed to accurately complete the questionnaire. 
Voluntary participation, confidentiality, and anonymity were guaranteed. The 
present research was conducted in accordance with international ethical 
guidelines, which are consistent with the American Psychological Association 
(APA) guidelines. 
8.6.1.2. Measures 
Organizational culture 
Organizational culture was assessed by the Organizational Culture Inventory 
(OCI). As described in Section 5.2.1., the OCI, developed by Human Synergistics 
International (Cooke and Lafferty, 1987), provides an assessment of the operating 
organizational culture in terms of the behaviors that members believe are required 
to ‗fit in‘ and ‗meet expectations‘ within their organization. The OCI comprises 
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12 cultural norms categorized into three different general cultural styles: 
Constructive (e.g., ―resolve conflicts constructively‖, ―show concern for people‖, 
―do even simple tasks well‖), Passive/defensive (e.g., ―switch priorities to please 
others‖, ―willingly obey orders‖, ―put things off‖), and Aggressive/defensive (e.g. 
―turn the job into a contest‖, ―refuse to accept criticism‖, ―stay on the offensive‖). 
Each cultural norm is represented by 10 items with which respondents report their 
degree of agreement using a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at 
all) to 5 (strongly), with a total of 120 items. In the present study, we addressed 
the validation of the original 120-item version of the OCI adapted to Spanish. 
However, in our sample, some items were found to show unsatisfactory 
psychometric properties. Thus, as a result of the validation process, a 113-item 
version of the OCI was proposed and used to carry out further analyses in studies 
1 and 2. Cronbach‘s alphas in the 113-item version were as follows:  = .96 for 
the Constructive style, ranging from .78 to .92 for its sub-dimensions of cultural 
norms.  = .90 for the Passive/defensive style, ranging from .76 to .84 for its 
cultural norms.  = .91 for the Aggressive/defensive style, ranging from .68 to .88 
for its cultural norms. 
Enacted safety culture 
Safety culture was assessed by the SCEQ (López de Castro et al., 2017). The 
SCEQ measures the degree to which the value of safety is enacted in three 
fundamental components of the functioning and operation of NPPs that 
correspond to the three dimensions of the questionnaire: Strategic decisions 
ensuring safety, Human Resources practices driving safety, Daily activities and 
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behaviors supporting safety. Participants were asked to give their opinion about 
the practical importance of safety on a daily basis in their organization. Five-point 
Likert-type scales with responses ranging from 1 (not important at all) to 5 (very 
important) were used to respond to the 21 items of the SCEQ. Strategic decisions 
ensuring safety was measured by five items (To what degree is nuclear safety 
important…―when allocating resources (time, personnel, money)?‖, ―when 
solving conflicts between safety and production?‖). Cronbach‘s alpha was .87. 
Human resources practices driving safety was assessed by eight items (To what 
degree is nuclear safety important … ―in hiring personnel‖, ―in evaluating 
employees‘ performance‖. Cronbach‘s alpha for this dimension was .90. Daily 
activities and behaviors supporting safety was measured by eight items (To what 
degree is nuclear safety important … ―in the daily behavior of the employees‖, ―in 
the meetings‖).  Cronbach‘s alpha for this dimension was .91. 
Group safety climate 
Group safety climate was assessed by an adapted version of the Group-level 
Safety Climate scale (Zohar and Luria, 2005), which was validated in another 
study (Latorre, Gracia, Tomás and Peiró, 2013). The scale is composed of 15 
items that assess employees‘ perceptions about the group leader‘s safety policies, 
procedures, and practices, and about the group members‘ safety behaviors. Some 
examples of items are: ―our boss insists that we follow the safety norms while 
repairing equipment, machines, or systems‖, ―we make sure we have everything 
we need to do the job in a safe way‖, ―there is a frequent check on whether the 
safety norms and procedures are being followed‖, or ―we talk about how to 
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improve safety‖. The questionnaire has a 5-point Likert scale from ―strongly 
disagree‖ to ―completely agree.‖ Cronbach‘s alpha was .96. 
Organizational safety climate 
Organizational safety climate was measured with an adapted version of the 
Organizational-Level Safety Climate scale (Zohar and Luria, 2005), which has 
been used in other previous studies (e.g., López de Castro et al., 2017). This 
adaptation kept the 16 items from Zohar and Luria‘s questionnaire, although the 
referent for workers‘ perceptions was modified from top management to the 
whole organization. Examples of items are: Our company…―reacts quickly to 
solve problems when told about safety hazards‖, ―provides all the equipment 
needed to do the job safely‖, and ―gives safety personnel the power they need to 
do their job‖. Following Zohar and Luria‘s scale, respondents were asked to 
answer these questions on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
(completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). Cronbach‘s alpha was .94. 
Safety satisfaction 
Safety satisfaction was assessed by the ―Safety Satisfaction Questionnaire 
(SSQ)‖, a scale developed by our team and used previously in other studies (e.g., 
López de Castro et al., 2017). The questionnaire was composed of 6 items 
designed to explore participants‘ satisfaction with organizational safety (e.g., ―To 
what extent are you satisfied with radiological issues?‖). Respondents answered 
on a five point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (very unsatisfied) to 5 (very 
satisfied). Cronbach‘s alpha was .90. 
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Job satisfaction 
Job satisfaction was measured with three items. It was conceptualized as 
overall satisfaction with the company, with the unit of work, and with the work 
itself. Consequently, participants were asked about their job satisfaction in 
relation to each of these domains: ―How satisfied are you with your work?‖; 
―How satisfied are you with your team?‖ and ―How satisfied are you with your 
company?‖ A five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (very unsatisfied) to 5 
(very satisfied) was employed for this purpose. Cronbach‘s alpha was .80. 
8.6.1.3. Analyses  
Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis) were 
obtained for individual items on the OCI. To test the internal structure of the OCI, 
confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) were performed with Lisrel 8.80 (Jöreskog 
and Sörbom, 2006). Maximum likelihood (ML) was selected as the estimation 
method, and Pearson correlations were used as input matrices. The ML estimation 
procedure assumes continuous, multivariate normal observed variables (e.g., 
Jöreskog, 1969, 1977). However, it has been stated that the linear approach can be 
an adequate approximation to ordered categorical data when the items have a 
sufficient number of categories (minimum 5) and reasonably fit a normal 
distribution (Lloret et al., 2014; Muthén and Kaplan, 1985). An averaged absolute 
value of the skewness of the variables lower than 1 (Boomsma, 1983), and most 
variables with univariate skewness and kurtosis in the range from –1 to +1 
(Muthén and Kaplan, 1985) have been considered as criteria to support a 
reasonable fit to normal distribution. In the present study, the linear approach was 
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an adequate approximation to the data because the items had a 5-category 
response scale and reasonably fitted a normal distribution. 
The following alternative models were tested with CFA using the global 
scale: 1) a one-factor model (all 120 items measuring a single dimension called 
organizational culture); 2) a three-factor model (representing the three styles of 
organizational culture: Constructive style (40 items), Passive/defensive style (40 
items) and Aggressive/defensive style (40 items)); and 3) a 12-factor model 
(representing the 12 types of organizational culture, each consisting of 10 items). 
Additionally, with only the items from each of the three styles of organizational 
culture, the following alternative models were compared using CFA: 1) a one-
factor model (all items from the specific general style, measuring a single 
dimension); and 2) a four-factor model (representing the four types of 
organizational culture included in each specific style of organizational culture). 
In order to interpret the results of the CFAs, model fit was assessed using the 
chi-square statistic and a number of goodness-of-fit indices (RMSEA, NNFI and 
CFI). Values of RMSEA lower than .05, lower than .08, and greater than .10 
indicate a close fit, a fair fit, and a poor fit of the model, respectively (Browne and 
Cudeck, 1993; Browne and Du Toit, 1992). NNFI and CFI values greater than .90 
and .95 are typically taken to reflect acceptable and excellent fit to the data, 
respectively (Marsh et al., 2005). To compare the alternative models‘ goodness of 
fit, the incremental fit indices were estimated. It has been suggested that 
differences not larger than .01 between NNFI and CFI are considered to indicate 
irrelevant differences between models (Cheung and Rensvold, 2002; Widaman, 
1985). Differences lower than .015 in RMSEA are also proposed as an indicator 
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of negligible practical differences (Chen, 2007). When differences between 
models cannot be proven, it is preferable to keep the most parsimonious solution.  
Internal consistency (homogeneity) analyses were performed for individual 
items (corrected item-scale correlations) and for entire scales (Cronbach‘s alpha). 
Corrected item-scale correlations should be higher than .30 (Nunnally and 
Bernstein, 1994). Additionally, values of .70 or more indicate acceptable 
reliability for Cronbach‘s alpha coefficient (Nunnally, 1978). The analyses were 
carried out using SPSS 22. 
Correlations between the scales and subscales of the OCI were also estimated. 
It is widely accepted that factor discrimination can be established when inter-
factor correlations are below .85 (Kline, 2005). 
Finally, evidence of validity based on relationships with external variables 
was obtained by correlating the scores on the OCI and the SCEQ with four scales 
that measure constructs that are theoretically and empirically associated with 
(safety) culture and regarded in the literature as consequences of safety culture 
(group safety climate, organizational safety climate, safety satisfaction, job 
satisfaction). From this point on, we will refer to these four constructs as safety 
culture outcomes. Further evidence of validity was provided by correlating the 
scores on the OCI with those of the three dimensions of the SCEQ (daily activities 
and behaviors supporting safety, human resources practices driving safety, and 
strategic decisions ensuring safety). Descriptive statistics, Cronbach‘s alpha 
coefficients, and correlations among the external variables were also estimated. 
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8.6.2. Study 2 
8.6.2.1. Participants and procedure 
Three years later we administered a similar battery of questionnaires in the 
same company, along with safety performance scales. On this occasion, we 
received a completed questionnaire from 495 workers. The total size of the 
company was 760 employees. Thus, we obtained a response rate of 65.13%. 
Again, the sample included all responsibility levels and functional areas in the 
nuclear facility. 47% of participants had completed university studies; 3% of 
participants were under 30 years old; 18% were between 30 and 45; and 79% 
were older than 45. 
The questionnaire administration procedure was exactly the same as the one 
described for study 1. For our second study, the final sample was composed only 
by those subjects who answered both surveys, the present one and the survey 
administered three years before. In order to make this match and maintain 
anonymity, at the end of both surveys, participants had to respond to a few 
questions only they knew the answer to (f.i., ―write the first letter of the month 
when your father was born‖). Participants‘ answers to these questions allowed us 
to create an alphanumeric code to identify them. The sample in study 2 was 
finally composed of 163 employees. 
8.6.2.2. Measures  
Organizational culture  
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Data for organizational culture collected in Study 1 were used in Study 2. As 
previously stated, organizational culture was measured by the OCI (see measures 
section for Study 1). Cronbach‘s alpha values for the dimensions and sub-
dimensions of this scale in the reduced longitudinal sample (N = 163) at Time 1 
were as follows:  = .96 for the Constructive style, ranging from .76 to .92 for its 
sub-dimensions of cultural norms;  = .90 for the Passive/defensive style, ranging 
from .78 to .83 for its cultural norms;  = .89 for the Aggressive/defensive style, 
ranging from .61 to .87 for its cultural norms. 
Enacted safety culture 
Data for enacted safety culture collected in Study 1 were used in Study 2. 
Enacted safety culture was assessed by the SCEQ, as previously mentioned (see 
measures section in Study 1). Cronbach‘s alphas for the dimensions of this scale 
in the reduced longitudinal sample (N = 163) at Time 1were as follows:  = .87 
for Strategic decisions ensuring safety;  = .90 for Human resources practices 
driving safety; and  = .91 for Daily activities and behaviors supporting safety. 
Safety compliance  
The original scale by Neal and Griffin (2006) was used. The scale consists of 
three items, with a five-point Likert response scale ranging from 1 (completely 
disagree) to 5 (completely agree). Scale items were: ―I use all the necessary safety 
equipment to do my job‖, ―I use the correct safety procedures for performing my 
job,‖ and ―I ensure the highest levels of safety when I do my job.‖ Cronbach‘s 
alpha was .91. 
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Safety participation 
As in the case of safety compliance, we used the original safety participation 
scale by Neal and Griffin (2006). The scale consisted of three items, with a 5-
point Likert response scale ranging from 1 (Completely disagree) to 5 
(Completely agree). Scale items were: ―I promote the safety program within the 
organization‖, ―I make extra effort to improve safety in the workplace‖, and ―I 
voluntarily carry out tasks or activities that help to improve workplace safety‖. 
Cronbach‘s alpha was .87. 
Risky behaviors 
Risky behaviors were assessed by a scale based on Mearns, Flin, Gordon and 
Fleming (2001). The original scale had 12 items, but two items were deleted 
because they were not appropriate for the nuclear sector. Therefore, our scale was 
composed of 10 items. This modified scale was used in previous studies (Latorre 
et al., 2013; Martínez-Córcoles, Gracia, Tomás and Peiró, 2011; Martínez-
Córcoles, Gracia, Tomás, Peiró and Schöbel, 2013). A 5-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (usually) was used, so that higher scores reflected 
risky behaviors. Sample items include: ―I ignore safety regulations to get the job 
done‖, ―In order to be more effective in my job, I have to break work procedures‖, 
or ―I take shortcuts that involve little or no risk‖. Cronbach‘s alpha was .91. 
8.6.2.3. Analyses  
Data were collected for three safety performance indicators (safety 
compliance, safety participation, and risky behavior) at Time 2. Descriptive 
statistics, Cronbach‘s alpha coefficients, and correlations among the safety 
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performance variables were estimated. Descriptive statistics, Cronbach‘s alpha 
coefficients, and correlations were also estimated for the SCEQ and OCI 
dimensions and sub-dimensions within the reduced longitudinal sample (N=163) 
collected at Time 1. Correlations among variables collected at Time 1 (SCEQ and 
OCI dimensions and sub-dimensions), and variables collected at Time 2 (safety 
performance indicators) were estimated. 
Multiple regression analyses were carried out with SPSS 22 in order to test 
whether the OCI and the SCEQ scales gathered at Time 1 were able to predict the 
three safety performance indicators at Time 2. Independent variables were 
standardized to avoid collinearity problems. 
8.7. RESULTS 
8.7.1. Study 1 
8.7.1.1. Descriptive analyses for the OCI items 
Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis) for 
individual items on the original 120-item version of the OCI are presented in 
Table 20. The items on the questionnaire showed standard deviations between .78 
and 1.19, which indicates some discriminant power of the questionnaire items. 
The averaged absolute skewness (|M| = .44) and kurtosis (|M| = .38) values for the 
items on the OCI were less than 1. Moreover, 97.5% of the items (117 out of 120) 
had skewness in the range from –1 to +1, and, additionally, 98.3% of the items 
(118 out of 120) had kurtosis values in the range from –1 to +1. Thus, only 5 
items (OCIc_x, OCId_i, OCIe_d, OCIb_m and OCIe_j) presented skewness or 
kurtosis values that were out of range.  
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Table 20  
Descriptive statistics of the items of the Organizational Culture Inventory 
(OCI) 
   
To what extent...     
  Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Dimension 1 – Constructive style     
      Humanistic-encouraging culture     
OCIa_b …2. 3.30 .91 -.38 -.13 
OCIa_c …3. 3.37 .89 -.46 -.09 
OCIa_d …4. 3.72 .86 -.64 .23 
OCIa_e …5. 3.60 .96 -.66 .21 
OCIa_r …18. 3.55 .95 -.56 .03 
OCIa_s …19. 3.77 .90 -.70 .55 
OCIa_t …20. 3.36 .98 -.40 -.14 
OCIb_h …34. 3.27 .95 -.44 -.12 
OCIb_i …35. 3.55 .94 -.60 .13 
OCIb_x …50. 3.25 .98 -.44 -.25 
      Affiliative culture     
OCIc_i …61. 3.99 .79 -.73 .93 
OCIc_j …62. 3.90 .84 -.74 .76 
OCIc_k …63. 3.73 .87 -.62 .39 
OCIc_l …64. 3.62 .92 -.51 -.06 
OCIc_x …76. 3.63 .82 -.69 1.03 
OCIc_y …77. 3.36 .98 -.33 -.31 
OCIc_z …78. 3.09 .99 -.32 -.35 
OCId_m …91. 3.36 .94 -.52 -.01 
OCId_n …92. 3.43 .91 -.63 .24 
OCIe_b …106. 3.67 .83 -.73 .74 
      Achievement culture     
OCIa_k …11. 2.95 1.08 -.16 -.64 
OCIa_z …26. 3.71 .92 -.35 -.31 
OCIb_a …27. 3.32 .92 -.65 .19 
OCIb_o …41. 2.60 .93 -.13 -.41 
OCIb_p …42. 3.35 1.13 -.38 -.57 
OCIb_q …43. 3.28 1.00 -.53 -.10 
OCIc_d …56. 3.85 .89 -.68 .18 
[OCIc_e …57.] 2.05 1.02 .77 -.03 
OCIc_f …58. 3.22 .95 -.32 -.01 
OCIc_g …59. 3.84 .88 -.70 .50 
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      Self-actualizing culture     
OCIc_w …75. 3.58 .95 -.73 .34 
OCId_k …89. 3.31 .98 -.47 -.02 
OCId_l …90. 3.08 1.00 -.28 -.52 
OCId_y …103. 2.82 .94 -.28 -.43 
OCId_z …104. 3.97 .81 -.63 .45 
OCIe_a …105. 3.70 .92 -.80 .51 
OCIe_m …117. 3.35 .87 -.46 .18 
OCIe_n …118. 3.55 .98 -.62 .05 
OCIe_o …119. 2.92 .99 -.12 -.45 
OCIe_p …120. 3.68 1.05 -.59 -.20 
      
Dimension 2 – Passive/defensive style     
      Approval culture     
OCIc_w …6. 3.20 .90 -.33 .05 
OCId_k …7. 3.60 .98 -.60 .06 
OCId_l …8. 3.06 .98 -.28 -.28 
OCId_y …9. 2.28 .99 .21 -.79 
OCId_z …21. 2.64 .97 .09 -.36 
OCIe_a …22. 2.39 1.03 .18 -.66 
OCIe_m …23. 2.89 .93 -.18 -.28 
OCIe_n …36. 3.19 .96 -.14 -.37 
OCIe_o …37. 2.39 1.02 .22 -.83 
OCIe_p …51. 3.20 .93 -.29 -.10 
      Conventional culture     
OCIc_o …67. 3.41 1.11 -.49 -.44 
OCIc_p …68. 3.64 1.06 -.74 .01 
OCIc_q …69. 3.57 .89 -.49 .19 
OCIc_r …70. 3.49 .92 -.48 .04 
OCId_e …83. 3.09 .94 -.21 -.20 
OCId_f …84. 2.07 1.07 .66 -.52 
OCId_g …85. 3.09 .98 -.22 -.30 
OCId_u …99. 3.60 .87 -.37 -.17 
OCId_v …100. 2.87 .96 -.04 -.39 
OCIe_k …115. 3.41 .93 -.40 -.03 
      Dependent culture     
OCIa_l …12. 2.82 1.08 -.01 -.63 
OCIa_m …13. 3.34 .87 -.28 -.16 
OCIa_n …14. 2.98 1.10 .08 -.61 
OCIa_o …15. 3.71 .82 -.48 .17 
OCIb_b …28. 3.40 .82 -.59 .26 
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[OCIb_c …29.] 3.35 .93 -.45 -.09 
OCIb_d …30. 2.89 1.10 -.13 -.75 
OCIb_r …44. 2.50 1.14 .41 -.59 
[OCIb_s …45.] 3.13 1.04 -.29 -.45 
OCIc_h …60. 3.75 .78 -.64 .86 
      Avoidance culture     
OCIc_s …71. 2.14 1.01 .39 -.79 
OCIc_t …72. 2.14 1.02 .49 -.54 
OCIc_u …73. 2.77 1.15 .07 -.85 
OCIc_v …74. 1.83 .95 .84 -.25 
OCId_h …86. 2.23 .98 .39 -.45 
OCId_i …87. 1.82 .99 1.04 .29 
OCId_j …88. 2.24 1.08 .48 -.56 
OCId_w …101. 2.03 1.00 .53 -.71 
OCId_x …102. 2.01 .96 .56 -.59 
OCIe_l …116. 2.52 1.00 .10 -.62 
      
Dimension 3 – Aggressive/defensive style      
      Oppositional culture     
[OCIa_a …1.] 3.26 .89 -.44 -.04 
[OCIa_p …16.] 3.49 .92 -.41 .01 
OCIa_q …17. 2.07 .99 .47 -.78 
OCIb_e …31. 2.74 .82 -.41 -.06 
[OCIb_f …32.] 3.35 1.05 -.41 -.27 
OCIb_g …33. 2.03 .91 .33 -.93 
OCIb_t …46. 2.66 .92 -.03 -.36 
OCIb_u …47. 2.14 .98 .46 -.43 
OCIb_v …48. 1.99 1.01 .66 -.49 
OCIb_w …49. 2.46 .98 .11 -.50 
      Power culture     
OCIc_m …65. 2.61 .97 .13 -.46 
[OCId_a …79.] 3.54 .92 -.65 .34 
OCId_b …80. 3.13 .97 -.33 -.11 
OCId_o …93. 1.84 .93 .84 -.05 
OCId_p …94. 2.08 1.02 .56 -.45 
OCId_q …95. 2.17 1.01 .46 -.57 
OCIe_c …107. 3.13 .91 -.28 -.13 
OCIe_d …108. 1.92 1.05 1.01 .22 
OCIe_e …109. 2.76 1.02 -.09 -.58 
OCIe_f …110. 2.53 1.07 .13 -.84 
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Competitive culture
OCIa_j …10. 2.43 1.04 .11 -.80
OCIa_x …24. 2.02 .94 .52 -.48
OCIa_y …25. 2.17 .97 .27 -.87
OCIb_l …38. 1.87 .99 .90 .02
OCIb_m …39. 1.68 .89 1.07 .20
OCIb_n …40. 1.87 .94 .75 -.32
OCIb_z …52. 2.33 .91 .01 -.72
OCIc_a …53. 2.82 .94 -.27 -.58
OCIc_b …54. 2.16 1.00 .35 -.81
OCIc_c …55. 1.79 .96 .95 -.08
 Perfectionistic culture
OCIc_n …66. 3.04 .86 -.17 -.13
OCId_c …81. 2.62 1.01 .14 -.42
OCId_d …82. 2.90 1.19 -.12 -.99
OCId_r …96. 2.00 .94 .60 -.35
OCId_s …97. 3.08 1.01 -.30 -.46
OCId_t …98. 3.48 .93 -.62 .10
OCIe_g …111. 3.40 .98 -.63 .04
OCIe_h …112. 2.98 1.04 -.20 -.51
OCIe_i …113. 3.12 .97 -.33 -.17
OCIe_j …114. 3.74 .79 -.74 1.06
Note. Items within [ ] were not considered for creating the dimensions (constructive style,
passive/defensive style and aggressive/defensive style) and sub-dimensions (achievement culture,
dependent culture, oppositional culture, and power culture). The original formulation of the items
is not given due to confidentiality reasons. Each item is identified by a code (for our 
research purposes) and on the left, by a number that corresponds to the order in which each of 
the items is presented in the original questionnaire.
 
8.7.1.2. Confirmatory factor analysis: Factorial structure of the OCI (120-item 
version) 
As Table 21 shows, confirmatory factor analysis of the original 120-item 
version of the OCI revealed that the three-factor model (χ2 = 40338.40, df = 7017, 
p < .01; RMSEA = .108; CFI = .901; NNFI = .900) and the twelve-factor model 
(χ2 = 27435.15, df = 6954, p < .01; RMSEA = .085; CFI = .917; NNFI = .915) 
fitted the data adequately. By contrast, the one-factor solution provided a poorer 
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fit to the data (χ2 = 79421.36, df = 7020, p < .01; RMSEA = .159; CFI = .879; 
NNFI = .877). Moreover, differences between the fit of the three-factor and one-
factor models (NNFI=.023, CFI =.022 and RMSEA=.051), and between the 
twelve-factor and one-factor models (NNFI=.038, CFI =.038 and 
RMSEA=.074), were relevant from a practical point of view. Additionally, 
differences between the fit of the three-factor and twelve-factor models 
(NNFI=.015, CFI =.016 and RMSEA=.023) were also non negligible. Thus, 
the three-factor model and the twelve-factor model were empirically supported, 
but the twelve-factor model appeared to be the best fitting model. 
 
Table 21 
Fit indices of different tested models with OCI (120 items version) 
  χ² gl χ²/gl RMSEA CFI NNFI 
One-factor model 79421.36 7020 11.31 .159 .879 .877 
Three-factor model 40338.40 7017 5.75 .108 .901 .900 
Twelve-factor model 27435.15 6954 3.95 .085 .917 .915 
Note. χ2 = Chi-square; gl = degrees of freedom; χ2/df = relative/normed chi-square; 
RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation, CFI = comparative fit index, NNFI = 
non-normed fit index. 
 
8.7.1.3. Reliability 
For the initial 120-item version of the OCI, the Cronbach‘s alpha values were 
satisfactory for the three dimensions of the questionnaire: .95 for constructive 
style; .87 for passive/defensive style; and .90 for aggressive/defensive style. 
However, when estimating the Cronbach‘s alpha values for the twelve sub-
dimensions, two scales (dependent culture and oppositional culture) showed non-
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satisfactory values ( = .68 and  = 59, respectively). Two items on the 
―dependent culture‖ scale (OCIb_c and OCIb_s) and three items on the 
―oppositional culture‖ scale (OCIa_a, OCIa_p, and OCIb_f) were found to have 
corrected item-scale correlations of less than .30 (values were -.08, .10, .08, .05 
and .09, respectively). We decided to eliminate these items in order to improve the 
reliability of their corresponding sub-dimensions. Two additional items, one 
belonging to the ―achievement culture‖ scale (OCIc_e) and the other belonging to 
the ―power culture‖ scale (OCId_a), showed very low corrected item-scale 
correlations (values were .02 and .05 respectively). These items were also 
eliminated from further analyses. After eliminating the aforementioned 7 items, 
for the 113-item version of the OCI, the Cronbach‘s alpha values were 
satisfactory for the three dimensions of the questionnaire (see Table 22): .96 for 
constructive style; .90 for passive/defensive style; and .91 for aggressive/defensive 
style. Moreover, reliability analyses showed strong internal consistency for the 
sub-dimensions of the OCI (see Table 23), except for the ―oppositional culture‖ 
scale, whose Cronbach‘s alpha value was still below the .70 criterion (specifically, 
 = .68). For the other sub-dimensions, Cronbach‘s alpha values were 
satisfactory, ranging from .76 to .92.  
 
Table 22 
Study 1 (N=566). Descriptive statistics, reliability and correlations for the 3 dimensions of 
the OCI (113 items version) 
  M SD 1 2 3 
1. Constructive style 3.38 .56 (.96)   
2. Passive/defensive style 2.86 .45 .03 (.90)  
3. Aggressive/defensive style 2.47 .55 .07 .63** (.91) 
Note. ** p< .01. Cronbach‘s alpha coefficients are in brackets.  
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Table 23 
Study 1 (N= 566). Descriptive statistics, reliability and correlations for the 12 sub-dimensions of the OCI (113 items version) 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constructive Style               
1. Humanistic-encouraging culture 3.47 .72 (.92)            
2. Affiliative culture 3.58 .67 .75** (.91)           
3. Achievement culture 3.35 .59 .68** .62** (.78)          
4. Self-actualizing culture 3.40 .61 .70** .77** .67** (.84)         
Passive/defensive style               
5. Approval culture 2.89 .56 .27** .29** .23** .14** (.76)        
6. Conventional culture 3.22 .58 -.12** -.01 .15** -.05 .40** (.80)       
7. Dependent culture 3.17 .61 -.13** -.09* .15** -.10* .45** .65** (.77)      
8. Avoidance culture 2.17 .65 -.42** -.39** -.24** -.38** .31** .43** .36** (.84)     
Aggressive/defensive style               
9. Oppositional culture 2.29 .56 -.11* -.10* .01 -.09* .41** .23** .24** .57** (.68)    
10. Power culture 2.47 .61 -.13** -.12** .13** -.08 .30** .51** .37** .54** .47** (.78)   
11. Competitive culture 2.11 .67 -.23** -.18** .05* -.16** .43** .40** .38** .64** .62** .64** (.88)  
12. Perfectionistic culture 3.04 .55 .03 .02 .33** .11* .27** .60** .47** .33** .25** .60** .42** (.76) 
Note. ** p< .01; * p< .05. Cronbach‘s alpha coefficients are in brackets. 
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8.7.1.4. Confirmatory factor analysis: Factorial structure of the OCI dimensions 
(113-item version) 
As previously stated, two alternative models (a one-factor model and a four-
factor model) were tested for each of the three dimension of the OCI (constructive 
style, passive/defensive style, and aggressive/defensive style). In the one-factor 
model, all the items from a particular dimension loaded in a single latent factor. In 
the four-factor model, four latent factors (representing the corresponding sub-
dimensions) were defined, and items from each particular sub-dimension loaded 
in the corresponding one.  
For all three dimensions of the OCI (constructive style, passive/defensive 
style, and aggressive/defensive style), the four-factor model showed a better fit 
than the one-factor model. Moreover, the differences in fit between the two 
models were not trivial for the ―constructive style‖ (RMSEA = .021, CFI = 
.013; NNFI = .014), the ―passive/defensive style‖ (RMSEA = .046, CFI = 
.049; NNFI = .051), and the ―aggressive/defensive style‖ (RMSEA = .027, 
CFI = .029; NNFI = .031).  
For the four-factor models, all factor loadings were statistically significant 
(p<.05). Average factor loadings for ―constructive style‖ were .69, ranging from 
.22 to .91. Average factor loadings for ―passive/defensive style‖ were .56, ranging 
from .10 to .82. Finally, average factor loadings for ―aggressive/defensive style‖ 
were .57, ranging from .20 to .89. The correlation coefficients among the sub-
dimensions of the questionnaire are shown in Table 23. All correlations among 
sub-dimensions belonging to the same dimension are positive and statistically 
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significant (p<.01), ranging from .62 to .77 for the ―constructive style‖ sub-
dimensions, from .31 to .65 for the ―passive/defensive style‖ sub-dimensions, and 
from .25 to .64 for the ―aggressive/defensive style‖ sub-dimensions. Moreover, 
none of the correlations exceeded the accepted criterion (rxy< .85), thus supporting 
factor discrimination. These correlations show that the different sub-dimensions 
represent interrelated but clearly differentiated components of a particular style. 
8.7.1.5. Evidence of validity based on relationships with external variables 
Table 24 presents descriptive statistics, Cronbach‘s alpha coefficients, and 
correlations among the external variables, including safety culture outcomes 
(group safety climate, organizational safety climate, safety satisfaction, job 
satisfaction) and the three dimensions of the SCEQ (daily activities and behaviors 
supporting safety, human resources practices driving safety, and strategic 
decisions ensuring safety). 
 
Table 24 
Study 1.Descriptive statistics, reliability and correlations among the SCEQ dimensions and the safety  culture 
outcomes 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Group safety climate 3.74 .79 (.96)       
2. Organizational safety climate 3.85 .65 .72** (.94)      
3. Safety satisfaction 4.16 .67 .62** .71** (.90)     
4. Job satisfaction 3.91 .92 .51** .50** .48** (.80)    
5. SCEQ-Daily activities and behaviors 3.88 .68 .54** .60** .58** .41** (.91)   
6. SCEQ-Human Resources Practices 3.35 .82 .51** .58** .52** .38** .69** (.90)  
7. SCEQ-Strategic decisions 4.22 .64 .52** .58** .58** .38** .74** .57** (.87) 
Note. ** p< .01. SCEQ = safety culture enactment questionnaire. Cronbach‘s alpha coefficients are in brackets. 
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Table 25 presents Pearson correlations between the three dimensions and 12 
sub-dimensions of the OCI, the three dimensions of the SCEQ, and the four safety 
culture outcomes. Constructive style, as well as each of its corresponding sub-
dimensions (humanistic-encouraging culture, affiliative culture, achievement 
culture, and self-actualizing culture) showed positive and statistically significant 
correlations with the four safety culture outcomes (group safety climate, 
organizational safety climate, safety satisfaction, job satisfaction) and with the 
three SCEQ dimensions (daily activities and behaviors supporting safety, human 
resources practices driving safety, and strategic decisions ensuring safety). 
Passive/defensive style showed negative and statistically significant 
correlations with the four safety culture outcomes (group safety climate, 
organizational safety climate, safety satisfaction, job satisfaction), but no 
relationship with the three SCEQ dimensions. Considering its sub-dimensions, 
only ―avoidance culture‖ showed negative and statistically significant correlations 
with all the external variables (except with the SCEQ dimension ―daily activities 
and behaviors supporting safety‖). ―Dependent culture‖ also showed negative and 
statistically significant correlations with safety satisfaction and job satisfaction. 
Aggressive/defensive style showed negative and statistically significant 
correlations with three of the safety culture outcomes (organizational safety 
climate, safety satisfaction, job satisfaction), but no relationships with the SCEQ 
dimensions. Considering its sub-dimensions, ―oppositional culture‖ and 
―competitive culture‖ showed negative and statistically significant correlations 
with all the external variables. ―Power culture‖ showed negative and statistically 
significant correlations with organizational safety climate, safety satisfaction, and 
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job satisfaction. Finally, ―perfectionistic culture‖ showed positive and statistically 
significant correlations with group safety climate and two of the SCEQ 
dimensions (daily activities and behaviors supporting safety, and strategic 
decisions ensuring safety). 
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Table 25 
Study 1 (N=566). Correlations of the OCI dimensions and sub-dimensions (113 items version) with the SCEQ dimensions and with the safety 
culture outcomes. 
  
Group Safety 
Climate 
Organizational 
Safety Climate 
Safety 
Satisfaction 
Job 
Satisfaction 
SCEQ 
DA&B 
SCEQ HR-
P 
SCEQ
SD
Constructive Style .43** .40** .36** .44** .41** .34** .40**
Humanistic-encouraging culture .45** .44** .38** .45** .40** .42** .38**
Affiliative culture .37** .38** .33** .40** .31** .31** .30**
Achievement culture .40** .36** .31** .40** .38** .30** .37**
Self-actualizing culture .39** .39** .40** .45** .38** .36** .37**
Passive/defensive style -.09* -.14** -.13** -.16** -.07 -.06 -.08
Approval culture .02 -.01 -.02 .01 .00 .08 -.04
Conventional culture .01 -.04 -.02 -.07 .05 .00 .04
Dependent culture -.04 -.08 -.09* -.11** -0.1 -.06 -.02
Avoidance culture -.22** -.26** -.25** -.28** -.22 -.19** -.22**
Aggressive/defensive style -.03 -.012** -.11** -.09* -.07 -.03 -.06
Oppositional culture -.13** -.19** -.18** -.11** -.20** -.10* -.21**
Power culture -.02 -.10* -.10* -.08* -0.6 -.02 -.05
Competitive culture -.15** -.23** -.19** -.13** -.17** -.10* -.17**
Perfectionistic culture .13** .04 .06 .03 .15** .07 .15**
Note. ** p< .01; * p< .05. SCEQ = safety culture enactment questionnaire; DA&B = daily activities and behaviors; HR-P = human resources
practices; SD = strategic decisions.
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8.7.2. Study 2 
8.7.2.1. Descriptive analyses, reliability and correlations 
Table 26 presents descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) and 
reliability values for the three safety performance indicators (safety compliance, 
safety participation, and risky behavior) collected at Time 2. Cronbach‘s alpha 
values were satisfactory: .91 for safety compliance; .87 for safety participation; 
and .91 for risky behaviors. 
Table 26 offers descriptive statistics and reliability values for the SCEQ and 
OCI dimensions found in the reduced longitudinal sample (N=163) collected at 
Time 1. Table 27 offers descriptive statistics and reliability values for the OCI 
sub-dimensions in the reduced longitudinal sample (N=163) collected at Time 1. 
Values at Time 1 for the SCEQ and the OCI dimensions and sub-dimensions in 
the entire sample (N=566) and the reduced longitudinal sample (N=163) were 
quite similar. Cronbach‘s alpha values were satisfactory for the SCEQ dimensions 
(ranging from .87 to .91) and the OCI dimensions (ranging from .89 to .96). 
Reliability analyses showed strong internal consistency for the sub-dimensions of 
the OCI (see Table 27), except for the ―oppositional culture‖ scale, whose 
Cronbach‘s alpha value was below the .70 criterion (concretely,  = .61). For the 
other sub-dimensions, Cronbach‘s alpha values were satisfactory, ranging from 
.70 to .92. 
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Table 26 
Study 2 (N = 163). Descriptive statistics, reliability and correlations among the dimensions of the OCI (113 items version), the SCEQ dimensions and 
the safety performance indicators. 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. OCI Constructive styleT1 3.47 .52 (.96)         
2. OCI Passive/defensive style T1 2.86 .45 -.15 (.90)        
3. OCI Aggressive/defensive styleT1 2.47 .49 -.01 .54** (.89)       
4. SCEQ-Daily activities and behaviors T1 3.93 .65 .39** -.20* -.16* (.91)      
5. SCEQ- Human Resources Practices T1 3.31 .79 .22** -.17* -.13 .62** (.90)     
6. SCEQ-Strategic decisions T1 4.25 .66 .31** -.10 -.13 .74** .49** (.87)    
7. Safety compliance T2 4.58 .62 .27** -.14 -.15 .25** .15 .33** (.91)   
8. Safety participation T2 4.09 .71 .19* -.03 -.05 .33** .22** .33** .57** (.87)  
9. Risky behavior T2 1.45 .51 -.17* .18* .25** -.20* -.21** -.19* -.48** -.36** (.91) 
Note. ** p< .01. OCI = organizational culture inventory; SCEQ = safety culture enactment questionnaire; T1 = time 1; T2 = time 2. Cronbach‘s alpha 
coefficients are in brackets. 
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Table 27 
Study 2 (N = 163). Descriptive statistics, reliability and correlations for the 12 OCI sub-dimensions (113 items version) at Time 1 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Constructive Style               
1. Humanistic-encouraging culture 3.47 .70 (.92)            
2. Affiliative culture 3.59 .65 .79** (.92)           
3. Achievement culture 3.45 .54 .65** .65** (.76)          
4. Self-actualizing culture 3.45 .57 .73** .75** .62** (.83)         
Passive/defensive style               
5. Approval culture 2.83 .56 .13 .21** .13 -.02 (.78)        
6. Conventional culture 3.23 .54 -.29** -.16* -.03 -.33** .31** (.78)       
7. Dependent culture 3.24 .65 -.29** -.20* .06 -.28* .47** .63** (.80)      
8. Avoidance culture 2.13 .64 -.52** -.48** -.35** -.58** .35** .41** .41** (.83)     
Aggressive/defensive style               
9. Oppositional culture 2.29 .50 -.12 -.15 -.07 -.11 .42** .04 .12 .51** (.61)    
10. Power culture 2.46 .55 -.21** -.21** .06 -.22** .21** .40** .29** .53** .42** (.73)   
11. Competitive culture 2.10 .64 -.30** -.24** .02 -.29** .45** .35** .38** .62** .53** .62** (.87)  
12. Perfectionistic culture 3.11 .49 -.02 -.02 .32** -.05* .26** .56** .39** .28** .13 .52** .43** (.70) 
Note. ** p< .01; * p< .05. Cronbach‘s alpha coefficients are in brackets. 
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Pearson correlations between the three dimensions and 12 sub-dimensions of 
the OCI and the three safety performance indicators are presented in Table 28. 
Constructive style, as well as each of its corresponding sub-dimensions 
(humanistic-encouraging culture, affiliative culture, achievement culture, and self-
actualizing culture) showed positive and statistically significant correlations with 
safety compliance and safety participation, and negative and statistically 
significant correlations with risky behavior (except achievement culture, which 
did not show a statistically significant correlation). Passive/defensive style 
showed a positive and statistically significant correlation with risky behaviors. 
Moreover, only the avoidance culture sub-dimension showed statistically 
significant correlations (negative with safety compliance and safety participation, 
and positive with risky behaviors). The aggressive/defensive style showed 
positive and statistically significant correlation with risky behaviors. Furthermore, 
the oppositional culture sub-dimension showed negative statistically significant 
correlations with safety compliance and safety participation; competitive culture 
showed a negative statistically significant correlation with safety compliance; and 
power culture showed a positive statistically significant correlation with risky 
behaviors. 
Finally, as Table 28 shows, all dimensions of the SCEQ showed positive and 
statistically significant correlations with safety compliance and safety 
participation (except for the correlation between ―human resources practices‖ and 
safety compliance), and negative and statistically significant correlations with 
risky behaviors. 
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Table 28 
Study 2 (N = 163). Correlations of the OCI (113 items version) and SCEQ with safety 
performance indicators. 
  
Safety 
Compliance 
T2 
Safety 
Participation 
T2 
Risky 
behaviors    
T2 
Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI) T1    
Constructive Style T1 .27** .19* -.17* 
Humanistic-encouraging culture .25** .22** -.24** 
Affiliative culture .23** .17** -.24** 
Achievement culture .25** .17* -.12 
Self-actualizing culture .25** .21* -.26** 
Passive/defensive style T1 -.14 -.03 .18* 
Approval culture -.10 -.01 .07 
Conventional culture -.01 .14 .10 
Dependent culture -.04 -.01 .12 
Avoidance culture -.24** -.19* .24** 
Aggressive/defensive style T1 -.15 -.05 .25** 
Oppositional culture -.26** -.28** .15 
Power culture -.14 -.03 .25** 
Competitive culture -.20* -.15 .11 
Perfectionistic culture .05 .12 .14 
    
Safety Culture Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ) T1    
Daily activities and behaviors .25** .33** -.20** 
Human Resources Practices .15 .22** -.21** 
Strategic decisions .33** .33** -.19* 
Note. ** p< .01; * p< .05. T1 = time 1; T2 = time 2. 
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8.7.2.2. Regression analyses 
As Tables 29, 30 and 31 reveal, only the ―strategic decisions‖ dimension of 
the SCEQ at Time 1 appeared as a positive and significant predictor of safety 
compliance and safety participation at Time 2. None of the SCEQ dimensions 
were significant predictors of risky behaviors. 
Considering the OCI dimensions, ―constructive style‖ was a positive and 
statistically significant predictor of safety compliance and safety participation at 
Time 2 and a negative and significant predictor of risky behaviors at Time 2. 
Additionally, the ―aggressive/defensive style‖ dimension was a positive and 
statistically significant predictor of risky behaviors.  
When considering the constructive style sub-dimensions, none of them 
appeared to be a significant predictor of any of the safety performance indicators. 
These results could be explained by the inter-correlations among the variables. 
Regarding the passive/defensive style sub-dimensions, the ―avoidance 
culture‖ negatively predicted safety compliance and safety participation and 
positively predicted risky behaviors at Time 2. Moreover, ―conventional culture‖ 
positively predicted safety participation at Time 2. 
Finally, when considering the aggressive/defensive sub-dimensions, 
―oppositional culture‖ negatively predicted safety compliance and safety 
participation at Time 2. Furthermore, ―power culture‖ positively predicted risky 
behaviors at Time 2. 
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When including the SCEQ dimension (daily activities and behaviors, human 
resources practices, strategic decisions) and the OCI dimensions (constructive 
style, passive/defensive style, aggressive/defensive style) in a hierarchical 
regression model, results indicated the R-square change for the consecutive 
models. The SCEQ dimensions (step 1) explained 11% of the variance in safety 
compliance (p < .01); when including the OCI dimensions (step 2), the regression 
model explained 16% of the variance in safety compliance (p < .01), with R-
square = .05 being statistically significant (p < .05). Regarding safety 
participation, the SCEQ dimensions (step 1) explained 12% of the variance in 
safety participation (p < .01); when including the OCI dimensions (step 2), the 
regression model explained 13% of the variance in safety participation (p < .01), 
with R-square = .01 not being statistically significant (p > .05). Finally, 
regarding risky behaviors, the SCEQ dimensions (step 1) explained 6% of the 
variance in risky behaviors (p < .05); when including the OCI dimensions (step 2), 
the regression model explained 11% of the variance in risky behaviors (p < .01), 
with R-square = .05 being statistically significant (p < .05). 
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Table 29. Results of the regression analyses for predicting Safety Compliance in 
Time 2. 
Predictors in Time 1  SE R
2
 
SCEQ dimensions   .11** 
Daily activities and behaviors .02 .08  
Human Resources Practices -.03 .06  
Strategic decisions .21** .07  
    
OCI dimensions   .10** 
Constructive Style .16** .05  
Passive/defensive style -.02 .06  
Aggressive/defensive style -.09 .06  
    
OCI sub-dimensions    
Constructive style sub-dimensions   .08* 
Humanistic-encouraging culture .06 .09  
Affiliative culture -.01 .09  
Achievement culture .08 .07  
Self-actualizing culture .07 .08  
    
Passive/defensive style sub-dimensions   .07* 
Approval culture -.03 .06  
Conventional culture .06 .06  
Dependent culture .02 .07  
Avoidance culture -.17** .06  
    
   Aggressive/defensive style sub-dimensions   .09** 
Oppositional culture -.12* .06  
Power culture -.04 .07  
Competitive culture -.07 .07  
Perfectionistic culture .10 .06  
Note:p≤.05, **p ≤ .01. = non-standardized regression coefficients; SE = 
standard error. 
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Table 30. Results of the regression analyses for predicting Safety Participation in 
Time 2. 
Predictors in Time 1  SE R
2
 
SCEQ dimensions   .12** 
Daily activities and behaviors .13 .09  
Human Resources Practices -.01 .07  
Strategic decisions .14* .08  
    
OCI dimensions   .04 
Constructive Style .14* .06  
Passive/defensive style .03 .07  
Aggressive/defensive style -.05 .07  
    
OCI sub-dimensions    
Constructive style sub-dimensions   .06 
Humanistic-encouraging culture .13 .10  
Affiliative culture -.05 .10  
Achievement culture .02 .08  
Self-actualizing culture .08 .09  
    
Passive/defensive style sub-dimensions   .09** 
Approval culture .03 .06  
Conventional culture .21** .07  
Dependent culture -.06 .08  
Avoidance culture -.20** .06  
    
   Aggressive/defensive style sub-dimensions   .11** 
Oppositional culture -.19** .07  
Power culture .04 .08  
Competitive culture -.08 .08  
Perfectionistic culture .12 .07  
Note:p≤.05, **p ≤ .01. = non-standardized regression coefficients; SE = 
standard error. 
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Table 31. Results of the regression analyses for predicting Risky Behaviors in 
Time 2. 
Predictors in Time 1  SE R
2
 
SCEQ dimensions   .06* 
Daily activities and behaviors -.02 .07  
Human Resources Practices -.07 .05  
Strategic decisions -.05 .06  
    
OCI dimensions   .09** 
Constructive Style -.08* .04  
Passive/defensive style .02 .05  
Aggressive/defensive style .11* .05  
    
OCI sub-dimensions    
Constructive style sub-dimensions   .09** 
Humanistic-encouraging culture -.05 .07  
Affiliative culture -.05 .07  
Achievement culture .07 .06  
Self-actualizing culture -.10 .06  
    
Passive/defensive style sub-dimensions   .06* 
Approval culture -.02 .05  
Conventional culture -.01 .05  
Dependent culture .03 .06  
Avoidance culture .12** .05  
    
   Aggressive/defensive style sub-dimensions   .07* 
Oppositional culture .05 .05  
Power culture .13* .06  
Competitive culture -.06 .06  
Perfectionistic culture .02 .05  
Note:p≤.05, **p ≤ .01. = non-standardized regression coefficients; SE = 
standard error. 
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8.8. DISCUSSION 
The Safety Culture Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ) and the Organizational 
Culture Inventory (OCI) were studied and compared on the basis of answers given 
by the workers of an NPP in 2008 and 2011. 
Summary and discussion of the results 
Reliability. Internal consistency of the three OCI dimensions (cultural styles) 
was found. However, reliability analyses detected two OCI cultural norms (sub-
dimensions) and seven problematic items that did not meet the established criteria 
for reliability acceptance. As part of the validation of the OCI questionnaire, these 
items were left out, and further analyses in this paper were performed with a 113-
item version of the OCI, which showed substantially improved psychometric 
properties. On the other hand, internal consistency of the 21 items and the three 
dimensions of the SCEQ was found. However, it should be noted that the SCEQ 
already went through a validation process in 2017, where three of the original 24 
items were found to contribute to reliability weaknesses and, therefore, dropped 
from the questionnaire (López de Castro et al., 2017). In conclusion, results 
obtained in our sample suggest that the SCEQ is slightly stronger than the Spanish 
version of the OCI, as it stands now, in terms of reliability. 
Evidence of validity based on the analysis of the internal structure. Empirical 
support for the three-factor structure (corresponding to the Constructive, 
Passive/defensive, and Aggressive/defensive styles or dimensions of the OCI) and 
the 12-factor structure (corresponding to the 12 cultural norms or sub-dimensions 
of the OCI) of the OCI was found. In addition, the internal structure of each of the 
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three OCI styles was individually analyzed and supported. Analyses to gather 
evidence of validity based on the internal structure of the SCEQ are not included 
in this manuscript because they were previously performed with the same sample 
(2008) in López de Castro et al. (2017), where the three-factor structure of the 
SCEQ and its underlying theoretical model were empirically supported. In 
conclusion, both the OCI and the SCEQ showed solid internal structures, which, 
at the same time, validates their underlying organizational culture and safety 
culture models. 
Evidence of validity of the OCI and the SCEQ based on their relationships 
with safety culture outcomes (Group safety climate, Organizational safety climate, 
Safety satisfaction, Job satisfaction) (transversal study).  
1) Insights into the relationships between the OCI styles, the SCEQ 
dimensions, and the four safety culture outcomes. The Constructive style played 
the main role in the analyses carried out with the OCI. The Constructive style 
correlated moderately with all four safety culture outcomes, whereas correlations 
between the other two OCI styles and the safety culture outcomes were low. 
Moreover, each of the four sub-dimensions of the Constructive style also 
correlated moderately with each of the four safety culture outcomes. However, 
most of the correlations between the sub-dimensions of the Aggressive/defensive 
style and the safety culture outcomes were low and significant, and most of the 
correlations between the sub-dimensions of the Passive/Defensive style and the 
safety culture outcomes were not significant. In addition, the Constructive style 
and its four cultural norms were found to correlate moderately and positively with 
each of the SCEQ dimensions, whereas the defensive styles did not present a 
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relationship with the SCEQ dimensions, and some of its cultural norms had a low 
correlation with the SCEQ dimensions. These results suggest that organizations 
characterized by the Constructive style will have a more positive safety culture 
and safety climate, and its employees will be more satisfied with the company, the 
unit of work, the work itself, and the organizational safety. This agrees with the 
theoretical propositions behind the OCI, which posit that the Constructive style is 
associated with positive and desired aspects and outcomes of the organization and 
its employees. However, this theory also proposes that organizations with 
defensive styles result in negative and unwanted aspects and outcomes for the 
organization and its employees. Thus, a higher correlation (negative in this case) 
between the two defensive styles (and their corresponding cultural norms) and the 
safety culture outcomes criteria, and between the two defensive styles (and their 
corresponding cultural norms) and the SCEQ dimensions, would have been 
expected. The results obtained may be due to the fact that safety-oriented 
organizations, such as the NPP studied in the present work, must be characterized 
by a prominent Constructive style, but they may also benefit from the presence of 
some degree of defensive cultural styles, as reported by García-Herrero et al. 
(2013). Regarding the correlations presented by the SCEQ, in addition to their 
relationships with the Constructive style and its norms, the three SCEQ 
dimensions were highly and positively correlated with the four safety culture 
outcomes. These results also supports that a positive safety culture will be 
reflected in the employees‘ safety climate perceptions, and in their satisfaction 
with their company, their unit of work, their work itself, and the safety of their 
organization.  
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2) Insights into the relationships between the OCI cultural norms, the SCEQ
dimensions, and four safety culture outcomes. Analyzing the four Constructive
norms, as expected, supportive and constructive organizations (Humanistic-
encouraging culture) that are concerned about the interpersonal relationships and
satisfaction of their employees (Afﬁliative culture), and not only value
accomplishing organizational and individual goals with enthusiasm (Achievement
culture), but also individual growth and quality over quantity work (Self -
actualizing culture), showed a positive relationship with employees‘ satisfaction at
work, with the perception of a safer work context, and with safety climate and
safety culture. In a Self-actualizing culture (which positively correlated with the
four safety culture outcomes and the SCEQ, like the rest of the Constructive
norms), creativity is highly valued (as seen in items such as ―think in unique and
independent ways" or "communicate ideas"). Although creativity is not always
looked upon favorably in NPPs(Klein et al., 1995), it is very important to find safe
solutions to unexpected circumstances and unpredictable events for which
procedures, protocols, and preferred actions are not established or are of no use.
However, creativity is also a requirement in order to anticipate (more expected)
scenarios where something could potentially fail, and develop effective strategies
to address these possible future situations beforehand. Creativity can therefore
help HROs to use mindful organizing. According to Weick and Sutcliffe (2007),
mindful organizing serves to maintain resilience during both unexpected and
expected events through anticipation and containment. Other research findings
suggest that NPPs with Constructive norms perform better under emergency
conditions than those with more defensive norms (Shurberg and Haber, 1992).
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Analyzing the low correlations presented by the defensive styles in greater detail, 
the Avoidance culture is found to be the only Passive/defensive cultural norm that 
showed a relationship with the four safety culture outcomes and the dimensions of 
the SCEQ (specifically with the dimensions ―Human Resources practices driving 
safety‖ and ―Strategic decisions ensuring safety‖). As expected, the correlations 
showed a negative sign. An avoidance culture is characterized by punishing 
employees for the mistakes they make, leading them to shift responsibilities to 
others. An avoidance culture is described as producing fear and lack of trust 
between employees, which could explain the negative correlation between this 
cultural norm and employees‘ satisfaction with their company, unit of work and, 
the work itself. On the other hand, the nuclear industry is aware that NPPs must 
be managed under ‗no blame‘ principles and that members must feel free to report 
mistakes (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997; Reason, 1998). Fear averts the identification 
and analysis of critical events and inhibits organizational learning (Catino and 
Albolino, 2007), both requirements to guarantee safety in NPPs. This may be one 
reason that the avoidance cultural norm correlated negatively with safety climate, 
safety culture, and safety satisfaction. The Dependent cultural norm correlated 
negatively with Safety satisfaction and Job satisfaction, although it did not present 
any relationship with the safety climate variables or the safety culture dimensions. 
A dependent culture describes hierarchically controlled organizations where 
employees only do what they are told, and where own-decisions and creativity are 
generally not accepted. Thus, the results obtained suggest that employees working 
under such constraints are not satisfied with their work and with the safety of the 
organization. On the other hand, the fact that this cultural norm does not present 
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any relationship with safety climate or safety culture may be explained by the
nature of NPPs. They present hierarchical structures and are governed by clear
and rigid procedures and processes, but at the same time they need to leave a
certain degree of flexibility and autonomy to react to the unexpected and
unwritten (Haber and Shurberg, 1993a), as mentioned above. The Oppositional
and Competitive cultural norms correlated negatively with both satisfaction and
safety climate variables, as well as with all the SCEQ dimensions. An
oppositional culture characterizes organizations in which confrontation prevails
and employees are reinforced for opposing the ideas of others. In a competitive
culture, members are reinforced for outperforming one another and working
against their peers. These two Aggressive/defensive cultural norms may lead to
strained and poor relations among employees, which contributes to low
satisfaction with their company, teams, and work, and to the perception of a non-
supportive unsafe work context. On the other hand, close collaboration and
criticism (but constructive) are essential to increasing employees‘ knowledge and
expertise about safe plant operations. This could be one reason the Oppositional
and Competitive cultural norms presented a negative relationship with safety
climate and safety culture in our study. The Perfectionistic culture was also found
to be related to both satisfaction and safety climate variables, as well as to SCEQ
dimensions. However, it was the only defensive cultural norm that correlated
positively with the safety culture outcomes and with safety culture. Perfectionistic
cultures describe organizations that strive to do things perfectly and without
mistakes, and anything necessary to accomplish organizational goals. The scale
measures the value placed on persistence, hard work, and perfectionism (Haber
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and Shurberg (1996). It is in the nature of safe HROs to seek perfection and work 
hard to achieve safety goals. Thus, the results obtained suggest that employees of 
HROs with positive safety cultures and safety climates also perceive that they are 
required to work in a perfectionistic manner. Along these lines, Haber and 
Shurberg (1996) also found that nuclear organizations scored higher than non-
nuclear organizations on the Perfectionistic cultural scale of the OCI. In 
conclusion, the expected pattern of relationships among the OCI, the SCEQ, and 
the safety culture outcomes was confirmed to a large extent, providing another 
source of evidence of the validity of the scales under study.  
Evidence of validity based on the predictive power of the OCI and the SCEQ 
(longitudinal study). Safety compliance was predicted by one of the three 
dimensions of the OCI (Constructive style) and by one of the three dimensions of 
the SCEQ (Strategic decisions ensuring safety). The SCEQ questionnaire 
explained a slightly higher percentage of the variance in safety compliance than 
the OCI questionnaire. Safety participation was also predicted by one of the three 
dimensions of the OCI (Constructive style) and by one of the three dimensions of 
the SCEQ (Strategic decisions ensuring safety). In this case, the SCEQ 
questionnaire explained a much higher percentage of the variance in safety 
participation than the OCI questionnaire. Risky behavior was predicted by two of 
the three dimensions of the OCI (Constructive style and Aggressive/defensive 
style) and by none of the dimensions of the SCEQ. The SCEQ questionnaire 
explained a slightly lower percentage of the variance in Risky behaviors than the 
OCI questionnaire. Studying the predictive power of the OCI at a sub-dimensional 
level, each of the three safety performance indicators was predicted by two of 12 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE OR SAFETY CULTURE ASSESSMENT?
340 
 
cultural norms. Surprisingly, although the Constructive style was the OCI 
dimension that showed the strongest power to predict safety performance, none of 
the four cultural norms of the Constructive style was able to predict safety 
performance. This result could be explained by the high inter-correlations among 
the variables of the Constructive style. The predictive power of the cultural norms 
(sub-dimensions) of the OCI could not be compared to the SCEQ because the 
three dimensions of the SCEQ are not further divided into sub-dimensions. In 
conclusion, evidence was provided of the validity of the SCEQ and OCI based on 
their power to predict safety performance. Results suggest a similar power of the 
OCI and SCEQ to predict Safety compliance, whereas it seems more appropriate 
to use the OCI to predict Risky behaviors and the SCEQ to predict Safety 
participation.  
Practical implications and contributions 
In light of the results of the studies, the present paper has served to initially 
validate the OCI and further validate the SCEQ in the Spanish nuclear industry. 
This validation process has given rise to several practical implications and 
contributions to HROs and, in particular, to the nuclear industry.  
Reliability implications in the use of the OCI. The process of validating the 
Spanish version of the OCI revealed that the psychometric properties of the 
original 120-item version substantially improved in our sample when seven of 
these items were removed from the questionnaire. Specifically, the reliability 
analyses did not provide enough support for the original 120-item version. 
Reliability refers to the degree to which questionnaire scores are unaffected by 
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measurement error; that is, reliability is concerned with accuracy. Thus, our 
results suggest that using the Spanish original 120-item version of the OCI may 
not guarantee that the individual score differences obtained are due to ‗true‘ 
differences in the constructs being assessed by the OCI. Should this be the case, 
some of the results obtained from the application of the OCI could be 
misinterpreted and, ultimately, lead to wrong corrective actions in the nuclear 
industry. 
Proposed OCI cultural constellation for NPPs. Results from the transversal
and longitudinal studies presented propose a preferred OCI cultural constellation
for NPPs. This constellation may help practitioners interpret the extent to which
the culture of their organizations ensures the safety of operations. Three
arguments are given in this regard: a) If we only look at the predictive power of
the OCI and analyze its dimensions and sub-dimensions that show power to
predict safety performance, the results suggest that NPPs that want to optimize
safety performance and safety outcomes (like the rate of accidents) should be
characterized by the Constructive style instead of the defensive styles.
Particularly, they should not be marked by the Aggressive/defensive style. At a
cultural norm level, these NPPs should not have the presence of Avoidance,
Oppositional and Power cultural norms; b) the correlations (not predictions) found
in this paper suggest the importance of having some degree of Perfectionistic
culture. As explained above, it is in the nature of safe HROs to seek perfection,
and other authors have also found a prominence of the Perfectionistic cultural
norm in nuclear organizations (Haber and Shurberg, 1996); c) the correlations
found between the OCI and the SCEQ indicate that the Constructive style is the
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OCI style that provides the most information about the safety culture of an
organization. In this regard, OCI-Ideal surveys
10
 administered in other NPPs and
HROs have been found to consistently produce ideal culture profiles that are
predominantly Constructive (Cooke and Szumal, 2000). More specifically, Haber
and Shurberg (1996) found that nuclear organizations, compared to non-nuclear
organizations, tend to score higher on the Constructive cultural norms, lower on
the Passive Defensive style, and more or less the same on the
Aggressive/Defensive style. Furthermore, García-Herrero et al. (2013) found that
the Constructive Style and its norms have the greatest inﬂuence on the safety
culture, whereas the defensive styles do not show clear relationships with safety
culture. One  explanation  might  be  found  in  the  conclusions  of  Brooks  (2012
p. 5), who argued that the contents of the Constructive style are ―absolutely in
alignment with those attributes and principles that contribute to a strong nuclear
safety culture, clearly articulated by IAEA, INPO and WANO‖.
The SCEQ or the OCI? Safety culture or organizational culture assessment? 
In our opinion, based on the presented results, it cannot be concluded that the OCI 
or the SCEQ is more adequate for HROs, or for NPPs in particular. If the results 
of this paper are extrapolated, a clear recommendation to lean toward the use of 
organizational culture assessment tools or safety culture assessment tools in HROs 
cannot be provided. However, as suggested by the hierarchical regression model 
presented in section 7.2., the use of both approaches at the same time to predict 
safety performance should offer better results than the single application of an 
                                                          
10
The OCI-Ideal is a complement to the traditional form of the OCI that aims to identify the 
optimal or preferred culture for the organization under study. It assesses the behaviours that 
leaders and other members believe should be expected to maximize effectiveness and enable the 
organization to reach its goals (Human Synergistics International website). 
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organizational culture questionnaire or a safety culture questionnaire separately. If 
a decision has to be made and only one questionnaire can be applied, two 
arguments can be made in favor of the OCI or the SCEQ. In favor of the OCI, it 
could be argued that its power to predict risky behaviors could be more 
determinant for the nuclear industry than the stronger power of the SCEQ to 
predict Safety participation. As explained in this paper, Risky behaviors refer to 
behaviors that have the potential to cause adverse consequences for safety (―I 
ignore safety regulations to get the job done‖; ―I take shortcuts that involve little 
or no risk‖). On the other hand, Safety participation refers to behaviors that, 
although not contributing directly to an individual‘s personal safety, are beneficial 
for a work environment supporting safety (―I promote the safety program within 
the organization‖; ―I make extra effort to improve safety in the workplace‖; and ―I 
voluntarily carry out tasks or activities that help to improve workplace safety‖). 
Thus, the absence of Safety participation behaviors and a proactive attitude to 
safety in the organization could also lead to negative safety outcomes. However, 
to our knowledge, whether Safety behaviors or Safety participation has a stronger 
influence on organizational safety outcomes has not yet been empirically studied. 
Two points are highlighted in favor of the SCEQ. First, the 21-item SCEQ 
questionnaire presented better psychometric properties than the original 120-item 
and suggested 113-item versions of the OCI. Second, it could be argued that, all 
else being equal, short questionnaires offer more advantages than long 
questionnaires: a) Shorter questionnaires are less time-consuming, and, therefore, 
organizations may be less reluctant to administer them often to monitor safety 
culture. Frequent monitoring in NPPs is extremely important for the early 
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detection of declining and weakening safety cultures (IAEA, 2006a), allowing 
time to take remedial action before minimum acceptable safety levels are 
challenged (IAEA, 2003). Moreover, systematic monitoring by comparing 
quantiﬁed results at different times makes it possible to detect trends (Hale, 2009; 
Håvold, 2005; IAEA, 2003) and evaluate the evolution of safety culture; b) When 
studying the effects of questionnaire length on the response rate, a number of 
authors have found better response rates for shorter questionnaires (Roszkowski 
and Bean, 1990; Sahlqvist, Song, Bull, Adams, Preston and Ogilvie, 2011). We 
could not show that questionnaire length affects non-response because both 
questionnaires were administered together as a part of a larger battery of 
questionnaires.  
Limitations and future research 
Although theoretical insights and practical implications for the use of the 
SCEQ and OCI have been provided, this paper has not elaborated on single items 
on the questionnaires. Such an analysis was beyond the scope of this paper and 
not practical in terms of the extension required. However, we strongly recommend 
performing a detail analysis of the answers to the questionnaires at an item level, 
especially when the questionnaires are used to take possible actions in the 
organization. This recommendation is also given by García-Herrero et al. (2013). 
As an example, they identified items from the Oppositional cultural norm of the 
OCI that have a direct positive influence on the safety (culture) of the 
organization (e.g., ―pointing out ﬂaws‖; ―adopting an impartial and completely 
objective attitude‖; ―looking for errors‖) and other items from the same cultural 
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norm that have an adverse influence (e.g., ―remaining on the sidelines‖; ―refusing 
criticism‖).  
We encourage the nuclear community to contribute to the empirical 
validation and understanding of the predictive capabilities of the OCI and the 
SCEQ for the nuclear industry. The empirical studies presented in this paper could 
be replicated to determine whether our results are consistent across different 
samples and NPPs. In particular, researchers and practitioners are encouraged to 
gather further evidence to support the reliability of the OCI (especially the 
Spanish version) scores in order to maximize its usefulness in practical settings. 
Future studies could replicate the validation process carried out in this paper to 
find out whether the seven ‗problematic‘ items also show poor psychometric 
properties in other Spanish samples, or even in samples where the OCI is 
administered in other languages. Furthermore, future studies could also compare 
other organizational culture questionnaires to other domain-specific (e.g., safety, 
innovation, quality, customer service) culture questionnaires in order to gain 
insights into the suitability of general-purpose and domain-specific approaches to 
ensure the accomplishment of priority organizational goals (e.g., safety, 
innovation, quality, customer service). 
 
  
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE OR SAFETY CULTURE ASSESSMENT?
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This page intentionally left blank
 CAPÍTULO IX.        
DISCUSIÓN GENERAL 
  
 
 
 
 
  This page intentionally left blank
349 
 
En este capítulo, en primer lugar, se resumen los principales resultados 
obtenidos en cada uno de los estudios realizados. En segundo lugar, se discuten 
las principales contribuciones e implicaciones que de esta tesis se derivan. 
Seguidamente, se concreta el ámbito de aplicación y posibilidades de 
generalización de los estudios realizados. El cuarto apartado acota a nivel global 
el alcance de la evidencia empírica obtenida. Finalmente se sugieren futuras líneas 
de investigación relacionadas con esta tesis en el campo de la cultura de 
seguridad.  
9.1. Resumen de resultados 
En este apartado resumimos los resultados principales obtenidos en los 
estudios de la presente tesis, que han satisfecho las motivaciones que llevaron a 
realizarlos y los objetivos propuestos.  
9.1.1. Resultados principales obtenidos en la introducción de la tesis 
Por una parte, el análisis de 40 de las definiciones de cultura de seguridad 
más influyentes en HROs hizo evidente la patente falta de acuerdo entre expertos 
en la materia sobre el significado del constructo. El número encontrado de 
interpretaciones del concepto fue tan amplio como se esperaba. Cada una de las 
definiciones ofreció un número de elementos que concretan la naturaleza del 
constructo. El análisis de las definiciones permitió resumir en 10 puntos el 
acuerdo alcanzado sobre la naturaleza de cultura de seguridad en los últimos 30 
años: la cultura de seguridad hace referencia a una prioridad máxima concedida a 
la seguridad; está integrada en las asunciones, valores, creencias, y normas de los 
miembros de la organización; se manifiesta en políticas, prácticas, y 
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procedimientos organizacionales, así como en las actitudes, percepciones, y 
comportamientos de estos miembros; debe ser compartida por todos los miembros 
de la organización; es estable y duradera; requiere el compromiso y 
responsabilidad de todos los miembros de la organización hacia la seguridad; 
determina el desempeño de seguridad de la organización; los líderes desempeñan 
un rol importante en la canalización de la cultura de seguridad; la 
formación/aprendizaje y los sistemas de recompensas juegan un papel 
determinante en la cultura de seguridad; y finalmente, el objetivo de la cultura de 
seguridad es fomentar y garantizar la seguridad en la organización, protegiendo 
así a los trabajadores, público, y medio ambiente de riesgos, accidentes y 
enfermedades. La integración de los contenidos identificados permitió ofrecer una 
definición que se ofrece a investigadores y HROs como marco de comprensión de 
cultura de seguridad:  
―Safety culture is an enduring and high value priority for safety, embedded in 
the assumptions, values, beliefs, and norms shared by organizational members 
and manifested in the organizational policies, procedures and practices and in the 
members’ attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors at work, that determines 
organizational safety performance and serves to protect the workers, public, and 
environment from risks, accidents, and illnesses.‖ 
Por otra parte, el análisis de 20 de los cuestionarios más reconocidos de 
cultura de seguridad puso de manifiesto la falta de consenso entre expertos en la 
materia sobre la dimensionalidad del constructo. El análisis de los cuestionarios 
mostró cómo el contenido de la cultura de seguridad se ha desglosado para poder 
ser medido a través de cuestionarios y permitió la identificación de las 30 
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dimensiones más utilizadas para este propósito. Tres de las cuatro dimensiones 
más utilizadas en los cuestionarios que analizamos (gestión/supervisión, 
formación y riesgo) habían sido también identificadas previamente por Flin y 
cols., (2000) y Guldenmund (2000) en sus revisiones de cuestionarios como 
contenidos utilizados más comúnmente.  
9.1.2. Resultados principales obtenidos en el Estudio 1 
En el Estudio 1 se investigó la dimensionalidad del modelo de cultura de 
seguridad de la IAEA, así como las propiedades psicométricas de los atributos del 
modelo, a través de tres estudios empíricos independientes y complementarios con 
tres muestras distintas. Los resultados obtenidos sugirieron que la mayoría de los 
37 atributos del modelo no están relacionados con las dimensiones de cultura de 
seguridad de las que, de acuerdo con la propuesta de la IAEA, deberían de formar 
parte. Es decir, nuestros resultados sugieren que la mayoría de los atributos no 
miden las dimensiones que deberían medir. Por otro lado, los resultados 
sugirieron que el modelo de IAEA podría ser unidimensional en vez de estar 
formado por las cinco dimensiones que la IAEA propone. Adicionalmente, los 
resultados sugirieron que el modelo tiene una validez de contenido moderada y 
una validez aparente baja. 
9.1.3. Resultados principales obtenidos en el Estudio 2 
En el Estudio 2 se presentó y validó nuestro cuestionario de cultura de 
seguridad (el SCEQ) y el modelo tridimensional de cultura de seguridad en que 
éste se sustenta a través de dos estudios. Un primer estudio con la muestra de 
2008 permitió explorar la estructura interna del cuestionario y conllevó la 
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eliminación de tres ítems de los 24 originales. Los análisis de fiabilidad, a nivel de
ítems y de dimensiones, apoyaron la fiabilidad de la versión final de 21 ítems del
SCEQ. Un segundo estudio con la muestra de 2014 confirmó la estructura de tres
dimensiones propuesta en el modelo tridimensional que sustenta el SCEQ
decisiones  estratégicas que garantizan la seguridad (strategic decisions ensuring
safety), prácticas de gestión de recursos humanos que impulsan la seguridad
(human resources practices driving safety), y comportamientos y actividades del
día a día en apoyo de la seguridad (daily activities and behaviors supporting
safety), lo que contribuyó a la validación tanto del cuestionario como del modelo.
Por otro lado, se confirmaron las relaciones esperadas entre el SCEQ y cuatro
resultados de la cultura de seguridad (clima de seguridad, satisfacción con la
seguridad, satisfacción con el trabajo, y comportamientos arriesgados).
Adicionalmente, se obtuvieron evidencias de validez discriminante entre el SCEQ
y clima de seguridad.
9.1.4. Resultados principales obtenidos en el Estudio 3 
En el Estudio 3 se analizaron y compararon el SCEQ y el OCI a través de un 
estudio transversal y de un estudio longitudinal con la finalidad de arrojar luz 
sobre la utilidad de ambos en las HROs y, en consecuencia, de herramientas de 
medición específicas (como es un cuestionario de cultura de seguridad) y 
generales (como es un cuestionario de cultura organizacional). Se encontraron 
mayores evidencias de fiabilidad de las puntuaciones del SCEQ que de las del 
OCI. Como parte del proceso de validación de la versión española del OCI, se 
eliminaron siete ítems de los 120 de la escala original debido a las bajas 
correlaciones corregidas que mostraron con sus escalas correspondientes, lo que 
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mejoró la fiabilidad de las dimensiones y sub-dimensiones del cuestionario y las 
propiedades psicométricas de los ítems. En el resto de análisis se trabajó con la 
versión mejorada de 113 ítems. Los resultados apoyaron la estructura interna de la 
versión española del OCI, lo que contribuyó a su validación y a la validación del 
modelo teórico en que se sustenta. Por otro lado, se confirmaron las relaciones 
esperadas entre el OCI, el SCEQ y los resultados de cultura de seguridad 
investigados (clima de seguridad organizacional, clima de seguridad grupal, 
satisfacción con la seguridad, y satisfacción con el trabajo). Se obtuvieron 
evidencias de validez basadas en el poder del OCI y del SCEQ para predecir, de 
forma conjunta o por separado, tres indicadores de desempeño de seguridad. En 
concreto, los resultados sugirieron que el OCI podría ser más útil para predecir 
comportamientos arriesgados, el SCEQ para medir participación en seguridad, y 
ambos cuestionarios predecirían de forma similar el cumplimiento de la 
seguridad. Adicionalmente, los resultados favorecieron la utilización conjunta de 
ambos cuestionarios para predecir desempeño de seguridad. Finalmente, en base a 
las evidencias de validación obtenidas y a estudios previos sobre el OCI, se 
propuso que las centrales nucleares deberían estar marcadas predominantemente 
por un estilo cultural ‗constructivo‘, cierta presencia de la norma cultural 
‗perfeccionista‘, y evitar las normas culturales de ‗evitación‘, ‗oposición‘ y 
‗poder‘. 
9.2. Contribuciones e implicaciones de la tesis 
La presente tesis doctoral se postula como una referencia para aquellos 
investigadores y profesionales interesados en la medición de cultura de seguridad 
en HROs. La contribuciones principales de esta tesis son la clarificación del 
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constructo de cultura de seguridad y, principalmente, el avance en medidas 
cuantitativas de cultura de seguridad. Por un lado, esta tesis pretende contribuir a 
la clarificación del significado y dimensionalidad del concepto de cultura de 
seguridad, demandada por investigadores, organismos reguladores y profesionales 
de las HROs, centralizando el conocimiento aportado y compartido por expertos 
en la materia, y ofreciéndose como una guía y/o punto de partida sobre el que 
aunar el esfuerzo generado por unos y otros para su comprensión. Por otro lado, 
esta tesis recuerda a la comunidad científica y, sobre todo, pretende sensibilizar y 
alertar a los profesionales y organismos reguladores de las HROs, de la necesidad 
de contar con modelos y herramientas de medición que permitan obtener 
información crítica sobre la cultura de seguridad de la organización, y de la 
importancia teórico-práctica de validar empíricamente aquellos modelos y 
herramientas de medición, de los cuales se puedan derivar decisiones que tengan 
un impacto en la seguridad de las organizaciones. Estos son los dos pilares sobre 
los que asientan las principales contribuciones de nuestra tesis.  
Los principales investigadores en cultura de seguridad han mostrado tener 
formas de entender la cultura de seguridad que difieren en mayor o menor medida. 
Esto es sin duda enriquecedor por las posibilidades que puede ofrecer trabajar con 
cultura de seguridad, sin embargo, una comprensión y definición comúnmente 
aceptada serviría como punto de referencia para guiar los esfuerzos de 
investigación sobre el constructo. Como expone Guldenmund, destacando la 
necesidad de una definición compartida de cultura de seguridad, ―la definición de 
un constructo prepara el terreno para su subsiguiente investigación, esto es, es la 
base de las hipótesis, paradigmas de investigación e interpretación de los 
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resultados. Demarca las fronteras del concepto y enfoca la investigación‖ (2000, 
p. 227). Partiendo de la propuesta de que la base para la creación de esta 
definición de referencia requiere aunar el conocimiento compartido del concepto 
por los expertos en la materia, la definición propuesta en esta tesis reúne los 
elementos más comunes de las definiciones ofrecidas hasta ahora y refleja en 
pocas palabras el acuerdo conseguido durante los últimos 30 años. Esta definición 
se ofrece, por tanto, como marco común para la comprensión de la cultura de 
seguridad y de trampolín para aunar los esfuerzos para su medición, gestión y 
optimización. 
La creación de cuestionarios para medir cultura de seguridad ha seguido 
distintos cursos. Algunos cuestionarios se han sustentado en modelos teóricos 
previos (de cultura de seguridad y cultura organizacional, principalmente) (Chinda 
y Mohamed, 2008; Díaz-Cabrera y cols., 2007; Filho y cols., 2010; Gordon y 
cols., 2007; Kao y cols., 2007; Schöbel y cols., 2017) o se han desarrollado de 
forma paralela a los modelos en que se sustentan (Grote y Kunzler, 2000; López 
de Castro y cols., 2017). Generalmente, este curso de acción utiliza las 
dimensiones o bloques de contenido de los modelos teóricos como dimensiones 
de cultura de seguridad donde poder operacionalizar el constructo. Otro curso de 
acción, más utilizado en el desarrollo de cuestionarios de medición de cultura de 
seguridad, es la identificación de ítems que puedan proporcionar información 
sobre el papel de la seguridad en la organización, y la posterior agrupación de 
estos ítems a través de AFCs o ACPs en dimensiones referidas por sus autores 
como dimensiones de cultura de seguridad. Nuestra presentación y análisis de 
cuestionarios puede servir de utilidad para aquellos investigadores que deseen 
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proceder de cualquiera de las dos formas en el desarrollo de futuros cuestionarios 
en HROs. Si se opta por construir un cuestionario partiendo de las dimensiones, 
las dimensiones de cultura de seguridad identificadas como más comunes en los 
cuestionarios revisados, podrían servir como dimensiones de futuros 
cuestionarios, como bloques de contenido que permitan posteriormente 
operacionalizar el constructo de cultura de seguridad. Si el curso elegido es la 
construcción del cuestionario partiendo de los ítems, las 180 dimensiones 
identificadas en los 20 cuestionarios pueden servir de guía para la asignación de 
etiquetas a las dimensiones que emerjan de los EFAs o PCAs aplicados. En ambos 
cursos de acción (partiendo desde las dimensiones o desde los ítems), los 
cuestionarios presentados podrían servir de referencia para escoger ítems (críticos 
para la seguridad de la organización) para la construcción de cuestionarios. En 
todo caso, se destaca que la finalidad de este estudio de comparación no es alentar 
la creación de numerosos nuevos cuestionarios, sino mostrar el alcance y grado de 
acuerdo de los cuestionarios de cultura de seguridad existentes.  
Sin embargo, a pesar de la utilidad de la medición de cultura de seguridad a 
través sus dimensiones, la medición del constructo no requiere forzosamente 
trabajar con sus dimensiones. Los investigadores de la presente tesis entienden 
que la presencia de una cultura de seguridad requiere que la seguridad esté 
presente en todo lo que la organización hace y en cómo lo hace. Partiendo de esta 
premisa, sería posible que los dos acercamientos previamente expuestos en la 
creación de cuestionarios de cultura de seguridad estuviesen dejando escapar 
elementos críticos donde el valor de la seguridad pueda y deba ponerse en 
práctica. De acuerdo con esta posibilidad, proponemos un cuestionario de cultura 
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de seguridad, que no busca las supuestas dimensiones de cultura de seguridad, 
sino que quiere evaluar en qué medida los valores de una organización (en 
concreto, la seguridad) se plasman en las actuaciones fundamentales de las 
organizaciones. Como exponemos en nuestra definición de cultura de seguridad, y 
en línea con la comprensión de la IAEA (2006) del concepto, la cultura de 
seguridad hace referencia a que la seguridad es un valor en acción, el valor más 
importante, una prioridad innegociable, que por lo tanto debe inspirar, influir e 
impregnar día a día las actuaciones de las organizaciones. Éste es uno de los dos 
pilares de nuestro cuestionario (el SCEQ), cuyas dimensiones no son facetas de 
cultura de seguridad, sino conjuntos de actuaciones fundamentales en el 
funcionamiento de las organizaciones alrededor de los cuales la cultura de 
seguridad se construye, se pone en práctica y se cristaliza. Se destaca que, a pesar 
de no estar formado por dimensiones de cultura de seguridad, el modelo que 
respalda el SCEQ se ha conceptualizado como un modelo de cultura de seguridad, 
debido al contexto en que ha sido creado y por su capacidad para recabar 
información sobre la cultura de seguridad en HROs. 
La presente tesis muestra, por tanto, como la evaluación de cultura de 
seguridad puede también beneficiarse de estrategias de medición que, en línea con 
nuestro modelo y cuestionario, en lugar de basarse en supuestas dimensiones de 
cultura de seguridad, se nutren de modelos organizacionales más generales, cuyos 
elementos puedan permitir identificar áreas del funcionamiento de las 
organizaciones donde es imprescindible que el valor prioritario de la seguridad se 
haga realidad.  
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Pero no menos importante, la identificación y medición de estos elementos 
fundamentales para la seguridad deben ser complementadas por estrategias que 
permitan evaluar el valor real de la seguridad en ellos en la organización bajo 
estudio. La medición de cultura de seguridad a través de herramientas 
cuantitativas se ha focalizado en recabar información de las mencionadas 
dimensiones o facetas de cultura de seguridad, principalmente a través de las 
percepciones de los trabajadores. Sin embargo, este enfoque no ha contribuido a 
que los cuestionarios aplicados en HROs puedan sobrepasar los niveles más 
superficiales de cultura, siendo los niveles más profundos los que determinan en 
mayor medida el funcionamiento de la organización y su desempeño de seguridad. 
Por tanto, maximizar la utilidad y el valor diagnóstico de un cuestionario de 
cultura de seguridad, requiere estrategias que le permitan acercarse lo más posible 
a los niveles más profundos de cultura. Éste es el otro pilar del SCEQ, que ha 
incorporado estrategias para alcanzar el nivel de los valores en acción, y se ofrece 
a las HROs como una herramienta que, sin ser cualitativa, ofrece mayores 
garantías de medición de la cultura de seguridad real (no teórica o deseada) de las 
organizaciones.  
Otro tema importante es el enfoque escogido a la hora de estudiar cultura de 
seguridad. El SCEQ y el modelo de la IAEA, por ejemplo, abordan el estudio de 
cultura de seguridad de forma directa e inmediata. Sin embargo, hay otro enfoque 
(distal) que entiende que la cultura de seguridad es parte de una cultura 
organizacional más amplia, y que estudiando esta última, podemos también 
obtener información sobre la cultura de seguridad, o sobre la importancia de la 
seguridad en la cultura de la organización o del grupo bajo estudio. Sin embargo, 
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apenas se encuentra evidencia empírica en la literatura sobre cuál de estos dos 
enfoques debería ser preferido en las HROs. La presente tesis profundiza en la 
utilidad de ambos enfoques, demostrado que una herramienta de medición de 
cultura organizacional también puede ofrecer información sobre la cultura de 
seguridad y sobre el futuro desempeño de seguridad de las HROs. Esto a su vez 
retroalimenta la propuesta de que modelos más generales (no basados en 
dimensiones de cultura de seguridad) pueden ser apropiados para la medición de 
cultura de seguridad.  
Pero siempre y en todo lugar, además de que los modelos y cuestionarios 
utilizados deben ofrecer el mayor potencial para la medición de cultura de 
seguridad, estos deben también contar con el mayor respaldo empírico posible. La 
utilización de modelos y cuestionarios, que no cuentan con apoyo empírico, puede 
llevar a investigadores a construir nuevo conocimiento sobre premisas teóricas 
que no se corresponden en la praxis con el funcionamiento y las relaciones de los 
constructos incluidos en estos modelos y cuestionarios. Por otro lado, los 
organismos reguladores se nutren en ocasiones de modelos y herramientas de 
medición, como el modelo de cultura de seguridad de la IAEA, para determinar 
políticas y normativas que afectan el funcionamiento de HROs. La utilización por 
parte de organismos reguladores de modelos y cuestionarios no validados, puede 
afectar el alcance de las políticas y normativas que estos organismos imponen a 
las organizaciones que regulan. Finalmente, la aplicación de cuestionarios (y la 
adopción de los modelos en que éstos se respaldan) en HROs, sin contar con 
evidencias de fiabilidad y validez de los resultados que de estos se obtienen, 
puede incrementar las posibilidades de que la interpretación de estos resultados 
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lleve a los profesionales a tomar decisiones y acciones erróneas (o menos 
apropiadas) sobre aspectos en la organización, que sean claves para asegurar la 
seguridad de sus operaciones. Un ejemplo sería el caso (frecuente) de 
profesionales que basan sus intervenciones en los resultados que un cuestionario 
ofrece a nivel dimensional, debido al enfoque más intuitivo o al ahorro de tiempo 
que conlleva no analizar los ítems de una herramienta, sobre todo si los ítems son 
muchos. Si hay ítems en una dimensión, por ejemplo ‗comunicación‘, que en 
realidad no la están midiendo, las puntuaciones obtenidas a nivel dimensional 
podrían ofrecer una imagen más positiva o más negativa de la contribución de la 
comunicación a la seguridad de la organización, lo que a su vez podría llevar a no 
intervenir (quizá siendo necesario hacerlo) o a intervenir (quizá habiendo otras 
áreas donde una intervención sea más prioritaria, aunque ésta no se ha 
identificado) en la comunicación de la organización. 
Por tanto, partiendo de la importancia y necesidad constatadas de la 
validación empírica de cuestionarios y modelos de cultura (de seguridad) 
aplicados en HROs, cada uno de nuestros estudios empíricos ha contribuido en 
esta dirección. Por un lado, hemos contribuido a la clarificación de la 
dimensionalidad y propiedades psicométricas del modelo de cultura de seguridad 
probablemente más aceptado en la industria nuclear, abriendo de esta forma la 
puerta hacia su reconsideración y optimización. Por otro lado, hemos validado el 
SCEQ y el modelo de cultura de seguridad en que éste se sustenta, ofreciendo así 
un cuestionario de cultura de seguridad, con respaldo empírico, cuyo objetivo es 
llegar al nivel de los valores en acción. Y finalmente, hemos contribuido a la 
validación de la versión española del OCI, cuestionario de cultura organizacional 
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más utilizado en el mundo (incluyendo en HROs), y ofrecido, entre otros, 
evidencias del poder del SCEQ y del OCI para predecir el desempeño de 
seguridad. 
9.3. Ámbito de aplicación de la presente tesis y generalización de resultados 
A lo largo de la tesis se ha hecho constante mención tanto a Organizaciones 
de Alta Fiabilidad (HROs) y a centrales nucleares (NPPs), como a la aplicación de 
nuestros estudios en las mismas. Las HROs generalmente se han entendido desde 
dos perspectivas. Por un lado, como aquellas organizaciones que son fiables, 
entendiendo fiabilidad como la baja probabilidad de error de una organización, y 
por otro lado, como aquellas organizaciones que buscan ser fiables (Hopkins, 
2007). Las primeras definiciones de HROs enfatizaban los resultados que estas 
conseguían, y hablaban de ‗desempeños libres de errores‘ (e.g., Roberts, 1989; 
Roberts y Gargano, 1990; Rochlin, La Porte y Roberts, 1987). Posteriormente se 
empezó a poner el énfasis en los procesos, es decir, en lo que estas organizaciones 
hacen para ‗buscar ser fiables‘ (Rochlin, 1993). Estas organizaciones se enmarcan 
en la industria nuclear, aeronáutica, marítima, espacial y petroquímica, entre otras. 
De una forma más intuitiva, se pueden entender las HROs, como las 
organizaciones ‗que no pueden fallar‘. En la introducción general de la tesis 
resaltamos en mayor detalle qué distingue una HRO de una que no lo es. La 
pregunta es por tanto, ¿son los resultados obtenidos en esta tesis aplicables 
únicamente a la industria nuclear o también a HROs y a industrias de alto riesgo 
en general? Los tres estudios empíricos incluidos en la tesis se han llevado a cabo 
en centrales nucleares, las muestras han estado formadas por trabajadores de 
centrales nucleares, y los cuestionarios han sido utilizados no solamente para fines 
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de investigación, sino también para ofrecer información sobre las variables 
estudiadas que permita a las centrales bajo estudio incrementar la seguridad de sus 
operaciones. Por estos motivos, se ha enfatizado la industria nuclear 
frecuentemente a lo largo de la presente tesis y de sus estudios empíricos. Sin 
embargo, todas las dimensiones y atributos del modelo de la IAEA, todos los 
estilos culturales, normas culturales e ítems del OCI, y todas las dimensiones e 
ítems del SCEQ (con la excepción del ítem ―en la planificación y contratación de 
personal para la recarga‖), no hacen referencia directa a centrales nucleares ni 
tienen ítems que puedan aplicarse únicamente en la industria nuclear. Nuestra 
opinión es que los resultados y las principales conclusiones obtenidas en esta tesis 
son aplicables no solamente a la industria nuclear, sino también a las HROs y a las 
industrias de alto riesgo en general, donde al igual que en el sector nuclear, la 
seguridad debe ser el valor prioritario que determine la forma pensar, sentir y 
actuar de sus trabajadores. No obstante, para poder concluir empíricamente si los 
resultados obtenidos son aplicables a otras organizaciones que no sean centrales 
nucleares, los estudios empíricos se deberían replicar previamente en muestras de 
otras HROs, previo análisis de la idoneidad de cada uno de los ítems utilizados 
(del SCEQ, del OCI y del modelo de la IAEA) en el tipo de organización bajo 
estudio.   
Por otro lado, si bien es cierto que nuestro estudio está enfocado en HROs y 
en particular en la industria nuclear, otro tipo de organizaciones podrían también 
beneficiarse, tanto del modelo de cultura de seguridad presentado que respalda el 
SCEQ, como de la estrategia seguida en el SCEQ para alcanzar el grado en que la 
seguridad es un valor en acción. Estos dos aspectos se explicación a continuación. 
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1) Generalización del modelo. Como se ha explicado a lo largo de la tesis, el 
modelo que sustenta el SCEQ no está compuesto por tres dimensiones de cultura 
de seguridad exactamente, sino que las dimensiones son tres conjuntos de 
actuaciones fundamentales de las organizaciones a través de las cuales se pretende 
obtener información sobre el valor o la prioridad real de la seguridad. Cada una de 
las tres dimensiones del modelo se ha operacionalizado en el SCEQ a través de 
ítems que cubren actuaciones que tienen poder de influir en el desempeño de 
seguridad de la organización. El SCEQ se convierte por tanto en una herramienta 
diagnóstica de cultura de seguridad que permite, a través del análisis de las 
respuestas dadas a sus dimensiones e ítems, detectar fortalezas y posibles áreas 
donde una intervención puede ser necesaria para garantizar la seguridad de la 
organización. Sin embargo, el modelo de cultura de seguridad presentado tiene la 
capacidad de poder ser también aplicado a otro tipo de organizaciones para las 
cuales su valor prioritario sea otro que la seguridad. De esta forma, los tres 
conjuntos de actuaciones fundamentales del modelo propuesto podrían servir 
como marco para desarrollar herramientas de medición de cultura de innovación, 
cultura de calidad, o de cultura de atención al cliente, entre otros. Por otro lado, 
parece razonable argumentar que varios de los ítems del SCEQ podrían arrojar 
información valiosa sobre la presencia de otros valores prioritarios en una 
organización (p.e., evaluado la importancia del valor bajo estudio en la 
adjudicación de recursos, en el reconocimiento de los jefes, en los 
comportamiento de la alta dirección, en la retribución de los trabajadores), 
mientras algunos ítems, tal y como están formulados en el SCEQ, no serían 
generalizables a otros valores o prioridades (p.e., resolución de conflictos entre 
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seguridad y producción) ni a otras organizaciones que no fuesen centrales
nucleares (p.e., planificación y contratación de personal para la recarga). En todo
caso, la aplicación de nuestro trabajo a otro tipo de organizaciones que no fuesen
HROs, requeriría las operacionalización de las tres dimensiones en ítems que
cubran actuaciones donde el valor prioritario buscado (p.e., innovación, calidad,
atención al cliente) se pueda y deba ponerse en práctica, así como la posterior
validación empírica del cuestionario. 2) Generalización de la estrategia del SCEQ
para medir la presencia de otros valores en acción. Como acabamos de comentar,
las dimensiones del modelo que hemos desarrollado, e incluso varios de sus ítems,
podrían ser utilizados para obtener información sobre otros tipos de cultura. Sin
embargo, para poder medir a través de un cuestionario el grado en que estos
valores (p.e., innovación, atención al cliente, la calidad) son puestos en práctica e
impregnan el día a día de las actuaciones de la organización, se recomienda tomar
como referencia los elementos diferenciales del SCEQ explicados en el Estudio 2:
introducción al cuestionario, escala de respuesta y naturaleza de los ítems.
9.4. Alcance de los estudios 
El objetivo de este apartado es acotar el alcance de la evidencia empírica y
conclusiones  extraídas  de  la  presente  tesis.  Es  importante  recordar que ya
hemos analizado en cada estudio sus limitaciones con el fin de comprender mejor
el significado de los resultados obtenidos. En este apartado consideramos el
alcance del estudio de forma global.
En primer lugar, la evidencia empírica que se presenta en esta tesis procede 
de la aplicación de medidas de auto-informe, lo que plantea el problema de la 
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varianza del método común como una limitación de los resultados presentados. La 
correlación entre las variables estudiadas podría haber sido más alta debido a que 
para su medición se ha utilizado el mismo método. Para paliar esta posible 
limitación se tomaron varias medidas. Por un lado, se utilizaron escalas de 
respuesta diferentes para las distintas variables. Por otro lado, para evitar el 
problema de la varianza del método común, se hizo hincapié en todo momento en 
que el anonimato y la confidencialidad de las respuestas estaban garantizados, 
minimizando así las posibilidades de obtener respuestas sesgadas por la 
deseabilidad social. Adicionalmente, se utilizó el test del factor único de Harman 
en el Estudio 1. En todo caso, para minimizar el problema de la varianza del 
método común en estudios como los presentados en esta tesis, siempre que sea 
posible, se recomienda la utilización de diferentes métodos para la medición de 
las variables (Podsakoff y cols., 2003). 
En segundo lugar, se destaca que las muestras de trabajadores del sector 
nuclear, utilizadas en los tres estudios empíricos, pertenecen a dos centrales 
nucleares. Aunque pertenecientes a la misma organización, dichas centrales están 
ubicadas en lugares geográficos distintos y funcionan de manera autónoma. Pocos 
estudios psicosociales se pueden encontrar en la literatura que hayan podido tener 
la oportunidad de recoger una muestra compuesta por más de una planta (p.e., 
Crichton y Flin, 2004; O‘Connor, O'Dea y Flin, 2008). No obstante, habida cuenta 
que la muestra de este trabajo está compuesta por dos plantas nucleares, es 
necesario tomar con precaución la generalización de los resultados obtenidos a la 
industria nuclear, así como a las HROs en general.   
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Finalmente, matizamos que por razones de practicabilidad, la definición 
propuesta de cultura de seguridad no incluyó tres de los diez elementos comunes 
identificados, sino aquellos que fueron considerados más relevantes para formar 
parte de la definición. Hubo, por tanto, tres contenidos comunes que no se 
incluyeron en la definición pero que deberían tenerse también en cuenta a la hora 
de investigar y trabajar con cultura de seguridad. Estos elementos fueron: el papel 
de los líderes en la canalización de la cultura de seguridad; la importancia del 
aprendizaje, formación y sistemas de reconocimiento en la cultura de seguridad; y 
la necesidad del compromiso y responsabilidad hacia la seguridad por parte de 
todos los trabajadores de la organización.  
9.5. Futuras líneas de investigación 
El Estudio 1 ha preparado el camino hacia la validación del modelo cultura de 
seguridad de la IAEA, que ha sido ampliamente utilizado en la industria nuclear 
para la comprensión y medición de cultura de seguridad. Del Estudio 2 se 
desprende la posibilidad de alcanzar niveles más profundos de cultura (valores en 
acción) a través de cuestionarios, lo que alienta a la comunidad científica a 
profundizar en nuestra propuesta y a investigar nuevas formas para conseguirlo. 
El Estudio 3 muestra que la cultura de seguridad se puede medir desde un enfoque 
directo (a través de herramientas de medición de cultura de seguridad) y desde un 
enfoque distal (a través de herramientas de medición de cultura organizacional), 
instando así a la comunidad científica a evaluar cuál de las dos estrategias debería 
utilizarse en las HROs.  
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El párrafo anterior describe en líneas generales las puertas de investigación 
que ha abierto cada uno de los estudios empíricos de la presente tesis. A su vez, 
cada estudio propone en mayor detalle vías de investigación para construir sobre 
el conocimiento aportado en cada uno de ellos. Sin embargo, en este apartado 
proponemos futuras líneas de investigación en cultura de seguridad, a nivel más 
global, que no se han abordado hasta este momento.  
En primer lugar, la visión de cultura de seguridad que se ha ofrecido a lo 
largo de esta tesis doctoral, es la de una cultura global a nivel organizacional que 
debe impregnar a todos los trabajadores de la organización con la prioridad 
innegociable de la seguridad. Sin embargo, si bien es cierto que los trabajadores 
de una organización comparten una cultura que en mayor o menor medida 
determina cómo éstos experimentan, sienten, dan significado e interpretan de 
forma similar su organización, lo que en ella ocurre y lo que ésta valora (p.e., 
seguridad), también existen sub-culturas que conviven dentro de las 
organizaciones, conformando asunciones, valores, creencias y normas 
compartidas entre los integrantes del grupo, que toman forma en percepciones, 
actitudes y comportamientos compartidos a nivel de grupo. La primera visión se 
enmarcaría dentro de una perspectiva integracionista, mientras la segunda, dentro 
una perspectiva de diferenciación (ver Martin [2002] para una distinción entre las 
perspectivas de integración, diferenciación y fragmentación). En el Estudio 2 de la 
presente tesis se tuvo en cuenta la influencia en las respuestas al SCEQ de 
posibles sub-culturas formadas entre distintos grupos jerárquicos (equipo de alta 
dirección y resto de empleados), encontrándose diferencias significativas entre las 
puntuaciones de ambos grupos. Como ya se ha explicado, este gap en la 
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valoración de la seguridad en la organización se ha observado frecuentemente en
la literatura (Huang y cols., 2014). Este tipo de análisis, no solo ofrecen
evidencias de validez basadas en la capacidad de una herramienta de medición
para discriminar entre las puntuaciones de distintos grupos que puede tener
sentido teórico que difieran en sus respuestas, sino que además puede ofrecer
información adicional valiosa para la interpretación de las respuestas obtenidas y
las posibles acciones que se deriven de la aplicación de la herramienta de
medición. Sin embargo, la mayoría de los estudios encontrados en la literatura se
ciñen al estudio de cultura organizacional o de seguridad desde una perspectiva
integracionista, sin considerar la influencia que otras sub-culturas puedan estar
ejerciendo en resultados organizacionales, sean  seguridad,  innovación,  calidad,
etc. Por este motivo, recomendamos que futuras investigaciones profundicen (p.e.,
a través de modelos multinivel) en las implicaciones teórico-prácticas derivadas
de una perspectiva de diferenciación en la medición de cultura de seguridad.
En segundo lugar, un desarrollo importante de esta tesis ha sido la propuesta 
de un modelo de cultura de seguridad y el desarrollo paralelo de un cuestionario, 
el SCEQ, que nos permite llegar con métodos cuantitativos de evaluación a los 
valores en acción.  Debido a que la muestra de este trabajo está compuesta por dos 
plantas nucleares, como hemos señalado con anterioridad, es necesario tomar con 
precaución la generalización de los resultados obtenidos a la industria nuclear, así 
como a las HROs en general. Futuras investigaciones deberían probar la validez 
del SCEQ y extender su aplicabilidad a otras HROs e industrias de riesgo en 
general. 
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En tercer lugar, la evaluación de la cultura de seguridad, tema central al que 
se ha pretendido contribuir en esta tesis, es especialmente interesante en la medida 
en que seamos capaces de enmarcar la cultura de seguridad dentro de modelos 
más amplios, en los que se incluyan predictores y posibles resultados de la cultura 
de seguridad. Futuras investigaciones en este campo enriquecerían la utilidad 
práctica de la medición de cultura de seguridad. Un ejemplo de dicho enfoque 
sería el modelo de evaluación de la cultura de seguridad y sus correlatos 
desarrollado por el IDOCAL (Peiró, Gracia y Martínez-Córcoles, 2015) 
basándose en el modelo de Análisis Multifacético de Intervención en Gestión 
Organizacional (Peiró, 1999; Peiró y Martínez-Tur, 2008). Como señalan Peiró y 
cols. (2015), ―si se pretende que la evaluación de la cultura de seguridad sea 
realmente útil para diagnosticar esa cultura y determinar vías para reforzar y 
mantener sus aspectos positivos y mejorar los que lo requieran, es importante 
medir, además de la propia cultura de seguridad otras variables organizativas, 
comportamentales y de output o resultados que son influidos por esa cultura (p.e., 
indicadores de seguridad en la organización). Un análisis basado en modelos 
teóricos validados mediante investigación empírica nos van a permitir identificar 
relaciones entre esas diferentes variables que ofrecen ideas sobre cómo se genera 
y se cambia la cultura de seguridad y cómo los diferentes componentes y situación 
de esa cultura influyen sobre otras variables relevantes en la seguridad de la 
organización (p.e., el clima de seguridad, los comportamientos de los empleados y 
otros actores relevantes y los propios indicadores que reflejan la seguridad de la 
organización)‖ (p. 44). 
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Por último, para comprender adecuadamente la cultura de seguridad y poder 
actuar sobre ella es importante analizar sus cambios y evolución temporal. 
Identificar las mejoras o deterioros de la cultura de seguridad o de los indicadores 
de seguridad de la organización es básico para desarrollar planes y actuaciones 
que permitan su gestión y su mejora (Peiró y cols., 2015). Por ello, 
investigaciones futuras, enmarcadas en los modelos más globales comentados 
anteriormente, deberán obtener medidas en varios momentos temporales de la 
cultura de seguridad y de sus correlatos más importantes. De esta forma será 
posible avanzar en la identificación de las ‗palancas de cambio‘, es decir, los 
factores organizativos y humanos que tienen mayor capacidad para incidir sobre 
los cambios en la cultura de seguridad. La identificación de los factores más 
relevantes en la mejora de la cultura de seguridad y de su impacto sobre la propia 
seguridad,  resultaría en información muy valiosa para la gestión y mejora de 
dicha cultura de seguridad. 
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The main conclusions of this thesis are presented in the following five paragraphs: 
 
1. A large variety of meanings and connotations have been given to safety 
culture. However, the following 10 points, concluded from 40 definitions of safety 
culture, seem to reasonably reflect the agreement reached by experts on the term: 
safety culture refers to a high value priority given to safety; it is embedded in 
organizational members‘ assumptions, values, beliefs, and norms; it is manifested 
in organizational policies, practices, and procedures, as well as in members‘ 
attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors; it must be shared by all members of the 
organization; it is stable and enduring; it requires the responsibility and 
commitment to safety of all organizational members; it determines the safety 
performance of the organization; leaders play an important role in channeling 
safety culture; training/learning and reward systems play a crucial role in safety 
culture; and lastly, the goal of safety culture is to promote and guarantee safety in 
the organization, thus protecting the workers, public, and environment from risks, 
accidents, and illnesses. 
2. The model of safety culture of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) has been accepted by the nuclear industry without prior empirical 
validation. Our results suggest that the model could be unidimensional instead of 
being composed of the five dimensions the IAEA proposes. On the other hand, 
several attributes of the model do not seem to be related to their corresponding 
dimensions. Moreover, evidence was not found for content and face validity of the 
model. Changes in the model and further validation processes seem necessary to 
maximize the usefulness of the model in the nuclear industry and its positive 
impact on the safety of operations in nuclear power plants (NPPs).  
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3. Questionnaires are a recurring strategy to assess safety culture in High 
Reliability Organizations (HROs). Management/leadership, training/learning, 
communication, risk, and support are the most common dimensions of safety 
culture included in these questionnaires. The assessment of safety culture, besides 
focusing on dimensions of safety culture, could also be nourished by wider 
organizational models, whose elements make it possible to identify the 
fundamental sets of actions in the functioning of HROs, where the value of safety 
is constructed and embedded.  
4. Existing safety culture questionnaires typically provide information about 
the organizational artifacts and, at best, the culture reﬂected in its espoused 
values. Strategies must be developed to reach the level of enacted values through 
quantitative methodologies because the enacted values determine the safety 
performance and safety outcomes of HROs to a greater extent. The Safety Culture 
Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ) proposed in this thesis is designed to capture 
the extent to which safety is an enacted value in HROs, particularly in NPPs. The 
SCEQ is based on a safety culture model that covers the main components of the 
functioning of any NPP or HRO where the value of safety must be put into 
practice: strategic decisions, human resources practices, and day-to-day operating 
behaviors. Empirical support is provided for the final 21 items of the SCEQ and 
the model on which it is based.  
5. The analysis and comparison of the Safety Culture Enactment 
Questionnaire (SCEQ) and the Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI) provides 
valuable information about the use of (domain-specific) safety culture 
questionnaires and (general) organizational culture questionnaires in the nuclear 
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industry. A 113-item version of the Spanish OCI is proposed as a result of the 
validation process. A longitudinal study supported the power of the SCEQ and the 
OCI to predict safety performance, as measured by safety compliance, safety 
participation, and risky behaviors. The use of both questionnaires at the same time 
to predict safety performance is preferred over the application of each of them 
separately. Further evidence of validity for both assessment tools is provided. 
Results suggest a preferred OCI cultural constellation for NPPs, which should 
mostly be characterized by the presence of a ‗constructive‘ cultural style and some 
degree of a ‗perfectionistic‘ culture, and by the absence of the ‗avoidance‘, 
‗oppositional‘, and ‗power‘ cultural norms.  
 
CONCLUSIONES 
Las conclusiones principales de esta tesis se presentan en los siguientes cinco 
párrafos: 
1. El término de cultura de seguridad ha presentado un gran número de 
significados y connotaciones. Sin embargo, hay diez puntos, extraídos del análisis 
de 40 definiciones de cultura de seguridad, que parecen recoger de forma 
razonable el acuerdo entre expertos sobre el concepto: la cultura de seguridad 
hace referencia a una prioridad máxima concedida a la seguridad; está integrada 
en las asunciones, valores, creencias, y normas de los miembros de la 
organización; se manifiesta en políticas, prácticas, y procedimientos 
organizacionales, así como en las actitudes, percepciones, y comportamientos de 
estos miembros; debe ser compartida por todos los miembros de la organización; 
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es estable y duradera; requiere el compromiso y responsabilidad de todos los 
miembros de la organización hacia la seguridad; determina el desempeño de 
seguridad de la organización; los líderes desempeñan un rol importante en la 
canalización de la cultura de seguridad; la formación/aprendizaje y los sistemas de 
recompensas juegan un papel determinante en la cultura de seguridad; y 
finalmente, el objetivo de la cultura de seguridad es fomentar y garantizar la 
seguridad en la organización, protegiendo así a los trabajadores, público, y medio 
ambiente de riesgos, accidentes y enfermedades. 
2. El modelo de cultura de seguridad de la Agencia Internacional de Energía 
Atómica (IAEA) ha sido aceptado en la industria nuclear sin haber sido validado 
de forma empírica previamente. Nuestros resultados sugieren que el modelo de 
IAEA podría ser unidimensional en vez de estar formado por las cinco 
dimensiones que la IAEA propone. Por otra parte, la mayoría de los atributos del 
modelo parecen no estar relacionados con dimensiones correspondientes. 
Adicionalmente, no se encontraron evidencias para apoyar la validez de contenido 
y aparente del modelo. Nuevos procesos de validación, y un consiguiente 
replanteamiento del modelo, parecen necesarios para maximizar su utilidad en la 
industria nuclear y su impacto positivo en la seguridad de la operación de las 
centrales nucleares.   
3. Los cuestionarios son una estrategia recurrente de medición de la cultura 
de seguridad en Organizaciones de Alta Fiabilidad (HROs). Las dimensiones de 
cultura de seguridad incluidas en estos cuestionarios con mayor frecuencia son: 
gestión/liderazgo, formación/aprendizaje, comunicación, riesgo, y apoyo. La 
evaluación de cultura de seguridad, además de basarse en dimensiones de cultura 
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de seguridad, podría también nutrirse de modelos organizacionales más generales, 
cuyos elementos permitan identificar las actuaciones fundamentales en el 
funcionamiento de las organizaciones, alrededor de las cuales la cultura de 
seguridad se construye y se cristaliza. 
4. Los cuestionarios de cultura de seguridad existentes recaban normalmente 
información sobre los artefactos de la organización y, en el mejor de los casos, 
sobre la cultura reflejada en los valores expuestos. Es necesario trabajar en el 
desarrollo de fórmulas que permitan alcanzar el nivel de los valores en acción a 
través de cuestionarios, ya que estos valores en acción determinan en mayor 
medida el desempeño de seguridad y los resultados de seguridad de las HROs. El 
Cuestionario de Cultura de Seguridad en Acción (Safety Culture Enactment 
Questionnaire [SCEQ]) propuesto en esta tesis está diseñado para capturar el 
grado en que la seguridad es un valor en acción en HROs, en particular en 
centrales nucleares. El SCEQ se sustenta en un modelo de cultura de seguridad 
que cubre los principales componentes del funcionamiento de una HROs, donde el 
valor prioritario de la seguridad sebe poner en práctica: decisiones estratégicas, 
prácticas de gestión de recursos humanos y comportamientos diarios operativos. 
La versión final del SCEQ de 21 ítems y el modelo en que este cuestionario se 
sustenta, obtuvieron apoyo empírico.  
5. El análisis y comparación entre el SCEQ y el Inventario de Cultura 
Organizacional (Organizational Culture Inventory [OCI]), ofrecieron información 
valiosa sobre la utilización de cuestionarios (específicos) de cultura de seguridad 
y cuestionarios (generales) de cultura organizacional en la industria nuclear. El 
proceso de validación de la versión española del OCI llevó a trabajar sobre una 
CONCLUSIONS
378 
 
versión de 113 ítems del OCI. Un estudio longitudinal apoyó el poder del SCEQ y 
del OCI para predecir el desempeño de seguridad, medido por las variables 
cumplimiento de la seguridad, participación en seguridad y conductas arriesgadas. 
La utilización de ambos cuestionarios de forma simultánea para predecir 
desempeño de seguridad es preferible que la aplicación de cada uno de los 
cuestionarios por separado. Se ofrecieron evidencias adicionales de validez de 
ambas herramientas de medición. Los resultados sugieren una constelación 
cultural del OCI preferida para la industria nuclear, que se caracteriza 
principalmente por un predominio del estilo cultural ‗constructivo‘, cierto grado 
de presencia de la norma cultural ‗perfeccionista‘, y la ausencia de normas 
culturales de ‗evitación‘, ‗oposición‘ y ‗poder‘. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER X
 REFERENCES /     
REFERENCIAS 
  
 
 
 
 
  This page intentionally left blank
381 
 
AERA, APA, NCME. American Psychological Association, American 
Educational Research Association, and National Council on Measurement in 
Education (1999). Standards for educational and psychological test and 
manuals. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Anastasi, A. (1976). Psychological testing, 4th edition. Macmillan, New York. 
Anastasi, A. (1986). Evolving concepts of test validation. Annual Review of 
Psychology 37, 1–15.  
American Educational Research Association, American Psychological 
Association, National Council on Measurement in Education, 1999. 
Standards for educational and psychological testing.American Educational 
Research Association, Washington, DC. 
Antonsen, S. (2009). Safety culture assessment: A mission impossible? Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management 17, 242–254. 
Argyris, C. (1990). Overcoming Organizational Defenses: Facilitating 
Organizational Learning. Allyn and Bacon, Boston. 
Argyris, C., Putnam,  R., Smith,  D.M. (1985). Action science. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass. 
Argyris, C., Schon, D.A. (1978). Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action 
Perspective. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA. 
Argyris, C., Schon, D.A. (1974). Theory in practice: Increasing professional 
effectiveness. Jossey Bass, San Francisco. 
REFERENCES
382 
 
Attree, M., Newbold, D. (2009). Risk, safety and reliability. From cult to culture? 
Journal of Nursing Management 17, 145–150. 
Baker, J.A. (2007). The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety 
Review Panel. Baker Panel. Washington, DC. 
Balthazard, P.A, Cooke, R.A., Potter, R.E. (2006). Dysfunctional culture, 
dysfunctional organization. Journal of Managerial Psychology 21, 709–732. 
Baram, M. (1996). Generic strategies for protecting worker health and safety: 
OSHA‘s General Duty Clause and Hazard Communication Standard 
Occupational Medicine: State of the Art Reviews 11, 69–77. 
Batista-Foguet, J.M., Coenders, G. (2000). Modelos de ecuaciones estructurales. 
Madrid. La Muralla/Hespérides. 
BEA (Bureau d‘Enquêtes et d‘Analyses pour la sécurité de l‘aviation civile) 
(2012). Final Report On the accident on 1st June 2009 to the Airbus A330-
203 registered F-GZCP operated by Air France flight AF 447 Rio de Janeiro - 
Paris. Le Bourget Cedex, France. 
Beckhard, R., Harris, R.T. (1977). Organizational transitions: Managing complex 
change.Readinng,  MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Belova, O. (2003). Development of a personnel selection process: a case of a 
Russian start-up. Dissertation. Alliant International University, San Francisco 
Bay 
REFERENCES
383 
 
Berends, J.J. (1996). On the Measurement of Safety Culture (Unpublished 
graduation report). Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven. 
Boomsma, A. (1983). On the robustness of LISREL (maximum likelihood 
estimation) against small sample size and non-normality. Unpublished PhD 
dissertation. University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands. 
Borman, W.C., Motowidlo, S.J. (1993). Expanding the criterion domain to include 
elements of contextual performance. In: Schmidt N., Borman, W.C., Howard, 
A., Kraut, A., Ilgen, D., Schneider, B., Zedeck, S., (Eds.), Personnel Selection 
in Organizations, Jossey-Bass. San Francisco, pp. 71–98. 
Borman, W.C., Motowidlo, S.J. (1997). Introduction: Organizational citizenship 
behavior and contextual performance. Special issue of Human Performance, 
Borman, W.C., Motowidlo, S.J., (Eds.), Human Performance 10, 67-69. 
Branch, K.M., Olson, J L. (2011). Review of the Literature Pertinent to the 
Evaluation of Safety Culture Interventions. Technical Letter Report prepared 
for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory, Richland, Washington. 
Briner, R.B., Rousseau, D.M. (2011). Evidence-Based I-O Psychology: Not There 
Yet. Industrial and Organizational Psychology 4, 3–22. 
Brooks, J. (2012). The Culture within a Culture – The Impact of Organizational 
Culture on Nuclear Safety. Presentation at the International Atomic Energy 
Agency Technical meeting on safety culture during pre-operational phases — 
REFERENCES
384 
 
practical working methods to increase safety. Cape town, South Africa. 26–
30 November 2012 
Brown, T.A. (2006). Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research. 
Guilford Press, New York. 
Brown, W.S. (2000a). Organizational Culture, Safety Culture, and Safety 
Performance at Research Facilities [BNL-67230]. Brookhaven National 
Laboratory. 
Brown, W.S. (2000b). Surveys of organizational culture and safety culture in 
nuclear power [BNL-67231]. Brookhaven National Laboratory. 
Browne, M.W., Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing model fit. In: 
Bollen, K.A., Long, J.S. (Eds.), Testing structural equation models. Sage, 
Newbury Park, CA. pp. 136–162. 
Browne, M.W., Du Toit, S.H.C. (1992). Automated fitting of nonstandard models 
for mean vectors and covariance matrix. Multivariate Behavioral Research 
27, 269–300. 
Byon, K.K., Zhang, J.J. (2010). Development of a scale measuring destination 
image. Marketing Intelligence & Planning 28, 508–532.  
Byrom, N., Corbridge, J., (1997). A tool to assess aspects of an organisation's 
health and safety climate. In: Proceedings of International Conference on 
Safety Culture in the Energy Industries, University of Aberdeen, 22 - 24 
September. 
REFERENCES
385 
 
CAIB (Columbia Accident Investigation Board) (2003). Report, Vol. 1., NASA, 
Washington. 
Cameron, K.S. (2009) An Introduction to the Competing Values Framework. 
Haworth Organizational Culture White Paper, Englewood  
Cameron, K.S., Quinn, R.E. (1999). Diagnosing and Changing Organizational 
Culture. Based on the Competing Values Framework. Addison Wesley, 
Massachusetts. 
CANSO. (2008). Safety Culture Deﬁnition and Enhancement Process.Civil Air 
Navigation Services Organisation. Retrieved July 8, 2015, from 
www.canso.org/sites/default/files/Safety%20Culture%20Definition%20and%
20Enhancement%20Process.pdf 
Carroll, J.S. (1998). Safety culture as an ongoing process: Culture surveys as 
opportunities for enquiry and change. Work & Stress 12, 272–284. 
Catino, M., Albolino, S. (2007). Learning from Failures. The Role of the No 
Blame Culture. Paper presented at the 23rd EGOS Colloquium July 5 to 7, 
2007, Vienna (Austria). 
Chaudhry, A., Coyle-Shapiro, J.A.M., Wayne, S.J. (2011). A longitudinal study of 
the impact of organizational change on transactional, relational, and balanced 
psychological contracts. Journal of Leadership & Organizational studies 18, 
247–259. 
Chen, F.F. (2007). Sensitivity of goodness of fit indexes to lack of measurement 
invariance. Structural Equation Modeling 14, 464–504.  
REFERENCES
386 
 
Cheung, G., Rensvold, R. (2002). Evaluating goodness-of-fit indexes for testing 
measurement invariance. Structural Equation Modeling 9, 233–255.  
Chinda, T., Mohamed, S. (2007). Structural equation model of construction safety 
culture. Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 15, 114–
131. 
 Choudhry, R.M., Fang, D., Mohamed, S. (2007). The Nature of Safety Culture: A 
Survey of the State of the Art, Safety Science, 45, 993–1012. 
Christian, M.S., Bradley, J.C., Wallace, J.C., Burke, M.J. (2009). Workplace 
Safety: A Meta-Analysis of the Roles of Person and Situation Factors. Journal 
of Applied Psychology 94, 1103-1127. 
Ciavarelli, A., Crowson, J. (2004). Organizational factors in accident risk 
assessment. Paper presented at the Safety across High-consequence Industries 
Conference, St. Louis, MO (March 9 & 10, 2004) 
Ciavarelli, A., Jr., Figlock, R. (1996). Organizational factors in aviation accidents. 
Proceedings of the Ninth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology 
(pp. 1033–1035). Columbus, OH: Department of Aviation. 
Clarke, S. (1999). Perceptions of organizational safety: Implications for the 
development of safety culture. Journal of Organizational Behavior 20, 185–
198. 
Clarke, S. (2003). The contemporary workforce implications for organisational 
safety culture. Personnel Review 32, 40–57. 
REFERENCES
387 
 
Clarke, S., 2006. The Relationship Between Safety Climate and Safety 
Performance: A Meta-Analytic Review. Journal of Occupational Health 
Psychology 11, 315–327. 
Cockrell, R.C., Stone, D.N. (2010). Industry culture inﬂuences pseudo-knowledge 
sharing: a multiple mediation analysis. Journal of Knowledge Management 
14, 841–857. 
Collins, D. (2003). Engineering Anayst, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut. 
Managing Safety Culture, Presented at the Advisory Commitee on Reactor 
Safeguards Workshop on Safety Culture, Washington, D.C., June 12–13. 
Colombo, A.G., Saiz de Bustamante, A. (1990). Systems Reliability Assessment. 
Proceedings of the Ispra Course held at the EscuelaTécnica Superior de 
IngenierosNavales, Madrid, Spain, September 19–23, 1988. Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands. 
Committee on Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for 
Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants, Nuclear and Radiation 
Studies Board, Division on Earth and Life Studies, National Research 
Council. (2014). Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for 
Improving Safety of U.S. Nuclear Plants. National Academies Press, 
Washington, DC.  
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) (1990). Developing a Safety Culture: 
Business for Safety. London: Confederation of British Industry. 
REFERENCES
388 
 
Cooke, R.A. (1989). Organizational Culture Inventory, leader's guide (2n. ed.). 
Plymouth, MI: Human Synergistics. 
Cooke, R.A., Lafferty, J.C. (1987). Organizational Culture Inventory (Form III). 
Plymouth, MI: Human Synergistics. 
Cooke, R.A. and Rousseau, D.M. (1988). Behavioral norms and expectations: a 
quantitative approach to the assessment of organizational culture. Group and 
Organization Studies 13, 245-73. 
Cooke, R.A. and Szumal, J.L. (1993). Measuring normative beliefs and shared 
behavioral expectations in organizations: the reliability and validity of the 
organizational culture inventory. Psychological Reports 72, 1299-330. 
Cooke, R. A., &Szumal, J. L. (2000). Using the Organizational Culture Inventory 
to understand the operating cultures of organizations. In N. M. Ashkanasy, C. 
P. M. Wilderom, & M. F. Peterson (Eds.), Handbook of organizational 
culture and climate (pp. 147–162). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Cooper, M.D. (2000). Towards a model of safety culture. Safety Science 36, 111–
136.  
Cording, M., Harrison, J.S., Hoskisson, R.E., Jonsen, K. (2014). Walking the talk: 
A multistakeholder exploration of organizational authenticity, employee 
productivity and postmerger performance. Academy of Management 
Perspectives 28, 38–56. 
REFERENCES
389 
 
Costello, A.B., Osborne, J.W. (2005). Best practices in exploratory factor 
analysis: four recommendations for getting the most from your analysis. 
Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation 10, 173–178.  
Cox, S.J., Cheyne, A.J.T. (2000).Assessing safety culture in offshore 
environments. Safety Science 34, 111–129. 
Cox, S., Cox, T. (1991). The structure of employee attitudes to safety: an 
European example. Work and Stress 5, 93–106. 
Cox, S., Flin, R. (1998). Safety culture: Philosopher‘s stone or man of straw? 
Work & Stress 12, 189–201. 
Creswell, J.W. (1998). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among 
five traditions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Cronbach, L.J. (1984). Essentials of psychological testing, 4th edition. Harper & 
Row, New York. 
Cullen, W.D. (1990). Report of the Official Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster, 
Chairman Lord Cullen. HMSO, London. 
Dawson, D.M., Brooks, B.J. (1999). The Esso Longford Gas Plant Explosion - 
Report of the Longford Royal Commission. Government Printer for the State 
of Victoria. Melbourne, Victoria. 
Deal, T.E., Kennedy, A.A. (1982). Corporate cultures: the rites and rituals of 
corporate life. Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., Reading, Mass. 
REFERENCES
390 
 
Denison, D.R. (1996). What is the Difference between Organizational Culture and 
Organizational Climate? A Native's Point of View on a Decade of Paradigm 
Wars. The Academy of Management Review 21, 619–654. 
Dien, Y. (1998). Safety and application of procedures, or "how do they have to 
use operating procedures in nuclear power plants?". Safety Science 29, 179–
187. 
Detert, J.R., Schroeder, R.G., Mauriel, J.J. (2000). A framework for linking 
culture and improvement initiatives in organizations. The Academy of 
Management Review 25, 850–863. 
Díaz-Cabrera, D., Hernández-Fernaud,  E., Isla-Díaz, R. (2007). An evaluation of 
a new instrument to measure organisational safety culture values and 
practices. Accident Analysis and Prevention 39, 1202–1211. 
Eiff, G. (1999). Organizational safety culture. Proceedings of the Tenth 
International Symposium on Aviation Psychology (pp. 1–14). Columbus, 
OH: Department of Aviation. Fajoun. 
Ek, Å., Akselsson, R., Arvidsson, M., Johansson, C.R. (2007). Safety culture in 
Swedish air traffic control. Safety Science 45, 791–811. 
Elizur, D. (1984). Facets of work values: A structural analysis of work outcomes. 
Journal of Applied Psychology 69, 379–389. 
Elosua Oliden, P. (2003). Sobre la validez de los test. Psicothema15, 315–321.  
REFERENCES
391 
 
Embretson, S.E. (1983). Construct validity: construct representation versus 
nomothetic span. PsychologicalBulletin 93, 179–197. 
Eppard, R.G. (2004). Transformational and transactional leadership styles as they 
predict constructive culture and defensive culture. Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University, United States – Virginia, p. 129. 
Fang, D.P., Chen, Y., Louisa, W. (2006). Safety climate in construction industry: 
a case study in Hong Kong. Journal of Construction Engineering and 
Management 132, 573–584. 
Faridah, I., Hashim, A.E., Ismail, R., Abdul Majid, M.Z. (2009). The 
Operationalisation of Safety Culture for the Malaysian Construction 
Organisations. International Journal of Business and Management 4, 226–
237. 
Fennell, D. (1988). Report of the official inquiry into the Kings Cross fire, 
Chairman Desmond Fennell QC. HMSO, London. 
Fernández-Muñiz, B., Montes-Péon, J.M., Vázquez-Ordás, C.J. (2007). Safety 
culture: analysis  of  the  causal  relationships  between  its  key  dimensions.  
Journal  of Safety Research 38, 627–641. 
Filho, A.P.G., Andrade, J.C.S., Marinho, M.M.D.O., (2010). A safety culture 
maturity model for petrochemical companies in Brazil. Safety Science 48, 
615–624.  
Fitzpatrick, A. (1983). The meaning of content validity. Applied Psychological 
Measurement 7, 3–13.  
REFERENCES
392 
 
Fleming, M. (1999). Safety Culture Maturity Model. UK HSE Oﬀshore 
Technology Report OTO 2000/049. HSE Books, Norwich. 
Fleming, M. (2001). Safety Culture Maturity Model; HSE Offshore Technology 
Report 2000/049: UK 
Flin, R., Mearns, K., O‘Connor, P., Bryden, R. (2000). Measuring safety climate: 
identifying the common features. Safety Science 34, 177–192. 
Floyd, F.J., Widaman, K.F. (1995). Factor analysis in the development and 
refinement of clinical assessment instruments. Psychological Assessment 7, 
286–299. 
Freeman, R.E., Auster, E.R. (2011). Values, authenticity, and responsible 
leadership. Journal of Business Ethics 98, 15–23. 
FNCA. (2011). (Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia). Summary of FNCA 
2007 Workshop on Nuclear Safety Culture. Retrieved November 18, 2011, 
from http://www.fnca.mext.go.jp/english/nsc/e_ws_2007_m.html 
Frazier, C.B., Ludwig, T.D., Whitaker, B. Roberts, D.S. (2013). A hierarchical 
factor analysis of a safety culture survey. Journal of Safety Research 45, 15–
28. 
Frischknecht, A. (2005). A changing world: Challenges to nuclear operators and 
regulators. In: Itoigawa, N., Wilpert, B., Fahlbruch, B., (Eds.), Emerging 
Demands for the Safety of Nuclear Power Operations, pp.5–15. CRC Press 
LLC, Florida. 
REFERENCES
393 
 
Furnham, A., Gunter, B. (1993). Corporate culture: definition, diagnosis and 
change. In: Cooper, C.L., Robertson, I.T. (Eds.), International Review of 
Industrial and Organisational Psychology. John Wiley and Sons, London, pp. 
233–261. 
Gadd, S., Collins, A.M. (2002). Safety culture: a review of the literature 
(HSL/2002/25). Health and Safety Laboratory, London. 
García-Herrero, S., Mariscal, M.A., Gutiérrez, J.M., Toca-Otero., A. (2013). 
Bayesian Network Analysis of Safety Culture and Organizational Culture in a 
Nuclear Power Plant. Safety Science, 53 82-95. 
Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures Selected Essays. Basic Books, 
New York. 
Gibbons, A.M., von Thaden, T.L., Wiegmann, D.A., (2006). Development and 
Initial Validation of a Survey for Assessing Safety Culture Within 
Commercial Flight Operations. The International Journal of Aviation 
Psychology 16, 215–238.  
Glaser, B.G., Strauss, A.L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies 
for qualitative research. Chicago: Aldine. 
Glendon, A. I., Stanton, N. A. (2000). Perspectives on safety culture. Safety 
Science 34, 193–214.   
González-Romá, V., Peiró, J.M., (2014). Climate and Culture Strength. In: 
Schneider, B., Barbera, K.M. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Organizational 
Climate and Culture. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 496–531. 
REFERENCES
394 
 
Gourley, M. (2005). Qantas ETOMS Safety Reliability Survey. Human 
Synergistics NZ Limited, Auckland, NZ, 2005. 
Gordon, R., Kirwan, B., Perrin, E. (2007). Measuring safety culture in a research 
and development centre: A comparison of two methods in the Air Traffic 
Management domain. Safety Science 45, 669–695. 
Gracia, F.J., Peiro, J.M. (2010). Desenvolupament ivalidacio d'una metodologia 
per a l'avaluacio de la cultura de seguretat per mitja  del'observacio de 
reunions de treball en una central nuclear [Development of A safety-culture 
appraisal methodology through the observation of work unit meetings in a 
NPP]. Anuari de Psicología de la Societat Valenciana de Psicologia 13, 209–
224. 
Griffin, M.A., Neal, A. (2000). Perceptions of safety at work: A framework for 
linking safety climate to safety performance, knowledge, and motivation. 
Journal of Occupational Health Psychology 5, 347–358. 
Grote, G., Künzler, C., (2000). Diagnosis of safety culture in safety management 
audits. Safety Science 34, 131–150. 
Guldenmund, F.W. (2000). The nature of safety culture: A review of theory and 
research. Safety Science 34, 215–257. 
Guldenmund, F.W. (2007). The use of questionnaires in safety culture research - 
an evaluation. Safety Science 45, 723–743. 
Guttman, L., Levy, S. (1976). Values and Attitudes of Israeli High School Youth. 
Jerusalem: Israel Institute of Applied Social Research. 
REFERENCES
395 
 
Haber, S.B., O'Brien, J.N., Metlay, D.S., Crouch, D.A. (1991). Influence of 
Organizational Factors on Performance Reliability. Upton, NY: Brookbaven 
National Laboratory. 
Haber, S.B., Shurberg, D. (1993a). Organizational Culture During the Accident 
Response Process: Proceedings of the Risk Management – Expanding 
Horizons, Ronald A. Knief, Editor: La Grange Park, Ill.: American Nuclear 
Society‘s Power Division. 
Haber, S.B., Shurberg, D. (1993b). The Nuclear Organization and Management 
Analysis Concept Methodology: Four Years Later. Brookhaven National 
Laboratory, Upton, NY, 1993.  
Haber, S.B., Shurberg, D. (1996). Safety culture in the nuclear versus non-nuclear 
organization. [BNL-63336]. Brookhaven National Laboratory. 
Hackman J.R. (2011). Collaborative Intelligence. Using teams to solve hard 
problems. Lessons from and for intelligence professionals.Berrett-Koehler 
Publishers, Inc., San Francisco, CA. 
HAEA (Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority) (2003). Report to the Chairman of 
the Hungarian Atomic Energy Commission on the Authority‘s investigation 
of the incident at Paks Nuclear Power Plant on 10 April 2003. Budapest, 
Hungary. 
REFERENCES
396 
 
Hair, J.F., Jr., Anderson, R.E., Tatham, R.L., Black, D.C. (1998). Multivariate 
Data Analysis with Readings, 5th edition. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey. 
Hale, A. (2000). Editorial: Culture‘s Confusions. Safety Science 34, 1–14. 
Hale, A. (2009). Why safety performance indicators? Safety Science 47, 479–480. 
Hammar, L., Wahlström, B., Kettunen J. (2000). Views on safety culture at 
Swedish and Finnish nuclear power plants, NKS-14, Nordic Nuclear Safety 
Research. 
Hanna, D.P. (1988). Designing organizations for high performance. Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley. 
Hardesty, D., Bearden, W. (2004). The use of expert judges in scale development 
- implications for improving face validity of measures of unobservable 
constructs. Journal of Business Research 57, 98–107.   
Harvey, J., Erdos, G., Bolam, H., Cox, M.A.A., Kennedy, J.N.P., Gregory, D.T. 
(2002). An analysis of safety culture attitudes in a highly regulated 
environment. Work & Stress 16, 18–36.  
Hatch, M.J. (1993). The dynamics of organizational culture . Academy of 
Management Review 18, 657–693. 
Haynes, S., Richard, D., Kubany, E. (1995). Content validity in psychological 
assessment: A functional approach to concepts and methods. Psychological 
Assessment 7, 238–247.   
REFERENCES
397 
 
Haukelid, K. (2008). Theories of (Safety) Culture Revisited – An Anthropological 
Approach. Safety Science 46, 413–426. 
Håvold, J.I. (2005). Safety culture in a Norwegian shipping company. Journal of 
Safety Research 36, 441–458. 
Helmreich, R.L. (2000). On error management: lessons from aviation. British 
Medical Journal 320, 781–785. 
Helmreich, R.L., Merritt A.C. (1998). Organizational culture. In: Helmreich R.L., 
Merritt, A.C. (Eds.), Culture at work in aviation and medicine (pp. 107–174). 
Brookfield, VT: Ashgate.    
Hidden, A. (1989). Investigation into the Clapham Junction Railway Accident.: 
Department of Transport. HMSO, London. 
Hofstede, G.H. (1980). Culture's Consequences: International Differences in 
Work-related Values. Sage, Beverly Hills, CA. 
Hofstede, G.H. (1991). Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. 
McGraw-Hill, London. 
Holden, R., Jackson, D. (1979). Item subtlety and face validity in personality-
assessment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 47, 459–468. 
Hollnagel, E. (1993). Human Reliability Analysis: Context and Control. 
Academic Press, London. 
REFERENCES
398 
 
Hooper, D., Coughlan, J., Mullen, M. (2008). Structural Equation Modelling: 
Guidelines for Determining Model Fit. Electronic Journal of Business 
Research Methods 6, 53–60.   
Howell, A., Kirk-Brown, A., Cooper, B.K. (2012). Does congruence between 
espoused and enacted organizational values predict affective commitment in 
Australian organizations?. The International Journal of Human Resource 
Management 23, 731–747. 
Hoyle, R.H., Panter, A.T. (1995). Writing about structural equation models. In: 
Hoyle, R.H. (Ed.), Structural equation modeling: concepts, issues, and 
applications. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, pp. 158–176. 
HSC. (1993). ACSNI Study Group on Human Factors. 3rd Report: Organising for 
Safety. Health and Safety Commission, HMSO, London. 
HSC. (2001). The Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry, Part 2 Report. The Rt Hon Lord 
Cullen PC. Health and Safety Commission Report, HSE Books. 
HSE. (2005). A review of safety culture and safety climate literature for the 
development of the safety culture inspection toolkit. Health and Safety 
Executive Research Report 367. HSE Books, London. 
Hu, L., Bentler, P.M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure 
analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation 
Modeling 6, 1–55.  
Huang, Y.H., Robertson, M.M., Lee, J., Rineer, J., Murphy, L.A., Garabet, A., 
Dainoff, M.J. (2014). Supervisory interpretation of safety climate versus 
REFERENCES
399 
 
employee safety climate perception: association with safety behavior and 
outcomes for lone workers. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic 
Psychology and Behaviour 26, 348–360. 
Hudson, P., 2001. Aviation safety culture. Safeskies 1, 23.  
Hudson, P., Willekes, F.C. (2000). The hearts and minds project in an operating 
company: developing tools to measure cultural factors. In: Proceeding of the 
SPE International Conference on Health, Safety, and the Environment in Oil 
and Gas Exploration and Production Stavanger, Norway. Richardson, Texas 
(SPE61228). 
Human Synergistics International website. https://www.humansynergistics.com/ 
IAEA. (1986). Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the 
Chernobyl Accident (Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-1). International Safety 
Advisory Group, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. 
IAEA. (1991). Safety Culture (Safety Series No. 75- INSAG-4). International 
Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Vienna. 
IAEA. (1996). NPP Personnel Training and its Evaluation (Technical Reports 
Series No. 380).International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. 
IAEA. (1998a). Developing Safety Culture in Nuclear Activities: Practical 
Suggestions to Assist Progress (Safety Reports Series No. 11). International 
Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. 
REFERENCES
400 
 
IAEA. (1998b.) Selection, competency development and assessment of nuclear 
power plant managers (TECDOC-1024). International Safety Advisory 
Group, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. 
IAEA. (1999). Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants (Safety Series 
No. 75-INSAG-3 Rev. 1 INSAG-12) International Safety Advisory Group, 
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. 
IAEA. (2000). Operational Limits and Conditions and Operating Procedures for 
Nuclear Power Plants (Safety Guide No.NS-G-2.2). International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Vienna. 
IAEA. (2001a). Extrabudgetary Programme for Safe Nuclear Energy in Romania. 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Retrieved November 18, 2011, from 
http://www-ns.iaea.org/projects/roman_bulgar/romania.asp?s=8&l=62 
IAEA. (2001b). Managing change in nuclear utilities (TECDOC-
1226).International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. 
IAEA. (2002a). Safety culture in nuclear installations. Guidance for use in the 
enhancement of safety culture. IAEA-TECDOC-1329. International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Vienna. 
IAEA. (2002b). Self-assessment of safety culture in nuclear installations. 
Highlights and good practices. IAEA-TECDOC-1321. International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Vienna. 
REFERENCES
401 
 
IAEA. (2002c). Recruitment, Qualification and Training of Personnel for Nuclear 
Power Plants (Safety Standards Series No.NS-G-2.8). International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Vienna. 
IAEA. (2003). Managing Change in the Nuclear Industry: The Effects on Safety. 
(INSAG-18). International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, International 
Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. 
IAEA. (2006a). Application of the Management System for Facilities and 
Activities. IAEA Safety Standards for protecting people and the environment 
(Safety Report Series No. GS-G-3.1). International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Vienna.    
IAEA. (2006b). Plant life management for long term operation of light water 
reactors. Principles and guidelines (Technical Reports Series No. 
448).International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. 
IAEA, (2006c). Safety Culture in the Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants 
(Safety Reports Series No. 42)  International Atomic Energy Agency. 
IAEA (2006d). IAEA 2006 Annual Report, GC(51)/5. International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Vienna. 
IAEA. (2007). IAEA 2007 Annual Report, GC(52)/9. International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Vienna. 
IAEA (2008a). SCART Guidelines. Reference Report for IAEA Safety Culture 
Assessment Review Team (SCART). International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Vienna.  
REFERENCES
402 
 
IAEA. (2008b). The Operating Organization and the Recruitment, Training and 
Qualification of Personnel for Research Reactors (Safety Standards Series 
No.NS-G-4.5). International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.  
IAEA (2009a). The Management System for Nuclear Installations. IAEA Safety 
Standards for protecting people and the environment (Safety Report Series 
No. GS-G-3.5). International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. 
IAEA. (2009b). IAEA 2009 Annual Report, GC(54)/4. International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Vienna. 
IAEA. (2010). Best Practices in the Management of an Operating Experience 
Programme at Nuclear Power Plants. International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Vienna. 
IAEA website. Developing Safety. International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Retrieved July 8, 2015, from 
www.iaea.org/ns/tutorials/regcontrol/chapters/develop.pdf 
INPO, 2004. Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture. Institute of Nuclear 
Power Operations, Atlanta, GA. 
Itoigawa, N., Wilpert, B. (2005). Introduction: Nuclear Industry in a New 
Environment. In: Itoigawa, N., Wilpert, B., Fahlbruch, B., (Eds.), Emerging 
Demands for the Safety of Nuclear Power Operations, pp. 99–108. CRC Press 
LLC, Florida. 
REFERENCES
403 
 
Jarvis, C.B., MacKenzie, S.B., Podsakoff, P.M. (2003). A critical review of 
construct indicators and measurement model misspecification in marketing 
and consumer research.  Journal of Consumer Research 30, 199–218. 
Jeffcott, S., Pidgeon, N., Weymann, A., Walls, J. (2006). Risk, Trust, and Safety 
Culture in U.K. Train Operating Companies. Risk Analysis 26, 1105–1121. 
Jones, J.L., Mehr, S.L. (2007). Foundations and assumptions of the scientist-
practitioner model. American Behavioral Scientist 50, 766–771.  
Jöreskog, K. G. (1969). A general approach to confirmatory maximum likelihood 
factor analysis. Psychometrika, 34, 183-202. 
Jöreskog, K. G. (1977). Structural equation models in the social sciences: 
Specification, estimation and testing. In P. R. Krisnaiah (Ed.), Applications of 
Statistics. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Jöreskog, K.G., Sörbom, D. (2006). LISREL 8.80 for Windows. Scientific 
Software International, Inc., Lincolnwood, IL. 
Karakowsky, L., Mann, S.L. (2008). Setting goals and taking ownership: 
Understanding the implications of participatively get goals from a causal 
attribution perspective. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies 14, 
260–270. 
Keenan, G.M., Cooke, R.A. and Hillis, S.L. (1998). Norms and nurse 
management of conﬂicts: keys to understanding nurse-physician 
collaboration. Research in Nursing and Health 21, 59–72. 
REFERENCES
404 
 
Kennedy, R., Kirwan, B., (1998). Development of a hazard and operability-based 
method for identifying safety management vulnerabilities in high risk 
systems. Safety Science 30, 249–274. 
Key, S. (1997). Analyzing managerial discretion: an assessment tool to predict 
individual policy decisions. The International Journal of Organizational 
Analysis 5, 134–155. 
Kline, R.B. (2005). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling, 2nd 
edition. Guilford Press, New York. 
Kotter, J.P., Heskett, J.L. (1992). Corporate culture and performance. New York: 
Free Press. 
Kaiser, H.F. (1974). An index of factorial simplicity. Psychometrika 39, 31–36. 
Kao, C.S., Chung, Y.M., Lai, W.H., Chuang, T. F., (2007). Analysis of Safety 
Culture and Safety Performance Relationship of a Major Petrochemical 
Corporation in Taiwan.Presentation at the Mary Kay O‘Connor Process 
Safety Center 2007 International Symposium, College Station, TX. 
Kariuki, S.G., Lowe, K., (2007). Integrating human factors into process analysis. 
Reliability Engineering and System Safety 92, 1764–1773. 
Kirwan, B. (1998). Safety Management Assessment and Task Analysis: a Missing 
Link. In: Hale, A., Baram, M., (Eds.). Safety Management: The Challenge of 
Change. Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 67−92. 
Kline, P. (1994). An easy guide to factor analysis. Routledge, London 
REFERENCES
405 
 
Klein, R.L., Bigley, G.A. Roberts, K.H. (1995) Organization Culture in High 
Reliability Organizations: An Extension. Human Relations, 48, 771−793. 
Kohn, M.L., Schooler, C. (1983). Work and Personality: An Inquiry into the 
Impact of Social Stratification. Ablex, Norwood, NJ. 
Lance, C.E., Butts, M.M., Michels, L.C. (2006). The sources of four commonly 
reported cutoff criteria: What did they really say? Organizational Research 
Methods 9, 202–220. 
Latham, G.P., Yukl, G.A., (1976). Effects of assigned and participative goal 
setting on performance and job satisfaction. Journal of Applied Psychology 
61, 166–171. 
Latorre, M.F., Gracia, F.J., Tomás, I., Peiró, J.M. (2013). Validation of the group 
nuclear safety climate questionnaire. Journal of Safety Research 46, 21–30.  
Lauver, K. J., Trank, C. Q., Le, H. (2011). Information by Design: How Employee 
Perceptions of Organizational Design Relate to Injury Reporting. Journal of 
Leadership & Organizational Studies 18, 344 –352. 
Lee, T. (1993). Psychological aspects of safety culture in the nuclear industry. 
Paper presented at the ‗Second Offshore Installation Management 
‘conference, Aberdeen, April. 
Lee, T.R. (1996). Perceptions, attitudes and behaviour: the vital elements of a 
safety culture. Health and Safety, October, 1–15. 
REFERENCES
406 
 
Lee, T. (1998) Assessment of safety culture at a nuclear reprocessing plant. Work 
Stress 12, 217–237 
Lee, T., Harrison, K. (2000). Assessing safety culture in nuclear power stations. 
Safety Science 34, 61–97. 
Leung, M.Y., Chan, I.Y.S., Yu, J. (2012). Preventing construction worker injury 
incidents through the management of personal stress and organizational 
stressors. Accident Analysis and Prevention 48, 156–166.  
Leveson, N. (2004). A New Accident Model for  Engineering Safer
Systems. Safety  Science  42,  237–270.
Liedtka, J. (2008). Strategy making and the search for authenticity. Journal of 
Business Ethics 80, 237–248. 
Lippitt, G. (1982). Organizational renewal (2rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N J: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Litwin, M.S. (1995). How to measure survey reliability and validity. Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Lloret-Segura, S., Ferreres-Traver, D., Hernández-Baeza, A., Tomás-Marco, I. 
(2014). El análisis factorial exploratorio de los ítems: Una guía práctica, 
revisada y actualizada. Anales de Psicología 30, 1151–1169.  
Locke, E.A., Latham, G.P. (1990). A Theory of Goal Setting and Task 
Performance. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
REFERENCES
407 
 
Loevinger, J. (1957). Objective tests as instruments of psychological theory. 
Psychological Reports (Monograph Supp. 9), 3, 635–694. 
López de Castro, B., Gracia, F.J., Pietrantoni, L., Peiró. J.M. (2011). Safety 
culture: clarifying the concept and testing the model of the IAEA. 
Presentation at the European Association of Work and Organizational 
Psychology (EAWOP) Congress. Maastricht.  
López de Castro, B., Gracia, F.J., Peiró, J.M., Pietrantoni, L., Hernández, A. 
(2013). Testing the validity of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) safety culture model. Accident Analysis and Prevention 60, 231–244. 
López de Castro, B., Gracia, F.J., Tomás, I., Peiró, J.M. (2017). The Safety 
Culture Enactment Questionnaire (SCEQ): Theoretical model and empirical 
validation. Accident Analysis and Prevention 103, 44–55 
Lundberg, C.C. (1990). Surfacing organisational culture. Journal of Managerial 
Psychology 5, 19–26. 
Marsh, H.W., Hau, K.T., Grayson, D. (2005). Goodness of fit in structural 
equation models. In: Maydeu-Olivares, A., McArdle, J.J. (Eds.), 
Contemporary psychometrics: A festschrift for Roderick P. McDonald 
Mahwah. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, NJ. pp. 225–340. 
REFERENCES
408 
 
Martínez-Córcoles, M. (2012). Liderazgo potenciador y desempeño de seguridad 
percibido en la industria nuclear: factores psicosociales intervinientes. 
Doctoral Thesis. Valencia, Spain. 
Martínez-Córcoles, M., Gracia, F., Tomás, I., Peiró, J.M. (2011). Leadership and 
employees' perceived safety behaviours in a nuclear power plant: A structural 
equation model. Safety Science 49, 1118–1129. 
Martínez-Córcoles, M., Gracia, F., Tomás, I., Peiró, J.M., Schöbel, M. (2013). 
Empowering team leadership and safety performance in nuclear power plants: 
A multilevel approach. Safety Science 51, 293–301. 
Maslow, A.H. (1954). Motivation and personality. New York: Harper and Row. 
McDonald, J., Worthington, P., Barker, N., Podonsky, G. (2010). EFCOG/DOE 
ISMS Safety Culture Task Team Final Report. 
Mearns, K., Flin, R., Fleming, M., Gordon, R. (1998). Measuring safety climate 
on offshore installations. Work and Stress 12, 238–254. 
Mearns, K.J., Flin, R. (1999). Assessing the state of organizational safety--Culture 
or climate? Current Psychology: Developmental, Learning, Personality, 
Social 18, 5–17. 
Mearns, K., Flin, R., Gordon, R., Fleming, M., (2001). Human and organizational 
factors in offshore safety. Work & Stress 15, 144–160. 
REFERENCES
409 
 
Mearns, K., Whitaker, S.M., Flin, R. (2003). Safety climate, safety management 
practice and safety performance in offshore environments. Safety Science 41, 
641–680. 
Mearns, K., Kirwan, B., Kennedy, R.J. (2009). Developing a safety culture 
measurement Toolkit (SCMT) for European ANSPS, Eighth USA / Europe 
Air Traffic Management Research and Development Seminar (ATM 2009), 
pp. 1–9. 
Mels, G. (2003). A workshop on structural equation modelling with LISREL 8.54 
for Windows.Scientific Software International, Chicago, IL. 
Mengolini, A., Debarberis, L. (2007). Safety culture enhancement through the 
implementation of IAEA guidelines. Reliability Engineering and System 
Safety 92, 520–529. 
Meshkati, N., Butler, T.S., Pelling, K. (2001). Nuclear safety culture and electric 
deregulation: challenges and potentials. In: Wilpert, B., Itoigawa, N. (Eds.), 
Safety culture in nuclear power operations. Taylor & Francis, London and 
New York, pp. 94–114. 
MEST. (2010). National Report of the Republica of Korea for the Fifth 
Convention on Nuclear Safety. Ministry of Education, Science, and 
Technology in South Korea. 
Minerals Council of Australia. 1999. Safety culture survey report of the Australia 
minerals industry.  
REFERENCES
410 
 
Mintzberg, H. (1979). The structuring of organizations: a synthesis of the 
research. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 
Mohamed, S. (2003).Scorecard approach to benchmarking organizational safety 
culture in construction. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management 
129, 80–88. 
Monta, K. (2001). The significance of safety culture for nuclear power operations. 
In: Wilpert, B., Itoigawa, N. (Eds.)., Safety culture in nuclear power 
operations. Taylor & Francis, London and New York, pp. 79–93. 
Motowidlo, S.J., Van Scotter, J.R. (1994). Evidence that Task Performance 
Should Be Distinguished From Contextual Performance. Journal of Applied 
Psychology 79, 475–480. 
Moorcroft, D. (2014). Organisational Effectiveness. A driver for sustainable 
safety and financial performance. White paper. 03. June 2014. Lloydmasters 
NATS. National Air Traffic Services. (2002). The Safety Culture Assessment 
Framework for UK National Air Traﬃc Services. 
Muthén, B., Kaplan D. (1985). A comparison of some methodologies for the 
factor analysis of non-normal Likert variables. British Journal of 
Mathematical and Statistical Psychology 38, 171–189. 
Muthén, B.O., Muthén, L.K. (1998-2010). Mplus user‘s guide (6thed.). Los 
Angeles, CA: Muthén & Muthén. 
REFERENCES
411 
 
Nævestad, T.O. (2010). Evaluating a safety culture campaign: Some lessons from 
a Norwegian case. Safety Science 48, 651–659. 
NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency). (1999). The role of the nuclear regulator in 
promoting and evaluating safety culture.Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Paris. 
Neal, A., Griffin, M.A. (2004). Safety climate and safety at work. In: Barling, J., 
Frone, M., (Eds.), The Psychology of Workplace Safety. American 
Psychological Association, Washington, DC.  
Neal, A., Griffin, M.A. (2006). A study of the lagged relationships among safety 
climate, safety motivation, safety behavior, and accidents at the individual 
and groups levels. Journal of Applied Psychology 91, 946–953. 
Neumann, H. (2005). The relationship between perceived organizational 
behavioral integrity and benchmarks of corporate performance. Dissertation. 
Stanford University. School of Education. 
Nickelby HFE Ltd (2002). Framework for Assessing Human Factor Capability. 
Prepared by Nickleby HFE Ltd for the UK Health and Safety Executive. 
Oﬀshore Technology Report OTO 2002/016. HSE Books, Norwich. 
Noar, S. (2003). The role of structural equation modeling in scale 
development.Structural Equation Modeling 10, 622–647. 
NRC (2011). Final Safety Culture Policy Statement, NRC–2010–0282. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commision. 
REFERENCES
412 
 
Nuclear Regulatory Commision Workshop (2010) 
Nunnally, J.C. (1978). Psychometric theory, 2d edition. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Nunnally, J.C., Bernstein, I.H. (1994). Psychometric theory, 3rd edition. 
McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Oberholtzer, B.D. (2005). An examination of the similarities between nation 
subculture and organizational culture through the perceptions of employees. 
Information & Learning, AAI3158898. 
Ooshaksaraie, M., Majid, A.A., Yasir, M.S., Yahaya, R. (2009). The Impact of 
Companies‘ Age on Safety Culture in the Metal Products Industry. Amercian 
Journal of E ngineering and  Applied Sciencies 2, 735–742. 
Ostrom, L., Wilhelmsen, C., Kaplan, B. (1993). Assessing safety culture. Nuclear 
Safety 34, 163–172. 
Ott, J.S. (1989). The Organizational Culture Perspective. Chicago: The Dorsey 
Press.  
Parker, D., Lawrie, M., Hudson, P. (2006). A framework for understanding the 
development of organisational safety culture. Safety Science 44, 551–562. 
Patankar, M.S., Brown, J.P., Sabin, E.J., Bigda-Peyton, T.G. (2011). Safety 
Culture: Building and Sustaining a Cultural Change in Aviation and 
Healthcare. Ashgate Press, London.  
REFERENCES
413 
 
Peiró, J.M., Gracia, F.J., Martinez-Córcoles, M. (2015). Recent developments in 
the study of safety culture and its correlates: the role of leadership. Nuclear 
España 359, 43–47. 
Peiró, J.M., Martínez-Tur, V. (2008). Organizational development and change. In: 
Chmiel, N. (Ed.), An introduction to work and organizational psychology. 1st 
edition. Blackwell, London, pp. 351–376. 
Pettigrew, A.M. (1990). Organizational climate and culture: Two constructs in 
search of a role. In B. Schneider (Ed.), Organizational climate and culture 
(pp. 413–434). San Francisco. Jossey-Bass. 
Perin, C. (2005). Shouldering Risks: The Culture of Control in the Nuclear Power 
Industry. Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 
Pidgeon, N.F. (1991). Safety culture and risk management in organizations. 
Journal of  Cross-Cultural Psychology  22, 129–140. 
Pidgeon, N.F., O‘Leary, M. (1994). Organizational  safety  culture:  implications  
for  aviation practice. In N. A. Johnston, McDonald, N., & Fuller, R. (eds), 
Aviation Psychology in  Practice (Aldershot: Avebury Technical),  pp. 21–43. 
Podsakoff, P.M., MacKenzie, S.B., Lee, J.Y., Podsakoff, N.P. (2003). Common 
method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and 
recommended remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology 88, 879-–903. 
Porter, L.W., Angle, H.L., Allen, R.W. (2003). Organizational Influence 
Processes, 2nd edition. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY. 
REFERENCES
414 
 
Ramanujam, R., Goodman, P.S. (2003). Latent errors and adverse organizational 
consequences: a conceptualization. Journal of  
Organizational Behavior 24, 815–836. 
Rasmussen, J. (2001). Nuclear Power and Societal Problems in Risk. In: Wilpert, 
B., Itoigawa, N. (Eds.), Safety Culture in Nuclear Power Operations. Taylor 
& Francis, London, pp. 19–37. 
Raykov, T. (2001). Estimation of congeneric scale reliability using covariance 
structure analysis with nonlinear constraints. British Journal of Mathematical 
and StatisticalPsychology 54, 315–323. 
Reason, J. (1990). The contribution of latent human failures to the breakdown of 
complex systems. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London. B327 (1241) 475–484. 
Reason, J. (1993). Managing the management risk: New approaches to 
organizational safety. In Wilpert, B., Qvale, T. (Eds.), Reliability and safety 
in hazardous work systems (pp. 7–22). Hove, United Kingdom: Lawrence 
Erlbaum. 
Reason, J. T. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Ashgate, 
Aldershot, UK. 
Reason, J. 1998. Achieving a Safe Culture: Theory and Practice. Work & Stress, 
12, 293-306 
REFERENCES
415 
 
Reason, J. (2000). Safety paradoxes and safety culture. Journal of Injury Control 
and Safety Promotion 7, 3–14. 
Reichers, A.E., Schneider, B., (1990). Climate and culture: An evolution of 
constructs. In: Schneider, B. (Ed.), Organizational climate and culture, 1st 
edition. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, pp. 5–39. 
Reiman, T., Oedewald, P. (2004). Measuring maintenance culture and 
maintenance core task with CULTURE-questionnaire - A case study in the 
power industry. Safety Science, 42, 859–889. 
Reiman, T., Pietikäinen, E. (2010). Indicators of safety culture – selection and 
utilization of leading safety performance indicators (Research Report 
2010:07). Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. 
Reiman, T., Rollenhagen, C. (2014). Does the concept of safety culture help or 
hinder systems thinking in safety? Accident Analysis and Prevention 68, 5–
15. 
Ren, J., Jenkinson, I., Wang, J. Xu, D.L., Yang, J.B. (2008). A methodology to 
model causal relationships in offshore safety assessment focusing on human 
and organisational factors. Journal of Safety Research 39, 87–100. 
Richter, A., Koch, C. (2004). Integration, differentiation and ambiguity in safety 
cultures. Safety Science 42, 703–722. 
Rizzo, J.R., House, R.J., Lirtzman, S.I. (1970). Role conflict and ambiguity in 
complex organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly 15, 150–163. 
REFERENCES
416 
 
Roberts, K. H. (1990). Some Characteristics of High-Reliability Organizations. 
Organization Science 1, 160–177. 
Robinson, S., Bennett, R. (1995). A typology of deviant workplace behaviors: a 
multi-dimensional scaling study, Academy of Management Journal 38, 555–
72. 
Rochlin, G. I. (1993). Defining high reliability organizations in practice: A 
taxonomic prologue. In: Roberts, K.H. (Ed.). New challenges to 
understanding organizations (pp. 11–32). New York: Macmillan. 
Rokeach, M. (1973). The Nature of Human Values. Free Press, New York.  
Rolina, G. (2011). Safety Culture Oversight Projects in the Framework of the 
Norwegian Cooperation Programmes with Bulgaria and Romania. 
Presentation prepared for the Technical Meeting on Safety Culture Oversight, 
International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, February 15–18.  
Rollenhagen, C. (2010). Can focus on safety culture become an excuse for not 
rethinking design of technology? Safety Science 48, 268–278. 
Roszkowski, M.J., Bean, A.G. (1990). Believe It or Not! Longer Questionnaires 
Have Lower Response Rates. Journal of Business and Psychology  4, 495-
509. 
Rotundo, M., Sackett, P.R. (2002). The relative importance of task, citizenship, 
and counterproductive performance to global ratings of job performance: A 
policy capturing approach. Journal of Applied Psychology 87, 66–80. 
REFERENCES
417 
 
Rousseau, D.M. (1990). Assessing organizational culture: The case for multiple 
methods. In: Schneider, B. (Ed.), Organizational climate and culture, 1st 
edition. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, pp.153–192. 
Sackmann, S. A. (2011). Culture and performance. In N. Ashkanasy, C. 
Wilderom, & M. Peterson (Eds.), The handbook of organizational culture and 
climate (2nd ed., pp. 188-224). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Sahlqvist, S., Song, Y., Bull, F., Adams, E., Preston, J., Ogilvie, D. (2011). Effect 
of questionnaire length, personalisation and reminder type on response rate to 
a complex postal survey: randomised controlled trial. BMC Med Res 
Methodol. 11: 62. 
Sartori, R. (2010). Face validity in personality tests: Psychometric instruments 
and projective techniques in comparison. Quality & Quantity 44, 749–759.  
Sass, D. A., Schmitt, T. A. (2010). A comparative investigation of rotation criteria 
within exploratory factor analysis. Multivariate Behavioral Research 45, 73–
103. 
Satorra, A. (2000). Scaled and adjusted restricted tests in multisample analysis of 
moment structures. In: Heijmails, D.D.H., Pollock, D.S.G., Satorra, A. (Eds.), 
Innovations in multivariate statistical analysis: A Festschrift for Heinz 
Neudecker. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, pp. 
233–247. 
Satorra, A., Bentler, P.M. (2001). A scaled difference chi-square test statistic for 
moment structure analysis.Psychometrika 66, 507–514. 
REFERENCES
418 
 
Sawacha, E., Naoum, S., Fong, D. (1999). Factors affecting safety performance on 
construction sites. International Journal of Project Management 17, 309–315. 
Schein, E.H. (1985). Organizational culture and leadership, 1st edition.Jossey-
Bass, San Francisco. 
Schein, E.H. (1990). Organizational culture. American Psychologist 45, 109–119. 
Schein, E.H. (1991). What is culture? In: Frost, P.J.E., Moore, L.F.E., Louis, 
M.R., Lundberg, C.C., Martin, J. (Eds.), Reframing organizational culture. 
Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA, pp. 243–53. 
Schein, E.H. (1992). Organizational culture and leadership, 2nd edition.Jossey-
Bass, San Francisco. 
Schein, E.H. (2010). Organizational culture and leadership, 4th edition.Jossey-
Bass, San Francisco. 
Schneider, B. (1990). The climate for service: An application of the climate 
construct. In B. Schneider (Ed.), Organizational climate and culture (pp. 383–
412). Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. 
Schneider, B. Ehrhart, M.G., Macey, W.H. (2013). Organizational climate and 
culture. Annual Review of Psychology 64, 361–368 
Schöbel, M., Klostermann, A., Lassalle, R., Beck, J., Manzey, D. (2017). Digging 
deeper! Insights from a multi-method assessment of safety culture in nuclear 
power plants based on Schein‘s culture model. Safety Science 95, 38–49. 
REFERENCES
419 
 
Schuh, A.M., Miller, G.M. (2006). Maybe Wilson Was Right: Espoused Values 
and Their Relationship to Enacted Values. International Journal of Public 
Administration 29, 719–741. 
Schwartz, S.H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of 
human values? Journal of Social Issues 50, 19–45. 
Shapiro, E.C. (1995). Fad Surfing in the Boardroom: Reclaiming the Courage to 
Manage in the Age of Instant Answers. Addison-Wesley Publishing, New 
York, NY. 
Sharp, J.V., Strutt, J.E., Busby, J. Terry, E. (2002) Measurement of organisational 
maturity in designing safe oﬀshore installations. In: Proceedings of 21st 
International Conference on Oﬀshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering, 
June 23–28, Oslo, Norway. 
Sheen, M.J. (1987). MV Herald of Free Enterprise. Report of Court No. 8074 
Formal Investigation. HMSO, London. 
Shurberg, D.A., Haber, S.B. (1992). Organizational culture during the accident 
response process. Proceedings of the Topical Meeting on Risk Management, 
American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park IL, pp. 152–55. 
Siehl, C., Martin, J. (1990). Organizational Culture: A key to financial 
performance? In: Schneider, B. (Ed.), Organizational Climate and Culture. 
Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, pp. 241–281. 
REFERENCES
420 
 
Simons, T. (2002). Behavioral Integrity: The Perceived Alignment between 
Managers' Words and Deeds as a Research Focus. Organization Science 13, 
18–35. 
Sireci, S. (1998). The construct of content validity. Social Indicators Research 45, 
83–117.  
Slowinski, G. (1992). The human touch in successful strategic alliances. Mergers 
& Acquisitions 27, 44–7. 
Smtih, P., Garrett, C., Calvert, D. (2006). A five factor measure of safety culture. 
Paper presented at the Queensland Mining, Health and Safety Conference, 
Townsville. 
Sorensen, J. (2002). Safety culture: A survey of the state-of-the-art. Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety 76, 189–204. 
Spector, P.E. (1992). Summated rating scale construction: An introduction. Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Stewart, A. (2014). Building a Safety Culture. White paper. Human Synergistics 
Canada. 
Suchman, L. (1987). Plans and situated actions: The problem of human-machine 
communication. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Tabachnick, B.G., Fidell, L.S. (2001). Using multivariate statistics, 4th edition. 
Harper & Row, New York. 
REFERENCES
421 
 
 Taylor, J.B. (2010). Safety culture: Assessing and changing the behavior of 
organizations. Gower Publishing, Farnham, UK. 
Tonn, J.C. (2003). Mary P. Follett: Creating Democracy, Transforming 
Management. Yale University Press, New Haven. 
Torres-Harding, S.R., Siers, B.P, Olson, B.D. (2011). Development and 
psychometric evaluation of the Social Justice Scale (SJS). American Journal 
of Community Psychology. 
Trierweiler, S.J., Stricker, G. (1998). The scientiﬁc practice of professional 
psychology. Plenum, New York. 
Tronea, M. (2011). Guidelines for Regulatory Oversight of Safety Culture in 
Licensees´ Organizations. Draft, rev. 8, Bucharest, Romania:  National 
Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN).  
Turner, B.A. (1991). The development  of a safety culture. Chemistry  and 
Industry 1, 241–243. 
Turner, B.A., Pidgeon, N. (1997). Man-Made Disasters. 2nd ed. Butterworth 
Heinemann, Oxford. 
Turner, B.A., Pidgeon, N., Blockley, D., Toft, B. (1989). Safety culture: its 
importance in future risk management.  Position  paper  for  the  Second  
World  Bank  Workshop  on  Safety  Control  and  Risk Management, 
Karlstad, Sweden. 
REFERENCES
422 
 
Utility Service Alliance and Human Synergistics (2004). Nuclear Plant Optimal 
Culture Report.  
Van der Velde, M., Class, M.D. (1996). The Relationship of Role Conflict and 
Ambiguity to Organizational Culture, in Organizational Risk Factors for Job 
Stress, Steven L. Sauter and Lawrence R. Murphy, eds., Washington, 
DC: American Psychological Association, 53-59. 
Van Wart, M. (1998). Changing Public Sector Values. New York/London: 
Garland Publishing. 
VandeWalle, D. (1997). Development and validation of a work domain goal 
orientation instrument. Educational and Psychological Measurement 57, 995–
1015. 
Verbeke, W. (2000). A revision of Hofsted et al.‘s organizational practices scale. 
Journal of Organizational Behavior 21, 287–602.  
Verbeke, W., Volkering, M., Hessels, M. (1998). Exploring the conceptual 
expansion within the field of organizational behavior: Organizational climate 
and organizational culture. Journal of Management Studies 35, 303–329. 
Vukotich, G (1996). Organizational culture: A view of the enculturation process 
and its relation to turnover. Information & Learning, Jun 1996. 
AAM9612436. 
Wahlström, B., Rollenhagen, C. (2004). Issues of safety culture; reflections from 
the LearnSafe project. In: Fourth American Nuclear Society International 
Topical Meeting on Nuclear Plant Instrumentation, Controls and Human–
REFERENCES
423 
 
Machine Interface Technologies (NPIC&HMIT 2004), Columbus, OH, 
September. 
Wang. C.H., Liu. Y.J. (2012). Omnidirectional safety culture analysis and 
discussion for railway industry. Safety Science 50, 1196–1204. 
Walton, R. (1987). Innovating to compete. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
WANO (2006). Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture, Guideline GL 
2006-02. World Association of Nuclear Operators. 
Waring, A.E. (1992). Organizational Culture, Management, and Safety. Paper 
presented at the British Academy of Management 6th Annual Conference, 
Bradford University, 14–16 September. 
Waring, A. (2015). Managerial and non-technical factors in the development of 
human-created disasters: A review and research agenda. Safety Science 79, 
254–267. 
Weick, K., Sutcliffe, K. (2007). Managing the unexpected: Resilient performance 
in an age of uncertainty. San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass. 
Wert, J. (1986). Safety culture at nuclear plants. An Unpublished Essay, as cited 
in O‘Hara, P. (2003). Nuclear Safety Culture: An Organisational 
Development Model. 
Westrum, R. (1993). Cultures with requisite imagination. In: Wise, J.A., Hopkin, 
V.D., Stager, P. (Eds.), Veriﬁcation and Validation of Complex Systems: 
Human Factors Issues. Springer-Verlag, New York. 
REFERENCES
424 
 
Widaman, K. (1985). Hierarchically nested covariance structure models for 
multitrait-multimethod data. Applied Psychological Measurement 9, 1–26.  
Wiegmann, D.A., Zhang, H., Thaden, T.L., Sharma, G., Gibbons, A.M. (2002). A 
Synthesis of Safety Culture and Safety Climate Research. Prepared for: 
Federal Aviation Administration Atlantic City International Airport, NJ. 
Wiegmann, D.A., Zhang, H., Thaden, T.L., Sharma, G., Gibbons, A.M. (2004). 
Safety culture: An integrative review. The International Journal of Aviation 
Psychology 14, 117–134. 
Williams, R.M. Jr. (1979). Change and stability in values and value systems: A 
sociological perspective. In: Rokeach, M. (Ed.), Understanding Human 
Values. Free Press, New York, pp. 15–46. 
Wilpert, B., Fahlbruch, B. (1998). Safety interventions in inter-organisational 
fields. In: Hale, A., Baram, M. (Eds.), Safety management (pp. 235–247). 
Oxford: Pergamon. 
Wilpert, B. (2001). The relevance of safety culture for nuclear power operations. 
In: Wilpert, B., Itoigawa, N. (Eds.), Safety Culture in Nuclear Power Plant. 
Taylor & Francis, London, pp. 5–18. 
Wilpert, B., Itoigawa, N. (2001). Safety Culture in Nuclear Power Operations. 
Taylor & Francis, London.  
Wilpert, B., Schöbel, M. (2007). Changes and Opportunities of assessing safety 
culture. Proceedings of the OECD-CCA Workshop on Human Factors in 
Chemical Accidents and Incidents, Potsdam, May 8–9, pp. 105-112. 
REFERENCES
425 
 
World Nuclear Association (2017). Retrieved 05.03.17 from http://www.world-
nuclear.org/nuclear-basics/global-number-of-nuclear-reactors.aspx 
World Nuclear Association (2016). Retrieved 05.03.17 from http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/uranium-resources/supply-
of-uranium.aspx 
U.S. Government. (2017). Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Sinks: 1990–2015 (published 2017). Developed by the U.S. Government to 
meet U.S. commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
Xenikou, A., Furnham, A. (1996). A correlational and factor analytic study of four 
questionnaire measures of organizational culture. Human Relations 49, 349–
371. 
Xu, D.L., Ruan, D., Yang, J.B. (2011). Supporting nuclear safety culture 
assessment using Intelligent Decision System software. Paper presented at the 
symposium on Computational Intelligence in Multicriteria Decision-Making 
(MCDM), Paris, April 11–15, pp. 67–72. 
Yule, S., 2003. Senior Management Influence on safety performance in the UK 
and US energy sectors. Doctoral thesis, University of Aberdeen, Scotland. 
Zohar, D. (2000). A group-level model of safety climate: Testing the effect of 
group climate on micro-accidents in manufacturing jobs. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 85, 587–596. 
REFERENCES
426 
 
Zohar, D., Hofmann, D. (2012). Organizational culture and climate. In: 
Kozlowski, S.W.J. (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Organizational 
Psychology, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. New York, pp. 643–666. 
Zohar, D., Luria, G. (2005). A multilevel model of safety climate: Cross-level 
relationships between organization and group-level climates. Journal of 
Applied Psychology 90, 616–628.  
Zwick, W.R., Velicer, W.F. (1986). Comparison of five rules for determining the 
number of components to retain. Psychological Bulletin 99, 432–442. 
 
 
  
REFERENCES
  
  
This page intentionally left blank
  
This page intentionally left blank
